Judgment :- 1. In these Civil Miscellaneous Petitions the question is raised whether a party could be impleaded in the Civil Revision Petition after the expiry of the period prescribed for filing the Civil Revision Petition. The Civil Revision Petitions have arisen from the order of the learned Munsiff of Palghat upholding the plea of the garnishee that the amounts in his possession which belonged to the judgment-debtor were already disbursed to him. The decree-holder who is the Revision Petitioner, sought to attach Rs. 200/- and Rs 300/- (Rs. 200 is covered by C. R. P. 617/68 and Rs. 300 by C. R. P. 610/68) which represented advance rent payable to the judgment-debtor but retained by the garnishee. But the garnishee contended that no amount was available with him and that whatever was due to the judgment-debtor had already been paid. This plea was accepted by the learned Munsiff and the prayer for attachment was rejected. It is against that order that the present Civil Revision Petitions have been preferred. But in the Civil Revision Petitions however, the petitioner omitted to implead the garnishee even though the garnishee is a necessary party to the proceeding. So, the above Civil Miscellaneous Petitions were filed to get him impleaded but the prayer is opposed in both the petitions on the ground that the Civil Miscellaneous Petitions having been preferred after the expiry of the time allowed for filing the Civil Revision Petitions are not maintainable. The Civil Revision Petitions were filed on the 20th of May 1968 but the Civil Miscellaneous Petitions were filed only on 9-7-1968. On the 9th of July 1968 the Civil Revision Petition, if had been filed, it would have been time-barred, This position is covered by authorities and the consensus of judicial opinion seems to be in favour of allowing the impleadment. In Girish Chander Lahiri v. Sasi Sekharaswar Roy (I. L. R.1906 Cal. - Vol. On the 9th of July 1968 the Civil Revision Petition, if had been filed, it would have been time-barred, This position is covered by authorities and the consensus of judicial opinion seems to be in favour of allowing the impleadment. In Girish Chander Lahiri v. Sasi Sekharaswar Roy (I. L. R.1906 Cal. - Vol. 33 - 329) it was observed: "The Limitation Act does not contract the power of the Court under S.559 of the Code of Civil Procedure to allow persons, who were parties to the proceedings in the Court below, but were not made respondents at the time when the appeal was presented, to be added as respondents, and it makes no difference whether an application is made by the appellant to bring in those persons as respondents, or the Court considers it necessary for the ends of justice that they should be added as respondents". 2. In Padarath Mahton v. Hitan Singh (AIR 1924 Patna 773) a Division Bench of the Patna High Court held: "There is no period of limitation provided for bringing parties to the suit upon the record in an appeal from a decision in that suit. Ordinary rules of limitation relating to appeals ought not to apply where in the course of an appeal the court finds that in order to do justice between the parties it is necessary to bring one of them who was a party to the suit upon the record in the appeal. An appellate court has power in second appeal to add as respondents to the appeal, persons who were parties to the suit in the original court but were not impleaded as respondents in the lower appellate court although the time in which the appeal might have been preferred as against them has expired." 3. An appellate court has power in second appeal to add as respondents to the appeal, persons who were parties to the suit in the original court but were not impleaded as respondents in the lower appellate court although the time in which the appeal might have been preferred as against them has expired." 3. In Swaminatha v. Gopalaswami (AIR 1937 Madras 741) it was held under similar circumstances that: "Even a person against whom the right of appeal has become barred can be added as a respondent under 0.41, R.20, Civil P. C." In Sham Lal v. Sultan (AIR 1961 J & K. 9 ) the Jammu and Kashmir High Court on a review of all the authorities have held: "Where the omission on the part of the defendants - appellants to implead as respondents the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiffs or the subsequently added plaintiffs was due to the error in the decree and the judgment which did not show these persons as co-plaintiffs such persons can be impleaded as respondents under 0.41, R.20 even after the period of limitation for preferring an appeal had expired. Further, the High Court has ample power under S, 151 to add a respondent to the appeal even after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for the appeal against him if in the peculiar circumstances of the case before it, it thinks fit to do so." 4. Under S.21 of the Limitation Act, " (1) Where after the institution of a suit, a new plaintiff or defendant is substituted or added, the suit shall, as regards him, be deemed to have been instituted when h: was so made a party: Provided that where the Court is satisfied that the omission to include a new plaintiff or defendant was due to a mistake made in good faith it may direct that the suit as regards such plaintiff or defendant shall be deemed to have been instituted on any earlier date." 5. Order 41 R.20 C. P. C. is in these terms: "Where it appears to the Court at the hearing that any person who was a party to the suit in the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, but who has not been made party to the appeal, is interested in the result of the appeal, the Court may adjourn the bearing to a future day to be fixed by the Court and direct that such person be made a respondent." 6. The position taken up by the learned counsel for the respondent is that S.21 of the Limitation Act can apply only to suits and not appeals or revisions, as according to him the definition of ' suit ' in S.2 (1) does not include an appeal or application. The power vested in the Court under 0.41 R.20 is discretionary and can be exercised by the court if it thinks it necessary that to do justice between the parties such a course has to be resorted to. " Though the law of limitation does not apply to an addition of parties by the Court of appeal under 0.41, R.20 of the Code, yet the power under that provision is discretionary and should not be exercised in all cases, for instance, where the party is extremely negligent. But if the court finds it necessary to bring a party upon the record of the appeal in order to do justice between the parties, the Court has ample power to do so irrespective of limitation even in second appeals. Ordinarily the Court will not allow" the addition of a necessary party after an appeal has become barred by limitation. In fact, it is difficult to conceive a case where the right of appeal does not become barred as against a party not impleaded by the time the appeal comes on for hearing for under the rule, be it noted, the action to be taken is at the hearing of the appeal. Even apart from the provisions of 0.41, R.20, the High Court has power under S.151 Code of Civil Procedure to add a respondent to the appeal even after the expiry of the period of limitation for the appeal against him, if in the circumstances of the case before it, it thinks fit to do so." (Mitra's Law of Limitation 8th Edition p. 387) 7. The conditions to be satisfied before a party is impleaded under 0.41 R.20 is in the first place, that the person must have been a party to the suit but not made a party in the appeal and ultimately that the person added is one interested in the result of the appeal. I think both these conditions are present in the instant case. Without the garnishee on record no effective order could be passed to afford relief to the decree-holder. The money according to the decree-holder is in the hands of the garnishes which is really due to the judgment-debtor and an order of the court directing the garnishee not to pay the amount to the judgment-debtor, cannot be passed without the garnishee himself is made a party to the proceeding. In my view therefore, this is a fit case where the discretion vested in the court under 0.41 R.20 is to be exercised in favour of the impleadment. When once the impleadment is found necessary in the interests of justice the question of limitation need not deter us because the necessity for the impleadment strikes the court only at the time of hearing and by that time in most cases the period allowed for filing the appeal or revision will be over. In the circumstances, the prayer for impleadment has to be allowed. I would, therefore, allow C. M. P. Nos. 6931 and 6932 of 1969 and direct the impleadment of the garnishee in both the Civil Revision Petitions. After impleadment the C. R. Ps. will be posted for hearing. Allowed.