JUDGMENT M.N. Shukla, J. - This reference has been made by the learned II Additional Sessions Judge, Ballia, against the order dated 8-3-1968 passed by Sri D. P. Srivastava, Magistrate, First Class, Ballia, in proceedings under section 145 CrPC. This reference is connected with Cr. Reference Nos. 539, 540, 541 and 542 of 1968. The facts of all these cases are almost similar but since there were different opposite parties there were different cases giving rise to these references. 2. The facts briefly stated are that on a police report dated 17-6-1965 in respect of certain agricultural plots situate in village Janger Mafi, police station Narhi, district Ballia, a preliminary order of attachment was passed on 7-7-1965 and the attachment was actually made on 22-8-1965. While the proceedings under section 145 CrPC were pending. both parties made a joint application on 13-5-1966 stating that a compromise had been effected between them and there was no apprehension of breach of peace. Hence, the Magistrate passed an order on 13-5-1967 dropping the proceedings under section 145 CrPC and releasing the property. It may be noted that the order did not indicate in whose favour the property was being released. In fact, the memo of attachment also does not clarify as to the party from whose possession the property was being attached and the release order did not contain any specific allegation in this regard. During the pendency of the attachment it appears some of the cultivatory plots attached were auctioned and the auction money was deposited in the court of the Magistrate. On 26-5-1967 the applicants applied for refund of some money deposited in court in connection with the initial auction of the cultivatory plots. The applicants prayed that the money be refunded to them. On the said application a report was called for and the record was also ordered to be put up. Accordingly the office placed the record and also submitted a report. On 16/17-6-1967 the Magistrate ordered for preparation of refund vouchers. This was done without notice to the opposite parties namely Sudarshan Gir and others. In consequence of that order the applicants withdrew the money through repayment vouchers on 8-8-1967. The opposite party Sudarshan Gir made an application before the Magistrate praying that the auction money kept in deposit in the Magistrate's court be refunded to him. This was done without notice to the opposite parties namely Sudarshan Gir and others. In consequence of that order the applicants withdrew the money through repayment vouchers on 8-8-1967. The opposite party Sudarshan Gir made an application before the Magistrate praying that the auction money kept in deposit in the Magistrate's court be refunded to him. On the same date the Magistrate passed an order directing the applicants to deposit the auction money back in court so that he may decide as to who was entitled to refund. Against this order the applicants went up in revision and agreeing with them the learned Sessions Judge has made this reference. 3. I have heard Sri D.S. Tewari in support of this reference and ' Sri Grisih Chandra who has opposed it. I have also been taken through the record of the case. The learned counsel opposing this reference made the follo-ing submissions. In the first place, it was contended that the order dated 17-6-1967 for refund in the applicant's favour was not actually an order for withdrawal of money in their favour. It merely directed preparation of refund voucher without indicating in whose favour the voucher had to be drawn up. Secondly, the order could only be passed under section 517 CrPC and since no incidental order finally disposing of the possession of the attached property had yet been passed, the matter was still pending and it was open to the Magistrate to deal with it and pass the order dated 8-3-1968 which was a valid order and should not be disturbed. Thirdly, the order dated 17-6-1967 was an exparte order, passed at the back of the present applicants and so the court had inherent jurisdiction to recall that order as there had been a violation of the principles of natural justice. Fourthly, S. 369 CrPC was not a bar to the passing of the impugned order, inasmuch as that provision of law was applicable only to judgments and not to orders. Lastly, it was contended that the opposite parties had withdrawn the money fraudulently and by misrepresentation of facts before the Magistrate. In this connection reference was also made to a previous order of the Magistrate dated 1-7-1968 which is not to be found on the file, and the allegation was made at the bar that that order had been secreted away from the record by the opposite parties. In this connection reference was also made to a previous order of the Magistrate dated 1-7-1968 which is not to be found on the file, and the allegation was made at the bar that that order had been secreted away from the record by the opposite parties. In these circumstances it was submitted that there was ample jurisdiction in the court to recall the previous order regarding withdrawal of money of the opposite parties. I am unable to accept these submissions of the learned counsel. 4. As regards the first point, the surrounding circumstances of the case and the recitals in the application of the present applicants dated 26-5-1967 leave no room for doubt that the effect of the order dated 26-7-1967 was that the money in deposit be refunded to the applicants. The direction for preparation, of refund voucher has to be read in the context of the applicants' own prayer. In fact, if the intention of the order was not to allow payment to be made to the applicants, it would have been hardly necessary for the Magistrate to pass the subsequent order dated 8-3-1968 and surely the Magistrate could not have overlooked the fact of the actual withdrawal of the money by the applicants. 5. As regards the second submission of the learned counsel it is true that the order dated 17-6-1967 could be passed under section 517 CrPC but I do not agree with his contention that this matter was not finally disposed of and was still open. The order for refund of the money in favour of a certain party completely disposed of the application of the applicants dated 26-5-1967. So far as the issue of refund of the money in deposit was concerned, it had been completely dealt with and no further order was required in that connection. There is power in the Magistrate even after he has passed the final order under section 145 CrPC to pass incidental orders regarding the disposal of the property or such things e.g. standing crops or money deposits made in court after the auction of the agricultural plots. The incidents l orders for the purpose of disposing of these subsidiary matters can be passed even though proceedings under section 145 CrPC may have come to an end. The incidents l orders for the purpose of disposing of these subsidiary matters can be passed even though proceedings under section 145 CrPC may have come to an end. In my opinion there was full jurisdiction in the Magistrate to pass the order dated 17-6-1967 regarding the withdrawal of the deposit money. The proceedings had terminated on the basis of the compromise application and if an application was made by one of the parties for refund of the money,there would have been nothing basically suspicious in such an application and the Magistrate did not commit any irregularity in passing that order after calling for a report from the office and perusing the record. Be that as it may, once an order was passed finally attached to it and the matter no longer remained open. 6. I am not impressed with the third contention of the learned counsel that the order dated 17-6-1967 was necessarily void on account of its being passed ex-parte. In fact, it might be ex-parte only in the sense that one of the parties was not present, but it was really an order on merits. As already pointed out by me, it was passed after the perusal of the record and the office report which had been called for. 'There, was in fact no violation of the principles of natural justice as such. It has to be noted that this order was passed in a case which had originally ended in a compromise between the parties and it could be presumed, unless the contrary was established, that one of the parties to the compromise was making an application for withdrawal with the consent of the other party. Hence, there was nothing irregular in the Magistrate passing the order at the time when he did on the material which was placed before him. There was therefore no violation of the principles of natural justice. Moreover, my attention has not been invited to any provision of law under which the Magistrate could recall the order after having passed it once. Recalling an order would necessarily involve a review of the previous order, which is not competent under the law. 7. There is absolutely no substance in the argument of the learned counsel that S. 369 CrPC does not apply to orders and is limited to judgments. Recalling an order would necessarily involve a review of the previous order, which is not competent under the law. 7. There is absolutely no substance in the argument of the learned counsel that S. 369 CrPC does not apply to orders and is limited to judgments. The principle underlying S. 369 CrPC is as much applicable to orders as to judgments finally disposing of the case. Any adjudication in whatever formal shape it might be embodied, whether in the shape of an order or a final judgment, has a sanctity about it which cannot be violated. Therefore, in my opinion it was not open to the Magistrate to review his previous order dated 17-6-1967. 8. So far as the allegation of fraud is concerned, I am of the opinion that the learned counsel was not entitled to raise that plea in this Court, though it was strenuously pressed by him. He did not lay any foundation for that plea in the courts below nor was any evidence led to prove this allegation. It would be trite to observe that the allegation of fraud has to be specific and categorical, giving all the material particulars of fraud and then it must be substantiated by evidence of an impeachable character. In the instant case the opposite parties never filed even an affidavit at any stage of the case alleging fraud. It was argued at the bar that the Magistrate had passed an earlier order on 1-7-1968 which had been secreted away from the record by the opposite parties. This is a serious allegation but I cannot take any notice of it without foundation being laid in the court below and in the absence of any evidence to substantiate it. If there was any truth in the allegation, it should have been proved and made at the appropriate stage supported by evidence and finding of the first court obtained with regard to it. Then alone it would have been possible for me to assess and scrutinise this allegation. No judicial notice can be taken of such a grievance merely on the basis of a statement made at the bar. In fact, what is very significant is that even the Magistrate in his order dated 8-3-1968 has not referred to any fraud being committed by a party. No judicial notice can be taken of such a grievance merely on the basis of a statement made at the bar. In fact, what is very significant is that even the Magistrate in his order dated 8-3-1968 has not referred to any fraud being committed by a party. He has not recorded a finding with regard to it at any stage of the proceedings for the simple reason that the point does not seem to have been canvassed before him and he was never asked to record a finding. 9. Thus, I do not find any substance in any of the arguments raised by the learned counsel who opposed this reference. In my opinion the order of the Magistrate dated 8-3-1968 was illegal and must be set aside. The reason for this view is short and simple . Once an order J or refund of money has been made, there is no provision to review the same. In fact, it has been held in numerous authorities that even when a supurdar misappropriates the money which he has come by in his capacity as such, it is not open to the Magistrate in proceedings under section 145CrPC to pass an order for the recovery of that amount. For that the suitable remedy would be either to file a regular civil or criminal action but in the proceedings under section 145 CrPC no order can be pissed for the recovery of that amount. See AIR 1955 NUC Allahabad 2649-Rameshwar Singh others v. Lakhan Singh and another and AIR 1953 Allahabad 341, Dulla v. The State. The proposition that a criminal court has no power to alter or review its order is covered by a Full Bench decision of this Court in Raj Narain v. State, (1959 ALJ 56 FB). 10. For these reasons I am of the opinion that the order dated 17-6-1967 passed by the Magistrate was neither improper nor illegal and the subsequent order dated 8-3-1968 was on the face of it illegal. 11. I, therefore, set aside that order and accept this reference and other references Nos. 539, 540, 541 and 542 of 1968.