S. Rangarajan, J. ( 1 ) THE appeal has been REFERRED TO to a large Bench by Dua CJ. (as his Lordship then was) with a view to reconcile certain previous decisions, which seemed to require reconciliation. ( 2 ) THE facts leading to this Regular Second Appeal may be briefly noticed. The Respondent 1s the owner of property bearing four Municipal Nos. 2337, 2359, 2360, 2361, two of which, namely, 2337 and 2360, are shops and the other two are residential premises, all of them situate in Ward No. XVI, Gali No. 14, Beadonpura, Karol Bagh, Delhi. It is common ground that prior to 1956 the annual house-tax for the entire property, comprising those four Municipal numbers, was Rs. 40. 00. It was raised for the year 1957-1958 to Rs. 75. 60 Paise. ( 3 ) A notice, Exhibit P. 3, was given on 6th October 1956, to the Respondent 1nforming him, baldly, that the previous value which, for the purpose of assessment, was Rs. 444. 00 was proposed to be raised to Rs. 840. 00. The respondent was required to inform the Assistant Secretary, Municipal Committee, Delhi, who had issued that notice under section 65 of the Punjab Municipal Act (3 of 1911), whether he had any objection to the same being raised. In his objections, the respondent stated that there were only two tenants, Kunja Lal and Prahlad Singh, occupying Nos. 2337 and 2360 respectively, on a monthly rent of Rs. 3/2/ (an obvious mistake for Rs. 3/8. 00) and Rs. 10. 00 respectively; the third tenant, Salig Ram, who was paying a monthly rent of Rs. 13/8. 00 for occupation of No. 2361, having vacated it (on 16th April 1956) under orders of civil court he (the owner) occupied that portion also in addition to the portion which had always been in his occupation (assessed at Rs. 10. 00 per mensem ). It was pointed out that there was no change in the tenancy for the past several years except that the respondent had got possession of No. 2361 through court since he required the same for his own bonci fide occupation. None-thc-less the annual house-tax was enhanced to Rs. 75. 60 Paise. The said order has not been filed or exhibited. Against the said decision the respondent preferred TO an appeal to the Additional District Magistrate, who is stated to have dismissed the appeal. None-thc-less the annual house-tax was enhanced to Rs. 75. 60 Paise. The said order has not been filed or exhibited. Against the said decision the respondent preferred TO an appeal to the Additional District Magistrate, who is stated to have dismissed the appeal. Even that order has not been filed or exhibited. ( 4 ) THE respondent thereupon filed a suit, on 26th February 1958, seeking an injunction against the Municipal Committee of Delhi from recovering the enhanced tax. Neither in the plaint, which is bald, nor in the written statement, which is devoid of particulars, have the above facts, which have been admitted, been fully set out. A plea was, however, taken in the written-statement that section 86 of the Punjab Municipal Act barred the suit. THE following issues were framed :- 1. Whether section 86 of the Punjab Municipal Act is a bar to the maintainability of the present suit ? O. P. D. 2. Whether the claim in respect of the house-tax at enhanced rate is illegal and arbitrary, as alleged ? ( 5 ) BOTH the courts below found that section 86 is not a bar to the present suit. The trial court found that the plaintiff had not succeeded in establishing his allegations concerning the illegality of the enhancement of house-tax and dismissed the suit on this ground. The appellate court reversed the finding of the lower court on this question, allowed the appeal and decreed the suit. ( 6 ) IN the Regular Second Appeal, filed by the appellant (directed to be heard by this larger Bench) Shri D. D. Chawla, learned counsel for the appellant, has taken us through the decisions cited in the order of reference, namely (1) of Dua J. in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Harnam Singh rendered on 18th May, 1966, when sitting on Circuit Bench as Judge of the Punjab High Court; (2) of the Himachal Bench of the Delhi High Court, rendered by Hardy and Deshpande JJ. in Vidya Prakash v. Municipal Committee, Simla decided on 14th October 1968); (3) of Dua and Tatachari JJ. in Messrs. Edward Keventers v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, New Delhi and (4) of Dulat and Pandit JJ. of the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench of Delhi, in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Dass. ( 7 ) WE shall now consider the aforesaid decisions. in Messrs. Edward Keventers v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, New Delhi and (4) of Dulat and Pandit JJ. of the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench of Delhi, in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Dass. ( 7 ) WE shall now consider the aforesaid decisions. In the case of Harnam Singh, Dua J. observed as follows : "from the various documents on the record produced by the Municipal Corporation, it is quite clear that the material on which the rate of assessment has been raised is disclosed to the parties concerned and it is not established that the asessment has not been revised in accordance with the statutory provisions. I may here point out that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Courts is, of course, not to be readily inferred and such exclusion must either be explicitly expresed or clearly implied. Even if the jurisdiction is so excluded, civil courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal. has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. In the case in hand, however, it has not been shown that there is any such infirmity in the matter of enhanced assessment. There is no excess or contravention of the power conferred by the statute. If there is any grie vance in regard to the erroneous calculation or erroneous determination of the increased tax then the aggrieved party must seek his remedy under the Punjab Municipal Act and cannot institute a regular suit, as has been done in the present case. " (Emphasis added) ( 8 ) THE actual decision in the case was there was no contravention of the statute in the mater of the impugned assessment in that case. No further question, therefore, arose as to whether in that situation a civil suit lay or not to question the assessment. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Das the following was stated:- "if a special jurisdiction has been conferred on a Tribunal in respect of a particular matter, it cannot exceed those powers. In other words, it has to function within the limits prescribed by the particular enactment. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Das the following was stated:- "if a special jurisdiction has been conferred on a Tribunal in respect of a particular matter, it cannot exceed those powers. In other words, it has to function within the limits prescribed by the particular enactment. The moment it exceeds those powers, the consequence would be that that order would be in excess of the authority conferred on it by the statute and, thus, the Tribunal could not be said to be acting under the Act and would be abusing its powers. In such a situation, the aggrieved party can seek relief in a civil court. If it is proved that the Committee was levying tax which was not permitted under the Act, the aggrieved party could not be debarred under the provisions of section 86 of the Act from seeking the protection of the civil courts. The remedy of an appeal or a reference against taxation provided in section 84 is merely confined to those acts which are within the powers of the authorities under the Act and the bar mentioned in section 86 also applied to such an assessment. " (*emphasis added) ( 9 ) IN the Edward Keventers case it was observed as follows :- "no violation of statutory provision going to the root of the jurisdiction of the statutory authority has been shown on behalf of the appellant, the only mistake alleged in our view being one in the lawful process of assessment within the Act. The assessment authorities do not seem to me to have travelled outside the Act while dealing with the assessment in question and the disputed assessment appears quite clearly to be within and under the Act, the possibility of mislake whether it is covered by one or the other provision of the Act notwithstanding. " (Emphasis added) ( 10 ) ON this matter, regarding the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court, the Supreme Court had occasion recently in Dhulabhai etc. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and another to sum up the approach to such matters. " (Emphasis added) ( 10 ) ON this matter, regarding the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court, the Supreme Court had occasion recently in Dhulabhai etc. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and another to sum up the approach to such matters. Hidayatullah C. J. observed follows :- "the result of this inquiry into the diverse views expressed in this Court may be stated as follows : (1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the civil court s jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil court would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil Court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necesary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions "in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. (3) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals. (4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challanged, a suit is open. A writ of certionari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit. (4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challanged, a suit is open. A writ of certionari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit. (5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected a suit lies. (6) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry. (7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply. " ( 11 ) PROPOSITION No. (1) is material for the present purpose. ( 12 ) IN the case of Vidya Parkash the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 were considered; it was held that the parties may according to that statute bargain and arrive at a contractual rent, according to the supply and demand for a particular building on a relevant time in the absence of any fair rent fixed by the Controller. This is totally inapplicable to the present case to which the provisions of Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act (38 of 1952) applied. Section 2 (i) defines Standard rent as follows :- "standard rent in relation to any premises means- (i) where the standard rent has been fixed by the court under section 8, the rent so fixed; or (ii) where the standard rent has not been fixed under section 8, the standard rent of the premises as determined in accordance with the provisions of the Second Schedule. " ( 13 ) THE Second Schedule to the said Act Part A (2) provides as follows :- "where the premises in respect of which rent is payable were let, for whatever purpose, on or after the 2nd day of June 1944, the standard rent of the premises shall be- (a) where the standard rent of the premises has been fixed by the Rent Controller under the provisions of the Fourth Schedule to the Delhi and Ajnier-Marwara Rent Control Act 1947 (XIX) of 1947, such standard rent; or (b) where the standard rent has been fixed by the court under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 8, such standard rent; or (c) in any other case, so long as the standard rent is not fixed by the Court, the rent at which the premises were first let. " ( 14 ) IT is thus clear that where the Court has not fixed the standard rent the rent at which the premises were first let would be the standard rent. Section 44 of the said Act, providing penalties for contravention of certain provisions of the Act, reads as follows:- "if any person receives any payment in contravention of the provisions of section 5, he shall be punishable with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to an amount exceeding one thousand rupees by the amount of unlawful charges so received by him, or with both. " ( 15 ) TURNING to section 5, contravention of which has been provided by section 44 (1), it is seen that there is a bar against claiming any rent in excess of the standard rent. The provisions of the East Punjab Rent Restrictions Act, which fell for consideration in Vidya Parkash, are thus totally different from the aforesaid provision in the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952. ( 16 ) EVEN before us it was not contended by Shri D. D. Chawla that no suit would be competent if the provisions of the Act were violated. In view of this stand we are relieved from the necessity of going, in greater length than what we have attempted, into the above said cases. ( 16 ) EVEN before us it was not contended by Shri D. D. Chawla that no suit would be competent if the provisions of the Act were violated. In view of this stand we are relieved from the necessity of going, in greater length than what we have attempted, into the above said cases. ( 17 ) THE simple question, on which the decision of this Regular Second Appeal would depend, is whether the Municipal Corporation was entilted to proceed on the footing that there had been any change in this case the result of such change being whether there was a reasonable possibility of the appellant getting increased rent from the premises ? According to section 3 (1) (b) of the Punjab Municipal Act the "annual value" in the case of any house or building, together with its appurtenances and any furniture that may be let for use or enjoyment therewith is the rent at which it may reasonably be expected to be let from year to year, subject to certain deductions. The criterion, therefore. is the amount for which the property may reasonably be expected to be let. If, in the present case, there was already tenant in No. 2361 paying a rent of Rs. 13/8. 00 per mensem that would be the standard rent. as per Schedule 2 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952 in the absence of any standard rent being fixed. Consequently. the Municipal Corporation of Delhi could not say that there could be any expectation of the same being reasonably let for anv higher rent. The occupation of the appellant of that portion after evicting his tenant residing in that portion could not lead to the inference of his being able to get a reasonably higher rent for it in the event of his letting the same. So far as the portion in the appellant s occupation throughout is concerned it would cause no difficulty at all because there was no change with reference to this position. ( 18 ) THE trial court is seen to have misled itself by approaching the question in the following manner :- "even taking the plaintiff at his own word there has been a change in the circumstances warranting a consequential change in the assessment of the annual value of the house for the purposes of house tax. ( 18 ) THE trial court is seen to have misled itself by approaching the question in the following manner :- "even taking the plaintiff at his own word there has been a change in the circumstances warranting a consequential change in the assessment of the annual value of the house for the purposes of house tax. One of the tenants has left the portion in his possession and the plaintiff himself has occupied that portion. It was therefore, incumbent upon the plaintiff to lead evidence to the effect that with this change in the circumstances, there has been no change in the annual rental value of his house in respect of which the assessment has been revised by the defendant. The plaintiff has not led any evidence in this behalf. The rent of the portion in occupation of the remaining two tenants has already been accepted by the defendant as correct. The plaintiff admitted in the course of cross-Examination that he did not disclose to the defendant the rental value of the portion of his own occupation nor has it been alleged much less pressed that he challenged the basis of assessment for the purposes of house-tax of the portion in his own occupation. In this suit also the plaintiff has not led any evidence on this point as to what should be the annual value of the portion in his occupation for the purpose of assesment of house tax. AIR 1920 Cal. 450 and 109 I. C 618 are the authorities for the view. "if the assessee does not adduce any evidence against the proposed assessment and fails to establish his case the proposed assessment should be confirmed. " The plaintiff having failed to adduce any evidence before the defendant in furtherance of his objections regarding the proposed enhancement of house-tax the proposed assessment had to be confirmed by the defendant under the circumstances. I do not think that the plaintiff has succeeded in substantiating his allegations of illegality in the enhancement of house tax by the defendant. The issue is decided against the plaintiff. " ( 19 ) IT may also be noticed that there is no ruling on page 450 of the AIR 1920 Calcutta 450, for the principle invoked by the trial court. In the other citation. Corporation of Calcutta v. Jalajbasini Debi, Sir George Claus Rankin CJ. The issue is decided against the plaintiff. " ( 19 ) IT may also be noticed that there is no ruling on page 450 of the AIR 1920 Calcutta 450, for the principle invoked by the trial court. In the other citation. Corporation of Calcutta v. Jalajbasini Debi, Sir George Claus Rankin CJ. , REFERRED TO to a still earlier decision in Corporation of Calcutta v. Keamuddin holding that the burden, in an appeal against the assessment, lay on the assessee to show that the assessment was wrongly made. ( 20 ) BUT this is not a case where we need be detained by any consideration of the burden of proof because no material of any kind was available before the Municipal Corporation for reviewing the assessment. As already stated, even the notice, Exhibit P. 3, was bald and entirely devoid of particulars. Falshaw CJ had occasion to criticise a similar notice in Kaviraj Khazan Chand v. The New Delhi Municipality. It is sufficient to cite the headnote :- "the intention of the law cannot be that inviting of objections from persons affected by the proposed increased assessments and the provisions for the disposal of such objections are to be a mere formality, and that the objection are intended to be automatically consigned to the waste paper basket in pursuance of a decision previously arrived at. The occupiers are entitled for the proper disposal of their objections to be informed of the formula on which it was proposed to base the new assessments both for the purpose of challenging its general validity and also its application in individual cases. " ( 21 ) IT is even unnecessary for the purpose of this case to be detained by Exhibit P. 3 being bald and devoid of particulars for it is not possible to hold that the appellant, in the event of his letting the portion, which was formally in the occupation of the tenant, could reasonably be expected to get any higher amount of rent than what he was paid, and which would be the standard rent. ( 22 ) SHRI D. D. Chawla REFERRED TO to the decision of the Supreme Court in M. M. Chawla v. J. S. Sethi and relied upon the following passage, while their Lordship were construing sections 4, 5, and 12 of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958:- "counsel says that by virtue of the provisions of ss. 4 and 5 recovery of rent by a landlord in excess of the standard rent is prohibited. But in our judgment the prohibition in ss. 4 and 5 operates only after the standard rent of permises is determined and not till then. So long as the standard rent is not determined by the Controller, the tenant must pay the contractual rent: after the standard rent is determined the landord becomes disentitled to recover an amount in excess of the standard rent from the date on which the determination operates. ( 23 ) WE are unable to agree that standard rent of a given tenement is by virtue of s. 6 of the Act a fixed quantity, and the liability for payment of a tenant is circumscribed thereby even if the standard rent is not fixed by order of the Controller. Under the scheme of the Act standard rent of a given tenement is that amount only which the Controller determines. Untill the standard rent is fixed by the controller the contract between the landord and the tenant determines the liability of the tenant to payment. That is clear from the terms of s. 9 of the Act. That section clearly indicates that the Controller alone has the power to fix the standard rent, and it cannot-be determined out of court. An attempt by the parties to determine by agreement the standard rent out of court is not binding. By section 12 in an application for fixation of standard rent of premises the Controller may give retrospective operation to his adjudication for a period not exceeding one year before the date of the application. The scheme of the Act is entirely inconsistent with standard rent being determined otherwise than by order of the Controller. By section 12 in an application for fixation of standard rent of premises the Controller may give retrospective operation to his adjudication for a period not exceeding one year before the date of the application. The scheme of the Act is entirely inconsistent with standard rent being determined otherwise than by order of the Controller. ( 24 ) THE question before the Supreme Court was entirely different; the discussion was in the context of an attempt to determine standard rent by agreement of parties without having the same fixed by the Controller besides, the present case is governed by the provisions of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952, Second Schedule, which clearly laid down that the original rent at the time of first letting was itself the standard rent for the purpose of the Act till it was varied by the Controller. The appellant, therefore, cannot derive any assistance from the above said observations of the Supreme Court. ( 25 ) IN the result the appellate Court was justified in striking down the enhancement of house-tax as not warranted by the provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.