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1969 DIGILAW 22 (PAT)

RANJIT SINHA v. IABHO DEVI

1969-02-03

U.N.SINHA

body1969
JUDGMENT : U.N. Sinha, J. This appeal has been filed by the plaintiffs and it arises out of a suit instituted by them for a declaration that a sale deed executed by Basdeo Prasad, defendant no. 14, dated the 12th July, 1957, in favour of the principal defendants was illegal, void, inoperative and not binding on the plaintiffs, and for recovery of the disputed property after redemption of a usufructuary mortgage dated the 19th September, 1949, executed by the said Basdeo Prasad and his brother, Brij Bihari Prasad alias Bhagwat Prasad, defendant no. 13. This usufructuary mortgage had been executed in favour of Rameshwar Prasad, defendant no.2. The plaintiffs have also claimed certain other ancillary reliefs. The suit was decreed in part by the trial court, and on appeal, the JUDGMENT : passed by the trial court has been affirmed. But, in view of certain circumstances happening after the institution of the suit, the learned Subordinate Judge had given certain additional directions, as he states, to cut short the litigation. 2. I do not propose to give all the facts in detail as I propose to remand the appeal to the court of appeal below and, therefore, only the necessary facts are mentioned below. The plaintiffs had alleged that defendants no. 13 and 14 were brothers, who had given in usufructuary mortgage 1 bigha 1 katha and 18 dhurs of land, which is the subject-matter of the present litigation, to defendant no. 2 for Rs. 800/- on the 19th September, 1949, and put the mortgagee in possession in the year 1963 Fasli. There was a partition between defendants no. 13 and 14 and the entire disputed land had fallen to the share of defendant no, 13, who sold the same on the 2nd July, 1958 to the plaintiff by two sale deeds, Hence the plaintiffs claimed to have the right of redemption, and according to them, they had tendered Rs 800/- to Rameshwar Prasad, and on his refusal, they had deposited the mortgage money in Court under Section 83 of the Transfer of Property Act, and on the mortgagee refusing to deliver possession, this suit had to be instituted, This appeal has been contested by defendant no. 3 and the substance of this defendant's case may be stated as follows: It was alleged that partition between defendants no. 3 and the substance of this defendant's case may be stated as follows: It was alleged that partition between defendants no. 13 and 14 had taken place in 1365 Fasli and in that partition the northern half of the disputed land had been allotted to defendant no. 14 and the sou them half had been allotted to defendant no. 13. According to the case of defendant no, 3, defendant no. 14 had sold his eight annas interest to defendant no. 3 on the 12th July, 1958. It was alleged that half of the mortgage money had been paid in the year 1959 to defendant no. 2 and it was later on alleged that the other half had been paid on the 15th May, 1963 during the pendency of the suit. Thus defendant no, 3 claimed to be in possession of the mortgaged land. 3. On the controversies raised by the parties, a number of issues were framed by the trial court and one of the points for determination was the genuineness or otherwise of a document marked as Exhibit 6. The trial court had not accepted the genuineness of this document and the court of appeal below has concurred in this conclusion and if there were nothing more, then this finding would have been a finding of fact. But, it appears from a perusal of the JUDGMENT : of the court of appeal, especially Paragraphs 18 and 19 of the JUDGMENT :, that, on such an important matter as to the genuineness or otherwise of a document produced in court, the Court of appeal below has not given its own finding based on the entire evidence on record, It appears that two handwriting experts had been examined in the trial court, who were P.W’s 2 and 25. This matter has been dealt with by the learned Subordinate Judge in Paragraph 18 of his JUDGMENT : and all that he has said is that the learned Munsif had correctly found that P.W. 25, whose evidence was in favour of the plaintiffs, was not an expert in h1ndwriting. For this reason, the learned Subordinate Judge has refused to differ from the conclusion of the learned Munsif with respect to the evidence of the hand writing expert examined as P.W. 25. For this reason, the learned Subordinate Judge has refused to differ from the conclusion of the learned Munsif with respect to the evidence of the hand writing expert examined as P.W. 25. On the other evidence adduced by the parties with respect to the genuineness or otherwise of Exhibit 6, all that the learned Subordinate Judge has stated in Paragraph 19 of his JUDGMENT : is that other evidence on the genuineness of this document is oral and cannot safely be relied upon. In my opinion, the conclusion of the learned Subordinate Judge on such a vital matter is not in accordance with law. First, in agreeing with the JUDGMENT : of the learned Munsif with respect to P.W. 25, it will appear that the learned Munsif had fallen into an error in reading the evidence of P.W. 25, when he stated in Paragraph 12 of the JUDGMENT : that P.W. 25 had admitted that he had never any occasion either to examine or to give opinion on any handwriting. Probably the learned Subordinate Judge had this in mind while stating in Paragraph 18 of his JUDGMENT : that according to the learned Munsif, P.W. 25, was not an expert in handwriting. But, what P.W. 25 had stated in his cross-examination was that so long as he was serving in the Fingerprint Bureau, he had no occasion either to examine or give opinion with respect to any handwriting. Apparently, P.W. 25 was a photographer attached to the Fingerprint Bureau for sometime. He had resigned in 1931. Therefore, it is clear that the learned Subordinate Judge has not considered even the evidence of P. W. 25 independently. Moreover, the actual evidence given on oath on the genuineness or otherwise of Exhibit 6 is more important than the opinion of handwriting experts examined during the pendency of the litigation, and the learned Subordinate Judge has not considered the oral evidence on this point at all. There is another aspect of the matter considered by the learned Subordinate Judge in Paragraph 17 of his JUDGMENT :. He has stated there that according to the case of the plaintiffs, the entire disputed land had fallen to the exclusive share of defendant no. 13 by Panchaiti, as shown by Exhibit 15 and Exhibits 6 to 6 (b). There is another aspect of the matter considered by the learned Subordinate Judge in Paragraph 17 of his JUDGMENT :. He has stated there that according to the case of the plaintiffs, the entire disputed land had fallen to the exclusive share of defendant no. 13 by Panchaiti, as shown by Exhibit 15 and Exhibits 6 to 6 (b). This case of the plaintiffs has been rejected by the learned Subordinate Judge for the reasons given in Paragraph 17. Here also, it appears that the learned Subordinate Judge ha~ not given an independent consideration of the plaintiffs' case at all. Even the learned trial Judge has mentioned in Paragraph 12 of his JUDGMENT : that P.W. 5 had admitted that the Panches had decided only the right to partition. The plaintiffs' case as given in Paragraph 7 of the plaint does not appear to be what the learned Subordinate Judge has stated in Paragraph 17 of his JUDGMENT :. Therefore, the final court of fact must decide the actual case of the plaintiffs made out in their plaint and supported by the evidence adduced in court in ORDER :to find whether their case can be accepted or not. The learned Advocate-General appearing for the appellant has contended that the entire approach made by the learned Subordinate Judge to the contest between the parties, as given in Paragraph 16 of the JUDGMENT : is erroneous. The contention is not without force, Point no. 1, formulated by the learned Subordinate Judge for decision was whether the story of partition between defendants no. 13 and 14 and the allotment of the disputed land to the exclusive share of defendant no. 13 was correct or not, and I do not think that the learned Subordinate Judge was right in holding that the suit had such a narrow scope that it was immaterial as to how and when the properties of defendants no. 13 and 14, besides the disputed land were partitioned. The plaintiffs had alleged complete partition between the two brothers in 1363 Fasli and the contesting defendants had alleged partition in the year 1365 Fasli. The learned Judge was also not right in stating in Paragraph 16 of his JUDGMENT : that the defence case of partition of the disputed land allotting the northern half to defendant no. 14 was not material. The learned Judge was also not right in stating in Paragraph 16 of his JUDGMENT : that the defence case of partition of the disputed land allotting the northern half to defendant no. 14 was not material. The entire case ought to have been looked into for a proper consideration of the actual point in controversy and it was not correct to confine the decision only to the question as to whether the plaintiffs case of exclusive allotment of the disputed land to defendant no. 13 was correct or not. Learned counsel for the contesting respondent has urged that the JUDGMENT : of the trial court was thorough and comprehensive and the learned Subordinate Judge need not have dealt with each and every point which the learned Munsif had elaborately dealt with for concurring in the findings of the trial court. I do not think that this argument can be upheld in this case. On all material points the parties were at issue and a point of far reaching consequence of genuineness or otherwise of a document had been raised. Therefore, it was the duty of the court of appeal below to have considered all the evidence on record for its own conclusion on the points which had arisen in the case. Learned counsel for the contesting respondent has further argued that the suit should fail in any event, as defendant no. 3 must be taken to be a trespasser, on the plaintiffs’ case, and, therefore, a mere suit for redemption was not maintainable. According to the learned counsel, the plaintiffs’ suit should have been for a declaration of title and for recovery of his possession and the present suit was not maintainable. This aspect of the matter was cot agitated in the courts below, and if it is agitated, I have no doubt that the court of appeal below will consider it on its own merit. In my opinion, this is a fit case for remand, and, therefore, the JUDGMENT : and decree of the court of appeal below are set aside and the appeal is remanded for re-hearing. Costs of this Court will abide the result. Appeal remanded.