JUDGMENT K. Sadasivan, J. The State has come up in appeal against acquittal in a prosecution under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (shortly stated the Act). The accused Secretary, C.W.C.C. Stores, Cannanore was prosecuted by the Food Inspector, Elayavoor Panchayat under S.16(1)(a) and 7(1) read with S. 2(1) (a) of the Act, in that he was found selling adulterated honey. The accused put forward the defence that the product in question falls under the category of "AGMARK" honey supplied by the Government of India and that the accused being not the manufacturer, they cannot be hauled up under the Act. The Analyst reported that the sample contained artificial invart sugar and as such is adulterated; but the learned Magistrate holding that, being an AGMARK product the quality is guaranteed and as such the accused who is the retail dealer cannot be convicted. They have accordingly been acquitted. Certain sanctity is attached to the AGMARK label covered by Instruction for the Grading of Honey under AGMARK'. Under Instruction 1.1, the grading and marking of extracted honey is to be done by parties authorised to do so under the Agricultural Produce (Grading and Marking) Act, 1937; General Grading and Marking Rules, 1937 and the Honey Grading and Marking Rules,1955. Under instruction 2.3, 'the marketing officer of the state concerned, shall make necessary enquiries and inspect the premises of the apiary, and the equipment for extracting pooling, sampling and filling honey, belonging to the party. With a view to determining the quality of honey produced or packed by the party, the inspecting officer shall take few samples of packed honey and send them to the Central Control Laboratory for analysis and report.' Under instruction 5.1' the Chemist shall individually subject each lot sample to the tests prescribed to see whether the honey conforms to the AGMARK specifications as given in Appendix III, in his laboratory.' Under instruction 7.1, "A grade designation mark consisting of the appropriate Agmark Label shall be applied only to such batches of honey, the lot samples of which have been found to conform to the specifications and after the honey has been packed in suitable containers and they have been securely closed.' All these specifications would show that to secure quality of the article, various precautions are taken at various stages of its manufacture. 'Grade designation' means 'a designation pre­scribed as indicative of the quality of any scheduled articles.' and 'grade designation mark' means a mark prescribed as representing a particular grade designation. 'Quality' in relation to any article, includes the state and condition of the article (vide Appendix 1). The authority responsible for the honey in question covered by Agmark specification, is the Ministry of Food and Agriculture as is seen from the schedule. Item 3 of Appendix III defines the quality in these terms: "The quality of honey indicated by the grades shall be as set out against each designation in columns (2), (3) and (4) of Schedule I. It shall also possess the physical and chemical characteristics as mentioned against each grade in Schedule II." And Schedule II gives the component parts of honey and they are: Special Grade A 1. Specific gravity at 27"C .. Not less than 1.40 Not less than 1.40% 2. Sucrose Content .. Not less than 5.0% Not more than 10% 3. Ash content .. Not more than 0.9% Not more than 0.5% 4. Moisture content .. Not more than 18% Not more than 20% 5. Total reducing/sugar .. Not less than 75% Not less than 65% 6. Fructose Glucose ratio .. Not less than 1.03% Not less than 1.% 7. Percentage of acidity (Calculated as formic acid) .. Not more than 0.2 Not more than 0.2 8. Fiches test .. Negative Negative 9. Animine Chloride test .. Negative Negative The standard prescribed for honey is given under item 07.03 under Appendix B of the Food Adulteration Rules, wherein it is stated: "Honey means the food derived entirely from the work of bees operating upon the nectar of flowers and other sweet exudation of plants. It shall not contain more than (a)25 per cent of moisture (b) 0.5 per cent of ash, and (c) 10 per cent of sucrose. The minimum reducing sugar content shall be 60 per cent." On a comparison of this standard with the normal physical and chemical characteristics of Honey to which grade marks may be applied as shown in Schedule II of Instructions for the Grading of Honey under Agmark shows that the quality is in no way inferior. The question for consideration is whether the accused is protected by any of the provisions of the Act. The question for consideration is whether the accused is protected by any of the provisions of the Act. Under S.19(2)(a) the present accused is protected since the articles is question is covered by a warranty indicated by the Agmark label on the seal. The form of the warranty as shown is Form VIA is to the effect that 'the warranty to be of the nature and quality which it purports to be.' Rule 12A regarding warranty is to the following effect: "Every manufacturer, distributor or dealer selling an article of food to a vendor shall give either separately or in the bill, each memo or label, a warranty in Form VTA. Provided that no warranty in such form shall be necessary if the label on the article of food or the cash memo delivered by the trader to the vendor in respect of that article contains a warranty certifying that the food contained in the package or container or mentioned in the cash memo is the same in nature, substance and quality and demanded by the vendor." On behalf of the State it is contended that the Agmark on the seal does not satisfy the requirements of a warranty as indicated in Rule 12. The argument is that since the Agmark seal does not contain the words, "same in nature, substance and quality as demanded by the vendor", the proviso to S. 12A will not apply. I do not think the argument is sound. The Supreme Court in dealing with this question observed, in Criminal Appeal 141/67 (Judgment dated 14th Aug, 1969 K. Ramanatha Reddiar v State) as follows: "It was contended before us on behalf of the respondent that the warranty must state expressly that the food mentioned in the cash memo is the same in nature, substance and quality as demanded by the vendor, and if these words did not exist in the cash memo, the proviso would not apply. We are unable to accede to this contention It seems to us that if the words in the warranty can reasonably be interpreted to have the same effect as certifying "the nature, substance and quality" of an article of food, warranty will fall within the proviso. The Act is of wide application and millions of small traders have to comply with the provisions of the Act and the Rules. The Act is of wide application and millions of small traders have to comply with the provisions of the Act and the Rules. The learned counsel for the state said that if they are not able to comply with the provisions they should stop carrying on their trade. But if the object underlying the Act can be achieved, without disorganising the trade, by giving a reasonable interpretation to Rule 12A, it is our duty to do so." In that case the language used in the cash bill was 'quality is up to the mark. According to their lordships of the Supreme Court this meant that the quality of the article was up to the standard required by the Act and the vendee. Their Lordships further observed: "Quality in this context would include nature and substance because the name of the article is given in the cash memo. It must be remembered that it is not a document drafted by a solicitor; it is a document using the language of a tradesman. Any tradesman, when he is assured that the quality of the article is upto the mark will readily conclude that he is being assured that the article is not adulterated." So also in the present case the 'Agmark' on the seal is an assurance to the purchaser of the quality of the article, that the article, the quality of which is as required by the Act and the rules. From the extract of the Instruction for the Grading of Honey under Agmark quoted above, it is clear that the quality of the Honey is guaranteed (vide item 3 of Appendix III.) The accused is, therefore, protected by S.19(2) of the Act. Against the maintainability of the appeal also, a point was raised by the learned counsel for the respondent. According to the learned counsel this is a case instituted upon complaint, and the complainant must apply for special leave under S. 417 (1) and such special leave having not been applied for, the present appeal preferred by the State is not maintainable. This contention is not correct. The Allahabad High Court in State v. Maiku Baideo Chamar (A.I.R. 1963 All. 486). This contention is not correct. The Allahabad High Court in State v. Maiku Baideo Chamar (A.I.R. 1963 All. 486). Observed is a similar matter: "On a reading of sub-sections (1), (3) and (5) of S. 417, Criminal PC together, it is very clear that the state government is given a right to appeal to the High Court against any and every order of acquittal passed by a subordinate court, regardless whether the acquittal has followed a police prosecution or in a case instituted upon a complaint, except where the acquittal has resulted in a case instituted upon a complaint and the special leave to file an appeal, as required by sub-s. (3) aforesaid, has already been refused by the High court. The State Government's right to file an appeal under S. 417 (1) is fetterd in such a case only and in no other." This view has been followed by the Rajasthan High Court in State v. kapoor Chand (A.I.R. 1967 Raj. 237). The learned Judge in that case observed: "The precise argument of the learned counsel is that this prosecution having been instituted on the basis of a complaint an appeal under sub-s(3)of S.417 of the Code of criminal procedure alone was competent. The learned counsel further sought support from sub-(5) of S.417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure when it says that in case an application under Sub-s (3) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal is refused no appeal from that order of acquittal shall lie under sub-s(1)." After quoting the Allahabad decision (cited supra) the learned judge continues: "The only limitation to this right of preferring an appeal against an acquittal is the one contained in sub-s (5) of S. 417 of the C.P.C. This limitation has a specific object. In a case instituted upon a complaint which ended is acquittal and the complainant seeks special leave to prefer an appeal the matter is examined and if such leave is refused sub-s (5) lays down that it shall not be open to the State to prefer an appeal under sub-s (1) of Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The reason is obvious. The court having once examined that the case was not fit for an appeal against acquittal it was not to be approached again for the same purpose. It is a safeguard against repetition of action. The reason is obvious. The court having once examined that the case was not fit for an appeal against acquittal it was not to be approached again for the same purpose. It is a safeguard against repetition of action. It is a limitation to prevent multiplicity of proceedings. Sub-s (5) of S. 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not support the contention of the learned counsel when he says that it is only a complainant in a case of acquittal who can come up in appeal by asking for special leave to appeal. This interpretation is supported by the language of sub-s (3) itself. The words used are "complainant may present an appeal to the High Court." It seems to me that sub-s (3) which has been introduced by the Amending Act of 1955 has enabled a complaint also to come up in High Court for preferring an appeal against acquittal and be not left to depend upon the discretion which the State Government in such a matter may or may not exercise. Excepting the fetter improved by sub-s (5) the state government has right to come up in appeal against an order of acquittal in any case. This objection of the learned counsel therefore has no force and is rejected. " In the present case also no special leave was applied for by the complainant. In the circumstances, the State can file the appeal under S. 417(1) of the Code. The present appeal, therefore is competent. For the reasons already stated, the appeal fails and it is dismissed.