JUDGMENT Gangeshwar Prasad, J. - This is a special appeal against the judgment of a learned single Judge of this court by which he allowed a writ petition filed by respondents Nos. 1 to 4 (hereinafter called the respondents) , quashed the orders of the Consolidation authorities in a proceeding under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act in so far as the orders related to the land of Khata No. 382 in village Kasela, Pargana Kirauli, district Agra and directed that the claim of the appellants to the said Khata shall stand rejected. 2. The facts leading up to the petition were as follows. The land of Khata No. 382 which consists of five plots was usufructuarily mortgaged by Darua, the father of Radhey Shyam and Saheb Singh appellants Nos. 1 and 2 and brother of appellant No. 3, to the respondents by a registered mortgage deed dated June 3, 1964. The mortgage was a self-liquidating mortgage for a period of 18 years commencing from 1354F. and ending with 1371F. In the records of the basic year the respondents were recorded as Sirdars of the land in dispute. Radhey Shyam and Latte appellants filed objections claiming that they along with Saheb Singh appellant were Bhumidhars of the land and stating that the entry in favour of the respondents was incorrect. The claim was based on the allegations that the land was Sir or Khudkasht of Darua on the date of the mortgage and that it was in the personal cultivation of the mortgagees on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting. The respondents denied the claim of the appellants and contended that they had become Sirdars of the disputed land by virtue of Section 14 (2) (b) and Section 19 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter called the Act) by paying to the State Government the amount required to be paid under the former provisions. The Consolidation Officer upheld the claim of the appellants only in respect of plots Nos. 1935 and 1945 of the Khata and ordered that the appellants be recorded as Bhumidhars and the respondents, who were held to be in possession, be recorded as Asamis thereof. The claim of the appellants in respect of the remaining three plots of the Khata was rejected. Both the parties filed appeals against the above order. 1935 and 1945 of the Khata and ordered that the appellants be recorded as Bhumidhars and the respondents, who were held to be in possession, be recorded as Asamis thereof. The claim of the appellants in respect of the remaining three plots of the Khata was rejected. Both the parties filed appeals against the above order. In appeal the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) found that all the plots of Khata No. 382 were Khudkasht of the mortgagor on the date of the mortgage and he ordered that the appellants be recorded as Bhumidhars over all of them. He further directed that the respondents be recorded as trespassers and not as Asamis. The respondents went up in revision, but the revision was dismissed by the Assistant Director of Consolidation. The respondents then filed the writ petition which has given rise to this special appeal. 3. The main question in controversy before the learned single Tudge was whether the rights of the appellants in the disputed land became extinguished on account of their failure to institute a suit for ejectment of the respondents under Section 209 of the Act, and his finding was that the rights did become extinguished on that account. It, however, also appears to have been contended before him that the finding of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and the Assistant Director of Consolidation that the land in dispute was Khudkasht on the date of the mortgage was not justified. The learned Judge assumed for the purposes of the petition that the land was Sir or Khudkasht on the date of the mortgage and proceeded to decide the main controversy. Since, in his view, the possession of the respondents became adverse to the appellants after the enforcement of the Act and the appellants lost their right and interest in the land by lapse of the period of limitation prescribed for a suit under Section 209 of the Act he allowed the petition, quashed the orders of all the Consolidation authorities and directed that the claim of the appellants shall stand rejected. 4. The question whether the disputed land was Khudkasht of the mortgagor on the date of the mortgage need not detain us. The correctness of the finding of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and Assistant Director of Consolidation on that question was not seriously disputed before us as, indeed, it could not be disputed. 4. The question whether the disputed land was Khudkasht of the mortgagor on the date of the mortgage need not detain us. The correctness of the finding of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and Assistant Director of Consolidation on that question was not seriously disputed before us as, indeed, it could not be disputed. The mortgage of 1946 in favour of the respondent was the second mortgage of the disputed land, the first mortgage under which possession was transferred to mortgagee having been made in 1929. A certified copy of the first mortgage deed was on record and the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) has observed that it showed that the land was Khudkasht of the mortgagor when the deed was executed. Under Explanation TI to Section 14 of the Act the date of the mortgage in Section 14 (2) (a) means the date of the first mortgage, and it is, therefore, obvious that the land was Khudkasht on the date of the mortgage within the meaning of the said provision. It is not in dispute that the land was in the personal cultivation of the mortgagees on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting. The result, therefore, clearly was that under Section 14 (2) (a) read with Section 18 of the Act the appellants became Bhumidhars of the land upon the enforcement of the Act. 5. We then come to the principal question involved in the case, namely, whether the rights acquired by appellants came to an end after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for a suit under Section 209 of the Act. We have first to examine how the Act affected the rights of a mortgagee with possession. Section 14 (1) provides that subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (2) a mortgagee, in possession of an estate or share therein shall, with effect from the date of vesting, cease to have any right to hold or possess as such any land in such estate. It will be noticed that the right that ceased by operation of this provision was the right or the Mortgagee to hold or possess the mortgaged land as such i.e. as mortgagee, but neither the mortgage debt stood discharged nor did the mortgage itself come to an end. It will be noticed that the right that ceased by operation of this provision was the right or the Mortgagee to hold or possess the mortgaged land as such i.e. as mortgagee, but neither the mortgage debt stood discharged nor did the mortgage itself come to an end. The debt secured by the mortgage still remained payable, the mortgaged property continued to be a security for the debt and the relationship not only of debtor and creditor but also of mortgagor and mortgagee was left subsisting between the parties to the mortgage-vide Section 6 (g) (i) of the Act. The mortgagee became certainly divested of his right to retain possession of the mortgaged properly, but from that it did not follow that if he still continued in possession his possession was that of a trespasser and adverse to the mortgagor. 6. A usufructuary mortgage, as its definition in Section 58 (d) of the Transfer of Property Act would also show, originates in an authorisation by the mortgagor in favour of the mortgagee that the latter would remain in possession of the mortgaged property, of which possession is delivered to him by the former, until payment of the mortgage money. The true legal character of the possession of the mortgagee is, therefore, permissive, although the permission granted by the mortgagor is of such a nature that it creates in favour of the mortgagee an interest in the mortgaged property and confers upon him a right to retain possession of it so long as the mortgage money remains unpaid. The facts that the mortgagee cannot be deprived of his possession by the mortgagor except in accordance with the terms of the mortgage and that a mortgage is a transfer of property do not make the possession of the mortgagee otherwise than permissive. We may observe that a lessee too like a usufructuary mortgagee cannot be deprived of his possession by the lessor except in accordance with the terms of his lease and a lease too creates an interest in property and is a transfer of property, but it is indisputable that the possession of a lea see is permissive. A usufrucutary mortgagee is holder of only a derivative and subordinate interest in the mortgaged property and his possession originates in a permission and is founded on it. Obviously,therefore, his possession is permissive. A usufrucutary mortgagee is holder of only a derivative and subordinate interest in the mortgaged property and his possession originates in a permission and is founded on it. Obviously,therefore, his possession is permissive. The matter needs no authority but we may refer to Mahendra Bahadur Singh v. Chandra Pal Singh, A.I.R. 1921 Oudh 124 and Sri Ram v. Thakur Dhan Bahadur Singh, A.I.R. 1965 Alld. 223 where the possession of a mortgagee was characterised and regarded as permissive. The position thus is that until atleast the enforcement of the Act the respondents were in permissive possession of the land in dispute, and the only question to be considered is whether their possession ceased to be permissive and became adverse thereafter. It was contended on behalf of the respondents that the cessation of the right of the respondents to retain possession of the land in dispute rendered them liable to ejectment under Section 209 of the Act and therefore it made their subsequent possession adverse to the mortgagor ipso facto. Reliance for this contention was placed on Smt. Prem Raji v. Jhungi Nath, 1964 ALJ 1109; Latta v. Ambika, 1968 ALJ 1133 and Badri v. Ram Pyare, 1968 Revenue Decision 507. 7. Let us first consider the provisions of Section 209 to test the validity of this contention. The section, it will be seen, does not use the words' adverse possession'. It, however, mentions the two essential ingredients of adverse possession in describing the nature of the possession which would make the section applicable. Confining ourselves to the case of a land in the holding of a person who has become a Bhumidhar under Section 14 (2) (a) read with Section 18, it is dear that the applicability of Section 209 depends upon two conditions: firstly, the person retaining possession must be doing so otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force; and, secondly, he must be doing so without the consent of the Bhumidhar. Now, the right of a mortgagee to continue in possession having come to an end by reason of Section 14 (1) , his retaining possession would certainly be otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force, but that alone would not attract Section 209, and the retaining of possession must further be without the consent of the Bhumidhar. Because of Section 14 (1) the Bhumidhar no doubt became free to withdraw his consent and to eject the mortgagee whenever he chose to do so and the mortgagee could not claim against him a right to remain in possession, but that did not lead to the result that if the mortgagee remained in possession his possession was necessarily without the consent of the Bhumidhar. A possession may be otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force and yet be with the consent of the Bhumidhar. Unless that possession is also without the consent of the Bhumidhar Section 209 would not come into play, time would not be set running against the Bhumidhar and the consequence laid down in Section 210 would not ensue. 8. Undoubtedly, a certain change in the nature of the legal rights of the Bhumidhar and his mortgagee was brought about by the Act but it could not have the ,effect of converting the permissive possession of the mortgagee into adverse possession. The mortgagee's right to be in possession in the capacity of a usufructuary mortgagee (the words's as such in Section 14 (1) may be noticed) certainly came to an end by the force of a statutory provision with the result that it became devoid of legal sanction and was rendered entirely dependent upon the consent of the Bhumidhar which would, thereafter, be revoked at will. The revocation had, to be a conscious and deliberate act of the Bhumidhar, and from the mere fact that the right of the mortgagee to remain in possession became devoid of legal sanction it cannot be concluded that the consent of the Bhumidhat stood automatically revoked. It is true that revocation of consent by a Bhumidhar, in a case where the person in possession of his land loses the right to continue in possession which was in its origin per-missive, need not take any particular form, and if a suit under Section 209 of the Act is filed by the Bhumidhar for the ejectment of such person that would itself be proof of and amount to revocation. But in the absence of any proof of revocation there will be a presumption of continuance of the consent so long as there is no denial by the person in possession, to the knowledge of the Bhumidhar, that his possession is permissive. But in the absence of any proof of revocation there will be a presumption of continuance of the consent so long as there is no denial by the person in possession, to the knowledge of the Bhumidhar, that his possession is permissive. Until such denial, the burden of proving which would be on the person in possession, his possession cannot assume the character of possession without the consent of the Bhumidhar and it cannot call for a suit under Section 209 of the Act. If all that was necessary for the application of Section 209 of the Act was that a person retained possession otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force the words "without the consent of a Bhumidhar" were wholly unnecessary. These words are, however, an integral part of the section and it may be observed similar words were used in the corresponding provisions of the U. P. Tenancy Act of 1939 (Sec. 180) and the Agra Tenancy Act of 1926 (Sec. 44) . These words lay down an additional and an equally essential condition for the application of the section. They would certainly be of little significance where a suit under Section 209 for the ejectment of the mortgagee has been filed and what is contended on behalf of the mortgagee is that at the time of the filing of the suit his possession was not without the consent of the Bhumidhar the consent of the Bhumidhar having become revocable by virtue of Section 14 (1) , it would be manifest from the mere institution of the suit that the consent has been revoked and no further proof of revocation would be necessary. Revocation of consent is implied in and really speaking means demand of possession. Institution of a suit for ejectment, thus, by itself, amounts to a revocation of the Bhumidhar's consent to the possession of the mortgagee. The words 'without the consent of the Bhumidhar' would, however, assume vital importance where the question to be decided is whether the right of the Bhumidhar became extinguished on account of his failure to bring a suit under Section 209 within the prescribed period. In such as case it has to be seen whether the Bhumidhar was called upon to bring such a suit and, if so, when. In such as case it has to be seen whether the Bhumidhar was called upon to bring such a suit and, if so, when. If the possession of the mortgagee was not without his consent the Bhumidhar was evidently under no necessity to bring such a suit and time could not run against him unless that necessity arose. It was open to him to let the mortgagee remain in possession and he was not obliged to revoke the consent and himself create a situation necessitating a suit under Section 209. 9. We now come to the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents. In Smt. Prem. Raji v. Jhungi Nath and also in Lalta v. Ambika the plaintiffs had become Bhumidhars under Section 14 (2) (a) read with Section 18 of the Act and had instituted a suit for the ejectment of the mortgagees under Section 209. The main grounds of contest in both the suits were that the mortgagees had acquired Sirdari rights by making the requisite payment under Section 14 (2) (b) and that a suit under Section 209 was not maintainable. In determining the application of Section 209 to the facts of those cases all that had to be decided was whether the possession of the mortgagees could be said to be otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force, It was held in both the cases that after the enforcement of the Act the possession of the mortgagees was otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force and they were, therefore, liable to ejectment under Section 209. It was further held that the mortgagees were not entitled to make the deposit provided for in Section 14 (2) (b) and it did not, therefore, confer upon them any right at all. Since the mortgagees were sought to be ejected by means of the suits the consent of the Bhumidhars obviously stood revoked and the mortgagees were retaining possession without the consent of the Bhumidhars. The second of the two conditions necessary for the application of Section 209 was satisfied by the mere fact that the plaintiffs desired ejectment of the mortgagees, and no question as to the existence of that condition was either raised or could be raised. The second of the two conditions necessary for the application of Section 209 was satisfied by the mere fact that the plaintiffs desired ejectment of the mortgagees, and no question as to the existence of that condition was either raised or could be raised. The learned counsel for the respondents sought support for his contention from the following passage in Smt. Preen Raji v. Jhungi Nath a passage which has been quoted in Lalta v. Arnblita: "Sub-sec; (1) of Section 14 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act had the effect of completely extinguishing from the date of vesting the right of d mortgagee in possession of an estate of share therein to hold or possess as such arty land therein. Retention of possession by such a mortgagee became altogether devoid of legal sanction from the aforesaid date and was manifestly otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force." This passage only explains the result following from Section 14(1) for the purpose of showing that the first condition for the application of Section 209-which was and could be the only condition in dispute in the above cases-was also satisfied. These cases do not lay down that irrespective of the fact whether a mortgagee continued in possession with or without the consent of the Bhumidhar time for the institution of a suit under Section 209 started running against the Bhumidhar from the date of the enforcement of the Act nor do they lay down that retention of possession by a mortgagee after the enforcement of the Act would necessarily be without the consent of the Bhumidhar. The learned counsel cannot therefore, derive any assistance from these two decisions. 10. Badri v. Ram Pyare is, however, a case in point and it supports the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents. In that case Satish Chandra, j. made the following observations : "Similarly where the land was Sir or Khudkasht of the mortgagor the mortgagor becomes the Bhumidhar. The possession of the mortgagee could not in the context of Section 14, be said to be with the consent of the mortgagor. The mortgagee could not be a licensee. His possession after the date of vesting would be per se adverse, either to the mortgagor-Bhumidhar or to the Gaon Sabha. He would be liable to ejectment. The possession of the mortgagee could not in the context of Section 14, be said to be with the consent of the mortgagor. The mortgagee could not be a licensee. His possession after the date of vesting would be per se adverse, either to the mortgagor-Bhumidhar or to the Gaon Sabha. He would be liable to ejectment. After the expiry of the requisite period of time he would become a Sirdar in view of Section 210 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act". With respect to the learned Judge, we are unable to agree with him in his view regarding the legal character of the possession of a mortgagee who has lost his rights to possession as such under Section 14 (1) of the Act. It is true that possession is prima facie adverse, which only means that the person in possession of a property is presumed to possess it not under any permission but as of right. This presumption, however, does not arise where the possession is permissive in its inception or, to put it in different words, this presumption yields place to the presumption that a possession which is permissive in its inception retains its permissive character until there is a clear and unequivocal repudiation of its permissive character by the person in possession and the repudiation is made to the knowledge of the owner. The principle is so firmly established that it does not appear necessary to cite decisions in support of it and we will only extract the following passage from Vol. 11, page 1314, of the Commentary on the Limitation Act by Chitaley and Rao (1965 Edition) : "Where possession is proved to be in its origin permissive, it could be presumed that it continued to be of the same character until and unless something occurred to make it adverse. The onus is on the permissive occupant to show when and how his possession became adverse. In order to discharge this there must be clear and affirmative evidence to establish the change in the character of possession. There must be an open and explicit dis approval and disclaimer brought to the knowledge of the owner." We think that this passage states the legal position correctly. 11. In order to discharge this there must be clear and affirmative evidence to establish the change in the character of possession. There must be an open and explicit dis approval and disclaimer brought to the knowledge of the owner." We think that this passage states the legal position correctly. 11. Badri v. Ram Pyare appears to be the only reported decision in which the exact question which we are called upon to consider has been dealt with and for reasons stated by us we are unable to concur in the opinion expressed in that case. There is, however, another case of this court which has an important bearing on the question and which lends support to our vies. That case is Biti Bal v. Tantya Singh, A.I.R. 1926 Alld. 136 decided by Sulaiman, J., (as he then was). The facts of the case were that five persons had made a usufructuary mortgagee. Three of them filed an application under Section 6 of the Bundelkhand Encumbered Estates Act requesting that the provisions of the Act be applied to them. In the written statement which they were required to submit they did not mention that mortgage at all and the mortgagees too did not prefer any claim. It was held in the above case that on account of the failure of the mortgagees to prefer a claim in the mortgage debt was discharged under Section 12 so far as the three mortgagors who had filed the application under Section 6 were concerned and further that the integrity of the mortgage was broken in respect of the interest of the said mortgagors in the mortgaged property. The mortgagees had however, continued in possession over the entire mortgaged property for over 12 years after the discharge of the debt to the extent mentioned above. The question therefore arose whether the possession of the mortgagees over that share of the mortgaged property which belonged to the aforesaid three mortgagors was adverse from the date of the proportionate discharge of the debt under Section 12 of the Bundelkhand Encumbered Estates Act. His lordship observed :- "The next question is whether their possession was adverse as against those whose share of the mortgaged debt was discharged. This, in my opinion is a mixed question of law and fact. His lordship observed :- "The next question is whether their possession was adverse as against those whose share of the mortgaged debt was discharged. This, in my opinion is a mixed question of law and fact. If the defendants have not asserted adverse possession to the knowledge of those proprietors, the 12 years' rule *of limitation would not apply because the plaintiffs are not suing for possession on the ground of dispossession within the meaning of Article 142. Even if the debt stands discharged, it does not necessarily follow that from that moment the possession of the mortgagees is adverse. It is true that under Section 18 he may be ordered to be ejected by the JUdge, but the liability to ejectment does not necessarily mean that the possession of the mortgagee is adverse. In many cases the mortgaged debt of a usufructuary mortgagee is discharged out of the usufruct and yet he continues in possession. It has never been suggested that his possession is deemed to have become adverse from the moment when his debt was paid off." In the instant case the mortgage debt remained realizable from the mortgaged property even after the enforcement of the Act and the observations quoted above, therefore, apply to it with greater force. Particular attention may be invited to that part of the above quoted observations where it had been said that the mortgagee's liability to ejectment did not necessarily mean that his possession was adverse. 12. We may here note that in setting forth what we consider to be the law in . the matter of presumption and burden of proof regarding permissive and adverse possession we have ignored the change introduced by the new Limitation Act (Act XXXVI of 1963) and have kept in view only Articles 142 and 144 of the old 1/4. Limitation Act (Act IX of 1908) . If the owner of a property brought a suit for possession against a person whose possession was in its inception permissive the provision that governed the suit was not Article 142 but Article 144 even though the person in possession had set up a claim hostiles to the owner prior to the institution of the suit. In such a case there was neither dispossession nor discontinuance of possession within the meaning of Article 142 and, consequently, it was Article 144 that applied. In such a case there was neither dispossession nor discontinuance of possession within the meaning of Article 142 and, consequently, it was Article 144 that applied. This matter is now beyond dispute in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Kesar Singh v. Balwant Singh, A.I.R. 1967 SC 457 where, dealing with the question of limitation raised in the case by the defendant appellant, their Lordships observed : "As originally the possession of the appellant and the other defendant was clearly permissive, there can be no question of the application of Article 142 in the present case and the appellant could only succeed if he could prove adverse possession under Article 144 for over 12 years." We may only mention here that Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act of 1963 have left no room for the controversy which frequently arose regarding the respective scope of Article 142 and 144 of the limitation Act of 1908, and Article 65 of the new Act applied to all suits for possession of immovable property based on title with the result that even if the possession of a defendant in a suit governed by the new Act was not permissive in origin he will have to prove, adverse possession for over 12 years in order to establish that the plaintiff has lost his right to the property. 13. From the above discussion it follows that the possession of the respondents in the instant case will be presumed to have been permissive unless it is shown by them that they explicitly and to the knowledge of the appellants denied that it was permissive. It was not disputed by the learned counsel for the respondents that the established legal principles relating to adverse and permissive possession have to be borne in mind in interpreting the provisions of the Act, and, we may note, they have been constantly applied in the case of tenancies under statutes preceding the Act and to tenures under the Act. The principle that possession is prima facie adverse-which was regarded by the learned Judge who decided the case of Badri v. Ram Pyare as supporting the view taken by him-is itself one of such principles of general application. The principle that possession is prima facie adverse-which was regarded by the learned Judge who decided the case of Badri v. Ram Pyare as supporting the view taken by him-is itself one of such principles of general application. Stated in terms of Sections 209 and 210 of the Act the position, therefore, is that possession of a Bhumidhar's land originating in his consent will be presumed to have continued with his consent and if it is asserted that the rights of the Bhumidhar in the land became extinct under Section 210 the burden will be upon the person making that assertion to show that the person in possession explicitly and to the knowledge of the Bhumidhar, repudiated that he was in possession with the Bhumidhar's consent and the period of limitation prescribed for a suit under Section 209 has elapsed since the repudiation. 14. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that in the instant case there was proof of the fact that the respondents' asserted that they were in possession in their own right (amounting to a denial that the possession was permissive) and also of the fact that the appellants had withdrawn their consent to the continuance of the respondents' possession after the enforcement of the Act. It appears that the respondents, purporting to act under Section 14 (2) (b) of the Act, deposited a sum equal to five times the rent payable for the land in dispute and the deposit was accepted by the State Government in December 1952. In view of the fact that the land was Khudkasht of the appellants on the date of the mortgage the respondents were not entitled to avail of the benefit of Section 14 (2) (b) and the acceptance of the deposit by the State Government conferred no right whatsoever upon them. Smt. Prem Raji v. Jhungi Nath and Lalta v. Ambika may be seen in this connection. There is nothing to indicate what assertion, if any, respecting their right to make the deposit was made by the respondents. But assuming that there was an assertion which amounted to a denial of the permissive nature of their possession, the possession of the respondents could not, as we have said above, become adverse or, to use the phraseology of Section 209, without the consent of the appellants unless the assertion had been made to the knowledge of the appellants. But assuming that there was an assertion which amounted to a denial of the permissive nature of their possession, the possession of the respondents could not, as we have said above, become adverse or, to use the phraseology of Section 209, without the consent of the appellants unless the assertion had been made to the knowledge of the appellants. Section 14 (2) does not require any notice to the mortgagor nor is there any finding of the Consolidation authorities or evidence to the effect that the appellants were made aware of the claim made by the respondents or even of the deposit. It cannot, therefore, be held that the possession of the respondents became adverse in 1952 and limitation for the institution of a suit under Section 209 of the Act started running from then. To show that the appellants had revoked their consent our attention was drawn by the learned counsel for the respondents to a copy of the plaint in a suit for possession of the land in dispute filed by Radhey Shyam appellant in the Civil Court. This document is on the record of the consolidation proceedings which was sent for by us. The suit appears to have been filed on March 6, 1964 and since consolidation proceeding started early in 1965 the suit was stayed. In paragraph 3 of the plaint it was stated that on July 1, 1952 (when the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act came into force) the defendants Nos. 1 to 4 (respondents in this appeal) lost their right and the plaintiff (Radhey Shyam appellant) and defendant No. 5 (Saheb Singh appellant) became entitled to take possession of the property in suit. This paragraph, therefore, only states the legal position which Section 14 read with Section 18 of the Act brought about. The respondents certainly lost their right to remain in possession and Radhey Shyam and Saheb Singh appellants became naturally and also under the specific provision made in that behalf in Section 18 entitled to take possession. But, as we have already said, this was not sufficient for making the possession of the respondents adverse unless the possession was also without the consent of the appellant. But, as we have already said, this was not sufficient for making the possession of the respondents adverse unless the possession was also without the consent of the appellant. The question thus is as to when, according to the plaint, the consent was revoked; and for that we have to go to paragraph 6 where it is stated that the cause of action for the suit arose on January 31, 1964 when possession was demanded but not given by the respondents. On the plaint allegation, therefore, it was not until January 31, 1964 that the consent was revoked and the possession of the respondents became adverse. We may here note that 1371F., by the end of which the period of the mortgage was to expire, ended on June 30, 1964. The revocation of the consent was thus alleged to have been made six months prior to the expiry of the period for which the mortgage was created. That does not, however, matter because Radlity Shyam appellant had the right to revoke his consent whenever he chooses to do so. We must also observe in this connection that Radhey Shyam alone was the plaintiff in the above suit, and he alone had signed the plaint. The statement made by Radhey Shyam cannot therefore be used as an admission against Saheb Singh and Latte respondents. Irrespective of the question whether the appellants were members of a joint family or not and irrespective also of the position of Radhey Shyam in that family in case it was joint, they held the land in suit only as co-Bhumidhars vide Ram Awalamb v. Jata Shanker, 1968 ALJ 1108 FB, and the statement made in the plaint could, therefore, be used as an admission only against Radhey Shyam appellant unless it appears that he also acted as an agent for the other co-Bhumidhars. There is nothing to indicate such agency. It may be noted that Latte was not even a defendant in that suit, and he was not alleged to be a co-Bhumidhar. Quite apart from this consideration, however, even according to the plaint limitation for a suit for ejectment of the respondents did not start earlier than January 31, 1964 and it is not disputed that if that was so the right of the appellants in the disputed land did not become extinguished as proceedings for consolidation started in 1965. 15. Quite apart from this consideration, however, even according to the plaint limitation for a suit for ejectment of the respondents did not start earlier than January 31, 1964 and it is not disputed that if that was so the right of the appellants in the disputed land did not become extinguished as proceedings for consolidation started in 1965. 15. We thus find that there is a total absence of any evidence of withdrawal of consent by the appellants-at least prior to January 31, 1964-or of any repudiation of the permissive nature of their possession by the respondents to the knowledge of the appellants on the other hand the circumstances of the case and the very nature of the legal relationship between the parties suggest that the appellants did not withdraw their consent and the respondents remained in permissive possession even after the enforcement of the Act. There is abundant authority for the view that the circumstances attending a possession and the relationship between the owner and the person in possession may by themselves show that the possession is permissive and it is not always necessary that permission should be expressed. We may only refer to Maqbul Ahmad v. Farhat Ati, A.I.R. 1922 Oudh 152 in which Wazir Hasan, A. J. C. (as he then was) held : "permissive possession does not rest barely on an expressed agreement by means of which one party permits another to take possession of his property. It is a question of legal inference from the circumstances of a particular case." And if permissive character of a possession may be inferred from. circumstances even though there is no direct evidence that the possession started under a permission, its continuance may certainly be inferred from circumstances where the origin of the possession is admittedly permissive or positively proved to be so. Let us now see the circumstances. 16. The mortgage in favour of the respondents was a self-liquidating mortgage and a considerable portion of the mortgage money was still due and realizable when the Act came into force. Even if the respondents had no legal right to tontine in possession as usufructuary mortgagees the continuance of their possession was still to be for the benefit of the appellants as it was to go towards the liquidation of the mortgage debt. Even if the respondents had no legal right to tontine in possession as usufructuary mortgagees the continuance of their possession was still to be for the benefit of the appellants as it was to go towards the liquidation of the mortgage debt. The question whether there had to be an accounting in regard to the profits of the mortgaged property for the period during which the respondents were in possession prior to the enforcement of the Act or there had to be a proportionate reduction of the mortgage money on the basis of mere duration irrespective of the profit was difficult to decide, and what portion of the mortgage money should be regarded as paid was not, therefore, easily ascertainable. If it has to be presumed, as we were asked by the learned counsel for the respondents to presume, that the appellants became aware of the change in the legal position introduced by the Act it would also be reasonable to infer that the appellants thought that the mortgage debt should be paid up by allowing the respondents to remain in possession for the unexpired period of the mortgage and legal proceedings for the realisation of the mortgage money by sale of the mortgaged property should be obviated. In our opinion the circumstances too indicate that the appellants did not withdraw their permission and the possession of the respondents therefore, continued to be permissive. We should not be understood to mean that the legal position would have been different if the mortgage in favour of the respondents were not a self-liquidating mortgage. Even if the mortgage in their favour had not been a self-liquidating mortgage their possession would still have been only permissive in spite of the fact that their right to possession came to an end under Section 14 (1) of the Act. We have mentioned the above circumstances simply to show that they reinforce the conclusion reached by us as to the nature of the respondents' possession. 17. The result of the above discussion may be summarised as follows. The possession of the respondents over the land in dispute was permissive in its origin and it will be presumed that it continued to be permissive even after the enforcement of the Act. 17. The result of the above discussion may be summarised as follows. The possession of the respondents over the land in dispute was permissive in its origin and it will be presumed that it continued to be permissive even after the enforcement of the Act. The right of the respondents to remain' in possession as usufructuary mortgagees certainly ceased on account of Section 14 (1) of the Act and the appellants were thus released from the obligation of allowing the respondents to continue in possession for the period for which the mortgage was created. The possession of the respondents was not, however, on that account converted into adverse possession. Their possession after the enforcement of the Act was in the nature of the possession of a licensee using the word 'licensee' in the broad legal sense of a person whose possession has originated in and is based on a permission. Since the possession of the respondents was not without the consent of the appellants it was not necessary for the appellants to have filed a suit for the ejectment of respondents under Section 209 of the Act, and time did not start running against them at least till January 31, 1964, the date of demand of possession mentioned in the plaint referred to above. The rights of the appellants in the land in dispute before us did not, therefore, become extinguished under Section 210 of the Act and the orders passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and the Assistant Director of Consolidation were thus quite correct and proper. 18. The Special Appeal is accordingly allowed, the judgment of the learned single Judge is set aside and the writ petition filed by the respondents is dismissed. The parties shall, however, bear their own costs of the Special Appeal as also of the proceedings before the learned single