JUDGMENT V. Balakrishna Eradi, J. 1. On 1st August 1969 the 1st respondent, namely the District Collector and Additional District Magistrate (Independent), Kozhikode passed the proceedings evidenced by Ext. P-23 in purported exercise of his powers under section 27 of the Kerala Police Act, 1960 (Act 5 of 1961), hereinafter referred to as the Act, ordering that the dam site and its appurtenances of the Kuttiadi Hydro-electric Project Area described in the schedule appended to the order shall be taken possession of with all the improvements, buildings, other structures, etc., and declaring simultaneously that they were accordingly taken possession of temporarily until further orders, excluding all persons there from and prohibiting the entry of any one into the site except the officials of the Kerala State Electricity Board and the persons duly authorised by them. The validity of the said order is under challenge in this writ petition. 2. The petitioner before this court is a contractor to whom the 5th respondent, namely the Kerala State Electricity Board, had entrusted the work of construction of the Kuttiadi dam as per a contract entered into between the parties on 21st April 1964. Although, under the terms of the agreement the work was to be completed within 525 working days, which period admittedly expired on 22nd October 1966, only a portion of the work could be carried out by that date. Since the Kerala State Electricity Board was apparently satisfied that the contractor could not be held solely responsible for the delay and that the circumstances which led to the delay were beyond the control of the Board and the contractor (see Ext. P-24), a further agreement was executed between the parties on 15th July 1967 where under the petitioner himself was entrusted with the task of carrying out the remaining portion of the work on the dam so as to complete it on or before 31st May 1969, the rates fixed under this agreement in respect of the various items of work being higher than those allowed under the original agreement dated the 21st April 1964. Disputes appear to have arisen between the contracting parties by about April 1968. Disputes appear to have arisen between the contracting parties by about April 1968. Some of the letters and notices that passed between them have been produced and marked before this court and they disclose that while the contractor was complaining that there was failure on the part of the Board in effecting timely supply of compressed air, electric power, cement, detonators, crushed sand, etc., which had been agreed to be supplied by the Board and that huge loss was being caused to him by reason of the delay in making such supplies and also on account of the strike of the non-muster-rolls employees, C.L.R. workmen and the work establishment staff of the Kerala State Electricity Board, the Board stoutly denied any liability to compensate the contractor for interruptions in power supply, breakdown in compressed air supply and delay in erection or breakdown of sand processing plants. The Board also repudiated the contractor's claim for compensation for alleged loss caused to him on account of the strikes resorted to by its employees and asserted that the circumstance that there was such a strike would not justify any stoppage of the work on the part of the contractor. By the notice Ext. P-3, dated 22nd April 1968 sent to the Chief Engineer of the Board the petitioner informed the Board that by reason of the strike resorted to by the work establishment staff of the Board with effect from the 14th of that month the petitioner was being compelled to keep his large labour force idle and that unless the Board issued a stoppage order the petitioner will have to incur a daily loss amounting to between Rs. 10,000 and Rs. 15,000. It was further stated in the notice that unless a reply was received from the Board within ten days it will be taken that the Board was not amenable to accede to the contractor's request to compensate him for the loss that he may sustain on account of the circumstances pointed out in Ext. P-3 and he would have to take further steps accordingly. The Board sent a reply to the notice Ext. P-3 only after a lapse of more than four months see Ext. P-4, dated 13th September 1968. In the meantime, the contractor stopped further work on the project. Ultimately, by the communication Ext. P-3 and he would have to take further steps accordingly. The Board sent a reply to the notice Ext. P-3 only after a lapse of more than four months see Ext. P-4, dated 13th September 1968. In the meantime, the contractor stopped further work on the project. Ultimately, by the communication Ext. P-10 addressed to the petitioner by the Engineer (Civil), Kerala State Electricity Board dated the 15th October 1968, the petitioner was informed that the contract in his favour was thereby terminated and he was called upon to leave the work site and to direct his staff, servants and workmen also to do likewise so that the further work on the project could be continued by the Board or by such agency as will be decided by it. The petitioner sent a reply Ext. P-11, dated 26th October 1968 stating that the Board had no right to terminate his contract and that he was not prepared to comply with the direction in Ext. P-10 that himself, his staff, Servants and workmen should leave the work site. He denied having committed any breach of contract and charged the Board with the entire responsibility for the deadlock in the matter of construction of the dam. He claimed that an amount of Rs. 54,00,000 was due to him from the Board and made it clear that any attempt on the part of the Board to take possession of the materials, tools and other properties belonging to him and situated on the dam-site would be treated as an encroachment of his rights and would be resisted. The Chief Engineer of the Board sent a further notice to the petitioner as per Ext. P-13, dated 27th November 1968 repudiating the petitioner's contentions and asserting that the contract had been validly terminated. He again called upon the contractor to leave the work site together with his workmen so that the work on the dam may be continued by the Board or its contractors without any hindrance or obstruction by the petitioner or his agents. The petitioner was given five days time from the receipt of the letter to comply with the said demand. The petitioner was given five days time from the receipt of the letter to comply with the said demand. He was further informed that the Executive Engineer, Kuttiadi Construction Division, had been given peremptory orders to take an inventory of the materials, tools, etc., belonging to him which were kept on the site and to take measurements of the work done by the petitioner subsequent to the date on which measurements had been last taken and also to assess the entire work executed by him after award of the contract. Ext. P-13 wound up by stating that steps were also being taken by the Board to invite tenders for the balance work and that if it was ultimately found after the completion of the balance work by grant of contract as per such tenders that the Board had been put to loss the petitioner would be liable for all such loss. A tender notification, dated 12th December 1968 appears to have been subsequently published by the Board in the newspaper "Keralakaumudi" on 21st December 1968. This was countered by the petitioner by causing a notice to be published in the "Indian Express" as well as in the "Keralakaumudi" (Ext. P-15) intimating all concerned that the contract for the construction of the Kuttiadi dam entered into as between himself and the Kerala State Electricity Board was still subsisting and had not been validly terminated, that the partly completed dam, the dam-site and the project area measuring in all nearly 15 square miles in extent were in his absolute possession and control for the purpose of execution of the work so entrusted to him, that the action taken by the Board to invite tenders for execution of the balance work on the dam was a nullity and would not be binding on him and that any person who tenders for the work in response to the Board's notification would be doing, so at his risk. 3. On account of the disputes between the petitioner and the Board and, more particularly, the petitioner's claim that the contract had not been validly terminated and that he was in lawful occupation of the dam site and work area, the Board seems to have found it difficult to get the remaining work executed through the agency of any other contractor or even departmentally. Based on his stand that the contract in his favour had not been validly terminated, the petitioner was asserting that he was in lawful occupation of the dam site and the Engineering staff deputed for work on the spot reported to the Board that it was not possible for them to carry out even the work of taking the measurements on account of obstruction from the contractor's men. The petitioner's advocate wrote to the Chief Engineer of the Board on the 24th May, 1969 as per Ext. R-45 informing the latter that the petitioner was in possession of the dam and the dam site, that large quantities of materials belonging to the petitioner were spread all over the work area, that the petitioner was keeping an establishment at the dam-site to look after his properties and assets, and that he will complete the work on the dam by himself and hand back possession of the dam and the dam site only after the fulfilment of the entire contract. He complained that the Chief Engineer of the Board had made three attempts to take forcible possession of the dam site including the articles belonging to the petitioner and contended that except by taking action to evict him in accordance with due process of law the Board or its officers had no right to forcibly take possession of the dam site or to interfere with his occupation thereof. It was further staged in this notice that any attempt on the part of the Board's officers to "trespass" on the dam site and to forcibly dispossess the petitioner's men therefrom would be strongly resisted and that the Board will be responsible for the consequences emanating therefrom. 4. By his letters evidenced by Ext. R-46, dated 10th June 1969, Ext. R-48, dated 27th June 1969 and Ext. R-47, dated 12th July 1969, the Superintending Engineer, Civil Circle, Trichur informed the (1st respondent) about the difficulties experienced by the Board's officers in the matter of resumption of the work on the dam on account of the obstruction by the contractor's workmen and requested that necessary police protection may be provided so as to enable the Executive Engineer to carry out the works without hindrance. Pursuant to these representations the 1st respondent deputed the Revenue Divisional Officer, Kozhikode (2nd respondent) to visit the spot and make enquiries about the matter complained against by the Board's officers. Pursuant to these representations the 1st respondent deputed the Revenue Divisional Officer, Kozhikode (2nd respondent) to visit the spot and make enquiries about the matter complained against by the Board's officers. The 1st respondent has passed the impugned order Ext. P-23, dated 1st August 1969 under section 27 of the Act on the basis of the information contained in the two communications addressed to him by the Superintending Engineer evidenced by Exts. R-46 and R-47 and also on the contents of the report Ext. R-1, dated 1st August 1969 submitted to him by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Kozhikode (2nd respondent). 5. I have narrated at some length the fact forming the background for the passing of the impugned order Ext. P-23 in so far as they are necessary for a proper understanding of the contentions advanced before me by both sides, which I shall presently proceed to discuss. 6. Although the writ petition contains a prayer for the issuance of writ of mandamus or other appropriate order or direction to respondents 5 and 6 to settle the petitioner's claims based on the contract and to afford to him the opportunity to complete the construction of the Kuttiadi Dam, counsel appearing for the petitioner stated during his arguments that he is not pressing this prayer and that the petitioner proposes to resort to other appropriate proceedings for enforcement of his claims under the contract. Without prejudice to the petitioner's rights to institute such other action as he may be advised, for the adjudication of whatever claims he may have against respondents 5 and 6 based on the contract, the relief asked for in prayer (b) is disallowed and the writ petition is so far as it seeks that relief will stand dismissed. 7. The principal grounds of attack levelled by the petitioner against the order evidenced by Ext. 7. The principal grounds of attack levelled by the petitioner against the order evidenced by Ext. P-23 are: (a) that it is a colourable exercise by the 1st respondent of his power under section 27 of the Act and is only a ruse adopted for evicting the petitioner from the dam site without resorting to due process of law and legal procedure and thereby to confer an undue and unfair advantage on one of the contracting parties, namely the Kerala State Electricity Board in the pending dispute between the petitioner and the Board; (b) that the impugned action taken by the 1st respondent is without jurisdiction and is ultra vires of the section since the order has been passed not for serving the purpose mentioned in the section, namely the prevention or suppression of riot or grave disturbance of the peace, but really for the purpose of enabling the Kerala State Electricity Board to carry on the work on the Kuttiadi dam after dispossessing the petitioner of his occupation of the dam site. It is urged that there was no emergency of any kind justifying action under section 27 of the Act since even the reports of the Superintending Engineer relied on in Ext. P-23 are dated 10th June 1969 and 12th July 1969 whereas the order has been passed only on 1st August 1969. According to the petitioner, a mere reading of the recitals contained in Ext. P-23 and also the contents of the report of the Revenue Divisional Officer (Ext. R-1) relied on therein would conclusively show that the real motive and purpose behind the action was only to enable the Kerala State Electricity Board to take possession of the dam together with all the materials belonging, to the petitioner and to execute departmentally the work of construction of the remaining portion of the dam. Counsel appearing for the petitioner attacked the order as a mala fide abuse of power by the 1st respondent on the ground that the order has been passed on extraneous considerations and for purposes not relevant under section 27 of the Act; (c) It is also contended that no reasonable person could possibly come to the conclusion on the materials referred to in Ext. P-23 that there was danger of either rioting or grave disturbance of peace in the area so as to necessitate action being taken under section 27 of the Act and that the order is therefore unreasonable and perverse arid liable to be quashed for that reason also; (d) Another point urged by the petitioner is that the impugned order is violative of the principles of natural justice since it has been passed without any notice to the petitioner or affording him any opportunity to put forward his case. In this context the petitioner's counsel laid stress on the fact that there was a long interval of time between the passing of the impugned order and the receipt of the complaints from the Superintending Engineer of the Board (Exts. R-46 and R-47) and argued that before any action was taken by the 1st respondent on the basis of the said reports made to him by one of the contending parties in the pending dispute between the contractor and the Board, natural justice required that the petitioner also ought to have been given an opportunity by the 1st respondent to put forward his case in relation to the matter, particularly when there was no pressing emergency justifying any deviation from the path of natural justice; (e) The petitioner has attacked the validity of section 27 of the Act on the ground that it constitutes an unreasonable restriction on his fundamental rights under Article 19 (1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution of India and is also violative of Article 14 of the Constitution on the ground of arbitrariness. 8. The Government Pleader appearing on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 submitted that the impugned action has been taken by the 1st respondent only on his having been satisfied after due enquiry that it was necessary to make an order under section 27 of the Act in order to prevent grave disturbance of peace in the dam site area. He contended that under section 27 of the Act the legislature has empowered the District Magistrate to pass the order on the basis of his subjective satisfaction regarding the necessity for such action and that it is not therefore open to the petitioner to contend before this court that circumstances did not exist warranting the invocation by the 1st respondent of his powers under the said section. On this basis the Government Pleader argued that it is beyond the scope of these proceedings to investigate as to whether or not the impugned action taken by the 1st respondent was justified on facts. The petitioner's contention that the order under challenge is violative of the principles of natural justice was sought to be met by the Government Pleader by pointing out that the requirement to give a previous notice and hearing cannot have any application in cases where summary and emergent action needs to be taken under section 27 of the Act for prevention of rioting or gave disturbance of peace. It was urged that the order contemplated under section 27 being only a temporary one the contention that the section is violative of Article 19 (1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution cannot stand. The Government Pleader refuted the petitioner's plea that section 27 confers arbitrary and uncanalised powers and is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, It was submitted by him that on the strength of the averments contained in the counter-affidavits filed by respondents 1 and 2 the impugned order should be upheld as a valid exercise by the 1st respondent of his powers under section 27 of the Act rejecting the petitioner's contention that the 1st respondent was influenced by extraneous considerations in passing the order and that Ext. P-23 constitutes an abuse of power. 9. On behalf of the 5th respondent Kerala State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) a detailed counter-affidavit has been filed traversing at great length the petitioner's allegations regarding the facts and circumstances which culminated in the termination of the contract as per Ext. P-10. As many as 48 documents have been produced as annexures to this counter-affidavit. They consist of various letters and notices which passed between the parties, the correspondence inter se between the Board and its officers and the communications addressed by the Superintending Engineer, Trichur to the 1st respondent requesting for police protection. P-10. As many as 48 documents have been produced as annexures to this counter-affidavit. They consist of various letters and notices which passed between the parties, the correspondence inter se between the Board and its officers and the communications addressed by the Superintending Engineer, Trichur to the 1st respondent requesting for police protection. In view of the statement by the petitioner's counsel that he is not pressing for the relief covered by prayer (b) in the writ petition any discussion of the question regarding the validity or otherwise of the action taken by the Board to terminate the petitioner's contract is outside the scope of the present enquiry and hence it is unnecessary to refer to the details of the case put forward by the Board in support of the action taken by it as per Ext. P-10. The counsel appearing for the Board while generally supporting all the arguments put forward by the Government Pleader for sustaining the legality of Ext. P-23, raised an additional contention that the petitioner has no locus standi to challenge the said order before this court under Article 26 of the Constitution and urged that the writ petition should be dismissed on this preliminary ground. 10. I am unable to see any substance in the preliminary contention taken by the counsel appearing for the 5th respondent questioning the locus standi of the petitioner to maintain this writ petition. The impugned order states that the petitioner and his men are 'intentionally remaining at the dam site' even subsequent to the termination of the contract by the Board and it directs the petitioner and his agents to leave the dam site area and prohibits them from entering the said area thereafter. It is admitted that vast quantities of materials, tools, other equipments and also certain structures belonging to the petitioner are existing on the side which has been taken possession of by the 1st respondent under Ext. P-23. In these circumstances it is impossible to hold that the order Ext. P-23 does not visit the petitioner with adverse civil consequences or that none of his rights are affected thereby. The petitioner is therefore a person directly affected by the order and he is entitled to challenge the legality and validity of the action so taken against him. The preliminary objection is therefore overruled. 11. P-23 does not visit the petitioner with adverse civil consequences or that none of his rights are affected thereby. The petitioner is therefore a person directly affected by the order and he is entitled to challenge the legality and validity of the action so taken against him. The preliminary objection is therefore overruled. 11. I pass on to consider the argument District advanced on behalf of the 1st respondent that Collector, the power under section 27 of the Act is to be exercised by the District Magistrate on his subjective satisfaction and that the order so passed by him is not amenable to judicial scrutiny on grounds of impropriety, insufficiency of materials or non-existence of justifying facts and circumstances. Section 27 of the Act is in the following terms:- "In order to prevent or Suppress any riot or grave disturbance of the peace, the District Magistrate may temporarily close or take possession of any building or place and may exclude all or any persons therefrom, or may allow access thereto to such persons only and on such terms as he may deem expedient. All persons concerned shall be bound to conduct themselves in accordance with such orders as the District Magistrate may make and notify in the exercise of the authority hereby vested in him."� I do not find it possible to accept the contention of the learned Government Pleader that the legislature in enacting this section has intended that the exercise of the power conferred thereunder should be dependent solely on the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate regarding the existence of circumstances necessitating such action. If such were the intention, it is legitimate to expect that the legislature would have incorporated in the section suitable terminology which is commonly employed in legislative practice for conferring upon public authorities powers couched in "subjective terms"� so as to indicate that such powers are exercisable when they are "satisfied" or when "it appears to"� them or when "in their opinion"� a certain state of affairs exists, or enabling them to take action "if they consider it necessary"� to do so. It is particularly significant that in certain other sections of the very same enactment such subjective formulae have been used by the legislature see sections 21, 22, 23, 26 and 28 of the Act. It is particularly significant that in certain other sections of the very same enactment such subjective formulae have been used by the legislature see sections 21, 22, 23, 26 and 28 of the Act. The absence of any such words in section 27 is, in my opinion, a clear pointer that the legislature deliberately did not want to make the exercise of the, far-reaching power under section 27 dependent solely on the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate and thereby substantially deprive the person affected of the right to challenge the proceedings before a superior court. It has to be remembered that the statute under consideration is a post-Constitution enactment, that the exercise of the power under section 27 may very often have serious impacts on the rights of citizens and that the statute does hot provide any remedy by way of appeal to a party affected by such action. In such circumstances, the court would lean towards giving to the section a construction that would render its provisions reasonable and not arbitrary. The contention that section 27 has invested the District Magistrate with an absolute discretion and constituted him as the sole judge to determine conclusively about the existence of the jurisdictional facts warranting the invocation of the powers conferred by the said section, cannot therefore stand. 12. Even if it is, however, assumed for the purpose of discussion that the exercise of the power conferred by section 27 of the Act is dependent upon the subjective opinion of the District Magistrate that such action has to be taken in order to prevent or suppress any riot or grave disturbance of the peace, the existence of facts and circumstances justifying an inference that there was imminent danger of rioting or grave disturbance of the peace is a condition fundamental to the formation of such opinion by the District Magistrate. While the formation of the opinion itself may be subjective the existence of circumstances relevant to the inference as a sine qua non for action must be demonstrable. While the formation of the opinion itself may be subjective the existence of circumstances relevant to the inference as a sine qua non for action must be demonstrable. If the validity of the order passed under section 27 of the Act is challenged before the superior court on the ground that no circumstances justifying an inference of imminent danger or rioting or disturbance of the peace existed, the impugned action will be exposed to interference unless the existence of such circumstances is made out see Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 295 at 309. Further, it is established law that even where a statute has endowed an authority with the power to take some action on the basis of its subjective satisfaction, its order will still be liable to be challenged before the court if the authority has acted outside the limits of the legislative provision, as for example when the power has been exercised for a purpose or with an intention beyond the scope of the instrument creating it or on grounds which are alien and irrelevant to the purpose and intention mentioned in the statute. As observed by the learned author S. A de Smith in his treatise "Judicial Review of Administrative Action", the courts will not readily be deterred by subjectively worded statutory formulae from determining whether acts done avowedly in pursuance of statutory powers bore an adequate relationship to the purposes prescribed by the statute. If a power granted for one purpose is exercised for a substantially different purpose it is generally immaterial whether its repository was acting in good faith or in bad faith and even if the order is passed in good faith and with the best of intentions, it is liable to be quashed by the court if it is found to have been passed on grounds extraneous to the legislation. The order of the statutory authority can also be challenged if there were no grounds at all for taking such action or if the grounds stated by the authority are such that no one can reasonably arrive at the opinion or satisfaction requisite under the legislation. The order of the statutory authority can also be challenged if there were no grounds at all for taking such action or if the grounds stated by the authority are such that no one can reasonably arrive at the opinion or satisfaction requisite under the legislation. If the court comes to the conclusion that no reasonable authority would have passed the impugned order on the materials which were before the authority, the order is liable to be struck down see Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S. D. Agarwal, A.I.R. 1969 S.C.707 at 714, and Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 295 at 309. This is obviously so because the courts of law stand guard against flagrant abuse of power on the simple and sound principle that the legislature cannot have intended the powers conferred by it to be abused beyond what might be called the inevitable area where opinions may legitimately differ. As pointed out by Lord Halsbury in Sharp v. Wakefield, (1891) A.C. 173 at 179, when it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authority it necessarily means that that something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion: according to law and not humour; it is to be, not arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular. 13. Having given the matter my anxious consideration, I have come to the conclusion that the petitioner's challenge against the order Ext. P-23 has to be upheld both on the ground of unreasonableness of the action and also for the reason that in passing the impugned order the 1st respondent has been substantially influenced by considerations which are irrelevant and extraneous to the purpose of the statute. 14. It is now necessary to extract in full the order Ext. P-23. It runs thus:- "PROCEEDINGS OF THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR AND ADDITIONAL DISTRICT MAGISTRATE (INDEPENDENT), KOZHIKODE Ref. S2-22546/69. Dated 1st August 1969. Order under section 27of the Kerala Police Act, 1961 Read. - (1) Report No. H.C. 5659/69, dated 1st August 1969 from Revenue Divisional Officer, Kozhikode. (2) Report No. DB. 1-4/69, dated 12th July 1969 from the Superintending Engineer, Civil Circle, Trichur-1. (3) Report No. DB. 1-4/69, dated, 10th June 1969 from the Superintending Engineer, (Civil Circle), Kerala State Electricity Board, Trichur-1. - (1) Report No. H.C. 5659/69, dated 1st August 1969 from Revenue Divisional Officer, Kozhikode. (2) Report No. DB. 1-4/69, dated 12th July 1969 from the Superintending Engineer, Civil Circle, Trichur-1. (3) Report No. DB. 1-4/69, dated, 10th June 1969 from the Superintending Engineer, (Civil Circle), Kerala State Electricity Board, Trichur-1. Whereas the reports read above of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Kozhikode and the Superintending Engineer, Kerala State Electricity Board, Trichur disclose that ever since the contract entered into by the contractor Sri N. Chellappan with the Kerala State Electricity Board for the construction of the dam for the Kuttiadi Hydro Electric Project at the site described in the schedule appended has been terminated with effect from 15th October 1968, the contractor Sri N. Chellappan and his men have been intentionally remaining at the dam site and forcibly resisting every attempt on the part of officers and men of the Kerala State Electricity Board to execute certain items of work connected with the completion of the Kuttiadi Hydro Electric Project and that they have been threatening to resist any attempt for executing any work at the dam site by the officers and men of the Kerala State Electricity Board with every force at their command and that if this is allowed to continue, any move on the part of the Kerala State Electricity Board to complete the work relating to Kuttiadi Hydro Electric Project is likely to meet with strong resistence from the side of contractor Sri N. Chellappan and his agents with force thereby resulting in grave disturbance of peace and rioting in the area; And whereas I, Sri K. V. Vidyadharan, District Collector and Additional District Magistrate (Independent), Kozhikode am satisfied from the report of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Kozhikode after his enquiry in pursuance of the instructions issued by me on the basis of the various letters received from the officials of the Kerala State Electricity Board that some immediate action has to be taken to prevent riot and grave disturbance of peace which are likely to happen on account of the disorderly and adamant conduct adopted by the contractor Sri N. Chellappan and his men as indicated in the report of the Revenue Divisional Officer, I hereby order, under section 27 of the Kerala Police Act (Act V of 1961), that the dam site and its appurtenances of the Kuttiadi Hydro Electric Project area described in the schedule appended hereto shall be taken possession of with all the improvements, buildings, other structures and all properties and I hereby take possession temporarily till further orders; I hereby further order to exclude all persons therefrom and that none shall enter the site except the officials of the Kerala State Electricity Board and persons duly authorised by them; This order does not preclude the contractor Sri N. Chellappan and his agents from settling his claims whatsoever either through this court or any other appropriate court of law. Given under may hand and the seal of this court this the 1st day of August, 1969. K. V. Vidyadharan, District Collector and Additional District Magistrate (Independent)."� It is clear from Ext. P-23 that the only materials on the basis of which the 1st respondent has passed the order are the two communications (Exts. R-46 and R-47) sent to him by the Superintending Engineer, Trichur and a report dated 1st August 1969 submitted to him by the 2nd respondent (a copy of which has been produced along with the counter-affidavit of the 2nd respondent and marked as Ext. R-1). As has been already mentioned earlier in this judgment, the complaint put forward by the Superintending Engineer in Exts. R-46 and R-47 was that the departmental staff of the Electricity Board deputed for work at the dam site was being obstructed by some agents and workmen of the former contractor from carrying out certain essential works like taking of measurements, etc., and the 1st respondent in his capacity as District Collector was requested to provide the Executive Engineer with necessary police protection to enable the field staff to carry out their duties at the dam site. Of the above mentioned two letters Ext. R-46 was sent on 10th June 1969. In the second letter Ext. R-47 dated 12th July 1969 despatched one month thereafter the Superintending Engineer has stated that there was no change in the situation at the work site of the Kuttiadi dam. This would per se negative any theory that the situation in the area was progressively deteriorating or that any critical development had taken place in between the dates of the two reports. The order Ext. P-23 was passed on 1st August 1969, the very same date on which the 2nd respondent submitted his report Ext. R-1 to the 1st respondent. The contents of Ext. R-1 do not also bear out the existence of any emergency involving danger of imminent grave disturbance of the peace or rioting in the dam site area. A good part of the report Ext. R-1 consists of the narration of the facts leading up to the cancellation of the petitioner's contract by the Board. The contents of Ext. R-1 do not also bear out the existence of any emergency involving danger of imminent grave disturbance of the peace or rioting in the dam site area. A good part of the report Ext. R-1 consists of the narration of the facts leading up to the cancellation of the petitioner's contract by the Board. After reciting those facts, the 2nd respondent has stated that when the contract was awarded to the petitioner he had also been given suitable access and possession of the dam site and that even though as per the terms and conditions of the agreement the contractor had to hand over the site back to the Department he had not done so till that date. Then follows a very significant statement that "the contractor has not visited the area for the last three months and the labourers are also not there" and that there are only five monthly paid employees of the contractor in the dam site area. The second respondent has mentioned the names of these five persons and proceeded to state that his enquiry showed that those employees had instructions from the contractor to obstruct even the entry of the employees of the Board into the dam site and that they were ready to carry out the instructions and that therefore "there is thus a grave disturbance to peace and even riot at the dam site by the activities of the contractor's men referred to above if the employees of the Kerala State Electricity Board make a real attempt to execute any work in the area". 15. There being nothing at all either in Ext. R-46 or Ext. R-47 to indicate that there was imminent danger or rioting or grave breach of peace in the dam site area, the contents of Ext. R-1 must be taken to be the only material on the basis of which the 1st respondent came to the conclusion that there was likelihood of rioting and grave disturbance of the peace and that action under section 27 of the Act was necessary for preventing the same. It is evident from the terms of Ext. R-1 must be taken to be the only material on the basis of which the 1st respondent came to the conclusion that there was likelihood of rioting and grave disturbance of the peace and that action under section 27 of the Act was necessary for preventing the same. It is evident from the terms of Ext. P-23 that in passing that order the 1st respondent has proceeded on the assumption that the contractor and his workmen were District intentionally remaining at the dam site ever Collector, since 15th October 1968 on which dale the contract was purported to be terminated by the Board. But what was actually reported by the second respondent in Ext. R-1 was that "the contractor has not visited the area for the last three months and the labourers were also not there". The impression created in my mind from a reading of Ext. P-23 is that the 1st respondent, who passed the order Ext. P-23 apparently in some haste on the very same day on which he received the report Ext. R-1, was under a misapprehension that the entire large labour force of the contractor was still present at the dam site ready to offer forcible resistance to any attempt on the part of the officers and men of the Board in case they attempted to execute any work at the dam site. It has to be remembered that the dam site area referred to is of an extent of about 15 square miles. Unless it be for a mistaken impression as aforesaid, it is difficult to imagine how the 1st respondent could conceivably have entertained the opinion that there was likelihood of grave disturbance of the peace and rioting in the area if he had realised that only five employees of the contractor were actually present at the site. It is not contended before me on behalf of the 1st respondent that in passing the order Ext. P-23 he was acting up on any material other than the three reports referred to in the said order. I have no hesitation to hold that on these materials no authority acting reasonably could possibly have come to the conclusion that any situation involving the likelihood of rioting or grave disturbance of peace existed at the dam site warranting action being taken under section 27 of the Act. I have no hesitation to hold that on these materials no authority acting reasonably could possibly have come to the conclusion that any situation involving the likelihood of rioting or grave disturbance of peace existed at the dam site warranting action being taken under section 27 of the Act. It has to be remembered that the said section vests extraordinary powers on the District Magistrate whose exercise may involve substantial inroad into the fundamental rights of freedom of property, etc., guaranteed by Article 19 (1) of the Constitution and that such powers are intended to be used sparingly and only in cases of extreme emergency. It need hardly be stated that the power conferred by section 27 is not meant to be employed as a convenient substitute for other procedures prescribed by law to meet situation not directly covered by this section, though they may be less speedy, and it ought, never to be exercised for the indirect attainment of purposes not sanctioned by the particular legislative provision, however laudable and desirable they might otherwise be, for it will then constitute an abuse of the power conferred by the legislature and the action would be ultra vires in law. 16. It is abundantly clear even from the very recitals in Ext. P-23 that one of the main considerations that weighed with the 1st respondent in passing that order was that it was necessary to ensure that the Board was enabled to complete the work of construction of the Kuttiadi dam without any hindrance or obstruction from the contractor (petitioner) who was disputing the validity of the termination of his contract and was claiming that he was still in lawful possession of the dam site and that he was himself entitled to complete the balance work on the dam. A combined reading of Ext. P-23 and the three reports Exts. R-1, R-46 and R-47 referred to therein lead to the irresistible inference that the impugned order has been passed largely, if not principally, for securing the object and purpose of facilitating the completion of the work at the dam site by the officers and men of the Board. 17. A combined reading of Ext. P-23 and the three reports Exts. R-1, R-46 and R-47 referred to therein lead to the irresistible inference that the impugned order has been passed largely, if not principally, for securing the object and purpose of facilitating the completion of the work at the dam site by the officers and men of the Board. 17. I have already found that on the materials which were available before the 1st respondent no person acting reasonably could arrive at the opinion that there was imminent likelihood of grave disturbance of the peace or rioting so as to necessitate action being taken under section 27 of the Act. This also lends further support to the inference that the main purpose of the order was not the prevention of rioting or disturbance to peace but to render the assistance requested for by the Superintending Engineer in his letters Exts. R-46 and R-47. It is well settled that an authority which is authorised by a statute to do an act for a specified purpose will not be permitted to use its powers for any different purpose and that if it attempts to do so the courts will interfere and set aside the action on the ground of its having been taken with an ulterior object not authorised by the statute. Even if the ulterior object appears to the authority to be desirable in the public interest, nevertheless, if the purpose is one not authorised by the particular statutory provision its action is unlawful. Hence, even if it be that the achievement of the purpose of facilitating the execution of the remaining work on the dam by the Board will serve the interests of the public at large, it is not a relevant consideration for the purposes of section 27 of the Act but is, on the other hand, wholly alien and extraneous to it. 18. It was contended on behalf of the 1st respondent that the mere fact that besides preventing riot and grave disturbance of peace the impugned order has incidentally resulted also in enabling the Board to carry on the work of construction of the remaining portion of the dam, cannot invalidate the exercise of the power under section 27 of the Act by the 1st respondent. Stated in the form of an abstract proposition this can admit of no controversy, but it will have application only if in passing the impugned, order the 1st respondent had been influenced only by the relevant consideration, namely the necessity to prevent a riot or grave disturbance of peace. Such however, is not the case here, because, far from its being only an incidental by-product of the action, the rendering of assistance to the Board for facilitating the execution of the work of construction of the dam by removal of the contractor's men from the spot was a predominant motivating factor which led to the passing of the said order. This irrelevant consideration has very substantially influenced the mind of the 1st respondent in passing the order Ext. P-23 and it is not possible to predicate whether the 1st respondent would have thought it fit to take the action under section 27 of the Act if that extraneous factor had been excluded from consideration by him. I am constrained to hold that the action of the 1st respondent in passing the impugned order constitutes an abuse of the statutory power conferred by section 27 of the Act and is therefore ultra vires. 19. In as much as I have found that the order Ext. P-23 is illegal and ultra vires on the ground of unreasonableness and that it also constitutes an abuse of the power conferred by section 27 of the Act, it is unnecessary for me to consider the merits of the petitioner's challenge against the validity of section 27 of the Act and also his further contention based on alleged contravention of the principles of natural justice. 20. I quash the order Ext. P-23 and allow the original petition to that extent. The petitioner will get the costs of this writ petition from the respondents.