JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - These two writ petitions have been filed by the Zila Parishad, Hardoi praying in each that the order of the Commissioner setting aside the dismissal of the Panchayat Secretary and directing his reinstatement, be quashed. 2. In Writ No. 3129 of 1968 the facts are that Hari Prasad Bajpai, respondent No. 3, was appointed as a Panchayat Secretary on 19th August, 1955, in a temporary capacity. The appointment was liable to be terminated on three months' notice. After the coming into force of the Zila Parishad and Kshettra Samitis Act, the Zila Parishad became the appointing authority of Panchayat Secretaries. In view of Section 35 of the Kshettra Samities and Zila Parishad Adhiniyam read with schedule III and entry relating to Section 25-A, the Zila Parishad was given the power to appoint Panchayat Secretaries and to exercise administrative control over them in respect of promotion. dismissal and removal, but the Kshettra Samiti was given the power to exercise administrative control in respect of leave, transfer and other disciplinary actions, which does not include appointment, promotion, dismissal and removal. It is not in dispute that the Zila Parishad delegated this power to its Adhyaksh; so the Adhyaksh became tho appointing authority of the Panchayat Secretary, (which are dealt with by Section 25-A of the Panchayat Raj Act) . 3. In exercise of this power the Adhyaksh terminated the service of respondent No. 3 by an order passed on 16th January, 1965, by giving him three months notice. Aggrieved by this order dated 16th January, 1965, Mr. Baipai went in appeal to the District Magistrate. The District Magistrate dismissed the appeal on 7-11-1966. Thereafter, Mr. Bajpai filed an appeal before the Commissioner, Lucknow division. The appeal purported to be against the order of termination as well as against the order of the District Magistrate dismissing his appeal. The Commissioner on 19th March, 1968, allowed the appeal. He held that the services of the appellant were terminated for reasons of inefficiency and charges of misconduct. Under the circumstances, he should have been dealt with under the punishment and Appeal Rules. Termination of his service without following the prescribed procedure was invalid. He directed the reinstatement of the appellant, though he himself inflicted a 'minor punishment on him. 4. Under the circumstances, he should have been dealt with under the punishment and Appeal Rules. Termination of his service without following the prescribed procedure was invalid. He directed the reinstatement of the appellant, though he himself inflicted a 'minor punishment on him. 4. The order of the Commissioner has been challenged on the grounds that the order of termination was not appealable, and secondly the appeal did not lay to the Commissioner. Section 25-A Panchayat Raj Act provides for appeals. Sub-sec. (1) of Section 25-A provides for appointment of Secretary for every Gaon Panchayat. Under sub-sec. (2) the Secretaries are put under the administrative control of the prescribed authority in matters of leave, promotion, transfer, dismissal, removal and other disciplinary action. The proviso then says : "Provided that an order of the prescribed authority removing or dismissing a Secretary shall be appealable within a period and in the manner to be prescribed, to the District Magistrate, or if any authority is prescribed in this behalf to such other authority." Though under sub-sec. (2) the Secretary is liable to administrative control in several matters like leave, promotion, transfer, dismissal, removal and other disciplinary action, orders of dismissal and removal alone have been made appealable. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that removal or dismissal would in the context of the said provision of the Act, mean termination of service by way of punishment for some misconduct or some other cause. But it would not include a termination simplicitor. I am inclined to agree with the learned counsel. The rules framed under the Panchayat Raj Act corroborate this interpretation. Rule 174 of the Panchayat Raj Rules specifically provides for determination of period of office of a servant. Under clause (d) the office determines when the servant has been given by the authority competent to appoint lris successor one month's notice or a sum equal to one month's pay in lieu of nonce. So the procedure for determination of the office of the servant has been prescribed by Rule 174. This procedure was followed in the present case. Apparently the order in question in the present case would be a determination within the meaning of Rule 174. Schedule V of the rules deals with Gaon Panchayat and Nyay Panchayat Services (Punishment and Appeals) rules. Rule 3 prescribes various punishments which may be imposed on a servant of the Gaon Sabha or Nyay Panchayat. Apparently the order in question in the present case would be a determination within the meaning of Rule 174. Schedule V of the rules deals with Gaon Panchayat and Nyay Panchayat Services (Punishment and Appeals) rules. Rule 3 prescribes various punishments which may be imposed on a servant of the Gaon Sabha or Nyay Panchayat. Clause (g) speaks of removal from service. So the rules contemplate that removal or dismissal are both punishments imposed in accordance with the procedure prescribed therein. The explanation deals with discharge. Clause (c) thereof says that discharge of a person engaged under contract, in accordance with the term of his contract shall not be deemed to be removal or dismissal within the meaning of this rule or Rule 4. - Thus, a person like the respondent, who was engaged under a contract of temporary service, whose services could be terminated on payment of three months pay, cannot say that his termination according to the term of his contract would be removal or dismissal. It would be "discharge" from service. 5. Those rules corroborate the view that the words "removal" or "dismissal" have been used, in the Act, in the limited sense, to indicate the termination of service by way of punishment for some misconduct. 6. Section 25 of the Panchayat Raj Act speaks of the power to appoint, punish or discharge, dismiss or control a servant of the Gaon Sabha. This provision shows that the legislature was aware of the significance of discharge of a servant as distinct from his dismissal. If the intention was to provide for an appeal against the order of discharge or termination of service simplicitor the legislature could have used the words "discharge" also rather than "removal" or "dismissal" alone in the proviso to Section 25-A of the Panchayat Raj Act. 7. The third schedule to the Kshettra Samiti and Zila Parishad Adhiniyam which prescribes the powers exercisable by the Zila Parishad, brings out the distinction between termination simplicitor and removal or dismissal. Under sub-entry 2 of Section 25-A the Kshettra Samitis have been given power to exercise administrative control over Panchayat Secretaries in respect of leave, transfer and other disciplinary actions which does not include appointment promotion, dismissal and removal. Clearly, dismissal and removal have been referred in this clause as a kind of disciplinary action. Under sub-entry 2 of Section 25-A the Kshettra Samitis have been given power to exercise administrative control over Panchayat Secretaries in respect of leave, transfer and other disciplinary actions which does not include appointment promotion, dismissal and removal. Clearly, dismissal and removal have been referred in this clause as a kind of disciplinary action. That is why these were expressly excluded from the powers of the Kshettra Samiti because powers in relation to appointment of Panchayat Secretaries and to exercise administrative control over them were conferred upon the Zila Parishad by the first entry. 8. A similar question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in S. R. Tewari v. District Board, 1963 A.L.J. 944. Section 82 of the District Boards Act conferred power upon the President and the Secretary of the Board in relation to several matters like appointment, grant leave of absence, to punish, dismiss, transfer and control of the servants of the Board. The Supreme Court held that the word "dismissal" has been used in Section 82 in a limited sense. Their lordships held that in the law relating to master and servant the expression "dismissal" has acquired a limited meaning-determination of employment as a measure of punishment for misconduct or other cause. It was held that that is the meaning in which the expression "dismissal" is used in the rules and in Section 82. The word "dismissal" was held not to include the power of termination of an employment simplicitor. Their lordships held that the power to appoint includes the power of termination of an employment, as distinct from dismissal in the limited sense. In my opinion, the same line of reasoning would apply to the interpretation of the words "dismissal" as well as "removal" occurring in Section 25-A of the Panchayat Raj Act. 9. The impugned order purported to be termination simplicitor in the exercise of the contractual power and in accordance with the order of appointment. Learned counsel for the respondent urged that the order would, in the eye of law, be deemed to have been passed by way of punishment, because, in fact, it was impelled by the existence of several charges against the petitioner. The Commissioner has in his order mentioned various charges, which were held out against the petitioner. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent urged that the order would, in the eye of law, be deemed to have been passed by way of punishment, because, in fact, it was impelled by the existence of several charges against the petitioner. The Commissioner has in his order mentioned various charges, which were held out against the petitioner. 10. The service conditions as mentioned in the Panchayat Raj Rules indicate that removal or dismissal was it punishment which could be inflicted after following the prescribed procedure, viz., of giving opportunity of hearing to the charged officer in respect of the various charges. Admittedly no such procedure was followed. Here no charges were framed or served on the respondent. No enquiring officer was appointed. No enquiry was held. No findings were recorded that the alleged charges have been proved or established against the respondent. All that can be said is that the petitioners were impelled to terminate the services because of the existence of complaints or allegations against the respondent No. 3. 11. By now it is well settled that in the law relating to master and servant and reason impelling the mind of the authority to terminate the service is irrelevant and will not make a termination an order passed by way of punishment unless it is established that the allegations were not merely the motive but it became the foundation for the order. Suspicion or charges become the foundation either when the order imputes some stigma on the officer, or the officer is visited with some evil consequences, which normally follow when an order of dismissal or removal is, in fact, passed. The only other category of cases in which such allegations have been held to become the foundation for the order is when the authority deliberately chooses to exercise the power of imposing the punishment instead of acting under its contractual power to simply terminate by going out of its way to prove the charges and to determine the employment on the basis of the findings that the charges were established. That is done. after an inquiry has been held and findings have been reached. If an order of termination of service is passed after such findings have been recorded then it is treated to have been passed by way of punishment and is considered to he an order of dismissal or removal. That is done. after an inquiry has been held and findings have been reached. If an order of termination of service is passed after such findings have been recorded then it is treated to have been passed by way of punishment and is considered to he an order of dismissal or removal. See State of Punjab v. Sukh Raj Bahadur, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1089. In my opinion, these principles, which are based upon the interpretation of service rules, are applicable to the instant case since the rules dealing with punishment of Panchayat Raj servants are similar in nature and contents. 12. The order terminating the respondent No. 3's service was not an order of removal and dismissal. Hence it was not appealable, and no appeal lay. The Commissioner had no jurisdiction to grant relief in any such appeal. 13. The facts of writ petition No. 3128 of 1968 in so far as the question of raw raised in it are concerned are practically similar to the facts of the other writ petit;on. There also an order of termination simplicitor was set aside in appeal by the Commissioner. For reasons, mentioned above, that order was illegal. 14. The petitions succeed and are allowed. The orders of the Commissioner dated 19th March, 1968 and 6th April, 1968, impugned in writ petitions Nos. 3129 of 1968 and 3128 of 1968 respectively are quashed. Parties shall bear their own costs.