Judgment :- 1. These two cases have been placed before me to decide whether the appeals have been filed out of time. The plaintiff filed a suit in respect of 97 cents of land against the defendant. The trial court decreed the suit to the extent of 52 cents but dismissed it for the balance. Appeals were carried by both the plaintiff and the defendant, but the learned District Judge dismissed the appeal of the defendant and allowed the appeal of the plaintiff. Thus, there were two decrees in appeal against which the present two appeals have been filed. The only point to be decided now is as to whether the appellant is entitled to take credit for the time taken for obtaining a copy of the decree in each case although the said application has been made only after the statutory period of 90 days i.e. (Article 116 to the Schedule of the Limitation Act, Act 36 of 1963). Going by the copy of the judgment furnished to Court and the time taken forgetting that copy, the appellant is out of time by 5 days, but if the time taken for getting the copy of the decree, excluding the overlapping period, is included he will be well within time. The objection taken by the office apparently is where the copy of the decree has been applied for only after the expiry of 90 days provided for under Art.116 of the Limitation Act, the appellant cannot claim the benefit of the period required to obtain that copy. S.12(3) of the Limitation Act permits a party to exclude the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment on which the decree is founded, and S.12(2) similarly excludes the time consumed for obtaining a copy of the decree. It is not permissible for the Court to abridge the period allowed for filing the appeal by S.12, read with Art.116 of the Limitation Act. A true construction of S.12 justifies the stand taken by counsel for the appellant that the exclusion of the time for obtaining the copy of the decree does not depend upon the application being made within 90 days. A true construction of S.12 justifies the stand taken by counsel for the appellant that the exclusion of the time for obtaining the copy of the decree does not depend upon the application being made within 90 days. Even if it is made beyond the original period of 90 days, such time can be excluded, provided the application has been made within the extended period, that is to say, within the total period made up of 90 days allowed under Art.116 and the time required to obtain a copy of the judgment allowed under S.12(3) of the Limitation Act. There is considerable authority in support of this proposition. A few of the rulings alone need be adverted to here. A Full Bench of the Nagpur High Court in a decision reported in Badshah Miyan v. Pandurang (AIR 1930 Nagpur 113) held: (I extract the head note): "Where a party applies for a copy of the judgment alone and sometimes later applies for a copy of the decree the time required for obtaining the copy of the judgment plus the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree should be excluded, provided that days on which both copies were being prepared cannot be doubly excluded, from the computation of the period of limitation. It is immaterial whether the period of limitation prescribed in Schedule.1 to the Limitation Act had expired when a copy of the decree was applied for." Similarly, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in a ruling reported in Om Prakash v. Sm. Sohan Devi (AIR 1956 All. 435) affirmed this view of the law and held (I extract the head notes): "The Limitation Act is an Act which takes away or restricts the right to take legal proceedings and even if the language is ambiguous it should be strictly construed in favour of the right to proceed. There are no words in S.12 to indicate that the application for a copy should be made within the original period of limitation in order to earn the benefit of S.12. Thus after a suit was decided on 8-5-1954 an application for a copy of decree was made on 2 61954 which was ready for delivery on 24-7-1954. Another application for a copy of judgment was made on 3181954 and it was ready on 11-9-1954. Thus after a suit was decided on 8-5-1954 an application for a copy of decree was made on 2 61954 which was ready for delivery on 24-7-1954. Another application for a copy of judgment was made on 3181954 and it was ready on 11-9-1954. The period for filing appeal was 90 days: Held that the appellants could get the benefit of S.12, as the second application for a copy of the judgment was made before the extended period had expired, The memorandum of appeal was, therefore, instituted within limitation." The same construction of the law has been adopted in a number of cases reported in Gul Rahdman v. Mt. Zar Jan (AIR 1936 Peshawar 179), Murlidhar Shrinivas v. Motilal Ramcoomar (AIR 1937 Bom.162) and Lalla Ram v. Deputy Commissioner, Kheri (AIR 1937 Oudh 65.) 2. The Court must adopt that construction which advances enforcement of rights rather than inhibits or curtails it. Therefore, as between two interpretations of S.12, one that will give a larger period of limitation must be preferred. Indeed, there is really no possibility of two interpretations in this case because S.12 expressly excluded two periods and there is no warrant for so readings. 12 as to constrain a party to apply for a copy of the decree and judgment within the statutory period of 90 days before he could claim the benefit of the exclusion. That would be re-writing the Section while what is required is to adopt a benignant construction. The appeals have been filed in time and may be duly registered.