JUDGMENT G.K. Mitter, J. - This is an appeal from an order of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Revision Case No. 1566 of 1956 rejecting the Revision Petition against an order of the Civil and Sessions Judge Agra upholding the conviction of the appellant by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Agra dated January 18, 1965. 2. The Magistrate held the appellant guilty of violation of Clause 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Foodgrains Dealers Licencing Order, 1964 made to exercise the powers under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 read with Section 7 of that Act. He was charged with having been in possession of 15 bags of flour (maida) weighing about 13 quintals without any licence or permit. The appellant never contested this fact but he pleaded not guilty to the charge raised against him. Clause 3(1) of the Licensing Order which provided for licensing of dealers reads: "No person shall carry on business as a dealer except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a licence issued in this behalf by the licensing authority." Sub-clause (2) of Clause 3 provides: "For the purpose of this clause; any person who stores any foodgrains in quantity of ten quintals or more of any one of the foodgrains or twenty five quintals, of all foodgrains taken together at any one time shall, unless the contrary is proved, be deemed to store the foodgrains for the purpose of sale. `Dealer' is defined in clause 2 (a) to mean a person engaged in the business of purchase, sale or storage for sale of any one of the foodgrains in quantity of ten quintals or more at any one time or in quantity of twenty-five quintals or more of all foodgrains taken together, but does not include a person who- (i) stores any foodgrains produced by him by personal cultivation, and (ii) does not engage in the business of purchase or sale of foodgrains." 3. Under sub-clause (b) `foodgrains' is defined as any one or more of the foodgrains specified in Schedule I to the Order including products of such foodgrains other than husk and bran. The Schedule contains a list of twelve kinds of foodgrains including wheat and as Maida is a product of wheat it would certainly be covered by the definition of foodgrains. 4. The Schedule contains a list of twelve kinds of foodgrains including wheat and as Maida is a product of wheat it would certainly be covered by the definition of foodgrains. 4. Before the Magistrate the appellant contended that he had purchased the maida on permit and that it was not for sale but for manufacturing biscuits and bread. The appellant examined several witnesses and attempted to prove that he had purchased 30 bags of maida on May 21, 1964 on a permit issued by the District Supply Officer. The Magistrate found himself unable to believe that the 15 bags of maida recovered from the possession of the appellant on August 30, 1964 when his premises was raided by the Marketing Inspector could be a portion of the 30 bags of maida purchased in May, 1964. The appellant also tried to show that he had purchased 15 bags of maida from a firm Chhootar Mal Aogan Mal on August 26, 1964 in two instalments. This story also was not accepted by the Magistrate. As the appellant was not a licencee and according to the Magistrate had not been able to prove that the maida was not for sale but kept for some other purpose, he held the accused guilty of violation of the provisions of clause 3 of the Order and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 200/-. 5. The Magistrate appears to have taken the view that the appellant was storing maida for the purpose of sale as such for in the last paragraph of his order he said: ".........it is borne out that on August 30, 1964 at about 7 p.m. the accused was found in possession of 15 bags of maida in his bakary. It has also been substantiated that the accused is not a licencee. And it has not been proved that the maida was not for sale and that it was for any other purpose. Therefore, it is evident that the accused contravened the provisions of clause 3 of the said Court." 6. The Magistrate seems to have concluded that the appellant was to be treated to be a dealer in maida as he had failed to prove that he was not storing the said foodgrains for sale. 7. Therefore, it is evident that the accused contravened the provisions of clause 3 of the said Court." 6. The Magistrate seems to have concluded that the appellant was to be treated to be a dealer in maida as he had failed to prove that he was not storing the said foodgrains for sale. 7. The appeal to the Civil and Sessions Judge was dismissed on August 17, 1966 except for reduction of the term of imprisonment and the Revision Petition was rejected by the High Court in limine on December 2, 1966. 8. In our view, the view taken by the Magistrate in convicting the appellant was not correct. No doubt the storage of foodgrains in excess of the limit specified even on a single occasion placed the appellant in the position of a person who was storing the same for sale. But the prosecution had to show that he was a dealer i.e. a person engaged in the business of storage for sale before he could be held guilty of violation of the Licensing Order. The mere fact that he was found on one occasion to have stored foodgrains in excess of the limits specified did not automatically bring him within the mischief of sub-clause (1) of Clause 3. A solitary instance of being found in possession of foodgrains in excess of the specified limits does not give rise to a presumption that the person is engaged in a business within the meaning of the word `dealer' as defined in clause 2 (a). Carrying on business imports the idea of continuity in operation. In order that a man can be said to be carrying on a business of a particular type, it must be shown that he was carrying on operations of prescribed type regularly or at least with such frequency that it could be said that he was pursuing a system or habitually following a particular occupation. 9. The point was dealt with at length in a decision of this Court in Monipur Administration v. M. Bila Chandra Singh, 1964 (5) SCR 574 . It was pointed out in that case that: "It is not a single, casual or solitary transaction of sale, purchase or storage that would make a person a dealer. 9. The point was dealt with at length in a decision of this Court in Monipur Administration v. M. Bila Chandra Singh, 1964 (5) SCR 574 . It was pointed out in that case that: "It is not a single, casual or solitary transaction of sale, purchase or storage that would make a person a dealer. It is only where it is shown that there is a sort of continuity of one or the other of the said transactions that the requirement as to business postulated by the definition would be satisfied. If this element of the definition is ignored, it would be rendering the use of the word `business' redundent and meaningless." 10. The above contains the ratio decided: which is applicable to the case before us. 11. Mr. Rana appearing on behalf of the State contended that the appellant in this case had nowhere put forward the plea that he was not a dealer and indeed he could not have done so as he was a biscuit manufacturer who habitually bought maida and converted the same into biscuits which he sold thereafter. Counsel argued that as biscuits are products of foodgrains they were also to be considered as foodgrains within the meaning of the licensing order. 12. To dispose of this contention, it is sufficient to note that the prosecution never raised such a plea before the Magistrate and the Magistrate did not have to deal with this aspect of the question at all. It is not for us to consider whether the appellant would have had a good defence to such a charge if it had been raised and it is not for us to speculate thereon. The appellant was evidently treated as a person storing maida in excess of the prescribed quantities for the purpose of sale of the maida and held guilty of violation of the Licensing Order because he had failed to prove to the contrary. There being no evidence to show that the appellant was pursuing any such business, his conviction cannot be allowed to stand. The appeal is therefore allowed and the sentence set aside. The fine, if paid, will be refunded to the appellant.