JUDGMENT V. Balakrishna Eradi, J. 1. By this original petition the petitioner who is employed in the service of the Government of India as an Assistant-in-charge in the Naval Store Depot, Cochin, seeks to quash the orders Exts. P-10 and P-16 passed against him by the 2nd respondent, namely the Commodore-in-charge, Naval Base, Cochin, as well as the appellate order Ext. P-13 passed by the 1st respondent the Director of Civilian Personnel, Naval Headquarters, New Delhi. 2. The petitioner has been working as a civilian in the Indian Navy from 1945 onwards having joined service as a lower division clerk in the naval establishment at Bombay on 31st December 1945. He was transferred to I.N.S. Venduruthy, Cochin in March, 1953 and was subsequently promoted as an upper division clerk in December, 1956. On the 17th March, 1964 the petitioner was promoted as an Assistant-in-charge and transferred to the Base Repair Organisation at Cochin. 3. On the 28th September, 1964, the petitioner was served with an order, dated 26th September, 1964, Ext. P-2, placing him under suspension with effect from the forenoon of the 28th September on the ground that an enquiry into his conduct was contemplated pending. Subsequently, by the notice Ext. P-3, dated the 30th September, 1964, the petitioner was informed that it was proposed to institute disciplinary proceedings against him under Rule 15 of the Civilians in Defence Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1952 and he was required to submit a written statement of his defence not later than the 10th October, 1964, stating whether he desired an oral enquiry to be held or to be heard in person. It was stated in Ext. P-3 that the grounds on which the action was proposed to be taken against him were specified in the charge statement enclosed therewith and that the allegations on which the charges were based were set out in the enclosed statement of allegations. The statement of charges accompanying Ext. P-3 contained only one charge which had been framed in the vaguest possible fashion. It read as follows: "The said Shri K.P.B. Nair, while functioning a Assistant-in-charge, in the Base Repair Organisation, Cochin, at about 16.00 on 24th September, 1964, did commit an act of gross misconduct." The statement of allegations, however, contained particulars of the alleged misconduct. P-3 contained only one charge which had been framed in the vaguest possible fashion. It read as follows: "The said Shri K.P.B. Nair, while functioning a Assistant-in-charge, in the Base Repair Organisation, Cochin, at about 16.00 on 24th September, 1964, did commit an act of gross misconduct." The statement of allegations, however, contained particulars of the alleged misconduct. It is not necessary for the purpose of this writ petition to advert in detail to the various allegations of fact contained in the said statement. All that requires to be noted is that in substance, the misconduct levelled against the petitioner was that at about 4 p.m. on the 24th September, 1964, the petitioner had behaved in an insolent manner towards his superior officer, namely one Commander Dalal who was the Officer-in-charge of the Base Repair Organisation, at the latter's office and further that on his returning to the main office after leaving the cabin of the Officer-in-charge the petitioner had thrown certain papers entrusted to him by the Officer on the table of an upper division clerk shouting " I don't care for him" and that this was done in the presence of service sailors, clerks and peons. The petitioner was thus alleged to be guilty of insubordination and versive of discipline. 4. In response to the notice Ext. P-3 the petitioner submitted a detailed explanation evidenced by Ext. P-4 wherein he categorically denied all the allegations levelled against him and stated that he had not used any improper or insolent language against the Officer-in-charge or shown any disrespectful attitude towards him. According to the petitioner, in spite of his having been most respectful to the said officer the latter had adopted a biased attitude against the petitioner and used highly objectionable language against him. The petitioner submitted that the officer's mind had obviously been poisoned against him by some interested parties as was apparent from the officer's rude behaviour towards the petitioner and the wrong imputations made against the petitioner had also been brought forward for the same reason. The petitioner, therefore, requested for an early enquiry and for permission to examine nine named individuals who were all working at the relevant time in the office of the Base Repair Organisation as defence witnesses for establishing his innocence. Incidentally, in Ext. The petitioner, therefore, requested for an early enquiry and for permission to examine nine named individuals who were all working at the relevant time in the office of the Base Repair Organisation as defence witnesses for establishing his innocence. Incidentally, in Ext. P-4 the petitioner also complained against the vagueness of the charge and requested for a copy of the report or complaint made against him based on which the disciplinary proceedings had been initiated. He also requested to be furnished with a list of the names of the sailors in whose presence he was said to have committed the alleged act of misconduct and also with copies of statements, if any, taken from them. 5. A Board of Enquiry was constituted by the 2nd respondent to conduct the departmental enquiry into the charge framed against the petitioner and it consisted of Commander Samuel Mathews, I. N. as President and Shri Sivasanker Domaji Bahata, Deputy Naval Store Officer as Member. The petitioner was summoned to attend the enquiry on Tuesday, the 20th October, 1964. As many as twenty one witnesses were examined at the said enquiry and the petitioner cross-examined them in great detail. The enquiry which went on for severnl days was concluded only on the 2nd November, 1964. On the 21st November, 1964 the 2nd respondent issued to the petitioner the memorandum Ext. P-5 informing him that it had been decided to reinstate him in service pending finalisation of the disciplinary proceedings instituted against him. (It may be remembered that the petitioner was under suspension from the 28th September, 1964). The petitioner was, therefore, directed to report the Naval Store Officer, Cochin immediately on receipt of the said memorandum. Accordingly he joined duty in the Naval Store Depot, Cochin on the 23rd November, 1964 to which establishment lie stood transferred from the Base Repair Organisation. 6. On the 23rd February, 1965, the petitioner received a communication from the 2nd respondent evidenced by Ext. P-6 whereby the petitioner was informed that as the 2nd respondent had observed from the proceedings of the departmental enquiry that the petitioner had not been afforded opportunity to cross-examine one of the charge witnesses and also that he had not been given " access to various official documents " relating to the case it had been decided to constitute another departmental enquiry with a view to affording him maximum opportunity to defend his case. It was further stated in Ext. P-6 that the fresh enquiry would commence at 10 a.m. on Saturday the 27th February, 1965 in I.N.S. Garuda. The petitioner was called upon to be present at the said enquiry and also to furnish the names of witnesses whom he wished to call in support of his defence. To this the petitioner replied on the 25th February, 1965, by Ext. P-7 stating that he had been permitted by the enquiry board to be present throughout the enquiry and had been enabled to cross-examine all the witnesses and that he did not recollect having omitted to cross-examine any charge witness whom he considered it necessary to cross-examine. The petitioner further stated that even if there was any such witness left without cross-examination he did not wish to have any further opportunity to cross-examine such person and that he had already done his best to bring out the facts concerning the charges and was fully satisfied with the opportunity afforded to him by the enquiry board to establish his innocence. The petitioner, therefore, submitted that the ordering of a fresh enquiry into the charges could not be regarded as a step designed to provide him with a better opportunity to defend himself and requested that the proposal for conducting a fresh enquiry may be dropped and an early decision be given on the case on the basis of the facts elicited at the enquiry which had already been elaborately conducted. 7. Notwithstanding the above representation made by the petitioner, the 2nd respondent constituted a new Board to conduct a de novo enquiry into the charges against the petitioner. The second enquiry Board consisted of Commander P.I. Telles, Commanding Officer, I.N.S. Garuda as President and Shri M. S. Kapoor, Naval Store Officer, as Member. In compliance with the notice calling upon him to be present at the enquiry the petitioner appeared before the Enquiry Board and participated in the proceedings. This enquiry which was commenced on the 9th March, 1965 also went on for a number of days and seventeen witnesses were examined before the Board, the examination of the last of them being closed only on the 19th of October, 1965. 8. Thereafter the petitioner was served with the memorandum Ext. This enquiry which was commenced on the 9th March, 1965 also went on for a number of days and seventeen witnesses were examined before the Board, the examination of the last of them being closed only on the 19th of October, 1965. 8. Thereafter the petitioner was served with the memorandum Ext. P-10, dated the 15th December, 1965, issued to him by the 2nd respondent which reads as follows: "I have had under consideration your various re-presentations and also the proceedings and findings of the Departmental Enquiry which investigated the charge framed against you, in accordance with my memo No. CS. 1172/29/1194, dated 23rd February, 1965. 2. Although the enquiry officers have found that there is insufficient evidence in suppoi t of the charge of misconduct Tue director on your part, in view of the inconsistent and conflicting nature of the evidence deposed by the various defence witnesses at the enquiry on the one side and the corroborating evidence tendered by the charge witnesses on the other side, in regard to the material facts, the proceedings of the enquiry fully substantiated that you were guilty of the offence of misconduct. I, therefore, do not agree with the findings of the Enquiry. 3. In view, however, of your long past satisfactory service, I am inclined to take a lenient view of the offences committed by you. I, therefore, hereby warn you to be more careful in your behaviour, towards superior officers and in the efficient performance of your duties, and that a recurrence of such offence will be dealt with very seriously. 4. Receipt of this memorandum is to be acknowledged." This was followed up by another communication Ext. P-11, dated the 20th December, 1965 issued to the petitioner by the 2nd respondent whereby the petitioner was informed that as it was evident from the order Ext. P-10, dated 15th December 1965 that he had not been exonerated of the offence of misconduct he was not entitled to the full pay and allowances for the period of suspension and that his pay and allowances for the said period were restricted to the subsistence allowance already paid to him. It was further mentioned in Ext. P-11 that the period during which the petitioner was under suspension will not be treated as on duty. It was further mentioned in Ext. P-11 that the period during which the petitioner was under suspension will not be treated as on duty. The petitioner preferred an appeal to the Chief of Naval Staff, Naval Headquarters, New Delhi complaining against the orders evidenced by Exts. P-10 and P-11. A copy of the appeal petition has been produced and marked in these proceedings as Ext. P-12 and it is seen therefrom that the petitioner had set out in great detail all the facts and circumstances of the case and the grounds upon which he contended that the impugned orderds passed by the 2nd respondent were incorrect and illegal. The petitioner had specifically raised the contention that there was no justification whatever for ordering a second enquiry when a full and elaborate-departmental enquiry had already been conducted and when there was no complaint whatever on his part that the said enquiry was not properly held. He also urged that when even the second departmental Enquiry Board after their deliberations lasting over eight months had found him to be not guilty of the charges levelled against him the procedure adopted by the 2nd respondent in disagreeing with the findings and condemning the petitioner as guilty of the misconduct without giving him any opportunity whatever to state his case before the 2nd respondent was not legal or fair. The petitioner submitted that the finding of guilt recorded against him by the 2nd respondent was not borne out by any evidence and that he was, therefore, entitled to have the slur cast on his fair name and reputation removed by having the findings set aside in appeal. In regard to the consequential orders passed by the 2nd respondent as to the manner in which the period of the petitioner's suspension was to be treated and as to the pay and allowances to which the petitioner was eligible during the said period, the petitioner represented that the suspension was wholly unjustified since not even a prima facie case had been established against him at the time when he was placed under suspension and his innocence had been fully vindicated by the findings entered by the two consecutive Boards of Enquiry. He, therefore, requested that the period during which he had been wrongfully kept out of duty should be treated for all purposes as period spent on duty. He, therefore, requested that the period during which he had been wrongfully kept out of duty should be treated for all purposes as period spent on duty. Lastly the petitioner brought to the notice of the Chief of Naval Staff that Commander Dalal had written a totally prejudiced confidential report against him for the year 1964 against which he had put in an appeal dated 12th October 1965 which remained undisposed of till then. It was urged by the petitioner that the adverse remarks entered against him were inextricably bound up with the allegations with which the petitioner had been charged in the departmental enquiry proceedings and since he had been found to be wholly innocent of the charge by the two Boards of Enquiry the adverse remarks should be expunged from his confidential records. 9. The aforesaid appeal petition was disposed of by the Director of Civilian Personnel, Naval Headquarters, New Delhi by the order Ext. P-13 dated the 4th June, 1966. The relevant portion of the order is extracted below: "2. The above appeal has been carefully considered by the undersigned under the powers vested in him under Rule 24 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. Taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case, I feel that the ends of justice will be met if: (a) Written warning given by the Commodore-in-charge, Cochin, vide his order No. CS. 1172/29, dated 15th December, 1965 is allowed to stay. (b) Shri Nair is granted 50 % of pay and allowance for the period he was under suspension. (c) The entire period of suspension is counted on duty for all purposes. 3. I therefore, set aside the order contained in the Commodore-in-charge, Cochin letter No. C.S/1172/29, dated 20th December. 1965 and order as under: (a) Shri Nair be granted 50% of pay and allowances for the period he was under suspension. (b) The suspension period be counted as on duty for all purposes except for pay and allowances which will be restricted to as stated in para 3(a) above." It is seen from Ext. P-13 that excepting for recording the conclusions of the appellate authority as to the final order to be passed in the matter, the order does not contain any reasoning, much less a discussion of any of the points which had been elaborately raised by the petitioner in Ext. P-12. 10. P-13 that excepting for recording the conclusions of the appellate authority as to the final order to be passed in the matter, the order does not contain any reasoning, much less a discussion of any of the points which had been elaborately raised by the petitioner in Ext. P-12. 10. The appeal petition which the petitioner had filed before the 2nd respondent against the adverse remarks entered in his confidential report for the year 1964 by Commander Delal, the Officer-in-charge of the Base Repair Organisation, was disposed of by the 2nd respondent under the order Ext. P-16, dated 17th December 1966 which stated that on a careful examination of the case the 2nd respondent did not see any ground to interfere with the report and that the appeal petition was accordingly rejected. 11. By this writ petition the petitioner seeks to quash Exts. P-10, P-11, P-13 and P-16. I shall first take up the challenge levelled by the petitioner against Ext. P-10. The petitioner has raised a specific plea in the original petition as well as the affidavit filed by him in support thereof that as a result of the elaborate enquiry conducted by the first departmental Enquiry Board that Board had completely exonerated the petitioner of the charges levelled against him see paragraph 12 of the affidavit and ground C of the original petition. On this basis the petitioner has contended in ground C that the action taken by the 2nd respondent in ordering a second enquiry against him in the face of the clear finding entered by the first Enquiry Board that the petitioner was innocent of the charges was without jurisdiction and was also mala fide. Notwithstanding such a clear plea having been put forward by the petitioner, the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is absolutely vague on this aspect. There is not even any clear statement as to the nature of the findings entered by the first Enquiry Board. The reason given in the counter-affidavit for conducting a second enquiry is as follows: "The second enquiry was held at the instance of the petitioner and for the reason that he complained of prejudice in the first enquiry and for no other." It has already been noticed that when the petitioner was informed by the communication Ext. The reason given in the counter-affidavit for conducting a second enquiry is as follows: "The second enquiry was held at the instance of the petitioner and for the reason that he complained of prejudice in the first enquiry and for no other." It has already been noticed that when the petitioner was informed by the communication Ext. P-6 that the 2nd respondent had decided to constitute another Enquiry Board and to conduct a fresh enquiry the petitioner immediately protested against the same by his representation Ext. P-7 and submitted that he had absolutely no complaint that the first enquiry had not been properly conducted but was on the other hand fully satisfied with the opportunity given to him at that enquiry for establishing his innocence. He had, therefore, requested that the proposal to conduct a fresh, enquiry should be dropped and a final decision taken in the proceedings against him on the basis of the materials gathered at the enquiry already conducted. It is, therefore, manifest the counter-affidavit enquiry cannot stand any scrutiny at all. There is no case before me that at any stage during the first enquiry or after its completion the petitioner had made any complaint whatever regarding the manner in which the enquiry was conducted or the extent of the opportunity afforded to him to establish his innocence. According to the petitioner, he had been able to disprove completely at the said enquiry the allegations levelled against him and the Board of Enquiry had entered findings exonerating him from all the charges. If this be true, there would be substantial force in the petitioner's contention that the action taken by the 2nd respondent in directing a fresh enquiry could not really have been for the purpose of affording the petitioner ''maximum opportunity to defend'' his case although the 2nd respondent has declared it to be so in Ext. P-6. It, therefore, becomes very material to ascertain the truth of the petitioner's contention that the first Enquiry Board had found him to be innocent of the charges. 12. Since the petitioner had not been furnished with a copy of the report of the said Board of Enquiry he could only assert in his pleadings what he believed to be true. The statements in the counter-affidavit touching this aspect are absolutely vague and unhelpful. 12. Since the petitioner had not been furnished with a copy of the report of the said Board of Enquiry he could only assert in his pleadings what he believed to be true. The statements in the counter-affidavit touching this aspect are absolutely vague and unhelpful. The petitioner moved this court by C.M.P. No. 7009 of 1967 for a direction to the 2nd respondent to produce before this court the reports made by the two Boards of Enquiry and by the order dated 7th November 1967 passed by my learned brother Mathew, J. the 2nd respondent was directed to produce the documents specified in the petition. During the course of the hearing of the original petition counsel for the respondents produced the files containing the proceedings of the two departmental Enquiry Boards and I have directed them to be marked as Exts. C-1 and C-2 respectively. A reference to the proceedings of the first departmental enquiry held against the petitioner shows (Ext. C-1) that the Enquiry Board had unanimously recorded the finding that "on a careful and close scrutiny of all the evidence placed before the Board it is the considered opinion of the Board that Shri K. P. B. Nair did not commit the alleged act of gross misconduct at about 16.00 on 24th September, 1964". The Board had further held that "from the evidence before the Board it is not practicable nor possible to establish a 'prima facie' case against Shri K. P. B. Nair, Assistant-in-charge, Base Repair Organisation, Cochin, now under suspension with effect from 28th September, 1964". Accordingly the Board recommended that the petitioner should be reinstated in his capacity as Assistant-in-charge and be transferred to any other department at the Base, the recommendation for transfer being apparently made for the reason that the Board considered that since the charges brought against the petitioner by the Officer-in-charge of the fiase Repair Organisation had been found to be baseless, it would not be fair to the petitioner to direct him to continue to work under the same person. 13. Thus, the record of the proceedings of the first departmental enquiry fully substantiates that truth of the petitioner's averment that the first Enquiry Board on a consideration of all the evidence had found the petitioner to be not guilty of the misconduct with which he was charged. 13. Thus, the record of the proceedings of the first departmental enquiry fully substantiates that truth of the petitioner's averment that the first Enquiry Board on a consideration of all the evidence had found the petitioner to be not guilty of the misconduct with which he was charged. It has not been shown by the counsel appearing for the respondents that this first departmental enquiry suffered from any illegality or irregularity of procedure so as to necessitate or warrant the holding of a fresh enquiry against the petitioner into the identical charge. I have already observed that I am not at all impressed with the explanation given in the counter affidavit that the fresh enquiry had been ordered only at the request of the petitioner because the records show that far from requesting for any fresh enquiry the petitioner had definitely stated before the 2nd respondent that he had absolutely no complaint against the first enquiry and that the proposal to hold a second enquiry should be dropped. Having carefully considered all the facts and circumstances I am constrained to observe that the procedure adopted by the 2nd respondent in ordering a fresh enquiry m per the order Ext. P-6 is to say the least most extraordinary and strange. The inference appears to me to be irresistible that the statement in Ext. P-6 that the fresh enquiry was being ordered with a view to affording to the petitioner maximum opportunity to defend his case cannot be regarded as correct or true and that the direction for holding a fresh enquiry must have been given for other reasons. I do not, however, wish to probe further into the matter because the petitioner did participate in the second enquiry proceedings, though under protest, and it is seen from the report of the second enquiry (Ext. C-2) that this Board of quarters, Enquiry also held that the charge of misconduct levelled against the petitioner was not established. I do not, however, wish to probe further into the matter because the petitioner did participate in the second enquiry proceedings, though under protest, and it is seen from the report of the second enquiry (Ext. C-2) that this Board of quarters, Enquiry also held that the charge of misconduct levelled against the petitioner was not established. However, before taking leave of this aspect of the case it is necessary to point out that it is neither proper nor permissible in law to subject a Government servant to successive departmental enquiries in respect of the same charge, except in cases where the earlier enquiry proceeding is either set aside by an appellate authority or by a court of law on the ground of some formal defect or where the disciplinary authority, if it was not the authority actually conducting the enquiry, finding that the enquiry had not been conducted either in accordance with the statutory rules or in conformity with the principles of natural justice. If the enquiry already held does not suffer from any of the aforesaid defects, the disciplinary authority would not be justified in directing the Government servant to undergo a fresh enquiry even if it bona fide considers that the evidence adduced at the enquiry already held has not fully brought out what it prima facie believes to be the truth in relation to the matter. 14. In other words, the law does not permit the holding of a second enquiry into the same charge merely for the purpose of either filling up the gaps in the prosecution evidence or defence evidence, or what is worse for giving either set of witnesses an opportunity to fare better in the witness box, particularly during cross-examination, and thereby to obliterate the effect of the poor performance they might have already given. 15. It is seen from Ext. C-2 that after a fresh elaborate enquiry conducted by the second Board, that Board also came to the conclusion that the charge of misconduct levelled against the petitioner had not been proved to be true. The charge against the petitioner was a very serious one because the allegation was that he had been guilty of insolent behaviour towards his superior officer and had behaved in the office in a highly objectionable manner subversive of discipline in the presence of service sailors, clerks and peons. The charge against the petitioner was a very serious one because the allegation was that he had been guilty of insolent behaviour towards his superior officer and had behaved in the office in a highly objectionable manner subversive of discipline in the presence of service sailors, clerks and peons. It was obviously on account of the gravity of the charge that the proceedings had been initiated against him under rule 15 of the Civilians in Defence Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1952 adopting the procedure for imposition of a major penalty. Under the said Rule the Government servant against whom proceedings are initiated is to be afforded an opportunity to establish his innocence at an oral enquiry if he wishes to have such an enquiry conducted. At the conclusion of such enquiry the Government servant is entitled in law to be furnished with a copy of the enquiry report and to be afforded an opportunity to canvass before the disciplinary authority the correctness of any adverse finding entered against him by the enquiring authority, except in cases where the disciplinary authority deems it fit and proper to drop the entire proceedings against the accused officer. 16. The Rules of 1952 were replaced by the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 issued under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution and these Rules came into force with effect from 1st December 1965. Under rule 34 (1) (b) of the aforesaid Rules of 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the New Rules) any proceedings initiated under the Civilians in Defence Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1952 and pending at the commencement of the New Rules are to be continued and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the New Rules as if such proceedings are proceedings initiated under the New Rules. Rule 17 of the New Rules is in the following terms: "Orders made by the disciplinary authority shall be communicated to the Government servant who shall also be supplied with a copy of the report of the inquiry, if any, held by the disciplinary authority and a copy of its findings on each article of charge, or, where the disciplinary authority is not the inquiring authority, a copy of the report of the inquiring authority and a statement of the findings of the disciplinary authority together with brief reasons for its disagreement, if any, with the findings of the inquiring authority (unless they have already been supplied to him) and also a copy of the advice, if any, given by the Commission, and where the disciplinary authority, has not accepted the advice of the Commission, a brief statement of the reasons for such non-acceptance." Since the proceedings commenced against the petitioner under the Rules of 1952 were pending on the date of commencement of the New Rules all further steps in the matter had to be taken by the 2nd respondent in strict conformity with the provisions contained in the New Rules. It is clear from rule 17 extracted above that it was incumbent on the 2nd respondent under its provisions to furnish the petitioner with a copy of the report of the Board of Enquiry. This was admittedly not done in this case nor has the 2nd respondent complied with the further requirement of rule 17 that the disciplinary authority should communicate to the Government servant concerned a statement of its finding together with its reasons for its disagreement with the findings of the inquiring authority. No reasons whatever are mentioned in Ext. P-10 as to why the findings of the Board of Enquiry were found of unacceptable by the 2nd respondent. The petitioner was told by Ext. P-10 that although the quarters inquiry officers had found that there was insufficient evidence in support of the charge against him, in view of the inconsistent and conflicting nature of the evidence given by the defence witnesses on the one side and the charge witnesses on the other side in regard to material facts the proceedings of the enquiry fully substantiated that the petitioner was guilty of the offence of misconduct. To put it most mildly it is impossible to follow this reasoning. To put it most mildly it is impossible to follow this reasoning. I have absolutely no hesitation to hold that Ext. P-10 is violative of the provisions of rule 17 and has to be struck down on this ground. 17. The procedure adopted by the 2nd respondent suffers from other infirmities as well. Quite apart from the statutory provisions contained in rule 17, it is an elementary requirement of natural justice that before the petitioner who had successfully exonerated himself before two successive Boards of Enquiry, was declared guilty by the 2nd respondent differing from the conclusion of the Board of Enquiry, the petitioner should certainly have been given an opportunity to state his case and establish his innocence before the disciplinary authority (2nd respondent). To my mind the applicability of this principle is not in any manner affected by the circumstance that the 2nd respondent chose to impose on the petitioner not any one of the major penalties but only a minor penalty of warning because the crucial fact remains that the petitioner had been branded guilty of a very grave misconduct, which undoubtedly does cast a stigma on his fair name and reputation besides constituting a perpetual black mark in his service record which will seriously affect his future prospects of departmental promotion, etc. It has to be noted in of civilian this connection that the only reason mentioned by the 2nd respondent in Ext. P-11 for denying to the petitioner the full pay and allowances for the period during which he was kept under suspension and for restricting it only to the subsistcnce allowance already drawn by him is that the petitioner had not been exonerated from the offence of misconduct in the final order evidenced by Ext. P-10. Thus, the finding of guilt recorded in Ext. P-10 has already had its repercussions on the petitioner's right to pay and allowances for the period during which he was kept under suspension and had clearly visited the petitioner with adverse civil consequences. It is now well established that before any such action is taken the party affected must be given a notice and hearing. As observed by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the recent case in State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1269. It is now well established that before any such action is taken the party affected must be given a notice and hearing. As observed by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the recent case in State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1269. "An order by the State to the prejudice of a person in derogation of his vested rights may be made only in accordance with the basic rules of justice and fairplay. The deciding authority, it is true, is not in the position of a Judge called upon to decide an action between contesting parties, and strict compliance with the forms of judicial procedure may not be insisted upon. He is, however, under a duty to give the person against whom an enquiry is held an opportunity to set up his version or defence and an opportunity to correct or controvert any evidence in che possession of the authority which is sought to be relied upon to his prejudice. For that purpose the person against whom an enquiry is held must be informed of the case he is called upon to meet, and the evidence in support thereof. The rule that a party to whose prejudice an order is intended to be passed is entitled to a hearing applies alike to judicial tribunals and bodies of persons invested with authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences. It is one of the fundamental rules of our constitutional set up that every citizen is protected against exercise of arbitrary authority by the State or its officers. Duty to act judicially would, therefore, arise from the very nature of the function intended to be performed; it need not be shown to be superadded. If there is power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power. If the essentials of justice be ignored and an order to the prejudice of a person is made, the order is a nullity. That is a basic concept of the rule of law and importance thereof transcends the significance of a decision in any particular case." It must, therefore, be held that Ext. P-10 is clearly violative of the principles of natural justice and is illegal and void for this reason as well. 18. The petitioner is also well-founded in his contention that the order Ext. P-10 is clearly violative of the principles of natural justice and is illegal and void for this reason as well. 18. The petitioner is also well-founded in his contention that the order Ext. P-11 whereby the second respondent decided that the period during which the petitioner was under suspension should not be treated as on duty and consequently the petitioner was denied his full pay and allowances for the said period and was further subjected to a forfeiture of his service for that period, is illegal since it was passed without any notice or affording an opportunity to him to show cause against such action. The point is directly covered in favour of the petitioner by the decision of the Supreme Court reported in M. Gopalakrishna Naidu v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1968) 1 S.C.W.R. 97, Their Lordships while considering the validity of a similar order passed under Fundamental Rule 54 explained the legal position thus: "It is true as Mr. Sen pointed out that F.R. 54 does not in express terms lay down that the authority shall give to the employee concerned the opportunity to show cause before he passes the order. Even so, the question, is whether the rule casts such a duty on the authority by implication. The order as to whether a given case falls under clause 2 or clause 5 of the Fundamental Rule must depend on the examination by the authority of all the facts and circumstances of the case and his forming the opinion therefrom of two factual findings; whether the employee was fully exonerated and in case of suspension whether it was wholly unjustified. Besides, an order passed under this rule would obviously affect the Government servant adversely if it is one made under clauses 3 and 5. Consideration under this rule depending as it does on facts and circumstances in their entirety, passing an order on the basis of factual finding arrived at from such facts and circumstances and such an order resulting in pecuniary loss to the Government servant must be held to be an objective rather than a subjective function. The very nature of the function implies the duty to act judicially. The very nature of the function implies the duty to act judicially. In such a case if an opportunity to show cause against the action proposed is not afforded, as admittedly it was not done in the present case, the order is liable to be struck down as invalid on the ground that it is one in breach of the principles of natural justice." Tested in the light of the above principles, there can be no doubt that Ext. P-11 order is violative of the principles of natural justice and is therefore void. 19. Although the petitioner in his appeal petition evidenced by Ext. P-12 had pointedly brought to the notice of the appellate authority the procedural irregularities committed by the 2nd respondent in passing the orders evidenced by Exts. P-10 and P-11 and had also raised several contentions in support of his challenge against the merits of the finding of guilt entered against the petitioner by the 2nd respondent, we do not find a consideration of any of the matters in the order Ext. P-13 passed by the appellate authority. Under rule 27 (2) (a) of the New Rules the appellate authority is bound to consider whether the procedure laid down by the rules has been complied with by the subordinate authority and if not, whether such non-compliance has resulted in the violation of any provisions of the Constitution of India or in the failure of justice. Under sub-clause (b) of the said rule it is further incumbent on the appellate authority to consider whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on record. The consideration of these matters by the appellate authority must necessarily be reflected in its order. In the present case there is nothing in Ext. P-13 to indicate that there has been a discharge of this mandatory function by the appellate authority, because all that one gets in Ext. P-13 is a statement by the appellate authority that taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case it felt that the ends of justice will be met if the written warning administered to the petitioner by the second respondent was allowed to stay and the petitioner is granted 50 per cent of the pay and allowances for the period he was under suspension treating the entire period of suspension as period spent on duty for all purposes. It is not possible to gather from Ext. P-13 what conclusion, if any, had been arrived at by the appellate authority on the most vital question as to whether the finding of guilt entered against the petitioner by the disciplinary authority was warranted by the evidence on record. It has, therefore, to be held that a their has not been a proper disposal of the appeal by the appellate authority and that the order Ext, P-13 cannot be sustained. Further, in as much as I have come to the conclusion that Exts. P-10 and P-11 are void on the ground of contravention oi the principles of natural justice, the order Ext. P-13 which has virtually confirmed Ext. P-10 and has proceeded to pass consequential orders, though in slight modification of Ext. P-11, has also necessarily to fall to the ground. I, therefore, quash the orders evidenced by Exts. P-10, P-11 and P-13. In the light of the above findings given by this Court, fresh orders will be passed by the respondents in consonance with law on the question of the petitioner's right to pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. 20. The last point raised by the petitioner relates to the adverse entries made in his annual confidential report, 1964, communicated to him by the Naval Store Officer under Ext. P-14. It cannot be ignored that this entry was made by the Officer-in-charge, Base Repair Organisation (Commander Dalal) at a time when the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner on his personal complaint was pending. From the two enquiry reports evidenced by Exts. C-1 and C-2 it is seen that it was concurrently found by the two successive Boards of Enquiry that the complaint put in by Commander Dalal imputing to the petitioner insubordinate and insolent behaviour subversive of discipline was not proved to be true. The immediate superior officer under whom the petitioner was working was one Lieutenant Sunny and it is said that the report in question was initiated by him. It is noteworthy that when this person was examined as a witness before the first Enquiry Board on the 24th of October, 1964 he has stated that from his experience he had found that the petitioner was a very honest and sincere man, patient and loyal and respectful to his seniors. It is noteworthy that when this person was examined as a witness before the first Enquiry Board on the 24th of October, 1964 he has stated that from his experience he had found that the petitioner was a very honest and sincere man, patient and loyal and respectful to his seniors. He was again examined before the second Board of Enquiry on the 5th July, 1965, and in answer to the question " from your knowledge of Shri Nair in your personal and official capacity, what have you to say about his character and efficiency " put to him by the Board the witness stated that " he is alright with his work. As far as I know his character is good". By that date, the adverse remark now complained against by the petitioner had been already communicated to him under Ext. P-14. The witness was, therefore, specifically cross-examined by the Board with reference to this report. He admitted that it was he who initiated the confidential report against the petitioner in the year 1964 and on being confronted with the report he made a very unsuccessful attempt to wriggle out of his previous answer certifying that the petitioner's work was quite satisfactory and that his character was also good. In regard to this evidence and the matter of the confidential report the second Enquiry Board had made the following remarks in paragraph 11 of its report: "In this same respect, the Board considers the evidence furnished by Lieut. P. Sunny as unreliable because when asked by the Board to give his opinion of Shri K. P. B. Nair's character and efficiency replied vide Ans. to Ques. 899 He is alright with his work. As far as I know his character is good '. Yet later in Ans. to Ques. 904 states that the remarks made in the extract of the Annual Confidential Report of 1964, furnished to Shri K. P. B. Nair, agrees with his opinion of the Assistaat-in-charge's character and ability. These two statements are inconsistent and contradictory. Shri K. P. B. Nair also claims that in the previous Departmental Enquiry, held in the same respect in October, 1964, Lieut. P. Sunny had given evidence that his (Shri K. P. B. Nair's) character was exemplary and his efficiency outstanding (see side-lined portion 'C' of Ans. to Ques. 923 on page 121 of the Proceedings). Shri K. P. B. Nair also claims that in the previous Departmental Enquiry, held in the same respect in October, 1964, Lieut. P. Sunny had given evidence that his (Shri K. P. B. Nair's) character was exemplary and his efficiency outstanding (see side-lined portion 'C' of Ans. to Ques. 923 on page 121 of the Proceedings). The Board was unable to check this but considers that this should be verified from the proceedings of the previous Departmental Enquiry. Confirmation of this aspect is considered important, as if Lieut. P. Sunny had in actual fact deposed before the last Departmental Enquiry Board that Shri K. P. B. Nair's character and efficiency was exemplary and outstanding respectively then his evidence before this Board would indicate a complete change-about, brought about by apparent influence and pressure." In the appeal petition Ext. P-15 preferred by the petitioner to the 2nd respondent against the adverse entries made in his confidential record the petitioner had expressly raised the contention that the said remarks had been entered against him by Lieutenant Sunny only at the instance of Commander Dalal so that the latter's complaint against the petitioner which was then pending enquiry might find corroboration in the petitioner's service record also. Pointed attention of the appellate authority had been invited by the petitioner to the evidence given by Lieutenant Sunny before the first Board of Enquiry certifying to his good work and character and to the significant fact that the petitioner had not worked in the Base Repair Organisation even for a single day after Lieutenant Sunny gave that evidence and there was, therefore, no occasion whatever for the said Officer to revise his opinion on the basis of any-subsequent event. In addition to the above, the petitioner had given a very detailed narration of facts and events which, according to him, would go to prove that the adverse remarks were totally uncalled for and had been deliberately made with mala fide and malacious intent. The appellate authority rejected the petitioner's representation by the order Ext. P-16. There is nothing in Ext. P-16 to show that the appellate authority has even applied us mind to any of the relevant facts or aspects mentioned in the appeal pethion. I feel no doubt that in passing the order Ext. The appellate authority rejected the petitioner's representation by the order Ext. P-16. There is nothing in Ext. P-16 to show that the appellate authority has even applied us mind to any of the relevant facts or aspects mentioned in the appeal pethion. I feel no doubt that in passing the order Ext. P-16 the 2nd respondent must have been very largely influenced by the fact of his having already found the petitioner guilty of the charge of misconduct as per his earlier proceeding evidenced by Ext. P-10, because in the circumstances of the case the subject-matter of the disciplinary proceedings is inextricably linked with the adverse observations recorded by the two officers who figured as the complainant and the prosecution witness in the disciplinary enquiry. I have already held that the order Ext. P-10 passed by the 2nd respondent whereby the petitioner was held to be guilty of the charge of misconduct is illegal and void. In the circumstances, justice and fairplay require that there should be a fresh consideration by the appellate authority of the justifiability of the adverse remarks entered against the petitioner in Ext. P-14. The order Ext. P-16 is therefore, quashed and the 2nd respondent is directed to consider afresh the appeal petition evidenced by Ext. P-15 in the light of the observations and findings contained in this judgment. 21. The original petition is allowed as above. There will be no direction regarding costs.