JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - The question is whether the setting aside of an order and sending the matter back for rehearing revived an interim order of stay passed by the original authority during the pendency of the case before it. It arises in this way. Against the grant of permission to sue for the petitioner's ejectment from the accommodation in dispute the petitioner-tenant filed a revision before the State Government under Section 7-F of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. During the pendency of the revision on 5th April, 1965, the State Government passed the following order :- "Operation of the permission under Section 3 of the Act granted by the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut to the opposite party-landlady to file a suit for the petitioner's ejectment from the house in question is stayed pending consideration of the case by the State Government." The State Government ort 14th June, 1966, allowed the revision and revoked the permission. The landlady came to this court in a writ petition. This petition was allowed by an order passed on 28th February, 1967. A learned single Judge found that the hearing of the revision before the State Government was not in accordance with law. The case must, therefore, be reheard according to law. The operative part of the order was :- "The petition is allowed. The order of the State Government dated 14/16-1-1966 (Annexure E to the petition) is quashed. The State Government is directed to rehear Smt. Prabhawati Devi's revision under Section 7-F of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, according to law." 2. The landlady filed a suit for the petitioner's ejectment in the civil court on 1st March, 1967, and thereafter took an objection before the State Government that the tenant's revision has become infructuous because of the institution of the suit. The State Government upheld this objection and dismissed the tenant's revision on 4th September, 1968. 3. The order of the State Government has been challenged on the ground that the institution of the suit on 1st March, 1967, was incompetent because as a result of the order of remand passed by this Court the stay order granted by the State Government on 5th April, 1965, revived. 3. The order of the State Government has been challenged on the ground that the institution of the suit on 1st March, 1967, was incompetent because as a result of the order of remand passed by this Court the stay order granted by the State Government on 5th April, 1965, revived. The operation of the permission granted to the landlady not being in operation because of the stay order, the institution of the suit could not be held to be in pursuance of the permission; and consequently the revision before the State Government did not become infructuous. 4. The point for consideration is whether the stay order would revive on the revival of the revision. In Om Prakash Gupta v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1955 SC 600 Mr. Gupta was placed under suspension pending enquiry into his conduct. As a result of the enquiry an order of dismissal by way of penalty had been passed against him. He challenged the validity of the order by way of a suit and succeeded. The civil court declared that the order of dismissal was invalid, It was argued before the Supreme Court that the order of suspension made against the petitioner was one pending an enquiry. Since the order of dismissal was declared to be illegal it became non-existent in the eye of law. The enquiry, the outcome of which `was the order of dismissal, had not, therefore, ended. It could only end with a valid order which would replace the order of suspension. Until that hapeened the order of suspension would remain in operation. The Supreme Court did not accept this submission. It held that when the order of dismissal was passed the order of suspension lapsed. The order of dismissal replaced the order of suspension which then ceased to exist. The subsequent declaration by the civil court' that the order of dismissal was illegal did not revive the order of suspension which did not exist. This decision would suggest that interim orders passed pending consideration of the case by the State Government would lapse and cease to exist the moment the State Government decides the case. If the decision of the State Government is for some reason set aside, then the previous interim order which had ceased to exist could not revive by itself. This decision would suggest that interim orders passed pending consideration of the case by the State Government would lapse and cease to exist the moment the State Government decides the case. If the decision of the State Government is for some reason set aside, then the previous interim order which had ceased to exist could not revive by itself. This Court when it quashed the order of the State Government and directed it to rehear the revision according to law did not either expressly or by any implication seek to revive the order of stay. The State Government also did not pass any fresh order of stay. 5. The same result seems to follow from Balvantrai Ratilal Patel v. State of Maherashtra, A.I.R. 1968 SC 800. In that case while considering the question whether sanction should be granted for the prosecution of the appellant. the authorities passed an order placing him under suspension "pending further orders". Subsequently the requisite sanction was given for the prosecution of the appellant under Section 161, I. P. C. The appellant was convicted but ultimately in revision the Bombay High Court set aside the conviction and sentence. Thereafter the Government directed that a departmental enquiry should be held against the appellant. At the enquiry the charges were held proved and an order of dismissal was passed against the appellant. He filed a suit to question the validity of the dismissal order. The suit was dismissed by the High Court as barred by time. The matter went up to the Supreme Court where it was urged that the order of suspension was pending an enquiry and it lapsed when the appellant was acquitted by the High Court in revision and hence he was entitled, to full pay for the period between the date of the High Court decision and the date when he was ultimately dismissed. The Supreme Court repelled this submission. It held that the order of suspension expressly stated that the appellant was suspended with immediate effect "pending further orders" and observed that it was clear, therefore, that the order of suspension could not be automatically terminated but it could have been terminated by another order of the State Government. Therefore, until another order had been passed terminating the suspension the appellant had no right to be reinstated to service. Therefore, until another order had been passed terminating the suspension the appellant had no right to be reinstated to service. It distinguished the decision of the Orissa High Court in Narayan Prasad Rewany v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1957 Orissa 51. In that case an order of suspension was passed under Rule 93-A of the Orissa Service Code under which the Government servant could be suspended during the periods when he was not actually detained in custody or imprisoned. Having regard to the terms of that rule it was held by the Orissa High Court that the order ceased to be operative as soon as criminal proceedings had terminated. The Supreme Court observed that the extent of the operation of the order of suspension depended upon the language of the rule. 6. This decision would also show that an order of suspension pending enquiry would last only so long as the enquiry continues. It will lapse on a final order being passed, unless the order itself or the relevant rules keep the order pending till the occurrence cf some other contingency, namely like passing of a fresh order revoking the order of suspension. 7. In the present case the State Government did not pass a fresh order pending further orders, but pending consideration of the case by the State Government. That consideration ended on 14th June, 1966. The stay order ceased to exist on that date. Once it ceased to exist there was no question of its revival by the accident of the final order being set aside by a higher authority or Court. 8. It is now well settled that an order, whether administrative or judicial, against which an appeal or revision is provided, merges with an order passed in appeal or revision, see Madan Gopal v. Secy. to the Government, A.I.R. 1962 SC 1513, Collector of Customs v. East India Commercial Company, A.I.R. 1963 SC 1124 and State of Madras v. Madurai Mills Co. Ltd., (1967) 19 Sales Tax Cases 144. Even if it is accepted that the effect of setting aside of the appellate or the revisional order may be to revive the original order, yet interim orders of stay etc. passed pending the decision of a case would not be on a par and this principle would not apply to them because the interim orders do not merge in the final orders. passed pending the decision of a case would not be on a par and this principle would not apply to them because the interim orders do not merge in the final orders. According to the Supreme Court they lapse or cease to exist. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to Khem Chand v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1963 SC 687. This case is not applicable. The Court interpreted the effect of sub-rules (3) and (4) of Rule 12 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957. Sub-rule (3) provided that when an order of penalty imposed upon a Government servant is set aside on appeal or review' under the rules and the case is remitted for further enquiry the order of suspension shall be deemed to have continued in force on and from the date of the original order of penalty and shall remain in force until further orders. Sub-rule (4) similarly 11` provides for the continuance of the order a suspension where the order of penalty is set aside by a court of law and the disciplinary authority decides to hold a further enquiry. In that case the effect in law of the setting aside of an order of penalty upon a previous order of suspension was neither raised nor considered. 10. The learned counsel invited my attention to some decisions in which it was held that when 'an order is set aside and the case is remanded the whole case is reopened and that the previous findings are not binding and fresh findings can be given. Even so, this principle would not help the' petitioner. It would suggest that the previous order no longer remained operative: and fresh orders have to be passed. 11. In my opinion the stay order passed by the State Government on 5th April, 1965, did not in law revive because of the quashing of the State Government's final order by this Court and sending the case back for rehearing. The suit filed by the landlady was hence maintainable, and, as held by the Supreme Court in Bhagwan Das v. Paras Nath, 1967 AWR 713 with' the institution of a suit, the revision before this State Government became infructuous. 12. The petition, therefore, fails and is a accordingly dismissed with costs.