JUDGMENT R.S. Pathak, J. - This is a judgment-debtor's appeal against an order dismissing his objection to the execution of a decree. 2. The decree-holder-respondents filed suit No. 30 of 1945 against two sets of defendants. The first set consisted of the appellant Ragho Prasad, Madho Prasad and Beni Prasad, sons of Misri Lal. The second set consisted of Bishambhar Nath Khazanchi. The suit was in respect of a property referred to as "Pechghar" and a piece of Nazul land. The Pechgarh property originally belonged to the appellant's mother Ambika Devi. It was alleged in the plaint that the plaintiffs held the property jointly with Bishambhar Nath Khazanchi, their share being three-fourths At by virtue of two sale deeds, one executed in 1919 by Ambika Devi and the other in 1923 by the defendants first set. The Nazul land was purchased by the father of the plaintiffs in 1923, but subsequently it was decided that he was entitled to a three-fourths share in it. The defendants first set remained in possession of both proper. ties with the permission of the plaintiffs and their father. They were requested subsequently to deliver possession of the three-fourths share to the plaintiffs and to render an account of the rents realised during their period of possession, but they declined to vacate and to render accounts. The plaintiffs also alleged that because of litigation with the defendant second set it was not possible for them to manage the property jointly with him. Accordingly, they prayed for partition of their three-fourths share and for possession thereof. The suit was contested by the defendants. On February 21, 1952 a preliminary decree was passed by the trial court for possession and partition. The plaintiffs were also granted mesne profits found due on accounting against the defendants first set. And a commission was also issued for partition of the three-fourths share claim ed in the two properties. An appeal by the defendants first set against the preliminary decree was dismissed by this Court on March 23, 1959. The final decree in the suit was passed on August 4, 1966, and on the basis of the Commissioner's report a Kura embodying their three-fourths share was allotted to the plaintiffs. The decree also declared that they could now take possession of the portion allotted to them through execution proceedings. On May 16, 1967 the final decree was put into execution. 3. The decree also declared that they could now take possession of the portion allotted to them through execution proceedings. On May 16, 1967 the final decree was put into execution. 3. Meanwhile, the defendants first set filed an appeal in this Court against the final decree, and on May 19, 1967, upon application made by them, this Court stayed the execution of the decree to the extent that their dispossession from a portion of the Pechghar known as the Haveli was stayed. That stay order was ultimately discharged in December, 1967. 4. As to the rest of the property, possession was delivered to the decree-holders on May 30, 1967. 5. The judgment-debtors first set now filed a series of objections before the executing court. 6. On July 3, 1967 an objection was filed complaining that the decree-holders had obtained possession over the Nazul land, and that as the Nazul land was not the subject of the decree the judgment-debtors should be restored to possession over the Nazul land. This objection was upheld by an order dated August 9, 1967, and an execution first appeal is now pending in this Court. 7. On October 17, 1967, the judgment-debtors filed another objection (No. 43 of 1967) pointing out that the Pechghar property had been in the possession of a receiver appointed by this Court, and that as possession had been taken without the permission of this Court it should be restored to the receiver. Another objection (Misc. No. 45 of 1967) was filed on November 4, 1967. This also pointed out that the decree for possession could not have been executed without the permission of this Court because the property was in the possession of the receiver, and, therefore, the execution was not maintainable and should be struck of. Both these objections were dismissed by the executing court on December 22, 1967. An execution first appeal against that order was dismissed in limine by a Division Bench of this Court on January 5, 1968. 8. The stay order of this Court enabling the judgment-debtors to continue in possession of the Haveli having been discharged in December, 1967, the executing court now issued a writ for delivery of possession of that property also. 9. 8. The stay order of this Court enabling the judgment-debtors to continue in possession of the Haveli having been discharged in December, 1967, the executing court now issued a writ for delivery of possession of that property also. 9. On January 8, 1968 the judgment-debtors filed an objection contending that they were not liable to be ejected from the Haveli and that the writ should be recalled and the execution application rejected. The grounds underlying the objection were elaborated in another objection filed on January 30, 1968. Both objections were dismissed by the executing court by an order dated July 16, 1969. That order is now challenged by the present appeal. 10. Before the executing court, the judgment-debtors raised two contentions. They urged that the execution was barred by limitation because the decree for possession as against them was embodied in the preliminary decree, and it became executable when that decree was passed in 1952. The other contention was that they were in adverse possession before the suit was filed and if the preliminary decree be taken as merely declaring the right of the decree-holders to possession the declaratory decree did not interrupt their adverse possession, and they had prescribed title by adverse possession by the time the final decree was passed. 11. Both contentions were rejected by the executing court, which also held that the objections were barred by constructive res judicata as all the pleas now taken could have been urged in the earlier objections filed by the judgment-debtors. 12. In the appeal before us, learned counsel for the appellant founds his submission that the execution is barred by limitation on the following argument. He urges that as there were two distinct sets of defendants in the suit, the preliminary decree of 1952 and the final decree of 1966 should both be comprehended as laying down separate provisions in respect of the two distinct sets of defendants. As against the defendants first set, they should be construed in the light of Order 20, Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and as against the defendant second set it is Order 20, Rule 18 which should be read. As against the defendants first set, they should be construed in the light of Order 20, Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and as against the defendant second set it is Order 20, Rule 18 which should be read. If that basis is adopted, then, says the appellant, in relation to the judgment-debtors first set the decree of 1952 must-be construed as a decree for possession executable immediately, and accompanied by a direction for taking accounts for quantifying the mesne profits. As against the defendant second act, the decree of 1952 was a preliminary decree declaring the share of the decree-holders and directing partition of the properties to enable a final decree to be passed thereafter. Learned counsel urges that as the decrees of 1952 and 1966 are ambiguous, he is entitled to refer to the plaint and the judgments leading to-the decrees, and he has referred us to certain paragraphs of the plaint to show that the plaintiffs had sought possession of their undivided share in the joint properties from the defendants first set, and that, he contends, could only have been granted in a proper suit praying for joint possession with those defendants as transferees. In reply, learned counsel for the decree-holders at first resisted any attempt to construe the two decrees by reference to the plaint and the judgments, but during the course of his submissions he has also relied on the contents of those documents. 13. It is settled law that the executing court is confined to the terms of the decree when executing it, and, where the terms of the decree are ambiguous for the purpose of construing those terms resort may be had to the pleadings and the judgment. Inasmuch as learned counsel for both the parties have for the purpose of construing the two decrees referred also to the plaint and the respective judgments, we consider it unnecessary to enter into the question whether we should confine ourselves to the decrees alone. 14. A perusal of the plaint clearly shows that the relief sought by the plaintiffs in the suit was partition of their three-fourths share in the two properties by forming a separate Qura and for actual possession of the same. In point of time, therefore, the relief is divisible into two stages. 14. A perusal of the plaint clearly shows that the relief sought by the plaintiffs in the suit was partition of their three-fourths share in the two properties by forming a separate Qura and for actual possession of the same. In point of time, therefore, the relief is divisible into two stages. First, partition of their share and its definities by the formation of a separate Qura and, second actual possession over the separated property embodied in the Qura. This was a relief claimed against both sets of defendants. No distinction was made between the two sets of defendants as regards the nature of the relief claimed. 16. Turning to the judgment dated February 21, 1952 leading to the preliminary decree, we find that towards the conclusion of the judgment and immediately preceding the operative part there is a paragraph reading :- "The plaintiffs ....... are also entitled to possession of the property after partition of their three-fourths share in the Nazul land and Pechghar." (halides fours) . 17. The trial court clearly contemplated that the share of the plaintiffs should first be partitioned and separated, and thereafter possession of the separated property should be given to them. 18. If the decree of 1952 is construed in the light of what is stated in the plaint and the judgment, we have no doubt that it cannot be construed in the sense in which learned counsel for the appellant has sought to persuade us. The decree of 1952 cannot be treated as a decree for possession executable forthwith against the defendants first set with relief for mesne profits to follow, and separately as a decree for partition and mesne profits against the defendant second set. 19. Accordingly, we hold that the period of limitation for executing the decree for possession did not commence to run from February 21, 1952, and on that ground the. execution application cannot be said to be barred by time. As we read the preliminary and the final decrees, it was upon the, passing of the final decree on October 24, 1966 that the decree-holders became entitled to execute the decree for possession, and we are, therefore, of opinion that the execution application was within time. 20. execution application cannot be said to be barred by time. As we read the preliminary and the final decrees, it was upon the, passing of the final decree on October 24, 1966 that the decree-holders became entitled to execute the decree for possession, and we are, therefore, of opinion that the execution application was within time. 20. We have been referred to a number of decisions by learned counsel for the appellant suggesting the remedy open to a co-sharer suing for possession of his share in joint property occupied by a trespasser. Those decisions are Radha Prosad Wasti v. Esuf, (1888) ILR 7 Cal. 414, Rohan Singh v. Ahsas Begama, (1912) 10 ALJR 518, Sabjan Bibi v. Asanulla Sheikh, AIR 1927 Calcutta 411 and Naresh Chandra v. Hyder Sheikh, AIR 1929 Calcutta 28. In our opinion, the decisions do not assist the appellant. We are not concerned with the question whether the plaintiffs were right in adopting the remedy by way of the present suit or whether they should have framed the suit differently. We need express no opinion on this question because neither the executing court nor we in appeal from its order are entitled to go into that question. It may have been a matter for consideration in the appeal against the preliminary decree. That appeal has been dismissed. So far as the instant proceeding is concerned, it is an execution proceeding and we must take the decree as it stands. An executing court is confined to executing the decree in the terms in which it is couched, it is not for it to adjudicate upon the legality or the correctness of the decree and to substitute a new decree for it. It is only in the exceptional case where the decree is a nullity that the executing court may give effect to an objection on that ground. Here, plainly, the decree is for partition of the plaintiffs' share in the properties, which is to be followed by possession of the demarcated or separated share. 21. The first contention of learned counsel for the appellant is rejected. 22. Here, plainly, the decree is for partition of the plaintiffs' share in the properties, which is to be followed by possession of the demarcated or separated share. 21. The first contention of learned counsel for the appellant is rejected. 22. The next contention of learned counsel is that if the decree-holders are held entitled to possession only upon the final decree, then the preliminary decree for possession must be considered as merely declaratory in nature, and, it is urged, as the judgment-debtors first set were in ad-verse possession for a considerable period before this (learned counsel suggests that the judgment-debtors must be taken to be in adverse possession from 1944 when certain litigation between the parties came to an end) the judgment-debtors must be taken to have prescribed title by adverse possession by the time the final decree was passed in 1966. The passing of the preliminary decree in 1952, it is said, did not in law interrupt the period of adverse possession. Reliance is placed on Subbaiva v. Md. Mustafa, A.I.R. 1923 P.C. 135. We are of opinion that the contention is without substance. The suit in the instant case Was not a suit for a declaration, it was a suit for partition and possession. In a suit such as this, it is not possible to hold that if the defendant has been in adverse possession before: the institution of the suit such adverse: possession continues to run even after: the institution of the suit so as to prescribe a good title in favour of the defendant. Were that so it could result in the frustration of the suit because while it was pending and before it terminated in: a decree the defendant could have acquired title by adverse possession. Such a result is wholly unwarranted in law. Learned counsel also suggests that adverse possession be taken to commence from 1952 when the preliminary decree was passed, and urges that by the time the final decree was passed the defendants first set must be considered as having prescribed title by adverse possession. That submission is also founded in fallacy. The preliminary decree did not terminate the suit. The suit continued to remain pending. It was terminated by the final decree only. 23. That submission is also founded in fallacy. The preliminary decree did not terminate the suit. The suit continued to remain pending. It was terminated by the final decree only. 23. The result is that in respect of both the contentions, namely that the execution application was barred by limitation and that the judgment-debtors have prescribed title by adverse possession held that they have no force and must be rejected. 24. The executing court has dismissed the objections of the judgment-debtors on another ground also. It has held that the objections were barred by the principle of constructive res judieata inasmuch as it was open to the judgment-debtors to raise these very pleas at an earlier stage of the execution proceedings, that they might and ought to have done so, and not having done so, they are barred from raising the pleas now. It is now settled law that the principle of constructive res judicata applies to execution proceeding. Mohanlat v. Benoy Kishna, A.I.R. 1953 SC 65. There is no dispute that notice of the execution application: was served upon the judgment-debtors, long before the present objections were filed in January 1968. The judgment-debtors were aware of the execution proceedings and initiated a series of steps to arrest it. They applied for stay of the execution in the appeal filed by them against the final decree and succeeded in obtaining a stay order in respect of the Haveli on May 19, 1967. Then, they also objected to the execution of the decree on the ground that execution could not be taken without the permission of this Court which had appointed a receiver in respect of the property. Those objections were filed on October 17, 1967 and November 4, 1967, and in the latter it was specifically prayed that the execution should be struck of. The two objections were dismissed on December 22, 1967 and thereafter an execution first appeal was dismiss ed by this Court on January 5, 1968. It was open to the judgment-debtors to take the pleas now raised in any of those proceedings. But they did not do so. Learned Counsel for the appellant points out that the execution proceeding in respect of the Haveli had remained stayed during this period by this Court, and consequently no occasion arose for challenging the validity of the execution proceedings. There is no substance in that contention. But they did not do so. Learned Counsel for the appellant points out that the execution proceeding in respect of the Haveli had remained stayed during this period by this Court, and consequently no occasion arose for challenging the validity of the execution proceedings. There is no substance in that contention. The execution proceeding, it is true, had been stayed in respect of the Haveli, but it proceeded in respect of the remaining properties. Moreover, stay of the execution did not mean that the execution proceeding was not pending. The execution proceeding continued to remain pending, even though suspended in respect of part of the property. The judgment-debtors did file objections to the execution proceedings. The two objections that the execution proceeding was not maintainable because the permission of this Court had not been taken before execution was commenced were objections under Section 47 of the Code. The objections were directed against the delivery of possession of the property to the decree-holders without previously obtaining the permission of this Court and in the first of the two objections it was prayed that possession of the property should be restored to the receiver. It is settled law that if the decree-holder takes in execution land not included in the decree, or in excess of the decree, the judgment-debtor must apply under Section 47 for the recovery of such land, and a separate suit for that purpose will not lie. In Ramanna v. Nallaparaju, A.I.R. 1956 SC 87 the Supreme Court observed:- "It is well settled that when a sale in execution of a decree is impugned on the ground that it is not warranted by the terms thereof, that question could be agitated, when it arises between the parties to the decree, only by an application under Section 47 and not in a separate Suit." 24. In Patnakar v. Sastri, A.I.R. 1961 SC 272 the decree-holder in execution of a decree in ejectment obtained possession and satisfaction of the decree was recorded and thereafter the judgment-debtor applied for redelinery on the ground that the order for delivery was illegal. The Supreme Court held that the question whether the decree was completely satisfied and the court became functus officio was a question which related to the execution, satisfactions and discharge of the decree and should be tried under Section 47. 25. The Supreme Court held that the question whether the decree was completely satisfied and the court became functus officio was a question which related to the execution, satisfactions and discharge of the decree and should be tried under Section 47. 25. We, therefore, affirm the view of the executing court that the pleas now raised by the judgment-debtors first set to the execution of the decree are barred by the principle of constructive res judicata. 26. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.