JUDGMENT 1. THIS is a suit raised on June 15, 1955, by Radha Krishna Daga, the lone proprietor of Banshidhar Radha Krishna, for recovery of Rs. 82,642, from the sole defendant, the General Assurance society, Limited, on account of the loss sustained by him of 525 bales of jute, which the defendant, by three cover notes or slips, each bearing date March 21, 1955, had insured against damage for "all :risks", on a voyage from Tezpur ghat, in Assam to Cossipore Ghat in calcutta by MV Raju, the owner of which is Neptune Navigation. 2. FOR 525 bales of jute so consigned from Tezpore Ghat to Cossipore ghat there were three bills of lading, each bearing date March 7, 1955. The bales specified in each such bill are ; Sl . No. Registered number of the bill of lading. Number of bales of jute consigned. (1) 2) (3) 1. 2. 3. Tez. |401|55|rj. Tez. |402|55|rj. Tez. |403|55|rj. 250 150 125 Total: 525 (Paragraph 4 of the plaint) Three separate cover notes or slips dated March 21, 1955, were made at Gauhati between the plaintiff Radha krishna Daga, on one hand, and the defendant insurance company, on the other. On behalf of the company, one a. C. Mookherjee, the company's officer in charge or agent or, at any rate, one held out by the company as such, acted in the making of the cover notes. More, "in consideration of premia paid and to be paid", the defendant company insured the plaintiff Daga "for all risks" against loss of, or damage to, the consignment of bales of jute stated above. Here is a tabular statement showing the requisite particulars of the three cover notes, each bearing date March 21, 1955 :3a. With a view to making for clarity, I depart a little from the plaint and reproduce below a specimen of the cover notes, marked exhibit C collectively, each being of the same pattern. : (In red ink, within the rubber-stamp of the defendant insurance company, wherein is inscribed Assam, gauhati.) 3. ONLY three days later, to be exact, on March 24, 1955, a sum of rs. 575-11 annas was paid on behalf of the plaintiff Daga and accepted on behalf of the defendant insurance company, such sum having been the aggregate of the premium and costs of stamp: paragraph 7 ibid. 4. ONLY three days later, to be exact, on March 24, 1955, a sum of rs. 575-11 annas was paid on behalf of the plaintiff Daga and accepted on behalf of the defendant insurance company, such sum having been the aggregate of the premium and costs of stamp: paragraph 7 ibid. 4. BUT only a day or two earlier, namely, on March 22 or 23 previous, the entire consignment of jute became a total loss due to fire when MV Raju was near Aricha in East Pakistan on her way to Cossipore from Tezpur. Result: the plaintiff Daga, who was all along interested in the consignment and also in the amount insured, suffered damages to the extent of Rs. 82,642, calculated at the current market rate of the value of different varieties of jute so consigned and destroyed : paragraphs 8 and 9 ibid. And Rs. 82,642 is the sum payable by the defendant insurance company which, however, wrongfully repudiated the contract of insurance and refrained too from issuing any policy or making any payment whatsoever : paragraph 11 ibid. Hence this suit for recovery of Rs. 82,642,-Rs. 8,858 less than the insured amount of Rs. 91,500. 5. SUCH then is the theme and thread of the plaint the plaintiff Radha krishna Daga comes to court with. 6. IN resisting a suit as this, the defendant insurance company denies or does not admit the material allegations summarised above. One, the consignment; of 525 bales of jute or Neptune navigation issuing bills of lading is not admitted : paragraph 2 of the written statement. Two, the issue of cover notes: on March 21, 1955, for consideration, or the authority of A. C. Mookherjee to issue so is denied : paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 ibid. Three, the plaintiff daga having been interested in the bales of jute and also in the amount insured is not admitted : paragraph 6 ibid., where paragraph 6 of the plaint is referred to through mistake instead of paragraph 8. Four, destruction by fire of the whole consignment or the plaintiff Daga having suffered any damage; is denied too: paragraph 7 ibid Five, are denied again. (i) the defendant company's liability for Rs. Four, destruction by fire of the whole consignment or the plaintiff Daga having suffered any damage; is denied too: paragraph 7 ibid Five, are denied again. (i) the defendant company's liability for Rs. 82,642 or any amount, (ii) any contract of insurance, (iii) the defendant company being under a liability to issue any policy, (iv) wrongful repudiation of the alleged contract of insurance, and (v) wrongful withholding of any policy : paragraphs 8 and 9 ibid. The issues raised at the trial are: 1. Did the plaintiff consign from tejpur 525 bales of jute, as alleged in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the plaint ? 2(a) Were the cover notes or slips dated March 21, 1955, made between the plaintiff and the defendant by any officer in charge of the defendant company or an agent thereof, as alleged in-paragraph 5 of the plaint ? (b) If so, when were the said cover notes or slips issued to the plaintiff-on March 21 or March 24, 1955 ? 3. Did the defendant insure the plaintiff for all risks, as alleged in paragraph 5 of the plaint ? 4. Did the defendant insure the plaintiff in consideration of the alleged premium, as set out in paragraph 5 ibid ? 5 (a) Had one A. C. Mookherjee any authority to issue the said cover notes or slips referred to in paragraph 5 ibid or to receive the premium or to grant receipt there for on behalf of the defendant ? (b) Did the defendant hold out the said A. C. Mookherjee as its officer-in-charge or agent, as alleged in paragraph 6 of the plaint ? 6. Was the plaintiff at all material times interested in the said goods and in the amount alleged to be insured, as bet out in paragraph 8 of the plaint ? 7. (a) Were the said jute goods destroyed by fire, as alleged in paragraph 9 of the plaint ? (b) If so, did the plaintiff suffer damages, as alleged in paragraph 9 ibid? 8. Was the contract of insurance, if any, repudiated by the defendant and did the defendant refrain from issuing the policies, as alleged in paragraph 11 of the plaint ? 9. What reliefs, if any, is the plaintiff entitled to ? 7. (b) If so, did the plaintiff suffer damages, as alleged in paragraph 9 ibid? 8. Was the contract of insurance, if any, repudiated by the defendant and did the defendant refrain from issuing the policies, as alleged in paragraph 11 of the plaint ? 9. What reliefs, if any, is the plaintiff entitled to ? 7. THE very basis of the plaintiff radha Krishna Daga's claim, as set out in the plaint, is that, by three separate cover notes or slips dated March 21, 1955, made between him and the defendant insurance company, and in consideration of premia paid and to be paid, the defendant insurance company insured him against loss or damage for all risks in respect of 525 bales of jute, valued at Rs. 91,500, while on board the mv Raju on her voyage from Tezpur ghat, the commencement of the transit, to Cossipore Ghat, the ultimate destination. Now, a voyage as this necessarily means the vessel concerned passing on and through rivers, such as the brahmaputra in Assam, the Padma in east Pakistan, and Ganga in West Bengal. Here is, therefore, inland navigation. 8. AND so soon as that is said, the policy that bulks large in this litigation is a policy' of sea-insurance or sea-policy, and the contract that bulks large too is a contract for sea-insurance, even though the very word "inland" connotes remoteness from the sea. For, that is the definition of each of the expressions, section 2, subsection 20, of the Stamp Act, 11 of 1899, bears. By virtue thereof, in so far as it is material here, "policy of sea-insurance" or "seapolicy"- (a) means any insurance made upon any. . . . vessel, (whether for marine or inland navigation),. . . . . upon any goods, merchandise or property of any description whatever on board of any,. . . vessel. . . . . and (b) includes any insurance of goods, merchandise or property for any transit which includes, not only sea-risk within the meaning of clause (a), but also any other risk incidental to the transit insured from the commencement of the transit to the ultimate destination covered by the insurance. . . vessel. . . . . and (b) includes any insurance of goods, merchandise or property for any transit which includes, not only sea-risk within the meaning of clause (a), but also any other risk incidental to the transit insured from the commencement of the transit to the ultimate destination covered by the insurance. The definition herein contained of a contract for sea-insurance: where any person, in consideration of any sum of money paid or to be paid for additional freight or otherwise, agrees to take upon himself any risk attending goods, merchandise or property of any description whatever while on board of any. . . . vessel, or engages to indemnify the owner of any such goods, merchandise or property from any risk, loss or damage, such agreement or engagement shall be deemed to be a contract for sea-insurance. For three separate cover notes, each bearing date March 21, 1955, the plaintiff Radha Krishna Daga, through his agent, paid the defendant insurance company Rs. 575-11 annas as the aggregate of the premium and costs of stamp. So he did on March 24, 1955. And only a day or two earlier, namely, on March 22 or 23, 1955, the entire consignment of 525 bales of jute was a total loss on account of fire near Aricha in East Pakistan in the course of MV Raju's transit "from Gauhati to Calcutta", as the averment in paragraph 9 of the plaint puts it. For such fire and total destruction of the consignment, the plaintiff radha Krishna Daga suffered damages to the extent of Rs. 82,642, which the defendant insurance company is bound to pay, under the contract of insurance, but will not pay. Worse still, the defendant insurance company " wrongfully and illegally repudiated the. . . contract of insurance", each cover note or slip dated March 21, 1955, being a separate contract of insurance, and "refrained from issuing the policies", one policy each against each cover note: paragraph 11 of the plaint. 9. SUCH then is the very cut of the plaint. When it avers "contracts of insurance" which the defendant insurance company repudiated, it really means a contract each for sea-insurance. When it avers "policies" which the defendant insurance company refrained from issuing, it really means policies of sea-insurance or sea-policies. 9. SUCH then is the very cut of the plaint. When it avers "contracts of insurance" which the defendant insurance company repudiated, it really means a contract each for sea-insurance. When it avers "policies" which the defendant insurance company refrained from issuing, it really means policies of sea-insurance or sea-policies. Indeed, that cannot but be so, the facts pleaded in the plaint being what they are : insurance of 525 bales of jute for transit, be such transit from Tezpur ghat to Cossipore Ghat or from gauhati to Calcutta, involving inland navigation, and for "all risks" too. Indeed, no controversy rages about this. 10. ONCE the conclusion is so,-and the conclusion cannot but be so, upon the very case made out in the plaint-it is apparent that the plaintiff Radha krishna Daga rests his claim of Rs. 82,642, on three contracts for sea-insurance, rested, in turn, on three separate cover-notes, which I have noticed more than once. But, as section 7, subsection 1, of the Stamp Act, 11 of 1899, prescribes,-"no contract for sea-insurance. . . . shall be valid unless the same is expressed in a sea-policy. " The question, therefore, is : do i see any sea-policy here ? If I do not, the contract for sea-insurance, the very basis of the claim in suit, is rendered invalid, and no court can rest its decree on that which the statute says is invalid. That there is no policy, far less a sea-policy, is in the realm of admissions. The first such admission is in the plaint, in paragraph 11 of which the plaintiff Radha Krishna Daga makes a grievance of the defendant insurance company having "refrained from issuing the policies". Another admission is in each cover note, exhibit c or exhibit 1, where Radha Krishna daga, signing as R. K. Daga, wrote as under X to the address of the defendant insurance company, 8, Dalhousie square East, Calcutta : "the policy to be sent to the above address"-that is, A3, Clive Buildings, the address of the firm, Messrs. Bangshidhar Radha Krishna, of which the plaintiff Daga is the sole proprietor. The policy against any one of the three cover notes was never issued., and, therefore, far less sent "to the above address". Conclusion: no policy, nothing to say of a sea-policy, do I see upon the whole of the record. Bangshidhar Radha Krishna, of which the plaintiff Daga is the sole proprietor. The policy against any one of the three cover notes was never issued., and, therefore, far less sent "to the above address". Conclusion: no policy, nothing to say of a sea-policy, do I see upon the whole of the record. Ergo, the contracts for sea-insurance, upon which the plaintiff Radha Krishna Daga bases his claim in suit, shall not be valid, and he shall not, therefore, recover either. 11. A conclusion as this follows as a matter of course from the bare reading of the provisions of the Stamp Act referred to above : section 7 read with section 2, subsection 20. It is reinforced so much the more "by one authority, but that a high one", to wit, (1) Surajmull Nagormull v. Triton insurance Company, Limited, (1924) LR 52 ia 126, a case rested on a contract for sea-insurance, expressed however not in a sea-policy, but founded on (a) a written quotation by the respondent insurance company of its lowest rate on jute on board the steamer Constantinos XII, at 1/2 per cent. and war risk at 5 per cent, less 10 percent; (b) an acceptance of this rate by the plaintiff appellant; (c) a statement by the plaintiff appellant, as arranged previously, to the respondent insurance company of the approximate amount to be covered; and (d) a declaration, in the end, for an aggregate amount of 10,870, for which the respondent insurance company refused to issue a policy. 12. SUCH refusal led the plaintiff appellant to insure elsewhere at higher premiums and to claim the excess as its damages in the action. Not that there was any loss of the goods; none at all. Upon such facts, Lord Sumner, delivering the judgment of the Board, laid down the law, with reference to section 7 of the Stamp Act, in the manmer following: "to allow the suit to proceed in defiance of section 7 would defeat the provisions of the law laid down therein." again, "in their Lordships view the contract alleged by the plaintiff was a contract for sea-insurance and nothing else, and, not being expressed in a policy, was unenforceable". Just so here To allow Radha krishna Daga's suit to proceed in defiance of section 7 is to defeat the provisions of the law laid down therein. Just so here To allow Radha krishna Daga's suit to proceed in defiance of section 7 is to defeat the provisions of the law laid down therein. The contract alleged by him is a contract for sea-insurance and nothing else, and, not being expressed in any policy, far less a sea-policy, is unenforceable. Such being the law enunciated by the then highest tribunal, naturally mr. Sen, who appears for the defendant insurance company, relies upon it, and from the very first day (March 26, 1965) when the case was opened so ably and exhaustively by late Mr. B. N. Dutt Roy (whose sad and untimely demise we all mourn). More, on the basis of this high authority, Mr. Sen asks me to dismiss this suit, the contracts for sea-insurance, upon which it rests, having not been expressed in sea-policies and having thereby become unenforceable. Naturally, again, Mr. Chowdhury, who appears for the plaintiff Radha Krishna Daga, goes all out to convince me that the (1) Surajmull case can do his client no harm. The contentions he puts forward, I proceed to examine, one after another. 13. MR. Chowdhury reminds me of that well-known passage from the speech of Earl of Halsbury, Lord Chancellor, in (2) Quinn v. Leathern, (1901)AC 495, at page 506 : ". . . . there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical Code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all. " I accept these two observations of a general character, as indeed I must, emanating as they do from the woolsack. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical Code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all. " I accept these two observations of a general character, as indeed I must, emanating as they do from the woolsack. More, in reading and applying the precedent furnished by the Privy council decision in the (1) Surajmull case, I govern myself, as indeed I am bound to, just by those two observations of the Lord Chancellor. But what do I find, in having proceeded so? I find- A. A contract for sea-insurance, not being expressed in a sea-policy, is unenforceable. B. The reason is that a contract as this for sea-insurance defies and, therefore, defeats section 7. C. The reason also is that no court can enforce as valid that which competent enactments have declared shall not be valid. 14. THE three propositions culled from the (1) Surajmull case and tabulated above are intended to be expositions of the whole law on the subject, touching section 7, neither governed nor qualified by the particular facts of the case. So, the first observation of a general character of the Lord Chancellor is well met here. Again, these are the very three propositions which lord Sumner actually decides in the (1) Surajmull case. Not that they, or any of them, can be said to follow logically from any other proposition Lord sumner actually decides. So, the second observation of general character o. f the Lord Chancellor is well met too. Mr. Chowdhry deviates from the propositions decided in the (1) Surajmull case when he descends upon facts therein, such as, (i) no loss of the goods at all, (ii) the transaction resting on pretty old conversations, except for the one letter quoting a rate of premium against war risk, (iii) the extreme difficulty of proving mercantile transactions by word of mouth, though such transactions are invariably commemorated in writing, etc. each of which fact is very true. But these are not propositions decided. These are facts found. And the three propositions actually decided, as tabulated above, are no more and no less than exposition of the law turning on the true construction of section 7, irrespective of such facts, but dependent on the solitary fact of a contract for sea-insurance, not expressed in a sea-policy. In vain, therefore, does Mr. These are facts found. And the three propositions actually decided, as tabulated above, are no more and no less than exposition of the law turning on the true construction of section 7, irrespective of such facts, but dependent on the solitary fact of a contract for sea-insurance, not expressed in a sea-policy. In vain, therefore, does Mr. Chowdhury compare the facts; in the (1) Surajmull case with the facts here, the most striking of which is that the contracts of insurance have been commemorated in writing in the garb of cover notes. In vain, because nothing short of a contract of sea-insurance, expressed in a sea-policy, (which a cover note is not), will make such a contract valid and, therefore, enforceable. That is the mandate of a competent and express enactmebt, namely, section 7, which the court is not at liberty to depart from. That is the ratio too of the (1) Surajmull case. The ratio is not, as Mr. Chowdhury puts it that a mere word of mouth will not do in a mercantile transaction. To view the matter so is to mistake a discussion of facts in a case for its ratio. 15. AND then what is Mr. Chowdhury really after ? Were I to accept his contention, it would come to saying that a judge can invoke a precedent only when the facts before him and the facts in an earlier decision are alike. But facts of two cases are seldom alike. So, a contention as this strikes at the very root of stare decisis, an expression which means- "to stand by things decided to abide by former precedents, where the same points come again in litigation, as well as to keep the scales of justice even and steady and not liable to waver with every judge's opinion, as also because, the law in that case being solemnly declared and determined, what before was uncertain and perhaps indifferent is now a permanent rule which it is not in the breast of any subsequent judge to alter or swerve from, according to his private sentiments, he being sworn to determine, not according to his private judgment, but according to the known laws and customs of the land, not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one, jus decere et non jus dare. " The Dictionary of english Law, by Earl Jowitt, Volume 2, page 1672. So, in the former precedent of the (1) Surajmull case, and a precedent of the Privy Council at that, the point decided is that a contract for sea-insurance, not expressed in a sea-policy, is invalid, by the very term of section 7, subsection 1, and, therefore, not enforceable. The same point comes again before me in this litigation. I must, therefore, abide by the former precedent, it being of the least materiality that in the former precedence there was no loss of goods at all or that the mercantile transaction depended on its proof mainly on conversations, some five years and a half old; whereas in the case on hand there has been loss of goods and the mercantile transaction rests on cover notes, which are sure enough not sea-policies. Such differences appear to be almost as irrelevant as, say, the difference in the names of the parties: Surajmull Nagarmull against Triton Insurance Co., in the former, and Radha Krishna Daga against the General Assurance Society here. What is of the utmost materially is the law laid down in the former precedent : invalidity and necessarily unenforceable of a contract for seainsurance, net expressed in a seapolicy, in defiance of section 7. Such law having been solemnly declared and determined by the then highest court of the realm is binding on me arid governs this litigation. 16. A little more about stare decisis which Mr. Chowdhury wants to keep away, only because of non-essential difference in certain facts noticed above, and in complete disregard, if I may say so, with respect, of the law laid down, irrespective of facts. Some two hundred years ago from today, lord Mansfield, C. J. observed in (3)R. v. Wilkes, (1770) 4 Burr. (2527: "we must act alike in all cases of like nature; and what we do now ought to be agreeable to former precedent, and will become a precedent in future cases of a like kind. " Lest it be cans dered too old, what lord Derming said, delivering the judgment of the Full Court of Appeal in (4) Word v. James, (1965) 1 All. ER 563 may as well be recalled : "it is an essential attribute to justice to a corarrunity that similar decisions should be given in similar cases. " Lest it be cans dered too old, what lord Derming said, delivering the judgment of the Full Court of Appeal in (4) Word v. James, (1965) 1 All. ER 563 may as well be recalled : "it is an essential attribute to justice to a corarrunity that similar decisions should be given in similar cases. " Were that not so law would be in a there of pernetual flux, "and nobody would know where hr stood". Now are not the (1) Surajmull case and the case on hand "cases of a like kind" or "similair cases ?' Without doubt, they are, the governing theme in both being 138 the same : whether or no a contract for sea-insurance, not expressed in a sea-policy, in defiance of section 7, is invalid and, therefore, unenforceable, no matter that the facts in one are not just the facts in the other. I must, therefore, so act as my decision becomes agreeable to former precedent, namely, the (1) Suraimull case. I must, therefore; give a decision similar to one in that, similar case. Indeed, the very case of (2) Quinn v. Leathern, which Mr. Chowdhury relies upon, in support of his contention that the (1) Surajmull case cannot be regarded as a binding precedent, goes to show just the other way about. (5) Allen v. Flood, (1898) Ac 1, is an earlier decision of the House. In the later case of (2) Quinn v. Lea them, the question arises whether the law., upon which the decision in (5) Allen v. Flood is founded, applies or not. That law, it is held, cannot apply, because the essential facts is in each case found, on which the law is founded, are poles asunder, so to say, even though each is an action that rests on inducing a person to break his contract, not to continue in h 3 employment, and the like. How widely different are the facts, upon which the rule of law is founded in each case, can best be illustrated in the form of a chart set out below : (5) Allen v. Flood. 1. The defendant neither uttered nor carried into effect ary threat at all. 2. An element in the decision was absence of conspiracy or even combination 3. 1. The defendant neither uttered nor carried into effect ary threat at all. 2. An element in the decision was absence of conspiracy or even combination 3. The defendant simply learned the plaintiff's employers of what the men there selves without his persuasion or influence, had determined to do. (2) Quinn v. Leathern. 1. The defendants wrongfully and maliciously induced customers and servants to cease to deal with the plaintiff. 2. The defendants did what is stated above in pursuance of a conspiracy framed among them. 3. The defendants did all this with malice in order to injure the plaintiff; and it did injure the plaintiff. 17. NO more of differences in essential facts need he brought out though there are some more yet. Because, what has been brought out is enough to show that the rule of law upon which the decision is founded m (15) Allen v. Flood cannot be the rule of law upon which the decision is founded in (2) Quinn v. Leathern. To say this of the (1) Surajmull case arid the case on hand is to say the unsayable. In each the material fact plus the decision thereon-and that is the best; definition of the ratio decidendi of a case-appear to be the same. The material fact is a contract for sea-insurance, not expressed in a sea-policy. The decision the-eon is that a contract as this, in defiance of section 7, is invalid and, therefore, unenforceable. 18. THUS, I am wholly unable ho accept Mr. Chowdhury's contention that the decision in the (1) Suraimidl case, corning as it does from the then highest hierarchy of authority, is not a precedent which binds me. I hold instead, it does very, very much. Mr. Chowdhury then refers me to (6) Commissioner of Income-tax v. Bai Shirinbai K. Kooka, AIR 1956 bombay 586. where Chagla C J, speaking for the court, observes : "the House of Lords may be a high authority, but so far as we are concerned, the Supreme Court is a higher authority and we must respectfully accept the law as laid down by that court. " who has ever denied that ? Neither mr. Sen nor I. And, indeed, who can deny it, when article 141 of the constitution is there, prescribing : the law declared by the Supreme court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India". 19. " who has ever denied that ? Neither mr. Sen nor I. And, indeed, who can deny it, when article 141 of the constitution is there, prescribing : the law declared by the Supreme court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India". 19. SO, that is not the question; indeed, that cannot be the question. The question is : has our Supreme court overruled the Privy Council decision in the (1) Surajmull case I am going by so far ? If it has, certainly I shall have to retrace my steps. Mr. Chowdhury contends, on the basis of two Supreme Court decisions read together : (7) Kalyanpur Lime Works, ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1954 SC 165 , and (8) R. Ratilal and Co. v. National security Assurance Co., Ltd., AIR 1964 sc 1396 , that, at any rate, the decision of the Judicial Committee in the (1) Surajmull case has been impliedly overruled. Has it been really ? Let me proceed to examine the matter, noticing first how Mr. Chowdhury prefaces such contention. 20. THAT the contracts in suit are invalid and, therefore, unenforceable, defy as they do section 7, has not been pleaded in the written statement, though that ought to have been done under Order 8, rule 2, of the Procedure code. More, there is no denial, in the written statement, of the legality of the controversial contracts pleaded in 1. Goodhart, "determining the Ratio decidendi of a Case," Essays in Jurisprudence and the Common Law, the plaint, though that ought to have been there under Order 6, rule 8 ibid. Mr. Chowdhury is right. Nothing like it is pleaded in the written statement. This leads Mr. Chowdhury to argue that the Judicial Committee, by its decision in the (1) Surajmull case, does not go so far as to abrogate such salu-U-ry provisions as Older 6, rule 8 and order 8, rule 2. That, in my judgment, is not the right way to look at the matter. No question of abrogation of this provision or that does arise here whatt does arise here is a 100% illegality staring the court in the face. And still the court will lie by and say : "that cannot be helped, because such illegality has not been pleaded. " What then is the court there for ? No question of abrogation of this provision or that does arise here whatt does arise here is a 100% illegality staring the court in the face. And still the court will lie by and say : "that cannot be helped, because such illegality has not been pleaded. " What then is the court there for ? Indeed, no court can bring itself to say so, by rising above the law, and thereby committing suicide. This is why Lord sumner said in the (1) Surajmull case, where also section 7 had not even been pleaded by the defendant, and the effect of that section was not considered until the case came before their Lordships' Board : the suggestion may be at once dismissed that it is too late now to raise the section (s. 7) as an answer to the claim. No Court can enforce as valid that which competent enactments have declared shall not be valid, nor is obedience to such an enactment a thing from which a Court can be dispensed by the consent of the parties, or by failure to plead or to argue the point at the outset : (9) Nixon v. Albion marine Insurance Co. " : (1867) LR 2 Ex. 338. Herein lies the complete answer to mr. Chowdhury's submission on the failure by the defendant insurance company before me to plead the infraction of section 7 and the consequential invalidity, as also unenforeeability, of the contracts in suit. What to say of failure to plead, which Mr. Chowhury maners so much of, even if both the parues before me had consented by their pleadings not to make a point of breach of section 7, that would not have helped matters forward for Mr. Chowdhury's client by one jot or one title. For; obedience to such an enactment is not a thing from which a court can be dispensed by the consent of the parties. And if it is not too late to raise the section (s. 7) as an answer to the illegal claim for the first time before their lordships' Board, a fortiori it is not tod late to raise it before the primary court for adjudication : just the court over which I preside. The more so, as mr. And if it is not too late to raise the section (s. 7) as an answer to the illegal claim for the first time before their lordships' Board, a fortiori it is not tod late to raise it before the primary court for adjudication : just the court over which I preside. The more so, as mr. Sen nade no secret of taking his stand on the (1) Surajmull case on the very first day of hearing : March 26, 1965, as noticed in paragraph 18 ante, thereby giving Mr. Chowdhury ample notice of such a defence. That the court will not assist illegality, so soon as it is brought to its notice, no matter whether it is pleaded or not, has been consistent, definite and settled law throughout. A little more than five years before the (1) Suraj- Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, sitting with Panton J., quoted a large member of authorities and laid down "the law on a topic as this in the manner following, in (10) Nawabzada Khajeh afakulla v. Nawab Khajeh Habibulla, (11919) 20 CLJ 241, a case Mr. Sen has referred me to : "it is well-settled that if the illegality of a transaction is brought to the notice of the Court, the Court will not assist the person who invokes its aid, even though the defendant has not pleaded the illegality and does not wish to raise that objection." Nathing mor need be said to demons rule the futility of Mr. Chowdhury's conaction that, failure on the part of the defendant insurance company to plead infraction of section 7 and all the rest precludes it from raising the point at the time of the hearing. Parading or no pleading, the contracts for sea-insurance pleaded In the plaint godown, expressed as they have not been in sea-policies. 21. IN this context, to rely on the supreme Court decision in the (7) Kalyanpur case, as Mr. Chowdhury does, is only to do a little exercise in futility again. Parading or no pleading, the contracts for sea-insurance pleaded In the plaint godown, expressed as they have not been in sea-policies. 21. IN this context, to rely on the supreme Court decision in the (7) Kalyanpur case, as Mr. Chowdhury does, is only to do a little exercise in futility again. Because the ratio (of this case, so far as material here, if at ail, is : 'if, in your pleading, you demy only the factum of the contract, but do net allege its unenforceability at law, you are precluded from raising the legality or unenforceability of the contract, on the ground that it does not conform to the provisions of section 30 of the Government of India Act 1915, bour. cl PS you are by your pleading. ' But sect en 30 is section 30, mo particular manner having been prescribed by the Governor-General as to how the contract was to be executed. Mr. Chowdhury sees this section 30 and section 7 of the Stamp Act oast in the same pattern. I do not. Section 30 is not prohibitory, as sect on 7 is. Omc enactment, not prohibitory, can bear no comparison to another, completely prohibitory : "no contract for sea-insurance shall be valid unless the same is expressed in a sea-policy." No wonder, therefore, in one case, the (7) Kalyanpur case, the pleading dominates the section, and in the others, the one before me, as also the (1) Surajmull case, the section dominates the pleading. The (7) Kalyanpur case thus furnishes a striking example of in irrelevant citation incapable of doing any duty here. Such is too (11) Lala Hemchand v. Lala Pearey Lai, air 1942 PC 64, which does no more than deprecate as irregular the adducing of evidence at the trial on points not raised in the pleadings, but which certainly is no authority for the proposition that the court will assist illegality, simply because it has not been pleaded. Why not then give a highwayman a decree for his share of the booty, because his adversary is timid enough not to plead the illegality of robbery ? 22. AT this stage, comes Mr. Chowdhury's contention : 'the Privy Council decision in the (1) Surajmull case stands, in spite of the unenforceability of the contracts in suit having not been pleaded ? 22. AT this stage, comes Mr. Chowdhury's contention : 'the Privy Council decision in the (1) Surajmull case stands, in spite of the unenforceability of the contracts in suit having not been pleaded ? (Of course, it does : paragraph 30 et seq.) Well, in that event, it has been impliedly overruled by the supreme Court in the (8) Ratilal case. How it can be contended so completely beats me. The (8) Ratilal case is a case of fire-insurance, not a case of sea-insurance. Necessarily, no contract for sea-insurance is there, as it is here or in the (1) Surajmull case. Necessarily, again, no question of invalidity of a contract for sea-insurance, because of infraction of section 7, arises there, as it does arises here or in the (1) Surajmull case. Last, but by no means least, Sarkar C. J. (then Sarkar J.) takes pain to make it clear in the penult mate paragraph of the majority judgment : AIR 1964 SC 1939 at p. 1400- "we wish, however, to observe that we have in this judgment dealt only with a letter of cover concerning fire insurance and our remarks on the interpretation of the proviso in the General exemption in Article 47 of Schedule 1 to the (Stamp) Act have been made in that context, only. Whether those remarks would apply in the case of a letter of ever concerning other varieties of insurance was not a matter for our consideration and on that question we have expressed no opinion. " Arid still it will be argued, as has indeed been argued by Mr. Chowdhury, that the Supreme Court by its judgment in the (8) Ratilal ease has impliedly overruled the Privy Council decision in the (1) Surajmull case, concerning a sea-insurance policy and a contract for a sea-insurance With respect, ii is not arguable even. On the contrary, far from having overruled, even impliedly, this frivy Council decision, the Supreme court approves it and relies on it, in express terms, in (12) Badri Prasad v. Nagarma. AIR 1959 SC 559 , a case mr. Sen cites. There a preliminary point is raised for the first time in the supreme Court, the point being a pure question of law, touching infraction of a prohibitory section, namely, section 4, subsection 2, of the Rewa State Companies Act 1935, and requiring no investigation of facts. AIR 1959 SC 559 , a case mr. Sen cites. There a preliminary point is raised for the first time in the supreme Court, the point being a pure question of law, touching infraction of a prohibitory section, namely, section 4, subsection 2, of the Rewa State Companies Act 1935, and requiring no investigation of facts. In that context S.K. Das C.J. (then S. K. Das J.), speaking for the court, approves, quotes from, (just what I have quoted too : paragraph 30), and relies on, inter alia, the Privy Council decision in the (1) Surajmull case, and refuses to exclude the prohibitory bar of that section from consideration, even though raised at so late a stage, just as Lord Sumner does in 52 LA. 126. So, Mr. Chowdhury's point of the Supreme Court having impliedly overruled the (1) Surajmull case (52 IA 126) appears to be a pointless one. 23. BY parity of reasoning that goer, hrforp. and on the clear mandate of section 7, subsection 1 strengthened so much the more by the Privy Council decision in the (I) Surajmull case, equally barren is Mr. Chowdhury's contention : "make the cover notes enforceable at law on payment of the requisite stamp duty payable on sea-policies. " a contract for sea-insurance,-each of the contracts in suit is just so-, is invalid, if not expressed in a sea-policy. None of the contracts in suit are expressed so. What the statute thus voids by section 7, subsection 1, it is not for the court to avoid by jumping such clear enactment. No doubt, section 35 provides for certain instruments being admitted in evidence on payment of the requisite stamp duty and penalty. But the statute renders no such instrument invalid ab inilio, as section 7, sub-section 1, renders a contract for sea-insurance, unless expressed in a sea-policy. In sum, you can bring back to life an instrument which the statute does not declare to be dead. But where (as here) the statute declares a contract for sea-insurance to be invalid, that is, dead, unless expressed in a sea-policy, you cannot rejuvenate that which is dead, by subsequently stamping it as a sea-policy. As an approdisiac to a dead person goes to waste, so does payment of stamp duty and penalty for a dead instrument. The existence of section 36 has not been overlooked either. As an approdisiac to a dead person goes to waste, so does payment of stamp duty and penalty for a dead instrument. The existence of section 36 has not been overlooked either. But more of which hereafter in paragraph 37: (viii) infra. 24. ON top of all that, it is a misconception to regard the stringent prohibitory provision, invalidating a contract for sea-insurance, unless expressed n a sea-policy, just what section 7 does, as solely a revenue measure. Were that so, Mr. Chowdhury's contenlien to make the cover-notes enforceable as sea-policies on payment of stamp duty and penalty might have been acceptable. But that is not so. To quote again from Lord Sumner's judgment in 52 IA 126 at page 129 : "the enactment (s. 7) is prohibitory. It s not confined, to affording a party a protection, of which he may avail himself or not as he pleases. It is not framed solely for the protection of the avenue and to be enforced solely at the instance of the revenue officials, nor is the prohibition limited to cases for which a penalty is exigible. The expression of an agreement for sea-insurance, otherwise than in a policy, is a thing forbidden in the public interest, and the statutory insistence on a policy is no mere collateral requirement or prescription of the proper way of making such an agreement." And still to argue, as Mr. Chowdhury does, that the cover-notes be made enforceable as contracts for sea-insurance, on realization of stamp duty requisite for sea-policies, is to argue the unarguable and to do just that which, in the public interest, the statute forbids. In view of the telling considerations that go before, and from which I see no escape for the plaintiff Radha krishna Daga. it will be a profitless task to examine in detail various other considerations Mr. Chowdhary urges on me, backed, where thought necessary, by authorities which, in my judgment, do not even reach the case on hand. Still the least I owe to Mr. Chowdhury is to notice them, so that, it may not be said elsewhere that such, points were not taken before me. Here is a resume of Mr. Chowdhury's contentions of this type : (i) The Marine Insurance Act, 11 of 1963, came into force on August 1, 1963, and defines, by section 15, what a marine insurance is. Chowdhury is to notice them, so that, it may not be said elsewhere that such, points were not taken before me. Here is a resume of Mr. Chowdhury's contentions of this type : (i) The Marine Insurance Act, 11 of 1963, came into force on August 1, 1963, and defines, by section 15, what a marine insurance is. There is no statutory form, for such insurance, though a paradigm you will find in Halsbury's laws of England, volume 22, 3rd edition, at p. 444. Be it so, as Mr. Chowdhury contends, though that is not so, as the schedule to the Marine Insurance Act 1963 does give a statutory form too. But all this is hardly an answer to the invalidity of the contracts in suit for sea-insurance, not expressed in sea-policies, in defiance of section 7, as indeed is the admission of the plaintiff. And section 7 governs this litigation. It matters little, therefore, that section 92 of the Marine Insurance Act 1963 repeals, as mr. Chowdhury submits, and rightly too, subsections 1, 2 and 3 of section 7 of the stamp Act 1899. And if this litigation were governed by the Marine Insurance act, the plaintiff Daga would have then fallen into the fire of sections 24 and 88 thereof out of the frying pan of section 7 of the Stamp Act. Enough has been noticed of a contention which really deserves no notice. (ii) True it is that "instrument", as defined in section 2, subsection 14, of the Stamp Act, may well be regarded as the genus, of which "sea-policy", as defined in section 2, subsection 20, is only a species. Equally true it is that the word "include" in section 2, subsection 20, clause (b), may lend itself to an interpretation by which the meaning of the words and phrases occurring therein may be enlarged : (13)Dil-worth v. Commissioner of Stamps, (1899) AC 99. Yet I see no sea-policy, as the plaintiff himself does not, his complaint being that the defendant "refrained from issuing the policies" : paragraph 11 of the plaint. And the plaintiff goes under, because of infraction of section 7. (iii) "any document. . . which contains the terms of the contract may bo created as, or even called, a policy. ": halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd. edition, volume 22, article 395, at p. 209. So what ? And the plaintiff goes under, because of infraction of section 7. (iii) "any document. . . which contains the terms of the contract may bo created as, or even called, a policy. ": halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd. edition, volume 22, article 395, at p. 209. So what ? That does not enable me to enforce a contract for sea-insurance, not expressed in a sea-policy, as defined in the Stamp Act in defiance of section 7 and the Privy Council decision in the (1) Su-iajmutl case. (iv) "apart from the special rules relating to marine insurance, there is no magic in the word 'policy'. In substance the expression seems to cover a contract of Insurance" : Viscount Cave l. C. in (14) Forsikrincjsaktielskabet national v. Attorney-General. (1925) AC 639 at p. 642. The very passage quoted from the speech of the Lord chancellor and relied upon goes' against the point contended for. So, there is magic in "the special rules relating to marine insurance", the expression the passage opens with. The special rule of law here relating to marine insurance is that embodied in section 7, under which a contract for sea-insurance, otherwise than in a sea-policy, "is a thing forbidden in the public interest", to quote Lord Sumner again. It is, therefore, idle to say that there is no magic in a sea-policy, which alone can make a contract for sea-insurance, and absence of which mars such a contract, the prohibitory enactment in section 7, subsection 1, being what it is, in the interest of the public. (v) Hsrdphip and equitable considerations are out of place here. Were to go the way Mr. Chowdhury wants me to, on considerations as these, I would in effect be repeal section 7 placed on the statue book by the legislature in the public interest but I dierhljn any such power Nor do I regret having come to the conclusion this sort of absolutely prohibitory enactment is there to receive effect from all. It may be hard on one who does not know such law. But then he and others must be taught it. And the best way to do so is by its enforcement. (vi) In (15) Tricambji Dambji and co. v. Verjl Kanji, AIR 1923 Bombay 142. It may be hard on one who does not know such law. But then he and others must be taught it. And the best way to do so is by its enforcement. (vi) In (15) Tricambji Dambji and co. v. Verjl Kanji, AIR 1923 Bombay 142. decided on June 19, 1922 no doubt was held by the court of appeal that an unstamped protection note did satisfy the requirements of the definition of "policy of sea insurance" and was, therefore, receivable in evidence, subject to the payment of the stamp with the necessary penalty. But after the Privy Council decision in the (1) Surajmull case on December 2, 1924, it can no longer pass as good law. And I leave it at that. (vii) No examination is considered 'worthwhile of (16) National Security assurance Co. v. R. Ratilal and Co., AIR; 1961 Calcutta 48, for two reasons. First, it is a case of fire insurance, not of sea-Insurance, with which alone I am concerned. Second, this decision of the court of appeal of our court has been reversed by the majority decision of the Supreme Court: (8) R. Ratilal and co. v. National Security Assurance Co., ltd. AIR 1964 SC 1936 See paragraph 33 ante. (viii) Ones it is grasped,-and it has to be grasped firmly enough-, that section 7 "is not framed solely for the protection of the revenue", and that it forbids, in the public interest, a contract for sea-insurance, otherwise than in a sea-policy, the cases, mr. Chowdhury takes the trouble to refer me to, only furnish striking examples again of he danger attending the injudicious citation of precedents. Chowdhury takes the trouble to refer me to, only furnish striking examples again of he danger attending the injudicious citation of precedents. Here are such cases : (17) Sri Rathnavarmaraja v. Smt. Vimla, AIR 1961 SC 1299 , which decides inter aliu, that whether or not proper court-fee 's paid on a plaint is primarily a mauer between the plaintiff and the State, certainly with no prohibitory enactment like section 7 of the Stamp Act, in the public interest, anywhere near, (18) V. E. A, anna-malai Chettiar v. S. V. V. S. Veerappa chettiar, AIR 1956 SC 12 , (19) Javer chand v. Pukhraj Sumna, AIR 1961 SC 1655 , (20) Rung Lal Kalooram v. Kedar nath Kesriwal, AIR 1921 Calcutta 613, and (21) Jayman Bewa v. Easin Sarkar, air 1926 Calcutta 377,-all turning on section 36 of the Stamp Act, the principle of the rule of law embodied there-in being that once an Instrument, required to be stamped, but not stamped, has been admitted in evidence, such admission shall not be called in question at any stage of the same suit or proceeding on the ground that the instrument has not been duly stamped. But what relevance has that here ? what I miss here, what the plaintiff misses here too, is a sea-policy. So, no question there can be of any policy being called in question on the ground that it has not been duly stamped. A sea-policy does not simply exist. That is all. Cover-notes ? They are cover-notes, not sea-policies, which, even the plaintiff's case is, the defendant has refrained (Vom issuing : paragraph 11 of the plaint. They, the cover-notes, are not being called in question either, on the ground that they have not been duly stamped. They are being called in question, because they evince no contracts for sea-Insurance; and they evince no contracts for sea-insurance, because they are not expressed in sea-policies it being the plaintiffs admission that no such policies have been issued. The plaintiff being ever ready to pay the stamp duty and, penalty-a fact his counsel reiterates (time and again-on non-existent sea-policies, but treating the cover-notes as such, can lead him nowhere. The plaintiff being ever ready to pay the stamp duty and, penalty-a fact his counsel reiterates (time and again-on non-existent sea-policies, but treating the cover-notes as such, can lead him nowhere. All this irrelevance arises, only because of the confusion of one class of infirm instruments, capable of being made firm by subsequent stamping, or getting into evidence unperceived and staying there s good evidence, such infirmity notwithstanding, with another class of instruments, namely, contracts for sea-insurance, which are invalid ab initio, unless expressed in sea-policies, duly stamped in the very beginning under section 17, and, therefore, incapable of being curecl or mended later. The prohibitory enactment in section 7 makes the latter class of Instruments so, but does not touch, however, the former class of instruments. Once this difference is borne in mind between the two classes of instruments, confusion will cease to confuse anybody and the tome of irrelevance I see in citations and submissions will vanish. ((ix) It is then said : 'why go by the form ? Go by the substance instead. Once you do so, you will find the cover-notes to be nothing but sea-policies, and the contracts evinced thereby nothing but contracts for sea-insurance, even within the meaning of section 7 of the Stamp Act. 'In support of such contention I have been referred to five authorities briefly noticed below-A. (22) In re Burmah Shell OH storage and Distributing Co., l Ad,, ATR 1933 Allahabad 735, is a decision of the full Bench of the Allahabad High court which does not go by the phraselogy used by the parties : that the document in question is an Agreement by way of licence, the words 'licensor' and 'licensee' having been used throughout, but by the substance, which makes the document an undertaking in writing to occupy immovable property and, therefore, a lease within the meaning of the definition thereof in section 2, subsection 16, of the Stamp act, chargeable as such under article 35, clause (a), sub-clause (iv), ibid. It does not fall here to La considered how far this can be regarded as good law today in view of (23) Associated Hotels of India, Ltd. v. R. N. Kapoor. AIR 1959 SC 1262 , the golden rule enunciated by Lord Greene M. R. in (24) Booker v. Palmer, (1942) 2 All. It does not fall here to La considered how far this can be regarded as good law today in view of (23) Associated Hotels of India, Ltd. v. R. N. Kapoor. AIR 1959 SC 1262 , the golden rule enunciated by Lord Greene M. R. in (24) Booker v. Palmer, (1942) 2 All. ER 674 (677), (25) Errington v. Errington and Woods, (1952) 1 KB 291, (26) Isaac v. Hotel DC paris, Ltd., (1960) 1 All. ER 348, to mention but a few, all of which I had an occasion to review in (27) P. Bhaskaran v. Indian Iron and Steel Co., Ltd., ilr (1967) 1 Calcutta 604: 71 CWN 302, if I may refer to my decision without, any impropriety. But how this ratio can be translated here, with a prohibitory enactment, forbidding in the public interest a contract for sea-insurance, otherwise than in a sea-policy, defeats me. Do I see a sea-policy in the case on hand ? I do not. The plaintiff does not too, making indeed a point of the defendant having issued no policy. Therefore, the plaintiff and I do not see any policy. We do not because it does not exist. Ergo, a contract for sea-insurance does no. 1 too. Going by the test of substance, you can interpret a document, but you cannot create one which does not exist; nor can you convert black into white or vice versa. The cover-notes i see here are not, and can never be, sea-policies. And without sea-policies there can never be contracts for sea-insurance. B. Equally irrelevant appears to be the citation of (28) M. P. Davis v. Commissioner of Agricultural income-Tax, AIR 1953 SC 719, the ratio of which is that what purports to be an agreement of partnership is really not so, because of (i) the internal evidence of the document itself (ii) the conduct of the parties, and (iii) the surrounding circumstances. But where (as here) there is a prohibitory enactment; in section 1, subsection 1, declaring H contract for sea-insurance to be invalid, unless expressed in a sea-policy, this sort of reading a cover-note in the light of its internal evidence, the conduct of the parties, and all the surrounding circumstances, assuming that such indica favour the plaintiff, cannot elevate it to the height of a sea-policy, which a cover-note (as is seen here) is not and cannot be. The plain mandate of the law is,-and the mandate cannot be plainer: 'no sea-policy, no contract for sea-insurance'. The mandate is not: 'no sea-policy, yet a valid contract for sea-insurance, if what is not a sea-policy is converted into that by subsequent stamping. To do so is to read into section 7, subsection 1, words which are not there, and to do just that which this prohibitory enactment forbids in the public interest. Ineffective too is the reference to the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in (29) In Re Marine insurance Certificate, (1894) ILR 19 bombay 130. The very year of the decision, 1894, is decisive. The date of the decision January 15, 1894, is still mere decisive. The Stamp Act that then ruled the reference to the high Court was Act 1 of 1879. The stamp Act that rules the litigation on hand is Act II of 1899. Act 1 of 1879 had not, and Act II of 1899 has, the prohibitory enactment in section 7, subsection 1. The insertion of section 7a (corresponding to section 7 of the 1899 Act, the graveyard oi a contract for sea-insurance otherwise than in a sea-policy) in the 1879 Act has not been overlooked for a moment. But it was inserted so by Act 6 of 1894 which received the assent of the Governor General on March 8, 1894; whereas the Full Bench rendered its judgment, be it said at the risk of repetition, on January 18, 1894, with nothing like section 7a (new section 7) before it. That the Full Benah, therefore, treated a slip with many things in it (as are to be found in a policy) as a policy and required it to be stamped as such has perhaps little surprising in it. With section 7a as the prohibitory enactment in force then, it appears to be open to the gravest doubt if the Full Bench could have brought itself to do what it did. Marine (insurance slips, marine certificates of insurance, marine covr notes, no matter how you call them, are not sea-policies, and upon them, therefore, cannot rest valid contracts for sea-insurance. Such contracts are indeed invalid, as is the clear and peremptory command of section 7, enacted in the public interest, a command which was not there on January 18, 1894, in the form of section 7a. Such contracts are indeed invalid, as is the clear and peremptory command of section 7, enacted in the public interest, a command which was not there on January 18, 1894, in the form of section 7a. D. Equally barren are two other citations : (30) Appa v. Kcchai bayyan Kutti, AIR 1932 Madras 689, where, upon the whole of the matters, including the subsequent conduct of the parties, and goi:ig by the real legal nature and effect, a document, though styed as a "karar", wss regarded as a deed of partition, and (31) Midde Varaprasada Rao v. Collector of Krishna, AIR 1959 AP 6!:io (SB), where, going by the substance, a document, purporting to be an agreement, was held to be a usufructuary mortgage and subject to stamp duty as such. I have no quarrel with such proposition, it being elementary that the stamp duty is leviable on an instrument, and not on a transaction, and. that the court goes not by what the instrument purports to be, but by what really it is. But what has this got to do with an instrument, being a contract for sea-insurance, rendered invalid by the command of the statute, unless expressed in a sea-policy? nothing E. I cannot, therefore, go by these citations, irrelevant to a degree. (x) Again, it is said: a cover-note evidences a completed contract, evincing as it does a proposal for insurance by the plaintiff and acceptance of the proposal by the defendant. ' A contention as this is reinforced by two authorities: one, a bench decision of the Allahabad High court in (32) Muhammad Sultan v. Clive Insurance Co., Ltd., AIR 1934 allahabad 298, where a proposal for insurance against burglary was accepted and covered by a cover note in token of such insurance for a period of thirty clays pending the issue of the policy; and that was held too good for mulcting the insurance company in a decree for Rs. 5,700; and another, a decision of the Supreme Court in (33) General Assurance Society, Ltd. v. Chandmull Jain, (1966) 2 SCA 219: air 1966 SC 1644 , a case of insurance of house property against fire, flood, erosion of river, and the like, where hidayatuhah C. J. (then Hidayatullah j.), speaking for the court, points out that, barring certain special features, there is no difference between a contract of insurance and any other contract, and observes : "a contract is formed when there is an unqualified acceptance of the proposal. Acceptance may be expressed in writing or it may even be implied if the insurer accepts the premium and retains it" great reliance is placed upon the passage quoted above. But what for ? His Lordship is not dealing here with a contract of sea-insurance-a contract which is not, and cannot be, formed, otherwise than in a sea-policy. His Lordship is dealing with a contract for fire-insurance etc.-a "non-sea-insurance", if I may coin such an expression. So is the Allahabad decision-the (32) Muhammad Sultan case-the burden of which is burglary-insurance, a "non-sea-insurance". Such citations, therefore, come ill from a party, on whose behalf is cited (2) Quinn v. Leathern (supra), if I may say so with respect. Because, these two decisions-the (32) Muhammad sultan case and the (33) Chandmull case-are not expositions of any law on a contract for sea-insurance and do not actually decide anything thereon, therefore, not attracting any one of the two tests Earl of Halsbury L. C. lays down in the (2) Quinn case : paragraphs 19 and 24 ante. I say no more on citations the irrelevance of which is so manifest. 25. THUS exhausts all I have been addressed on by Mr. Chowdhury in order to repel section 7, subsection 1, of the Stamp Act 1899. But such valiant attempt fails the plaintiff radha Krishna Daga. I have, however, not noticed yet all that Mr. Sen has submitted to run aground the plaintiff's claim rested on contracts of sea-insurance otherwise than in sea-polices. The (1) Surajmull case is no doubt a trump-card in his hands, and he has placed it in the forefront of his submissions. But he has placed too -what he considers as other sure cards. To notice what they are like, i now proceed. 26. The (1) Surajmull case is no doubt a trump-card in his hands, and he has placed it in the forefront of his submissions. But he has placed too -what he considers as other sure cards. To notice what they are like, i now proceed. 26. A little less than a hundred-year-old authority, (34) lonides and chapeaurouge v. The Pacific Fire and marine Insurance Company, (1872)LR 7 QB 517 Mr. Sen relies upon, in ccder to show that a slip, as distinguished from a policy, Kelly, C. B. holds, his four colleagues concurring, to be void as a contract, a mere nullity as a contract of assurance to be after-warids made, and as such inadmissible in evidence, under the statute, that is, 30 Vict. Cap. 23, section 7, which provides, just as our section 7 does : "no Contract or Agreement for sea Insurance. . . . . shall be valid unless the same is expressed in a policy. . . . . . " and: section 9 which provides inter alia. : "no Policy shall be pleaded or given in Evidence in any Court, or admitted in any Court to be good or available in law or in Equity, unless duly stamped." See Law Reports: The public General Statutes : 30 and 31 Victoria, Volume II: Page 254. Certainly, this ratio adds strength to Mr. Sen's contention, if any strength is needed at all in view of the clear language of section 7, subsection 1, of our Act, made clearer still by the privy Council decision in the (1) Surajmull case. Mr. Chowdhury has however three submissions to make. I notice and examine them one after another in the following four paragraphs. 27. FIRST : it is dangerous to apply the decisions of English Courts to the construction of Indian Statutes. That well known Privy Council decision in (35) Lasa Din v. Mt. Gulab Kunwar, air 1932 PC 207, it is said, is a case in point. There the Chief Court of Oudh, and other courts too, wer. t wrong in construing article 132 of the Limitation Act 9 of 1908, under which the terminus a quo of limitation is when the money sued for becomes due, not the date when the cause of action arose, as provided for by section 3 of the statute of James. There the Chief Court of Oudh, and other courts too, wer. t wrong in construing article 132 of the Limitation Act 9 of 1908, under which the terminus a quo of limitation is when the money sued for becomes due, not the date when the cause of action arose, as provided for by section 3 of the statute of James. Yet an English decision rested on that was applied in construction of article 132. In this context, Sir George Lowndes, delivering the judgment of the Board, censored the application of English decisions to the construction of an Indian act. Another case in point is said to be (36) Pratap Singh v. Shri Krishna gupta, AIR 1956 SC 140 , where a candidate for election to the. office of the president of a municipal committee secured the highest number of votes; and yet his election went down, because he had not stated in the reqjui-site form his occupation, as required by a certain statutory rule, even though the statute itself (the Central provinces and Berar Municipalities act 2 of 1922), by section 23, precluded the questioning of any such act, on account of any defect or irregularity not affecting merits of the case. Bose j., speaking for the court, upsets the decision, and considers, in that context, idle to examine a number of English cases cited from the bar. 28. THIS contention of Mr. Chawdhury lacks substance in the context of the case before me. Section 7 of our Act, on which I am resting my decision, is just the section (also section 7) in the corresponding British act (SO Viet. Cap. 23). Indeed, we have copied it from the British Act, as we so often do and are doing. To apply a decision of the English Courts, oil the construction of a British enactment, to the construction of an Indian enactment, not only pari materia, but almost in the same terms, cannot, therefore, spell any danger. Truth to tell, to do so is to receive helpful guidance and to steer clear of any manner of a danger And the danger is always there if a precedent, no matter whether Indian or English, is misread and misapplied. Truth to tell, to do so is to receive helpful guidance and to steer clear of any manner of a danger And the danger is always there if a precedent, no matter whether Indian or English, is misread and misapplied. To crown all, no possibility of a danger can there be when it is found that Lord Sumner, in rendering the decision of the Board in the (1) Surajmull case, goes by English decisions : "to allow the suit to proceed in defiance of section 7 (of our Stamp act) would defeat the provisions of the law laid down therein. In England this is well settled law : see (37)Fisher v. Liverpool Marine Insurance co, (1873) LR 8 QB 469; affirmed (38) (1874) LR 9 QB 418; (39) lonides v. Pacific Insurance Co., (1871) LR 6 QB 647,. . . . . and there is no ground for construing the Indian Act, expressed almost in identical terms, in any different way." The (39) lonides case Lord Sumner refers to is the very case--the (34) lonides case-Mr. Sen relies upon, with this difference that his Lordship is referring to the judgment of Blackburn J., speaking for the court of queen's Bench, whereas Mr. Sen is relying upon the judgment of the court of appeal unanimously affirming "the (said) judgment of the Court of queen's Bench". No more need, therefore, be said of such a contention-a contention of despair, if I may say so, with respect-to keep away this very apt decision of the English Court, on the basis of the (35) Lasa Din and (36)Pratap Singh cases, which, of course, can have no manner of application here. Second : in the appellate judgment in the (34) lonides case, Kelly, c. B. regards the slip as ''binding in point of honour between parties circumstances as these parties were. " That he does. So what ? The Chief Baron does not, sure enough, rest his appellate judgment of affirmance on the slip, "void as a contract" and "a mere nullity" "as a contract for a policy of assurance to be afterwards made. " He rests his judgment on the policy which was executed in pursuance of the slip. In the case on hand, no policy has been executed, as is the plaintiff's own case. This makes all the difference. " He rests his judgment on the policy which was executed in pursuance of the slip. In the case on hand, no policy has been executed, as is the plaintiff's own case. This makes all the difference. And about "point of honour", the circumstances before me are not the circumstances which obtained in the (34)lonides case. More of which hereafter : paragraph 46 infra. That apart the court over which I have the honour to preside is a court of law, not a court of ethics. So, when the command of the law is that no contract for sea-insurance, the foundation of the plaintiff's claim, shall be valid, unless the same is expressed in a sea-policy,-and it is not, in the case on hand-, such command shall receive effect in a court of law; and not anything pertaining to "point of honour. " 29. THIRD : because the slip is not admissible in evidence as a contract for a policy of assurance to be afterwards made, "it does not follow", says the Chief Baron, "that it is not admissible in evidence for a great variety of purposes". For example, "where a fraud is suggested, or where there is a plea", (as in the lonides case), "of misrepresentation, the slip may be evidence of the fraud or misrepresentation charged." There the plea of misrepresentation was as to the vessel, the Socrates, a Norwegian ship, or the Socrate, a French ship, by which the hides insured by the policy were to be shipped. In the case before me, there is not even the slightest breath of misrepresentation or fraud the plaintiff charges the defendant with. Say, there is. Even then, the plaintiff remains where he is. No sea-policy, no contract for sea-insurance, and, therefore, no claim founded upon that which does not exist. On top of that, the judgment of the chief Baron must be read as a whole. Here is a sentence in the judgment, which tells, and tells; heavily against the extravagant claim of the plaintiff; "if it (the slip) had been applied to a purpose forbidden by the Act of Parliament, I should not have hesitated to say that it ought not to be considered as admitted, or if admitted, applied to such purpose. " If I have to accede to Mr. " If I have to accede to Mr. Chowdhury's contention: that the cover notes or slips be treated as sea-policies, subject to payment of the stamp duty and penalty, I shall have to apply such slips to a purpose forbidden by section 7, subsection 1, of the Stamp Act. I have no hesitation in saying that I cannot so do. 30. I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the two [ (34) and (39)] lonides cases-one Mr. Sen cites and the oilier Lord Sumner refers to in the (1) Surajmull case-make the cover-notes, upon which Mr. Chowdhury banks so much, clearly unenforceable at law, in absence of sea-policies-such absence being in the realm of admission by the plaintiff. This is section 7, subsection 1 going into action. To hold the contrary is to write the section off the statute book. To allow the cover-notes to be given in evidence in proof of a binding contract between the parties is to do just that which section 7, subsection 1, foroids in the public interest. Mr. Sen also relies upon (38)Fisher v. The Liverpool Marine Insurance Co., (1874) LR 9 QB 418,-a case lord Sumner refers to as well in he (1) Surajmull case, as just noticed (paragraph 42). The (38) Fisher case evinces an attempt to make a dichotomy of the contract : One, on the basis of the slip (Cover-note here) which, it is conceded, cannot be enforced, because of the express words of 30 Vict. c. 23, and another, resting on the obligation on the part of the defendant to prepare a policy and to tender it for execution, the premium and stamp duty having been paid, as here, and as is the plaintiff's case : paragraphs 7 and 11 of the plaint. But such attempt fails : ". . . . the whole transaction is one, an entire and indivisible contract; and. . . . that one and indivisible contract cannot be enforced." : Per Lord Coleridge, C. J. Since the defendant refused so execute a stamped policy, in spite of having been paid the premium and stamp duty due,-and after such payment only, the steel rails were totally lost, by the perils intended to be insured against-, this sort of repudiation is condemned as shameful, and an agreement binding in honour is emphasized. Yet, it is held, nothing can be clone to render the shameful repudiation a failure, all because of the command of the law (30 Viet. c. 23). So, even if I [put the case of the plaintiff before me as high as that-I cannot though-it becomes impossible for me yet to grant him any relief without infringing the true of law embodied in section 7, subsection 1, of the Act-which of course I cannot do. 31. TWO other English cases Mr. Sen cites in support of his contention that there is no contract for sea-insurance here enforceable at law. One is (40) Inter National Benefit Assurance co., Ltd., (1928) 1 Ch. 74. There the liquidator of an insurance company, ordered to be wound up by the court, disallows proof of certain claims by another insurance company against the company, of which he is the liquidator, for marine insurance business, by virtue of a participation agreement [between the two companies, but without any duly stamped policy. 30 Vict. 23 is then no more. What is there then is the Stamp Act 1891, which, by section 93, subsection 1, provides, as our section 7 does : "a contract for sea-insurance. . . . shall not be valid unless the same is expressed in a policy of sea-insurance. " Eve J., and, on appeal, Lord hanworth M. R. and Sargant and Lawrence l. JJ. uphold the iquidator. The other case : (41) In- re Home and Colonial insurance Co., (1930) 1 Ch. 102: shows the reverse-a liquidator having come to grief for payment made by him, only on the basis of an agreement between two companies, but without any stamped policy, in defiance of section 93 of the Stamp Act, though the agreement is one for reinsuring marine risks. 32. THUS, the more one goes into the matter, the more it becomes apparent that the contracts for sea-insurance, which serve as the very basis of the plaintiff's claim in suit, are invalid, expressed as they have not been in sea-policies. Indeed, the only form of contract for sea-insurance, law knows of, is the one duly expressed in a stamped sea-policy. One more case cited by Mr. Sen on this point remains to be noticed: (42) Pannalal Kishanlal v. Osaka soshen Kaisha, (1965) 70 CWN 307, where A. N. Ray J. governs himself by the (1) Surajmull case. 33. Indeed, the only form of contract for sea-insurance, law knows of, is the one duly expressed in a stamped sea-policy. One more case cited by Mr. Sen on this point remains to be noticed: (42) Pannalal Kishanlal v. Osaka soshen Kaisha, (1965) 70 CWN 307, where A. N. Ray J. governs himself by the (1) Surajmull case. 33. IN view of all that goes before from paragraph 10, I find no contract for sea-insurance enforceable at law. On this consideration alone, the suit is bound to fail. And here are my answers to the cognate issues reproduced below : 34. THE findings just recorded being what they are. pivoted on one and the same proposition : that there is here no contract for sea-insurance, law knows of, and that any claim rested on such a contract invalid ah initio, as the plaintiff's claim is, cannot- but be foredoomed to failure, a discussion of other issues appears to be of academical interest. Since however the issues are there, it is but right that I record my findings thereon too, though with the utmost brevity, so that an unnecessary remit may be avoided, in case the court of appeal, or a higher court still, finds that I have gone wrong on the main point of there having been no valid con-tract for sea-insurance, expressed as it "has not been in a sea policy. Upon the whole of the evidence, it appears to be open to the gravest doubt if the plaintiff had, in fact, consigned 525 bales of jute, as alleged. The three bills of lading, exhibit A. are no doubt there. But they are not clothed with sacrosanctity. Under section 3, clause (n), of the Commercial Documents Evidence Act, 30 of 1939, read with serial No. 18 in Part II of the schedule thereto, the court may inter alia presume, not that the court must, that the statements contained therein are correct. But, here upon all that is seen, the court shall not presume so. 35. IN the first place, the court misses any firm evidence on 525 bales of jute having been actually put on, board the- MV Raju of Neptune Navigation at Tezpur Ghat on March 7, 1955. The plaintiff Daga, who examines himself as his first witness, was not at tezpur then. 35. IN the first place, the court misses any firm evidence on 525 bales of jute having been actually put on, board the- MV Raju of Neptune Navigation at Tezpur Ghat on March 7, 1955. The plaintiff Daga, who examines himself as his first witness, was not at tezpur then. He was there, if at all, for a day only, on or about March 15, 1955, and, even so, he had had no discussion whatever nor any manner of talks with N. K. Daga, the man on the spot, about the despatch of 525 bales of jute on March 7 previous, as he himself says. In saying so, however, he lays himself open to the charge of are extravagant indifference which is so inconsistent with natural human conduct and so consistent with there having been no consignment at all. Whatever that be, it is plain that he has no personal knowledge of loading on board the mv Raju. Nor has Dharamchand gupta, another man on the spot at tezpur, and the plaintiff's second witness. He did not see the 525 bales of jute put on board the vessel. To look after that, there was another representative. Who he is is anybody's guess. An any rate, such a one does not pledge his oath before me to say-that the bales of jute, loaded into lorries, as Bharamchand's evidence is, were off-loaded therefrom at Tezpur ghat, to be loaded into MV Raju. Only once he went to the steamer ghat by lorry and came back on it, N. K. Daga (full name : Narendra Kumar Daga)is still another man on the spot at tezpur at the relevant time, as just noticed. The fourth witness, of the plaintiff Daga, he and the plaintiff are related to one another as first cousins. In the course of his evidence the plaintiff Daga assures me more than once that, down with pleuresy and living at Pilkhuwa, some fifty to sixty miles away from Delhi, N. K. Daga, his cousin, will not come to court to give evidence. The date he assures me so is April 2, 1965. The hearing of the suit does not proceed de die in diem. Indeed, it cannot, because I am assigned to work on the Appellate Side. A little more than five months later, I am assigned back to the Original Side. The date he assures me so is April 2, 1965. The hearing of the suit does not proceed de die in diem. Indeed, it cannot, because I am assigned to work on the Appellate Side. A little more than five months later, I am assigned back to the Original Side. N. K. Daga, presumably rid of pleurisy by then, is able to attend my court and give me the benefit of his evidence. The date he does so is September 17, 1985. Such a one too speaks of the goods having been carried by lorries to be put on the steamers. So he does in a general way. But, he confesses, he did not accompany the lorries ever. All he did was to issue challans for the lorries. There is no other oral evidence worth reviewing on the exact point I am on now : 525 bales of jute having been put on board the MV Raju. And the conclusion must be what this paragraph opens with : absence of firm evidence about actual loading into the vessel. 36. IN the second place, the documentary evidence, led by the plaintiff, such as that coming from the Tezpur end, has produced disbelief in my mind. Indeed, the documents are such that they have only to be seen in order to be rejected. Take, for example, the Register of Jute purchased, carried, and in stock, exhibit H/l. The plaintiff's cousin and fourth witness, N.K. Daga, is definite-and says so on oath-that the heading of this register is not written by him, though counsel for the plaintiff gives him a second opportunity by inviting him to look at the heading closely. But, first, he says, he does not remember who the heading is written by : Thereafter, his memory improves, and he says firmly enough that it is not written by him. Dharamchand, the plaintiff's second witness, is however equally definite-and says so on oath-that the heading is written by N.K. Daga. Again, with reckless glibness, N.K. Daga speaks of so many figures appearing in the register as having been written by Dharam-chand. The date he does so is September 17, 1965, though such figures are supposed to have been written early in 1955. Again, with reckless glibness, N.K. Daga speaks of so many figures appearing in the register as having been written by Dharam-chand. The date he does so is September 17, 1965, though such figures are supposed to have been written early in 1955. A long span of ten years and a little more does not dim the definiteness with which such a one speaks, even though aged twenty-seven years on September 17, 1965, he was a lad of seventeen years of age, if that, early in 1955. Then, the register, exhibit H/1, contains many blank pages; why, N. K. Daga cannot say. There is a second set of entries too for the benefit of the assam Taxation authorities. Indeed, one person in the taxation office-a taxation officer-was good enough to oblige N.K. Daga by writing out the entries at the top. The authenticity of this part of the register is sought to be enhanced by the signatures of the taxation authorities, though no stamp or seal is there N.K. Daga does not remember whether or no any taxing officer lent his signatures on this register in his presence. Dharamchand left Tezpur in March 1955, as N.K. Daga says. N.K. Daga was the manager there at the age of seventeen or even less. And Dharamchand, a young man of twenty-one years of age, worked under him. He worked so, as is his evidence, up to March 30 or 31, 1955. Indeed, that could not but be so. The plaintiff Daga speaks of the Tezpur organization of his having been closed down by the end of March 1955. It very much looks, therefore, that the plaintiff's Tezpur office was somehow hanging on to lay the foundation of the transaction in suit. On the whole, the challans, exhibit I, and the Bilti Nakal book, exhibit J, without more, are not apt to inspire confidence. And nothing is easier than to have such documents, which, by-themselves, cannot carry the plaintiff far. I disbelieve dharamchand and N.K. Daga both, in absence of further and better evidence from the Tezpur end. In the third place, the evidence coming from Neptune Navigation, which again closed down in 1963, all its ships having been sold out, as is the sworn testimony of Vinay Kant malthuradas Shah, the plaintiff's third witness and a quondam assistant manager of Neptune Navigation, appears to be so poor and disappointing. In the third place, the evidence coming from Neptune Navigation, which again closed down in 1963, all its ships having been sold out, as is the sworn testimony of Vinay Kant malthuradas Shah, the plaintiff's third witness and a quondam assistant manager of Neptune Navigation, appears to be so poor and disappointing. Giving evidence on April 7, 1965, when Neptune Navigation was no more, indeed it had ceased to exist two years earlier-, how he produces the manifest of cargo on board the MV Raju from "his file" needs looking into a little. Shah was no more than an employee of Neptune navigation. So when that organization closed down in 1963, the papers could not have remained with such a one in the ordinary and natural course of events. Shah says as much. when he speaks of the records of this defunct firm (Neptune Navigation) having been kept in the office at Burrabazar of one Mr. Mehta or Mr. Mahato who was then looking after the business on behalf of the proprietrix. And from the cupboard of this gentleman, Shah came by the papers including the manifest, exhibit L. I am not on the admissibility of the manifest. If it is relevant, as it undoubtedly is, it matters not how Shah gets it. If he steals it even from Mr. Mehta's cupboard, it would be admissible : just the dictum of Crompton J. in (43) R. v. Leatham, (1861) 8 Cox. CC 498, quoted and approved by Lord Goddard C. J. in (44)Kuruma v. Reginam, (1955) 1 All. ER 236. Admissibility is not what I am on now. What I am on r. ow is its reliability. To judge that I would have welcomed the evidence of Mr. Mehta or Mr. Mohta; the more so, as shah's evidence strikes me as self-defeating, if not unmeaning. Tha-manifest is prepared at the despatching station (here at Tezpur) for customs clearance. But for all goods booked from Assam to Calcutta or elsewhere-goods which have to pass through East pakistan-there is the Indian border at Dhubri, and the manifest has to be prepared at such border. After having spoken so in two voices, Shah says that j. P. Shah or Saha (since dead) was the manager of Neptune Navigation at, calcutta in 1955. More, Neptune Navigation had an agent, Baldeo Sharms. After having spoken so in two voices, Shah says that j. P. Shah or Saha (since dead) was the manager of Neptune Navigation at, calcutta in 1955. More, Neptune Navigation had an agent, Baldeo Sharms. by name, at Gauhati, and none at Tezpur, the agency there having been, controlled by the Gauhati agent. So, the manifest, which I see before me, should have been over the signature of such a one, Sharma, or some ad hoc agent at the Dhubri end. But that is not so. It is over the signature of J. F, shah, the Calcutta manager in 1955, how can that be ? The witness Shah, the quondam assistant manager, has are explanation for that. The explanation, is : why, the manifest, exhibit L, is only a copy, not the original. So what if it is a copy, it is a copy of the original which the witness, as he asks me to believe, had compared with the copy, at the same time he says, if the original, which is not available, had been, forthcoming, the signature of J. P. Saha would not be there. And still you call it a copy which you compared with the original Hence, I say, such evidence is self-defeating, if not unmeaning. Two more features, out of sec many, be noticed. First, having a look at the manifest running into three sheets. The first two are carbon copies. The third is not. Was it then prepared at this end, though the consignments entered there were from "twz. ", an abbreviation for Tezpore, and "dh", presumably an abbreviation for dhubri? The whole thing looks suspicious in the extreme and cannot afford a safe resting-place for any satisfactory finding on the consignment of 525 bales of jute, as alleged in the plaint. Second, in the witness Shah, you have one who held the post of assistant manager of neptune Navigation, when it was a going concern. A knowledgeable person, on the face of it And still he is not asked a word about the bills of lading, exhibit A. On the other hand, dharam-chand's evidence is that one G. P. Saha, the manager of Neptune Navigation at tezpur, as he says, signed the bills of lading. But he cannot explain why the date: April 24, 1954, with reference to a bond, appears in two of the three bills of lading. But he cannot explain why the date: April 24, 1954, with reference to a bond, appears in two of the three bills of lading. Assistant Manager Shah, who was an officer of rank in the organization, could have perhaps explained it or told the court who this G. P. Saha was, were the transaction, on which the plaintiff's claim is rested, a genuine one. Dharamchand was not really giving evidence, but merely reading this document or that, in order to answer the questions put to him. The very fact that Assistant Manager Shah is not asked a word about such important matter makes a doubtful transaction resting on the bills of lading, exhibit A, still more doubtful. 37. IN the fourth place, the letters, exhibit D, the plaintiff Daga speaks of as having been received by him from neptune Navigation after MV Raju caught fire, appear to be of little standing, upon all I see here. To mention only the more important amongst them, the actual shipment and the manifest having been disbelieved, such letters subsequent to the shipment and the manifest cannot help matters forward for the plaintiff Daga. That apart, take the letter bearing date march 25, 1955, exhibit D, over the signature of J. P. Shah of Neptune Navigation. The plaintiff Daga proves, if that, this signature only of J. P. Shah. "if that", because he speaks of having pressed Neptune Navigation into service in the past and "naturally" having had therefore "a lot of correspondence with that firm". If this is true, of course, the plaintiff Daga's opinion evidence, even though he is a non-expert, as to J. P. Shah's signature is admissible under section 47 of the Evidence Act, read with the Explanation thereto. But is this true ? that is the question. The plaintiff daga has impressed me as one unworthy of credence. Naturally, nothing short of the best evidence will do. But what I have is the statement of daga unsupported by the "lot of correspondence" he speaks of. The minimal he owes to the court is to take the court into confidence about part at least of such "lot of correspondence" previous to the consignment in suit. And what is the difficulty ? Say, MV raju, loaded with jute, caught fire. The minimal he owes to the court is to take the court into confidence about part at least of such "lot of correspondence" previous to the consignment in suit. And what is the difficulty ? Say, MV raju, loaded with jute, caught fire. But the papers of his business in jute, which he carried on from 1951 to 1957,-now he is carrying on business in tamarind seeds-, did not, sure enough, catch fire. So, he must take the court into confidence. So long as he does not do so, his competence as a non-expert to give opinion evidence of J. Pi Shah's signature is not there. And once the conclusion is that, these three letters of Neptune navigation, marked exhibit D collectively, eliminate themselves, it being significant again that "neptune's" assistant Manager V. K. M. Shah, the plaintiff's third witness, does not say a word about this letter of March 25, 1955, having been over the signature of J. P. Shah. He claims instead that he had himself informed the parties by letters individually-parties who had their consignments on MV Raju Grant, this is so And the manifest does show the names of such parties, such as Nowrangrai Kishendayal as shipper and Nowrangrai Nagarmall as consignee, Manager, Bangur and Co. as shipper and Birla Jute Manufacturing as consignee, etc. etc. Sure enough, the plaintiff's firm Bangshidhar radhakrishna was not the only shipper and the only consignee. There were so many. Bring some of them, at the least, to prove that the story you come to court with is true. Not only you were the victim. So many were victims as well And some of the names in the manifest are so well known too in and around Calcutta. More, Assistant manager Shah says, there are letters by parties other than the plaintiff's firm. So their addresses are, and could be, known well enough. Yet no attempt is made to bring such evidence; on record. To add to all these consider ations, telling enough against the very cut of the plaintiff's case resting on shipment of 525 bales of jute, and the rest, come back to "neptune's" letter of March 25, 1955, exhibit D, informing the plaintiff's firm of its consignments of jute on board the MV Raju having caught fire-"a serious fire near tapakhola (near Aricha) in East Pakistan. " What are the consignments ? " What are the consignments ? The whole of the letter is typed, save the. bottom, where the numbers of the consignments are written in hand, almost in keeping with those in the bills of lading. Almost, because, to give; but one example, the number in one bill of lading is: Tez/401/55/rj, whereas the number in this letter of March 25 reads: Tez/rj/ 401/55. The symbol "rj" has changed places. Let it, even though that may well be indicative of "cooking" and in a hurry too. But who is it written by ? There is not even a soupcon of evidence to that end be it repeated at the risk of repetition that all that the plaintiff Daga deposes to is the signature of J. P. Shah, assuming the role of a non-expert an the foot of his acquaintance in the past with such signature,-a proposition which cannot be assumed, has 1o be strictly proved, but has not been so proved. This, there for, appeals to be beneath notice. And it is thus seen that "neptune's" letters to the plaintiff's firm, considered in the light of all that goes before, prove no shipment of 525 bales of jute by MV Raju. 38. IN the fifth place, out of 525 bales of jute, 250 bales (1,000 mds.) plus 125 bales (500 mds.), in all, 375 bales, are covered by sold notes, exhibit B, and 150 bales (600 mds.) are not. Necessarily, as the plaintiff Daga says, he would have tried to sell these 150 bales if they had reached Calcutta. Such evidence of the plaintiff Daga cannot, therefore, be put to test through sold notes, though I have little hesitation in rejecting what he says, because I have not been able to believe the fact of shipment even. The two sold notes, exhibit B, go to strengthen my disbelief all the more. One such sold note is dated February 8, 1955. By this note, as the plaintiff daga says and as the note itself bears, 250 bales of jute, weighing 1,000 maunds, were sold to Messrs. Jardine henderson, Ltd., Managing Agents to baranagore Jute Mills, as Daga says, or Jute Factory Co., Ltd., as the sold note bears,-it does not matter which-through G. Das and Co., Ltd., brokers. This sold note is over the signature of Indrajit Sing Boyed. A "per pro" signature it is. Jardine henderson, Ltd., Managing Agents to baranagore Jute Mills, as Daga says, or Jute Factory Co., Ltd., as the sold note bears,-it does not matter which-through G. Das and Co., Ltd., brokers. This sold note is over the signature of Indrajit Sing Boyed. A "per pro" signature it is. And the plaintiff Daga knows this signature. All this is good as far as it goes. It does not, however, go far enough. Because, who this contract was made by ? To prove that, the plaintiff examines ajit Baran Baral, the then employee of Messrs. G. Das and Co. (Private) Ltd., as Ajit, the plaintiff's sixth witness says. Glibly he says in chief: "we passed this contract. " But, on cross-examination, he breaks down and admits: "i did not put through the souda (contract). I say that that was done by the Manager. "The Manager is not examined; nor is Indrajit Singh boyed, over whose signature the sold note is, if he be somebody other than the manager. Thus, the very contract remaining unproved, most of the evidence of Ajit degenerates into irrelevance or futile, nothing to say of other unsatisfactory features, which needs hardly call for a review. Likewise, the contract, said to be represented by the other sold note bearing date March 17, 1955, in token of sale of 125 bales, weighing 500 maunds, to messrs. Alliance (North) Jute Mills co. Ltd., through Messrs. R. L. Saraf and Co., brokers, remains unproved. Indeed, to prove this contract, the plaintiff can do no better than examine as his fifth witness Nand Kishore saraf, son of Ratanlal Saraf, whose firm Messrs. R. L. Saraf and Co. is, as he says, and with which firm or with even the sold note of March 17, 1955, he had nothing whatever to do, as he confesses. Why does not his father ratanlal Saraf come and say about this contract, if there was a contract ? "some eye- troubles" he has, as spoken to by the son, could not have prevented him from giving evidence on the contract; the more so, as the business is still being carried on under his supervision; and only since 1962 he has not been calling on his customers. That is also what the son says. Again, the father was the sole proprietor of the firm in 1955 : "my father's firm", as Nand Kishore Saraf says. That is also what the son says. Again, the father was the sole proprietor of the firm in 1955 : "my father's firm", as Nand Kishore Saraf says. Only in 1959 it was converted into a partnership firm. If that is so, according the evidence of Nand kishore Saraf, how it is that the plaintiff Daga sees in the signature : r. L. Saraf and Co., at the foot of the sold note dated March 17, 1955, exhibit B, the signature of Biswanath shroff, one of the partners of the firm ? Obviously an untruth. There is a little more yet. And that little produces a result so big. Because the jute was burnt in transit, the plaintiff had to deliver another lot to the mills concerned. Such is the testimony of the plaintiff Daga, in support of which, however, there is no shred of evidence coming from the mills concerned. Thus, shady deals are getting shadier still. And nothing that the plaintiff Daga or his employee and eighth witness, Champalol mohta, manifestly a witness of untruth, says, about diversion of 125 bales and the consequential payment of freight to "neptune", can pull the deals or any part of it out of this morass. In the sixth place, a prudent man cannot but entertain the gravest doubt in his mind about the very existence of any organization of the plaintiff at Tezpur in or about 1955 or ever The plaintiff Daga does not think that there is any scrap of paper to corroborate his Tezpur visit between March 15 and 21, 1955. Such is his evidence given, on cross-examination, on April 2, 1965. But the eviderce given by his employee, somewhat of a factotum, and his eighth witness too, Champalal Mohta, given on September 6, 1967,-more than two years after the evidence of the plaintiff Daga-, is : Of course, there is an entry dated March 15, 1955, in the cash book at this end showing a debit of Rs. 150 to the plaintiff for his expenses when he left for Tezpur; exhibit Q/l. More, there is another entry dated March 23, 1955, showing a credit of Rs. 150 to the plaintiff, out of which Rs. 106/9 annas was expended for going to and coming from Tezpur, and Rs. 43/7 annas was refunded by him; exhibit Q/2. 150 to the plaintiff for his expenses when he left for Tezpur; exhibit Q/l. More, there is another entry dated March 23, 1955, showing a credit of Rs. 150 to the plaintiff, out of which Rs. 106/9 annas was expended for going to and coming from Tezpur, and Rs. 43/7 annas was refunded by him; exhibit Q/2. Evidence as this has only to be stated in order to be convinced that the cash book containing; such entries appears to be "cooked"; the more so, because of the following among other considerations : one, this book was disclosed after the suit was heard out for four days, by when the evidence of the plaintiff was concluded. Indeed, it was concluded on April 2, 1965, the 3rd day of hearing. Two, the internal evidence of the book, coupled with that of Champalal, almost clinches the book having been "cooked". The accounting year here is from one Ram Navami day to the succeeding Ram Navami day which would fall in March or even in April in certain years. Yet the last entry in the book-bears the date : July 15, 1955. The attempt by Champalal, that witness of untruth, to explain it away, looks singularly unattractive and fails, three, in the context of so much partcularity about the expenses; for the plaintiff on March 15 and 23, 1955, exhibits Q and Q/1, so as to fit his tezpur visit, there is nothing like it in the entry dated February 14, 1955, exh. bit 2/c. All that is entered here is a sum of Rs. 274. About who travelled, whose travelling allowance it represents, etc., Champalal has no recollection : lyad Nehi Hai, as Champalal says and as I have recorded in my contemporaneous notes, the English rendering of which only is in the transcribed evidence. But Rs. 274 is the air fare. And it might be for the plaintiff, "because it is he who used to travel by air mostly." So says Champalal. 39. IN sum, the less said about champalal's evidence, the better. One has only to see and hear him in the witness-box in order to find out what a poor type he is. 274 is the air fare. And it might be for the plaintiff, "because it is he who used to travel by air mostly." So says Champalal. 39. IN sum, the less said about champalal's evidence, the better. One has only to see and hear him in the witness-box in order to find out what a poor type he is. Even "the dead body of the evidence (of his), without its spirit, which is supplied when given openly and orally, by the ear and eye of those who receive it, "to quote the picturesque expression of sir John Taylor Coleridge, in (45) Reg. v. Henry Louis Bertrand, (1887) L.R. 1 P. C. 520 (532), cannot but leave an impression as that in the mind of a prudent man. So, I pass by infirmites in which Champalal's evidence abounds, and ask instead a simple question : 'if you have really a branch at tezpur over the years up to end of march 1955, why do you not bring some people from Tezpur to say so ?' None has been brought to prove that. The plaintiff Daga, his creatures, the 17-year old Dharamchand, cousin N. K. Daga, now too ill to come and then well enough to attend court, and Champalal of this end are not types whom I can bring myself to believe. 40. SUCH then are the broad considerations (right from paragraph 52 ante)which fill me with the gravest doubt about the plaintiff of his Tszpur branch having consigned 525 bales of jute from Tezpur, as alleged in the plaint, and lead me to find the first issue against him. Now, I take up the question of the defendant insurance company holding out A.C. Mookherjee, a mere assistant, as the company's officer in charge or agent, and allied topics. Upon the whole of the evidence, I find as facts- 1. It is not true, as the plaintiff Daga says, that, at the Gauhati branch office of the defendant insurance company; there was then a board inscribed in it only : "manager". What appears to be true, as Branch Manager C. N. Barua, the defendant's first witness says, is that, at the entrance of the chamber, his name-plate recording : C. N. Barua, branch Manager, was there at the relevant time. What appears to be true, as Branch Manager C. N. Barua, the defendant's first witness says, is that, at the entrance of the chamber, his name-plate recording : C. N. Barua, branch Manager, was there at the relevant time. After having heard and seen daga and Barua and taken into consideration the test of probability, I have no hesitation in preferring Barua's evidence to Daga's on this point. 2. Even without a name-plate, the plaintiff Daga, when he called on the branch office at Gauhati of the defendant insurance co., was accompanied by either trilok Chand Vaid, a representative of the firm, Messrs. Mahasingroy Meghraj bahadur Dhanpat Singh, Daga's agents at the Gauhati end, as is his version, or Manmohan Bharali, as is the defendant's version. Say, he was accompanied by Trilok Chand Vaid of that firm with so long a name, a firm which branch Manager C. N. Barua speaks of as one of the biggest at Gauhati. And Gauhati is Gauhati. It is not calcutta. That he (Trilok Chand) would not know Branch Manager C. N. Barua looks so improbable That he would take A. C. Mookherjee, a mere clerk, even though the first clerk, as the branch manager, looks still more improbable, no matter where Mookherjee was seated then : in the manager's room, as Daga says, or right in the office proper, as Mookherjee says. So it is impossible to believe the plaintiff Daga when he says that, Mr. Mookherjee having been seated on the chair in the manager's room, he "naturally" took him (Mookherjee) to be the manager. His agent's man, Trilok Chand, was there to rid him of that impression then and there-his first ever visit to the defendant insurance company's branch office at Gauhati. The so-called cover notes-Gau|7 to Gau|9 of 1955, exhibit c-initialled by Mookherjee, without putting in any designation whatever, were there too to disabuse his mind of such impression, if he, accompanied by a representative of one of the biggest firms at Gauhati, had formed that ever: a most unnatural impression. Mookherjee might not know Trilok chand. But Trilok Chand, one in so big a firm at Gauhati, might know in all probability who was who in the defendant's branch office there. 3. Mookherjee might not know Trilok chand. But Trilok Chand, one in so big a firm at Gauhati, might know in all probability who was who in the defendant's branch office there. 3. Then, appearances are so much in favour of the plaintiff Daga having accompanied by one Manmohan bharali, so "thick" with the branch office at Gauhati, and not by Trilok Chand,-a case the defendant insurance company has been making right from April 25, 1955, when Messrs. Jalan and Co., its solicitors, had written so, to Messrs. Mukherjee and Biswas, the plaintiff's solicitors : vide a common document of that date, P. D. No. 29/d. D. No. 15, at page 96 of the brief of documents, exhibi. t G. On a point as this, I prefer the evidence of Manager C. N. Barua and Clerk Mookherjee to that of the plaintiff Daga. True it is that if Daga fails to examine Trilok Chand as his witness, the defendant also fails to examine Manmohan Bharali as its witness. But the reason given by daga for non-examination of Trilok chand can hardly be believed. And what is the reason why Trilok Chand is not examined ? He, it is said, is not traceable. To find out his whereabouts, some correspondence passed to and fro between Daga and Mr. Mahasing Megraj of the firm, which is daga's agent or commission agent. That correspondence, which has an importance all its own, is not disclosed. Nor is Mr. Mahasing Megraj or anybody else of that firm, one of the biggest at Gauhati, examined. I, therefore, reject such evidence about nonavailability of Trilok Chand, and I presume that were he examined he would nat have supported Daga's version. Not that failure on the part of the defendant to examine Manmohan bharali, in support of its version that the plaintiff Daga was accompanied by him, rests on reasons each of which is excellent. That is not so. For example, Branch Manager C. N. Barua sent Bharali a letter, having pressed the office peon book into service for that; and the letter was for a statement he had promised about the Daga affair. But that peon book is not forthcoming; nor the office copy of that letter. That is not so. For example, Branch Manager C. N. Barua sent Bharali a letter, having pressed the office peon book into service for that; and the letter was for a statement he had promised about the Daga affair. But that peon book is not forthcoming; nor the office copy of that letter. Yet there are certain broad and telling considerations which make it look so probable that Manmohan Bharali did accompany the plaintiff Daga in his first ever visit to the branch office of the defendant insurance company at Gauhati. Here are they : (a) The plaintiff Daga is not insurance-minded. He used to take aut policies against such shipments at times, not always. He boasts of larger shipments-the present one was for rs. 91,500-, having been made without any insurance. And mostly from ruby General Insurance Co., Ltd. he had taken out policies for his jute shipments during 1951-57 after which he took to the business of purchasing tamarind seeds from South India. (b) But so he did, that is, he took out policies, in Calcutta. He therefore does not know, or at least does not remember, whether or no "ruby" had an office at Gauhati and Tezpur. (c) Such a one had never dome any business with the defendant insurance company before. It can therefore be taken for granted that such a one would be accompanied by a person well known to the human agency of the defendant insurance company at the Gauhati end. Manmohan bharali, residing just in front of the branch office, and a friend of Manager Barua, as also of Clerk Mookherjee, would so probably be such a person, and not trilok Chand unknown to either. Sure enough, an unknown person introducing an unknown person would not carry any mentionable weight. (d) The more so, when what was sought to be done, and done, in fact, was so extraordinary, indicating a "pull", without which it could not have been done. How extraordinary it was may best be judged from the following :i. Shipment at Tezpur on March 7, 1955. No insurance. II. The plaintiff Daga received the bills of lading dated March 7, 1,955, in calcutta on March 10 or 11,. 1955. No insurance yet. No enquiry even whether insurance was done or not. Res-ron : "no insurance used to be done in Calcutta". No insurance. II. The plaintiff Daga received the bills of lading dated March 7, 1,955, in calcutta on March 10 or 11,. 1955. No insurance yet. No enquiry even whether insurance was done or not. Res-ron : "no insurance used to be done in Calcutta". The plaintiff Daga, who says so, says too, asked whether "ruby", with which company mostly he had insurance, had an office at Gauhati or Tezpur, that he had such insurance with "ruby", only in Calcutta. So his evidence comes to this : No insurance in Calcutta versus inrurance only in Calcutta. III. Between March 11 and 15, 1955, he "had not an idea of doing insurance on this", that is, on the shipment of March 7, 1955. IV. Normally the goods take about 12 to 14 days to reach Calcutta after the issue of bills of lading at Tezpur. Going by this, as stated by the plaintiff Daga, the consignment in suit should have reached Calcutta port between March 19 and 21, 1955. V. On March 20, 1955, the plaintiff Daga was at Gauhati. In the course of his talks there with Mr. Bhupati Singh Kothari or so, a partner of Messrs Mahasingroy Meghraj Bahadur Dhanpat Singh, Daga's commission agents, he was advised that "there were chances of cyclonic weather. " bhupati Singh Kothari, or whatever be his name in full,-the plaintiff Daga does not remember that-, is not examined. Daga will not call him as a witness. VI. And, as Daga says, on March 21, 1955, by when the shipment would normally arrive at Calcutta, he called on the branch office of the defendant at Gauhati to effect the insurance, which he did, without any money in his pocket. No money, insurance yet ? Yes; because "at that time the custom was that we could pay premium later on-not immediately at the time of doing the insurance. " vii. Thus, the necessity of an intermediary who could pull his full weight with the human agency of the defendant insurance company at the gauhati end looks so apparent. Only because the plaintiff Daga speaks of "a custom", whatever may be his idea of what it means, an insurance company would not cover the risk of a perfect stranger. VIII. And risk on what material ? no bill of lading dated March 7, 1955. Only secondary material for that. Only because the plaintiff Daga speaks of "a custom", whatever may be his idea of what it means, an insurance company would not cover the risk of a perfect stranger. VIII. And risk on what material ? no bill of lading dated March 7, 1955. Only secondary material for that. The normal time by which the cargo was to reach Calcutta was over : March 7 to March 21-a period of fourteen days. On top of that, the whole of the evidence completely sat sfies me that the so-called marine insurance was done on March 24, 1955, by having back-dated it to March 21 previous. Now, sure enough Daga unknown there could not have done it all to himself, except by having greased the. itching palms of the defendant's human agency, of which, however, there is no evidence. Sure enough, in a matter as this what would count most would be the influence one could exert over the defendant's people at gauhati. IX. Add to this the plaintiff's case that the total consignment was totally destroyed on March 22/23, 1955. And the so-called marine insurance was had on March 24, 1955, when premium was paid ? Be it on March 21 even, going by the "custom" of no payment cash down, unbelievable though it is. To put it very mildly, the whole outlook is repellent, showing ex facie a very, very shady deal. No insurance for any one of the eleven days from March 7 to March 19, 1955. No idea even. On March 20, 1955, the idea of a cyclonic weather was injected into the mind of the plaintiff Daga. On March 21, 1955, insurance without payment, according to the "custom", and with-out the bills of lading too. And on march 22, 1955, "a serious fire" started consuming the consignment valued at nearly a lakh of rupees. Such telling facts have only to be remembered in order to realize how extraordinary the whole thing was. On March 21, 1955, insurance without payment, according to the "custom", and with-out the bills of lading too. And on march 22, 1955, "a serious fire" started consuming the consignment valued at nearly a lakh of rupees. Such telling facts have only to be remembered in order to realize how extraordinary the whole thing was. (e) Now, in this background, who would carry more weight with mookherjee, the first clerk of the defendant at the Gauhati office, in absence of Manager Barua out on tour then-one like Manmohan Bharali, living just in front of the defendant's branch office at Gauhati, friendly with Manager Barua and First Assistant mookherjee both, and writing business with them too, or Trilok Chand, a. representative though, of one of the biggest firms at Gauhati, but unknown to Mookherjee ? I answer: Manmohan Bharali, not a fictitious person, but a real man in flesh and blood, whom the plaintiff Daga happened to meet at Gauhati in the "gudee" of his commission agents (that long name gain) some eight to ten months after march 21, 1955, that is to say, sometime between November 21, 1955, and january 21, 1956. This suit was instituted on June 15, 1955. Two partners of the firm of his commission agents at Gauhati were then talking to manmohan Bharali. Trilok Chand may not be traceable, if at all. But Bharali is. Neither he nor his house in front of the defendant's office at gauhuati will 'vanish'. And through his commission agents' good offices it would not have been difficult for him to have Bharali as a witness to expose the falsity of the defendant's case that bharali did accompany Daga on March 24, 1955, and did prevail upon Mookherjee to "do" the so-called marine insurance that day and that Bharali backed out from his promised state-ment in favour of the defendant's case. After all, it is the plaintiff's suit, and he must prove it, to my complete satisfaction. That he had not done. The defendant could not very well have examined Bharali, as he would not espouse its cause. I believe Manager c. N. Barua is so far as he says that his attempt to get a statement from him failed. After all, it is the plaintiff's suit, and he must prove it, to my complete satisfaction. That he had not done. The defendant could not very well have examined Bharali, as he would not espouse its cause. I believe Manager c. N. Barua is so far as he says that his attempt to get a statement from him failed. But when Barua goes a little more and says that Bharali expressed his unwillingness to disoblige the plaintiff's commission agents, one of the biggest firms at Gauhati, I ignore this, the truth of which being at issue, plainly hearsay and inadmissible it is: (46) Subramanium v. Public Prosecutor, (1956) 1 W. L. R. 965. 4. Again, called upon to decide whose evidence I should go by-the plaintiff Daga's or Mookherjee's-I decide in favour of Mookherjee's evidence. Though he shows himself in an odious light, by back-dating the declaration forms, Gau 7 to Gau 9 of 1955, exhibit C-, as of March 21, 1955, by putting rubber stamps upon them with his initialled endorsement inside thereof: "risk covered Marine decl. ", without, I am completely satisfied upon evidence, any manner of authority, it is clear that he was "befooled", as he says. He took in good faith all that Daga had represented before him, supported as it was by one, bharali, whom he knew well enough, and in whom he had trust. He took it too to be a routine business, which would pass off smoothly, as every routine business does, little realizing that the so-called insurance on March 24, 1955, was not against a future risk, but for a risk already incurred for the evil that had already befallen the consignment, if any and the vessel carrying it. 5. Upon evidence, I would not call these declarations simpliciter as cover notes. A true cover note is in a form different from that which these declarations reveal. A specimen is there in exhibit 6. Even the plaintiff daga took each of these forms (exhibit C) to be "as an application and declaration" (q. 213 on cross-examination). An endorsement by the first assistant, who has no authority to issue a marine policy in any form,-even Manager Barua has no authority to do so-, as is the defendant's evidence which I accept, will not convert each of such application and declaration into a cover note. An endorsement by the first assistant, who has no authority to issue a marine policy in any form,-even Manager Barua has no authority to do so-, as is the defendant's evidence which I accept, will not convert each of such application and declaration into a cover note. It is significant that the original applications and declarations, exhibit 1, handed over by daga, exhibit C being replicas thereof, do not contain any such endorsement by Mookherjee. 6. In the context of all I see here, ioo much must not be made of the receipt dated March 24, 1955, for "premium and stamp duty of marine insurance "upon the evidence of Barua and Mookherjee-evidence which I accept-plainly it means acceptance of the money pending acceptance of the proposals and issue of the policies. 41. SUCH being the facts found by me upon evidence, the whole of which have considered, but into all the details of which I have not entered, I answer the following issues, namely, 2 (a) and (b), 5 (a) and (b), in favour of the defendant insurance company. 42. COULD I have found that the plaintiff had consigned 525 bales, as alleged, certainly I would, have found him interested in the goods so consigned, no less in the true value thereof. I find the sixth issue so. I find no legal evidence on which I can hold that the plaintiff's consignment, if any, was destroyed by fire, as alleged. Could I have held the opposite, the question of ascertaining damages I would have solved on the basis of the existing evidence, though not of the very best. Instead of getting what the plaintiff claims, he would have got a substantial amount all the same. This is how I decide the seventh issue. 43. ONLY one issue remains : issue No. 9, the general one on reliefs. In view of all that goes before, the finding must be that the plaintiff is disentitled to any relief whatever. 44. IN the result, the suit fails and be dismissed with costs. Certified for counsel.