JUDGMENT M.H. Hussain, J. - This is a criminal revision filed by Rajendra Prakash and Smt. Sarojni Agarwal against the order of the Addl. Sessions Judge, Bareilly, in Cr. Rev. No. 12 of 1967, sending back the complaint case with S. 468 IPC which had been dismissed by the Magistrate on 2-1-1967, as being misconceived, with a direction to proceed and enquire into the complaint on merits according to law. 2. The facts of the case are, that a complaint was filed by Abrar Husain, being Case No. 244 of 1966, on 31-5-1966, in the court of the judicial Officer City Bareilly, against the two aforesaid applicants, under section 468 IPC, with a prayer "that after necessary enquiry in the matter, the accused be committed to Sessions Court, Bareilly, for standing their trial under section 468 IPC or such other provisions of the IPC, which may apply to the facts of the present case, and the accused may be given suitable punishment in the matter". On this complaint the statement of Abrar Husain was recorded on 4-7-1966 and on 2-1-1967 the statement of Haji Ashiq Husain was recorded. The allegations, in brief, in the complaint, were that the applicants who were proprietors of Mrs. Hind Auto Engineering Company, Bareilly were the agents of the Firm of the complainant known as Hindustan Motor Cycle Works, that the agency had been terminated by the complainant through notices, that the applicants managed to procure a blank cheque form from the cheque book of the complainant's Company and forged or got forged this cheque for a sum of Rs.30,000 in favour of Rajendra Prakash under the forged signature of Hafiz Ashiq Hussain, working partner of the Firm M/s. Hindustan Motor Cycle Works, Bareilly. This cheque was dated 2-10-1965 and was presented to the Central Bank of India, Bareilly on 7-10-1965 but the said Bank did not cash it for want of funds and the cheque was returned to the applicants by the bank. On these allegations it has been contended that the cheque had been forged by the applicants who were liable to be punished for committing forgery. It was further contended in the complaint that the Kotwali police, where the report had been lodged, had not been prompt in taking action, and therefore the complaint was being filed. On these allegations it has been contended that the cheque had been forged by the applicants who were liable to be punished for committing forgery. It was further contended in the complaint that the Kotwali police, where the report had been lodged, had not been prompt in taking action, and therefore the complaint was being filed. From the statements of Abrar Husain and Hafiz Ashiq Husain in the court of the Magistrate it appears that information from the Bank was received telephonically by Abrar Husain and Ashiq Husain on 8-10-1965 about the precondition of the cheque for Rs.30,000 which the Bank could not pay for want of funds. On this communication from the Bank, a first information report is alleged to have been lodged in the Kotwali, Bareilly by the complainant. On 9-10-1965 Civil Suit No. 75 of 1965 by Rajendra Prakash had been filed against Abrar Husain and Ashiq Husain for the recovery of Rs. 30,000 as dues, in respect of the agency which had been terminated by the complainants. Along. with the plaint the cheque for Rs. 30,000 in favour of Rajendra Prakash, which had not been cashed by the Bank for want of funds, had also been filed. On 18-7-1966 in this criminal case (Abrar Husain v. Rajendra Prakash and others) an application dated 13-7-1966 signed by the complainant Abrar Husain was filed to the effect that the original cheque in question, which was . on the file of Civil Suit No. 75 of 1965 pending in the court of the Civil Judge, Bareilly, in the case M/s. Hind Auto Engineering Company through Rajendra Prakash and others plaintiffs v. Hindustan Motor Cycle Works, Bareilly, be at once summoned because without the aforesaid original cheque being before the court it would not be possible for the complainant to prove the allegations contained in the complaint. 3. It was contended before the trial court on behalf of Rajendra Prakash that the cheque had already been filed in the Civil Suit and it was for the civil court to adjudge as to whether the cheque was a forged document or a genuine one and it was for that court to proceed, if necessary. The learned Magistrate dismissed the complaint on the ground that it was misconceived and barred under section 195(1) (c) of the Cr. The learned Magistrate dismissed the complaint on the ground that it was misconceived and barred under section 195(1) (c) of the Cr. P.C. Abrar Husain went up in revision to the court of Sessions which, after considering a number of cases cited before it, came to the conclusion that the complaint of Abrar Husain could not be barred under section 19;(]) (c) of the CrPC. It was also of the opinion that the trial court or the Magistrate ought to have summoned and examined as prayed in the application by the complainant, the clerk of the Bank with the necessary papers. The appellate court was of the opinion that the provisions of S. 195 (1)(c) Cr PC were no bar to the complaint filed in the court of the Magistrate. 4. It has been contended here by Sri Radha Krishna, learned counsel for the applicants, that the whole basis of the complaint case was the forging of the cheque of Rs. 30,000 by the applicants and this cheque was a document already produced in the proceedings in Civil Suit No. 75 of 1965 filed by the applicants on 9-10-1965 long before the filing of this complaint. His contention is that if the Civil Court after assessment of the evidence records a finding that the cheque which is the basis of the civil suit was a forged one then it was for the civil court to proceed against his clients under section 195 (1) (c) CrPC. He also pointed out that even if the civil court refrained from taking action against the applicants inspite of finding that the cheque was forged, even then, it was still open to the complainant Abrar Husain to initiate criminal proceedings with the aid of S. 476 CrPC by requesting the civil court to take action against the applicants in the criminal court. Sri Radha Krishna has contended that the filing of the complaint by Abrar Husain on 31-5-1966 long after the filing of the civil suit was only a method to bring about indirect pressure on the applicants and to create hindrance in the civil suit taking its usual course. Sri Radha Krishna has contended that the filing of the complaint by Abrar Husain on 31-5-1966 long after the filing of the civil suit was only a method to bring about indirect pressure on the applicants and to create hindrance in the civil suit taking its usual course. A glance at the complaint would make it obvious that till such time was the cheque in dispute was with the applicants and had not been filed in the court in the civil suit, there was no question of instituting a complaint of forgery in respect of that particular cheque. It is stated in the complaint that the Central Bank, Bareilly, before whom the cheque in dispute was presented for encashment on 7-10-1965, did not pay the amount for the reason that there was not so much money in the bank to the credit of the complainant for which the cheque had been drawn and, therefore, it was returned to the accused. Thus till the date of filing of the cheque, i.e., 9-10-1965 in the civil court in Suit No. 75 of 1965 there could be no means for the complainant to ascertain that the particular cheque was a forged one. In fact Abrar Husain complainant on 4-7-1966 in his statement in support of his complaint dated 31-5-1966 has clearly stated before the court that the cheque is in the possession of Ram (Rajendra) Prakash "cheque Ram Prakash ke qabze men hai". Once the cheque had been filed in the court in a suit it would be deemed to be a document in a proceeding in a court and the provisions of S. 195 (1) (c) CrPC become applicable. 5. It was contended, on behalf of the complainant by Sri K. C. Agarwal, learned counsel, that prior to the filing of the civil suit the applicants tried to cheat by this forged cheque and obtain a sum of Rs.30,000 from the Bank and therefore the applicants are liable under section 468, IPC and that S. 468 IPC is not hit by S. 195 (1) (c) CrPC and therefore the complaint could be enquired into inspite of the pendency of the civil suit between the parties. In my opinion the basis of the enquiry in the complaint is the cheque itself which was not available for inspection or otherwise to the complainant till at least 9-10-1965 when it had actually been filed in a proceeding in a civil court. Once the cheque is in court in a proceeding then it is not open for the complainant to contend that the complaint can be independently enquired into. If the civil court holds that the cheque was a genuine cheque issued by the complainant in favour of the applicants then there will be no cause for the complaint. The allegations in the complaint go to indicate that the grievance of the complainant is of forging the cheque and not that of cheating which could not be accomplished due to insufficiency of funds in the hank. 6. S. 195(1) (c) CrPC says "that no court shall take cognizance of any offence described in S. 463 or punishable u/S.s 471, 475 or 476 of the same Code when such offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any court in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceedings, except on the complaint in writing of such court, or of some other courts to which such Court is suborinate." 7. S. 463 of the IPC defines 'forgery', while Sections 465, 466, 467, 468 and 469 are penal sections providing penalties under different set of facts. Therefore all complaints in respect of 'forgery' as defined in S. 463 IPC, if detected, in respect of a document which has already been filed in any proceeding in any "court can be taken cognizance of only in accordance with S. 195 (1) (c), CrPC. Therefore, I am unable to agree with the contention of Sri K. C. Agarwal, learned counsel for the complainant that S. 195 (1) (c) , CrPC cannot bar the complaint of his client under section 468 IPC. It has also been argued by Sri Agarwal that in the prayer clause in the complaint there is not only a prayer for conviction under section 468 but also under such other provisions of the IPC which may apply to the facts of the case. It has also been argued by Sri Agarwal that in the prayer clause in the complaint there is not only a prayer for conviction under section 468 but also under such other provisions of the IPC which may apply to the facts of the case. The complaint is headed under section 468 IPC and in the end it is prayed that the accused be committed to the court of sessions for trial under section 468 IPC or such other provisions of the IPC. In my opinion, an alternate prayer in the complaint so widely worded cannot nullify the impact of S. 195(1) (c), CrPC. 8. The Supreme Court in the case reported in Bashir-ul-Haq and others v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1953 SC 293 on the complaint of Dhirendra Nath Bera held that: "Though in our judgment, S. 195 does not bar the trial of an accused person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same facts and which is not in eluded within the ambit of that section, it has also to be borne in mind that the provisions of that section cannot be evaded by resorting to devices or camouflages. The test whether there is evasion of the section or not is whether the facts disclosed primarily and essentially an offence for which a complaint of the court or of the public servant is required. In other words, the provisions of the section cannot be evaded by the device of charging a person with an offence to which that section does not apply and then convicting him of an offence to which it does, upon the ground that such latter offence is a minor offence of the same character, or by describing the offence as being one punishable under some other section of the IPC. though in truth and substance the offence falls in the category of sections mentioned in the S. 195, CrPC. Merely by changing the garb or label of an offence which is essentially an offence covered by' the provisions of S. 195 prosecution for such an offence cannot be taken cognizance of by misdiscribing it or by putting a wrong label on it." In the instant case the facts are very clear. As stated above the complaint was filed over six months after the disputed cheque having been placed on the file of the civil suit no. As stated above the complaint was filed over six months after the disputed cheque having been placed on the file of the civil suit no. 75 of 1965 in the court of the Civil Judge Bareilly. The complainant himself by his application dated 13-7-1966 applied to the court of the Magistrate for summoning of the disputed cheque from the file of the Civil Suit for the purpose of establishing the allegations in the complaint. Had the applicants not filed the civil suit or even having filed the civil suit. if the applicants had withheld the cheque till such time as the filing of the cheque had become absolutely necessary, the complaint. in all probability, would not have been filed or at least could not have been proceeded with in the absence of the disputed cheque. 9. Moreover, the last sentence in paragraph 5 of the complaint reads thus: "The said cheque was dated 2-10-1965 as forged by the accused or got forged". This alternative assertion of the accused having "got forged" the cheque also attracts the provisions of S. 471 IPC and this S. 471 is specifically mentioned in S. 195 (1) (c) of the CrPC. Therefore, in my opinion, the complaint comes both under sections 468 and 471. IPC. Mere mention of S. 468 and omission of S. 471 in the complaint cannot nullify the effect of S. 195 (1) (c) CrPC to the facts and circumstances of this case. 10. Similar question of the applicability of S. 195 (1) (c). CrPC arose in the case reported in Vevekanand Nand Kishore v. State A.I.R. 1969 Alld. 189 Criminal proceedings under sections 406, 420, 467 and 471 IPC were i initiated in that case. Takru, J. held i that when the main offence is the one under section 471. IPC. namely, the offence of us fug a forged document as genuine document and the other offence under sections 420, 406, 467 all flow from it in the sense that if the charge under section 471 fails the charges for other offences would also fail. He further observed that none of the offences, namely, Sections 406, 420, 467 can, in truth and substance, be said to be of a distinct nature. In the present case, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the complainant that the applicant wanted to cheat by drawing a sum of Rs. He further observed that none of the offences, namely, Sections 406, 420, 467 can, in truth and substance, be said to be of a distinct nature. In the present case, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the complainant that the applicant wanted to cheat by drawing a sum of Rs. 30,000 on the basis of this forged cheque and, therefore, it is a distinct offence under section 420 IPC which the applicants committed while presenting the cheque before the Bank for encashment. The facts clearly indicate that cheating, if it had been accomplished, would have been the result of the cheque having been forged and, as such, cheating could not be a separate and distinct offence. The return of the cheque by the Bank for want of adequate funds is by itself indicative of the fact that the Bank did not find the said cheque to be forged one, otherwise the Bank would have with- held the cheque., in its possession and taken immediate steps for the apprehension of the applicants for being prosecuted for forgery and attempted cheating. 11. In the case reported in Harinath Singh v. State 1964 AWR (HC) 232 a Division Bench of this Court following the decision of the Supreme Court referred above, has observed "even for offences cognizance of which was not per se barred under section 195 CrPC no Magistrate could be allowed to take their cognizance if it was not a 'distinct' offence or, in truth and substance, the offence fell under the category of sections mentioned in S. 195 CrPC." In the instant case cheating, if at all, could not be a distinct offence from an offence of forgery. In S. 468 IPC penalty is provided for committing forgery in a document which is to be used for the purpose of cheating and, therefore, cheating, as mentioned in S. 468 IPC is not a distinct offence. 12. In view of the cases cited above and on the facts and circumstances of this particular case, I am of the opinion that the complaint cannot be proceeded with and is barred by S. 195 (1) (c) of the CrPC. The interest of the complainant is well protected under section 476, CrPC in the event of the civil court coming to a finding that the cheque was a forged one. 13. The interest of the complainant is well protected under section 476, CrPC in the event of the civil court coming to a finding that the cheque was a forged one. 13. Accordingly, the revision is allowed and the order of the I Additional Sessions Judge, dated 28-5-1968 remanding the case with directions to the trial court to proceed and enquire into the case on merits according to law is set aside and the order of the Magistrate dismissing the complaint is confirmed.