JUDGMENT SHAH, J.-The respondent obtained from the State of Rewa a mining Iease for 20 years authorising extraction of fireclay over an area of 1089.55 acres in village Jhala, District Shehdol. On July 28, 1961 the respondent applied to the State of Madhya Pradesh (into which the State of Rewa had merged) for renewal of the lease. This application was rejected by the State of Madhya Pradesh on June 26, 1962. An application moved before the Central Government under Rule 54 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, by the respondent was rejected, and intimation of the order was communicated to the respondent on May 13, 1964. The respondent had requested the Central Government to give him a personal hearing but no personal hearing was given before dismissing his application. The respondent then moved a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh for a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the Government of India and the order of the State Government. It was submitted in the petition that the Central Government which exercised quasi-judicial function had disposed of his revision application without affording him a reasonable opportunity of being heard in person and the procedure followed on that account was contrary to the rules of natural justice and the order the Central Government was liable to be quashed. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh quashed the order and directed that the Central Government do consider the revision application afresh and dispose it of according to law. The High Court observed : "......it was imperative for the Central Government to give an opportunity of a personal hearing to the petitioner before deciding the revision application filed by him under rule 54 of the Rules. As this was not done, the order passed by the Central Government must be regarded as one made contrary to rules of natural justice and as auch void." Counsel for the State of Madhya pradesh contends that the argument which found favour with the High Court of Madhya Pradesh was rejected by this Court in Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India and others. (1). In that case the Court unanimously held that a petitioner under the Mineral Concession Rules is not entitled as of right to a personal hearing. (1). In that case the Court unanimously held that a petitioner under the Mineral Concession Rules is not entitled as of right to a personal hearing. Subba Rao, J., observed : "It Is no doubt a principle of natural justice that a quasi-judicial tribunal cannot make any decision adverse to a perty without giving him an effective opportunity of meeting any relevant allegations against him. Indeed, Rule 55 of the Rules, recognizes the "said principle and states that no order shall be passed against any applicant unless he has been given an opportunity to make his representation against the comments, if any, received from the State Government or other authority. The said opportunity need not necessarily be by personal hearing. It can be by written representation." With that view Bhachawat J., agreed, Counsel for the State therefore contended that the judgment of the High Court is liable to be set aside. But counsel for the respondent urged that the order passed by the High Court may be sustained on another ground. It was pointed out that the order passed by the Central Government that : "I am directed to refer to your application dated November 27, 1962 on the above subject and to say that after careful consideration of the grounds stated therein the Central Government have come to the conclusion that there is no valid ground for interfering with the decision of the Government of Madhya Pradesh rejecting your application for renewal of Mining lease for fireclay over an area of 1099.55 acres in village Jhala of District Shahdol. Your application for revision is, therefore, rejected.", not being "a speaking order" must according to the decisions of this Court be still regarded as invalid. Counsel for the respondent contended that the Central Government in dealing with an application under the Mineral Concession Rules exercise quasi-judicial authority and an order which gives no reasons for rejecting the revision application is illegal. In support of this contention counsel relied upon the judgment of this Court in Bhagat Raja v. The Union of India and others (2). Counsel for the respondent contended that the Central Government in dealing with an application under the Mineral Concession Rules exercise quasi-judicial authority and an order which gives no reasons for rejecting the revision application is illegal. In support of this contention counsel relied upon the judgment of this Court in Bhagat Raja v. The Union of India and others (2). ln that case, in dealing with the legality of an order made by the Central Government in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under Rule 54 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1950, which was in terms indentical with the order passed in the present case, this Court held that the function exercised under Rule 55 of the Mineral Concession Rules, by the Central Government is quasi-judicial, and the decision on that account being subject to the supervisory power of the High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution and of the appellate power of this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution, an order which gives no reasons for the conclusion is illegal. The Court further observed that if the State Government gives sufficient reasons for accepting the 1. (1966) 1 S.C.R. 466 . 2. (1967) 3 S.C.R. 302 .application of one party and rejecting that of others, as it must, and the Central Government adopts the reasoning of the State Government, this Court may proceed to examine whether the reasons given are sufficient for the purpose of upholding the decision. But when the reasons given in the order of the State Government makes no attempt to clarify the same, this Court, in appeal may have to examine the case de novo, "without anybody being the wiser for the review by the Central Government". The Court also observed that a "speaking order" is all the more necessary in the case of a decision under Rule 55 because there is provision for new material being placed before the Central Government which was not there before the State Government, and further, because the decision, affecting important rights of parties may be given in a summary manner without granting a hearing to the parties. Counsel for the State contends that even though the impugned _order passed by the Central Government was subject to the infirmity pointed out by this Court in Bhagat Raja s case (2) since the respondent did not appeal to this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution, and moved the High Court by a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution for a writ the decision of the High Court cannot be upheld. But a patry aggrieved by an order of the Central Government which is not a "speaking order" may move the High Court under Art 226 of the Constitution for a writ of certiorari or may appeal to this Court under Art 136 of the Constitution. In either case it would be open to the Court dealing with the proceeding to quash the order and to direct a hearing by the Central Government according to law. We may observe that the Central Government is not bound to give a personal hearing to a party, provided all the facts which are in their possession and which have a bearing on the petition before them have been disclosed to the party approaching it. But in appropriate cases the Central Government may give a personal hearing to the party applying in revision. If the matter is complicated or requires elucidation or where fresh materials are brought to the notice of the Central Government, it will be proper exercise of jurisdiction to give a personal hearing so that the applicant may be able to clarify the contentions raised by him, and the representation made bt the State Government in answer to his claims and other evidence which has a hearing on the matter of controversy. The question is undoubtedly one of discretion and not of jurisdiction. On the sole ground that no personal hearing was given the order of the Central Government cannot be quashed. But in making its order if the Central Government gives as no reasons for rejecting the claims of the applicant, the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution and this Court entertaining an appeal under Art 136 of the Constitution have the power to quash the order of the Central Government. The appeal will be dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in this appeal. For Citation : (1973) 27 Fac LR 244