Judgment Somnath Iyer, J.- This is a singular case in which Mr Borna, an Advoate of this Court, faces a contempt charge arising out of a report of the District Judge of Coorg concerning an incident in the Chamber of the Munsiff of Virajpet on 3rd September, 1968. Mr. Borna who practises at Mercara, was the Advocate for the plaintiff in a. suit which was for hearing on that date. A Commissioner who had been selected by both sides had to be appointed on that day to record the evidence of a witness. But, before Mr. Borna arrived in Virajpet, the case had been called and another person appointed as Commissioner. But, on a joint representation in his Chamber, the Munsiff stated that he would change that order. Mr. Borna then offered to bring the record of the proceedings from the records section and brought it. What next happened is the subject-matter of the complaint before us. It is said that when the Munsiff commenced writing his order, Shivananjaiah, one of his clerks, entered his Chamber and made the complaint that that record had been removed by Mr. Borna without the knowledge of the concerned clerk and that when he did so, Mr. Borna asked him to mind his own business and remove himself “from the Chamber. It is again stated that the sequel to that was an alteration in the Court hall in the course of which Mr. Borna was rude to Shivananjaiah and attempted to manhandle him. But the Court was not then sitting. The District Judge who thought that Mr. Borna committed contempt of Court in that way, says in his report: “In my opinion, the conduct of Sri N.C.S. Borna amounts to contempt of Court, as his directing the said clerk in the presence of the Munsiff-Magistarte in his Chambers to ‘get out of the Chambers, he is not the concerned clerk’ amounts to undermining the prestige of the Court; and further his assaulting the official of “the Court in the premises of the Court amounts to contempt of Court.” In his counter-affidavit, Mr. Borna repudiates the truth of the accusations made against him and asserts that Shivananjaiah made an ‘intemperate attack’ on him in the Munsiff's Chamber. Borna repudiates the truth of the accusations made against him and asserts that Shivananjaiah made an ‘intemperate attack’ on him in the Munsiff's Chamber. That the assumption in his report by the District Judge that Shivananjaiah was assaulted in the Court hall is groundless is demonstrated by Shivananjaiah's complaint about the incident to the Munsiff on 3rd September, 1968, the relevant part of which reads: “After sometime he came to the Court hall where I was standing and to scold and assault me.” It is by no means clear from this complaint that Mr. Borna actually scolded Shivananjaiah. The complaint does not also set out the words employed for the scolding. But what is, however, clear is that Shivananjaiah did not state in his complaint that he was in fact assaulted. We do not, therefore, believe that there was any assault. We also think that the incident in the Chamber was no more than a mere small tiff of which no one should have taken any serious notice. Shivananjaiah's complaint demonstrates that what next happened in the Court hall was a mere verbal wrangle when the Court was not in session. Such small skirmishes through which there is no ‘deposing of the authority, justice or dignity of the Court’, do not constitute contempt of Court. In Parasharam Detaram Shamdasani v. King Emperor1 Lord Goddard in the context of an offensive remark by a litigant to the opening Counsel in Court said this: “To treat such words as requiring the exercise by the Court of its summary powers of punishment is not only to make a mountain out of a molehill but to give a wholly undeserved advertisement to what had far better have been treated as unworthy of either answer or even notice. But, apart from the question whether the motion was wise or expedient it has to be decided whether these words could be properly regarded as a contempt of Court. The principle to be applied is clear enough For words or motion used in face of the Court, or in the course of proceeding for they may be used outside the Court, to be a contempt, they must be such as would interfere, or tend to interfere, with the course of justice. No further definition can be attempted. The principle to be applied is clear enough For words or motion used in face of the Court, or in the course of proceeding for they may be used outside the Court, to be a contempt, they must be such as would interfere, or tend to interfere, with the course of justice. No further definition can be attempted. (page 269)” This enunciation was again referred to with appeal by the Privy Council in Joseph Orakwue Izuora v. The Queen2 So, we drop these proceedings and discharge the accused. S.V.S.-----Proceeding; dropped.