Judgment :- 1. The question involved in this revision petition is whether the provision of 0.9, R.9 of the Civil Procedure Code applies to an application, for fixation of fair rent under Act 1 of 1964 so as to bar a subsequent application after an earlier one had been dismissed for default. The Land Tribunal held that the said provision was a bar; and on that ground it dismissed the tenant's application for fixation of fair rent. The appellate authority held that the provision had no application to application for fixation of fair rent. It set aside the order of the Tribunal and remanded the matter back for investigation on the merits. The aggrieved landlord is the revision petitioner before us. 2. S.101 of the Kerala Act 1 of 1964 which defines the powers of the Land Tribunal, confers, by clauses (a) to (d) thereof, certain enumerated powers under the Civil Procedure Code, and leaves other powers to be "prescribed" by rules framed under the Act. The power under 0.9, R.9 is not expressly conferred by clauses (a) to (d). R.99 reads: "99. Proceedings in general. In all proceedings before the Land Tribunal and the Land Board, the procedure prescribed as regards applications in the Code of Civil Procedure or the rules made thereunder shall, as far as can be made applicable, be followed except to the extent otherwise provided in the Act or in these rules: Provided that the Land Tribunal may dispose of summarily applications for determination of fair rent." We shall assume that 0.9, R.9 which, expressis verbis has application only to suits, applies also to applications, by virtue of S.141 of the Civil Procedure Code, although that appears to be a matter on which judicial opinion is in conflict. Still, on the. language of R.99, it appears to us that it attracts only the procedural provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and not a substantive provision, such as the first part of 0.9 R.9, which bars the maintainability of an application. But our attention was called to the Full Bench decision in Kalyani Amma Bhagavathi Amma v. Ouseph Varkey (1967 KLT. 317). The question there considered was whether the Land Tribunal had power to restore an application dismissed for default, under powers analogous to those enacted by the second part of 0.9, R.9 CPC. On the strength of R.99 it was held that it had. 3. 317). The question there considered was whether the Land Tribunal had power to restore an application dismissed for default, under powers analogous to those enacted by the second part of 0.9, R.9 CPC. On the strength of R.99 it was held that it had. 3. Giving the matter our careful attention, it appears to us that the Full Bench decision in Kalyani Amma's case (1967 KLT. 317) was concerned with a procedural provision and not with a substantive one, such as what was involved in the present case. The present position appears to be directly covered by the decision in Thamukutty v. Athankutty (1961 KLT. 31) rendered with respect to the provisions of the Malabar Tenancy Act. S.15(2) of the said Act made the provisions of the CPC. applicable to the hearing of an application under the said Act, by the Rent Court. And S.49 of the Act enacted that the provisions of the CPC. will govern the proceedings relating to applications under this Act. It was held that these provisions of the Act did not take in the power under 0.9, R.9 of the Civil Procedure Code which debars a plaintiff from instituting a suit on the same cause of action in the event of the dismissal of an application to restore the suit. This decision is directly in point, and, as rightly pointed out by the appellate authority, was not noticed, much the less over-ruled, by the Full Bench in Kalyani Amma's case (1967 KLT. 317). 4. We requested Sri. V. Rama Shenoi to assist us in regard to the scope of the Full Bench decision, and, generally about the question involved in this Civil Revision Petition. He promptly complied with our request and we wish to record our grateful appreciation of his valuable assistance. Sri Shenoi contended that the observations of the Full Bench case are wide in their sweep, so as to attract the first part of 0.9, R.9, also to applications before Land Tribunals. We are unable to agree. Read and understood in its background and context, we feel that the Full Bench decision did not lay down anything more than that the procedural part of the Civil Procedure Code, is attracted. 5. We are unable to agree. Read and understood in its background and context, we feel that the Full Bench decision did not lay down anything more than that the procedural part of the Civil Procedure Code, is attracted. 5. Sri Shenoi further contended that on the language of S.31 of the Kerala Act 1 of 1964 the Tribunal had no power at all to dismiss an application for fixation of fair rent, for default; but was bound to enquire into it on the merits. S.31 reads: "Determination of fair rent by Land Tribunal: (1) The cultivating tenant or any landlord may apply, in such form as may be prescribed, to the Land Tribunal for determining the fair rent in respect of a holding. (2) On receipt of an application under sub-sec. (1), the Land Tribunal shall issue notices to all persons interested and after enquiry, determine by an order (i) the fair rent in respect of the holding; (ii) if there is an intermediary or intermediaries, the rent payable by such intermediary or intermediaries to his landlord or to their respective landlords; (iii) the instalments, if any, in which the fair rent shall be payable; and (iv) the date or dates on which the said rent or instalment shall be payable. (3) In determining the fair rent under sub-section (2) the Land Tribunal may take into account the statistics published under S.44." We do not think that the obligation placed on the Tribunal under sub-clause (2), above, is so imperative as to make it necessary for it to pay process fee and Issue notices to the parties, itself, even in cases where can intransigent applicant refuses to take any further steps after filing the application. To place such a construction on the section would be to place too great a burden on the Tribunal, (leading eventually to its liquidation) by a process of reductio ad absurdum. Mr. Shenoi's inspiration and support for the argument was from the decision of the Full Bench in S. Chenniappa Mudaliar, Madurai v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras AIR. 1965 Madras 62, confirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 1050 of 1968. The decision was concerned with S.33 (4) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 as it stood at the relevant time, read with S.SA (8) and R.24 thereof. 1965 Madras 62, confirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 1050 of 1968. The decision was concerned with S.33 (4) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 as it stood at the relevant time, read with S.SA (8) and R.24 thereof. The wording of S.31 of Act 1 of 1964 is materially different, and the decision cited furnishes no analogy. 6. Even assuming that the bar of O.9, R.9, of the CPC. is applicable to proceedings before the Land Tribunal, we are inclined to think although we express no final opinion that the subsequent application in the instant case cannot be dismissed on that ground. The earlier application (Ext. R-1), dismissed for default by Ext. R-2 order, related to a period antecedent to what is covered by the later one. It appears to us that the cause of action for the two applications may well be claimed to be different. The ruling in Thotta China Subba Rao and others v. Mattapalli Raju AIR. 1950 Federal Court 1 seems to furnish a useful analogy. In the view that we have taken, we do not propose to labour this point further, or to make any final pronouncement on the matter. 7. The view taken by the appellate court was right. We dismiss this revision petition, but make no order as to costs. Dismissed.