JUDGMENT S.N. Singh, J. - This is a tenant's appeal in a suit for ejectment and arrears. The plaintiff-respondent instituted the present suit for the ejectment of the defendant-tenant on the ground of default. The defendant-appellant was a tenant on payment of Rs. 12/- per month. It appears that on 7th August, 1965 a letter was sent to the defendant-appellant intimating him that five months rent was due and that he should pay the same as soon as possible. This letter was received by the tenant on 18th August, 1965. The tenant remitted the amount of rent due on 18th September, 1965 which was refused by the landlord on 27th September, 1965. The tenant although has remitted the entire rent due but did not remit the Bhoom Bhawan Kar as demanded by the landlord. After a lapse of more than one month from the receipt of the letter the landlord again sent a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act to the defendant on 7th October, 1965 determining his tenancy and demanding the rent due till the date of the determination of the Tenancy. It appears that on 20th October, 1965 the tenant sent through money order a sum of Rs. 23.40 P. as Bhoom Bhawan Kar to the landlord but the same was refused. Again on 2nd November, 1965 money order for Rs. 107.40 p. was sent to the landlord who again refused the same. It is after this that the present suit was instituted on 14th November, 1965 claiming the arrears as well as the ejectment of the defendant as already stated above on the ground of default. 2. This claim was resisted by the defendant mainly on the ground that defendant was not in default. The defendant had also taken the plea of non-joinder of necessary party and that the notice served was invalid and had been waived. 3. On the pleadings of the parties relevant issues were framed by the trial Court. The trial Court decreed the suit for recovery of the arrears of rent as well as the Bhoom Bhawan Kar as claimed but dismissed the suit for ejectment on the ground that there was no valid notice as contemplated by Section 3(1) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. 4. The trial Court decreed the suit for recovery of the arrears of rent as well as the Bhoom Bhawan Kar as claimed but dismissed the suit for ejectment on the ground that there was no valid notice as contemplated by Section 3(1) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. 4. On appeal the lower Appellate Court has reversed this judgment and has decreed the suit for ejectments as well. This is against the above judgment of the lower Appellate Court that the present appeal has been filed. 5. It has been argued on behalf of the tenant-appellant that there has not been any default as claimed by the plaintiff-respondent and that the letter dated 7th August, 1965 could not be treated as a valid notice of demand as contemplated by Section 3(1) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. It was further argued relying on a Full Bench decision of this Court in Mohd. Bashir v. Azizul Qadar, 1966 ALJ 677 at 679, that the second notice dated 7th October, 1965 amounted to the waiver of the first letter dated 7th August, 1965 even if this letter is accepted to be a notice of demand as contemplated by Section 3(1) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. 6. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel but regret mu inability to accept them. The first point urged was that the letter dated 7.8.1965 did not amount to a notice of demand. The letter was in these terms. After informing the tenant that there were arrears for five months, the letter read "Ap ko suchit kiya jata hai ki uprokt 22.50 ki rakam yeh patra milne par shighra se shighra bhej deve". Section 3(1) of the Rent Control and Eviction Act does not give any specific form of notice to be served on the tenant. It only states that there should be a notice of demand. In my opinion this letter clearly complies with the requirement of law as contemplated by Section 3(1). In a similar circumstances this Court accepted such a notice to be a notice of demand. It was said in that case "you are in arrears of rent for the last several months. I would very much appreciate if you please send the rent that is due". In a similar circumstances this Court accepted such a notice to be a notice of demand. It was said in that case "you are in arrears of rent for the last several months. I would very much appreciate if you please send the rent that is due". This was a case decided by this Court and is reported in Bishun Chandra Saxena v. Sushil Chandra Verma, 1960 ALJ 70. The language used in this reported case, in my opinion, is not better than the language used in the instant case. I am clearly of the opinion that the requirement of Section 3(1) of the Rent Control and Eviction Act has been amply complied with by the letter dated 7.8.1965. 7. The second argument of the learned counsel based on the Full Bench case also does not help him. Superficially it does appear that the Full Bench case helps the appellant but the facts of that case are entirely distinguishable. A Division Bench of this Court did not agree with the decision of another Division Bench about the interpretation of Section 7-C(2) of the Rent Control and Eviction Act. Consequently a reference was made to a Full Bench. The Full Bench interpreted Section 7-C sub-clause (2) in Mohd. Bashir v. Azizul Qadar (supra). In that case although no question about the waiver of notice had been referred, an argument was advanced that the deposit under Section 7-C sub-clause (2) of the Rent Control and Eviction Act even if accepted to be valid, since the deposit had been made more than one month after the notice of demand, the tenant could not take benefit of such a deposit. This argument was based on the fact that first notice of demand had been served on September 26, 1961 while the actual deposit had been made on December 19, 1961. This argument was repelled on the ground that the plaintiff in that case had not claimed ejectment on the ground of the first notice of demand dated 26th September, 1961 but had based his claim on a subsequent notice dated 21st November, 1961 terminating the tenancy. Consequently it was held that since the plaintiff had waived the first notice and had based the cause of action on the second notice, he could not be heard at the second appellate stage to argue that there was a default because of non-compliance of the first notice. Consequently it was held that since the plaintiff had waived the first notice and had based the cause of action on the second notice, he could not be heard at the second appellate stage to argue that there was a default because of non-compliance of the first notice. The facts of the present case are entirely different. In this case at first the landlord gave a notice to the tenant demanding rent as required by Section 3 sub-clause (1) of the Rent Control Act. The tenant, as the facts stated above, did not pay the amount due within one month. The result was that the bar of Section 3(1) was removed and the parties were relegated to the position that they occupied under the general law. After the bar was removed the landlord served notice as contemplated by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the tenancy and instituted the present suit for ejectment. In the plaint it was clearly stated that the cause of action arose on 7.8.1965 and thereafter on subsequent dates when the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had been given and the tenant had not vacated. Thus, the plaintiff in the present case has based his claim on both the notices. The facts of the present case are similar to that of the reported case in 1960 ALJ., page 70 (supra). I have also perused the subsequent notice which does not show that the landlord ever intended to waive the first notice of demand. Since the Full Bench case on which great reliance is placed is distinguishable and the view taken by the lower Appellate Court is in consonance with the view expressed in 1960 ALJ., page 70, I see no reason to interfere with the decision of the lower Appellate Court. 8. No case for interference has been made out. Accordingly this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. However, the tenant will not be ejected for a period of four months provided he pays the entire amount due upto date and a sum of Rs. 48/- for the use and occupation for these four months within a period of one month from today. In case of default the decree will be executable after a month.