Judgment :- 1. The short question that arises in this Second Appeal is whether the definition of Kudikidappukaran under S.2 (25) of Act 1 of 1964 is applicable to the case of the 3rd defendant appellant. The definition, leaving out the provisions and explanations which are not necessary for the purpose of this case, runs as follows: "Kudikidappukaran' means a person who has neither a homestead nor any land, either as owner or as tenant in possession, on which he could erect a homestead and (1) who has been permitted with or without an obligation to pay rent by a person in lawful possession of any land to have the use and occupation of a portion of such land for the purpose of erecting a homestead; or (ii) who has been permitted by a person in lawful possession of any land to occupy, with or without an obligation to pay rent, a but belonging to such person and situate in the said land, but otherwise has no interest in the land; and 'kudikidappu' means the land and the homestead or the but so permitted to be, erected or occupied together with the easements attached thereto." One of the qualifications to attract this, definition to a case is that the person who claims to be a kudikidapukaran must have neither homestead nor any land either as owner or as tenant in possession on which he could erect a homestead. In the present case the claim of kudikidappu is urged by the 3rd defendant. It is admitted that his mother Cheera was residing in the plaint building and on her death defendants 1 to 4, her heirs, obtained whatever right she had in the property, if her rights were heritable. Anyhow defendants 3 and 4 claimed to continue to reside in the plaint building. Though there is claim by the first defendant, he did not choose to prosecute the suit after filing written statement. The claim of defendants 3 and 4 to kudikidappu right was negatived on the ground that they were possessed of other land on which they could erect a homestead. The land so available to them is some area of paddy land. The 4th defendant has not filed an appeal. The claim of defendants 3 and 4 to kudikidappu right was negatived on the ground that they were possessed of other land on which they could erect a homestead. The land so available to them is some area of paddy land. The 4th defendant has not filed an appeal. The 3rd defendant alone filed the appeal and in that appeal he obtained relief, the appellate court holding that the land which be is shown to be possessed of was not such as that on which he could erect a homestead. The plaintiff who was thus non-suited is the appellant before me. 2. It is not sufficient if it is shown that the person who claims Kudikidappu rights is possessed of some land, but such land must be shown to be fit for erection of a homestead. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that any piece of wet land is capable of being reclaimed, converted into garden land and used for erecting a homestead and for the purpose of S.2 (25) that would be sufficient. In considering the question whether a particular piece of land is one on which a person could erect a homestead the nature of the land, the use to which such land is normally put and whether it is reasonable to expect any person to use such land for the purpose of homestead are considerations which are quite relevant. If the definition had required only possession of any land to negative the claim as a kudikidappukaran, one should have accepted the contention of the counsel. But such land is qualified as one on which he could erect a homestead. One does not normally expect a paddy land to be reclaimed into a garden land for the purpose of erection of homestead. No doubt there may be exceptional cases where the paddy land is so situate, say, by the side of the road or by the side of other property which is reclaimed, that it may possibly be said that the land may be put to better use by reclaiming and using for the erection of homestead. That would be for the person who contends that the kudikidappu right is not available to plead and prove. In the present case there is neither such a plea nor proof. That would be for the person who contends that the kudikidappu right is not available to plead and prove. In the present case there is neither such a plea nor proof. The only material available is that the 81/2 cents of land which the 3rd defendant is said to be possessed of is paddy land. Apart from the fact that it is certainly not normal to expect such paddy land possibly lying as a part of an'ela' to be reclaimed and used as land for erection of a homestead, I also see objection to this course in the provisions of the Kerala Land Utilisation Order, 1967. Clause.6(1) of that Order prohibits any holder of a land that has been under cultivation with any food crops three years immediately before the commencement of the Order from converting or attempting to convert or utilising or attempting to utilise such land for the cultivation of any other food crop or for any other purposes. The erection of a homestead is "any other purpose". This can be done only in accordance with the terms of a written permission given by the Collector. It is not necessary for me in this case to embark upon a consideration of the question under what circumstances the Collector would give such permission. 3. From the facts of this case I am satisfied that the 81/2 cents of land available to the 3rd defendant is such as that on which a homestead could not be erected. If so, the 3rd defendant would be entitled to the benefits available to a Kudikidappukaran under Act 1 of 1964. 4. Though there is no appeal at the instance of the 4th defendant, the appellate court has found that the decree of the trial could would not stand either against the 3rd defendant or against the 4th defendant. It is pointed out to me that there is no justification for such a course and the decree ought not to have been set aside as against the 4th defendant. No doubt, the ultimate result so far as the plaintiff is concerned would be the same in any case as the plaintiff would be non-suited even if the 3rd defendant is found to be a kudikidappukaran. But according to counsel for the appellant the declaration in favour of both defendants may confer rights on the 4th defendant also. No doubt, the ultimate result so far as the plaintiff is concerned would be the same in any case as the plaintiff would be non-suited even if the 3rd defendant is found to be a kudikidappukaran. But according to counsel for the appellant the declaration in favour of both defendants may confer rights on the 4th defendant also. Anyhow, in view of the fact that he is not an appellant in the appellate court, I make it clear that that court was not justified in finding that he too was entitled to kudikidappu right. Subject to the above observations, I dismiss this S. A. with costs.