Judgment :- 1. The two questions that arise for consideration in this appeal are: (1) Whether under the terras of Ext. P1 will executed by Ittiachan in 1083 his widow Ittianam was competent to execute Ext. P3 lease dated 22 91093 to the defendant's father, in respect of the plaint properties and (2) If so whether the defendant is entitled to the benefit of the proviso to clauses (i) to (vii) to sub-section (1) of S.3 of Act I of 1964. 2. The plaintiff who is entitled to possession of the plaint items under the terms of Ext. P1 instituted the suit for their recovery from the defendant. The suit has been concurrently decreed by the courts below. The second appeal is filed by the defendant against the decrees of the courts below. 3. Paramel Ittiachan executed Ext. P1 Will on 19101083 in respect of his properties including the plaint items. Ittiachan died in Mithunam 1083. The plaint properties are A schedule items 1 and 2 in Ext. P1. It is agreed that A schedule items 6 and 8 in Ext. P1 were given absolutely to Ittianam. The dispute between the parties relates to the nature of the right created in favour of Ittianam in respect of A schedule items 1 to 5, 7 and 9 to 17 in Ext. P1. It is admitted that these items were given to the plaintiff's father subject to the rights created in favour of Ittianam. The plaintiff's father died in 1932 and in the partition in the plaintiff's family evidenced by Ext. P2 dated 2611960 the plaint properties were allotted to the share of the plaintiff. The plaintiff claims recovery of possession of the plaint items from the defendant on the basis of his title. 4. The plea of the defendant that his father got the plaint items on lease from Ittiachan has been concurrently found against and the said finding was not impeached before us. 5. The appellate judge found that since Ext. P1 only authorised Ittianam to take the income from A schedule items 1 to 5, 7 and 9 to 17 in Ext. P1 for her maintenance she was not competent to execute Ext. P3. This finding was impeached before us by the counsel for the defendant. It is therefore necessary to examine the terms of Ext. P1. We shall extract Clause.4, 5 and 6 of Ext. P1 for her maintenance she was not competent to execute Ext. P3. This finding was impeached before us by the counsel for the defendant. It is therefore necessary to examine the terms of Ext. P1. We shall extract Clause.4, 5 and 6 of Ext. P1 which deal with the rights created in favour of Ittianam. 6. In view of the above clauses the plaintiff's counsel submitted that the right created in favour of Ittianam is only an interest in the properties restricted in its enjoyment to her personally within the meaning of S.6, clause (d) of the Transfer of Property Act, and Ext. P3 executed by her is invalid because of the said provision. It has to be mentioned that at the time of Ext. P3, the Transfer of Property Act was not in force in the erstwhile Cochin State, and the question, therefore, cannot be decided on the basis of S.6 of the Transfer of Property Act. 7. A lease of immovable property being a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, the person granting the lease must possess an interest therein. A lease may be in respect of corporeal hereditaments or in respect of incorporeal hereditaments. The words in Clause.4 of Ext. P1 make it clear that the testator did not intend to create a life-estate in favour of Ittianam in respect of the properties but he intended to confer on her a restricted right of enjoyment of the usufruct only for her maintenance. The object of the bequest in favour of Ittianam is to provide her maintenance and for this purpose to give her a personal right to appropriate the profits of the properties It is significant to find a provision in Ext. P1 to the effect that if on account of illness Ittianam had to incur any additional expenditure she could encumber the properties to the extent of Rs. 500/-. This shows that the properties set apart for the maintenance of Ittianam were yielding only an income sufficient for her maintenance. It is no doubt an indication that what was granted was only a right to appropriate the profits of the properties which will not exceed a reasonable maintenance for her. In view of the decisions in Lachmeshwar v. Moti Rani AIR. 1939 P. C. 157 and Lal Mohan v. Onkar Mall AIR. It is no doubt an indication that what was granted was only a right to appropriate the profits of the properties which will not exceed a reasonable maintenance for her. In view of the decisions in Lachmeshwar v. Moti Rani AIR. 1939 P. C. 157 and Lal Mohan v. Onkar Mall AIR. 1946 Patna 55, it may be possible to hold that the interest in favour of Ittianam under Ext. P1 was an interest restricted in its enjoyment to the owner personally within the meaning of clause (d) of S.6 of the Transfer of Property Act. But this finding will not in any way assist the plaintiff since S.6 (d) has no application to the case. It has therefore to be examined whether Ext. P1 created an interest in land in favour of Ittianam. We think it unnecessary to decide this question as we are of the view that even assuming that Ittianam was competent to execute Ext. P3, the defendant is not entitled to the benefit of the proviso to S.3 (1) (i) to (vii) of Act I of 1964. According to the learned counsel for the defendant though Ittianam got only a life-interest in the plaint properties under Ext. P1, the defendant who claims under Ext. P3 acquired fixity of tenure under S.4 of the Cochin Verumpattomdars Act (VIII of 1118) and the said right is preserved by the proviso to clauses (i) to (vii) of sub-section (1) of S.3 of Act 1 of 1964. 8. Clause (vi) of sub-section (1) of S.3 exempts tenancies in respect of land or of buildings or of both created by persons having only life-interest or other limited interest in the land or in the buildings or in both from the operation of Chapter II of Act I of 1964 subject to the right of the tenant for fixity of tenure during the period of the life-interest or other limited interest. But the proviso to clauses (i) to (vii) of sub-section (1) of S.3 of Act 1 of 1964 on which reliance was made on behalf of the defendant reads thus: "Provided that nothing in clauses (i) to (vii) shall affect the rights of persons who were entitled to fixity of tenure immediately before the 21st January, 1961, under any law then in force;" 9. The plea of the defendant was that though he was the lessee of a limited owner or a person having only a life-interest in the property S.4 of Cochin Verumpattomdars Act (VIII of 1118) has conferred on him fixity of tenure on the land which he is enjoying even against the plaintiff. It is therefore necessary to examine the soundness of this contention. The general principle of law is that a limited owner or a person having a limited interest is not entitled to create a subordinate interest to continue after the termination of his own interest in the property. If authorities are necessary for this proposition we will cite the decisions of the Supreme Court in Mahabir Gona v. Harbans Narain AIR. 1952 SC. 205 and Harihar Prasad v. Deonarain Prasad AIR. 1956 SC. 305. In Mahabir Gona v. Harbans Narain, AIR. 1952 SC. 205 Chandrasekhara Iyer, J. pointed put: "The general rule is that a person cannot by transfer or otherwise confer a better title on another than he himself has. A mortgagee cannot, therefore, create as interest in the mortgaged property which will enure beyond the termination of his interest as mortgagee." Venkatarama Ayyar, J. in Harihar Prasad v. Deonarain Prasad AIR. 1956 SC. 305 said: "The law is that a person cannot confer on another any right higher than what he himself possesses and therefore, a lease created by a usufructuary mortgages would normally terminate on the redemption of the mortgage." This principle is also recognised by S.111 (c) of the Transfer of Property Act. The learned counsel for the defendant did not demur to this general principle of law but according to him in view of the conferment of fixity of tenure to the tenants under the Cochin Verumpattamdars Act (VIII of 1118) the defendant who is only a tenant of the holder of a limited interest is entitled to claim immunity from eviction even against the plaintiff. In support of his proposition the learned counsel relied on Binad Lal Pakrashi v. Kalu Pramanik 20 Calcutta 708 and Atal Rishi v. Lakshmi Narain Ghose 10 Calcutta Law Journal 55. In support of his proposition the learned counsel relied on Binad Lal Pakrashi v. Kalu Pramanik 20 Calcutta 708 and Atal Rishi v. Lakshmi Narain Ghose 10 Calcutta Law Journal 55. In Binad Lal Pakrashi v. Kalu Pramanik, 20 Calcutta 708 a tenant was put into possession by a person who claimed to be the proprietor of the land and though it subsequently turned out that he was not, it was held that the leasing by such a de facto proprietor gave the tenant the status of a raiyat within the meaning of S.5, sub-section (3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act (8 of 1885). This decision was considered in Henry Mohan Monal v. Radhika Mohan Hazra 8 Cal. W. N. 315 and Krishna Nath v. Mahomed Wafiz AIR. 1916 Calcutta 598, where it was observed that the basis of the decision in Binad Lal Pakrashi v. Kalu Pramanik 20 Calcutta 708, was that the word "proprietor" in S.5 (3) would include a'de facto' as well as a'de jure' proprietor, and a tenant who is 'bona fide' inducted into possession by a de facto proprietor would have the status of a raiyat. The decision in Binad Lal Pakrashi v. Kalu Pramanik 20 Calcutta 708, does not therefore support the defendant. The decision in Atal Rishi v. Lakshmi Narain Ghose 10 Cal. L.J. 55 also proceeded on the interpretation of S.44 and 45 of the Bengal Tenancy Act (8 of 1885). The head-note of that decision is itself sufficient to show that. It reads thus: "As a general principle of law, a limited owner is not entitled to create a subordinate interest to continue after the termination of his own interest is the property. But when an ijaradar having a limited interest brings a raiyat on the land, the status of such raiyat is defined and his rights are regulated by the Bengal Tenancy Act. and he becomes at least a non-occupancy raiyat, and can be ejected only if one or more of the grounds mentioned in S.44 of the Bengal Tenancy Act are made out. and he becomes at least a non-occupancy raiyat, and can be ejected only if one or more of the grounds mentioned in S.44 of the Bengal Tenancy Act are made out. A raiyat who has obtained possession in good faith from even a trespasser is entitled to be treated as a non-occupancy raiyat." This decision also does not support the proposition advanced on behalf of the defendant that a tenant in whose favour fixity is granted against his landlord is entitled to claim permanent occupancy rights even against persons having paramount title to his landlord. The decisions of the Supreme Court in Mahabir Gona v. Harbans Narain, AIR. 1952 SC. 205 and Harihar Prasad v. Deonarain Prasad AIR. 1956 SC. 305. Prabhu v. Ramdeo AIR. 1966 5C. 1721 and Mahesh Shagat v. Ram Baran, AIR. 1968 SC. 1466, do not also in our view support the defendant. These decisions were based on an interpretation of the provisions in the several enactments discussed therein and cannot be of any help to us. S.4 of the Cochin Verumpattamdars Act (VIII of 1118) will not in any way help the defendant to non-suit the plaintiff. The said Act was passed to confer on certain terms and conditions fixity of tenure to verumpattam tenants against their landlords. S.4 of the said Act reads: "Notwithstanding any law, custom or contract to the contrary, every verumpattamdar shall have fixity of tenure in respect of his holding and shall not be evicted therefrom except as provided in S.8 of this Act." The terms "eviction" and "holding" are not defined in the Act. S.17 of the Act says "where there is any conflict or inconsistency the provisions of this Act and the provisions of the Cochin Transfer of Property Act XVII of 1111, or the Cochin Tenancy Act XV of 1113, the provisions of this Act shall prevail." The scheme of these enactments and also the Cochin Verumpattamdars Act was to grant fixity of tenure to a kanam tenant and to a verumpattamdar against the landlord. Since there is nothing inconsistent in the Cochin Verumpattamdars Act the terms "holding" and "eviction" therein are to carry the same meaning as that given by the definition clause in the Cochin Tenancy Act XV of 1113. 10. Since there is nothing inconsistent in the Cochin Verumpattamdars Act the terms "holding" and "eviction" therein are to carry the same meaning as that given by the definition clause in the Cochin Tenancy Act XV of 1113. 10. Even that apart S.6, 7, 9,10,11,13 and 16 indicate without any doubt that the benefit of S.4 of the Cochin Verumpattamdars Act is available to a tenant only against his landlord. We are of the view that S.4 of the Verumpattamdars Act, 1118, cannot in any way affect the right of the plaintiff to recover possession of the properties from the defendant. We therefore hold that the second appeal is without merit and dismiss it with costs.