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1969 DIGILAW 245 (ORI)

PASUPATI MAHANTO v. DAMODAR MAHANTO

1969-10-10

S.K.RAY

body1969
JUDGMENT : S.K. Ray, J. - This is a Defendant 1st second appeal from the confirming decision dated 25.9.1964 of Sri P.K. Mohanty, District Judge, Mayurbhanj, Keonjhar, passed in Sub-judge's appeal No. 1-k of 1963, whereby the suit has been decreed. 2. Plaintiff filed the suit for declaration of title, for recovery of possession of the suit property and for realisation of mesne profit for the year 1960.61 amounting to Rs. 100/- The suit-land is 2.60 acres out of 10.76 acres Padhani Jagir lands situated in village Kutariposi, in the district of Keonjhar. Plaintiff's father, Bhabagrahi, was the Padhan of the village Kutariposi, and as such, was entitled to the entire Jagir lands of 10.76 acres including the suit-lands as emoluments in respect of his office of Padhan. He was also enjoying the suit jagir lands. During the Plaintiff's minority, his father died in the year 1931), and a year or two thereafter, his mother also died. Therefore, the maternal uncle of the Plaintiff Gangadhar Mahanto was appointed guardian of the minor Plaintiff. Under the Padhan Jagir rules prevalent in Keonjhar district, when a Padhan is a minor, the revenue authorities appoint a guardian for him till the minor attains his majority. In accordance with these rules, the maternal uncle was appointed guardian of the Plaintiff. This maternal uncle, while acting as guardian of the minor Plaintiff, let out the suit-properties to defendent-l and husband of Defendant-2 in the year 1954. It may be noted that Defendant-2 is the mother of Defendants 3 to 6. Plaintiff attained majority on 1-1-1957, and thereafter he applied for discharge of the guardian. He then having been appointed Padhan, took possession of the suit-lands including the Jagir lands appertaining to the office of Padhan, but Defendant-1 and the husband of Defendant-2 obstructed the Plaintiff taking possession of the suit-land. There was a proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure which terminated in favour of Defendant-1 and husband of D-2. This gave rise to the present suit. 3. The case of the Defendants 1 to 6 was that the suit-land was allotted to the share of Bhagabat Mahanto who was one of the four brothers of the father of the Plaintiff, and since then the suit property has been in exclusive enjoyment of the Defendants and their predecessors-in-interest. There were other technical defences, viz. the suit was barred by limitation. There were other technical defences, viz. the suit was barred by limitation. In the alternative, the Defendants claim that they have acquired title to the property by adverse possession. The State of Orissa has been impleaded as Defendant-7 in the suit. He stated in the written statement that the Defendants cannot be held to have acquired any right as against his own interest. 4. The trial Court held that the plea of partition is not true, and that the Plaintiff has right, title and interest over the suit-land. The claim of acquisition of title by adverse possession by the Defendants was negatived on a finding that the Defendants were occupying the suit-property with the permission of the then guardian of the Plaintiff. The suit cannot be held to be barred by limitation. In regard to mesne profits for the year 1960-61, he decreed the claim of the Plaintiff but reduced the amount to Rs. 60/-. 5. The learned lower appellate Court agreed with all these findings and upheld the decision of the trial Court. 6. learned Counsel for the Appellant raises only one point, viz., that the village office of Padhan having been abolished under the Orissa Merged Territories (Village offices Abolition) Act, 10 of 1963, the title to the property vested with the Government, thereby divesting the Plaintiff of his title to the same. Accordingly the suit is not maintainable. This contention was not available to be taken at any earlier stage of this litigation, because this Act 10 of 1963 was enforced in Keonjhar State, where the disputed properties lie, during the pendency of the second appeal, on (sic)-4.1967 (vide Orissa Gazette (extraordinary) notification No. FA-1-oT-81-67-1633-R dated 31-3-1967. In support of his contention, be relies upon a number of decisions of this Court which dealt with cases of abolition of estates under the Orissa Estates Abolition Act. This point would require careful consideration. 7. Orissa Act 10 of 1963 under which Village offices were abolished, came into force in Keonjhar District on 1-4-1967. The Gazette Notification in this connection has already been referred to above. This point would require careful consideration. 7. Orissa Act 10 of 1963 under which Village offices were abolished, came into force in Keonjhar District on 1-4-1967. The Gazette Notification in this connection has already been referred to above. Section 3, Clause (f) of the Act runs as follows: Notwithstanding anything in any law, usage settlement, grant, sanad or order or in any judgment, decree or order of a Court, with effect from and on the appointed date; xx xx xx xx (f) all Bhogra lands shall stand resumed and vested absolutely in the State Government free from an encumbrances; and (g) the holder of any Village office shall cease to have the right to hold all other lands which he would not have continued to hold except by virtue of or as incidental to his office. Section 2, Clause (a) defines "appointed date" in relation to any area as meaning the date appointed in respect of such area by a notification under Sub-section (3) of Section 1. The notification, already referred to, designate 1-4-1967 as the appointed date. Clause (b) of Section 2 defines 'Bhogra Lands' in relation to any village office as meaning lands by whatever name described, or locally known, whether or not recorded as such in the settlement papers held as emolument in respect of such office. In the schedule to the Act, there are two columns. Col. 1 relates to the name of States to which the Act is applied and 001. 2 refers to village offices abolished. Item 10, in Col. 1 refers to Keonjhar, and as against it, the office of Padhan is indicated as one of the village offices which is abolished with effect from the appointed date. Section 3(f) provides for resumption of all Bhogra lands and vesting of the same absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances. Clause (g) of that section retains the right to hold such land which the holder of the office is entitled to, by virtue of other provisions of the Act despite the abolition of the village office. Any land which the holder of the Village office would have continued to hold by virtue of, or as incidental to, his office, would be the lands in respect of which he shall be deemed to have the right to hold. Any land which the holder of the Village office would have continued to hold by virtue of, or as incidental to, his office, would be the lands in respect of which he shall be deemed to have the right to hold. Section 5(1) of the Act reads as follows: All Bhogra lands resumed under the provisions of this Act shall subject to the provisions of Sub-section (2) be settled with rights of occupancy therein on a fair and equitable rent with the holder of the Village office or with him and all those other persons, if any, who may be in the enjoyment of the land or any part thereof as his co-sharers or as tenants under him or under such co-sharer to the extent that each such person was in separate and actual cultivating possession of the same immediately before the appointed date. This provision creates a right to settlement of an Bhogra Lands resumed under the provisions of the Act, subject to Sub-section (2) of Section 5. This is a statutory right which is conferred on all holders of Village offices which means it is a right which is also conferred on the Plaintiff. He, therefore, not only gets a right to hold the lands which he is entitled to a settlement of, under Sub-section (1) of Section 5, but is also entitled to enforce his right to have the same settled with him with rights of occupancy therein on a fair and equitable rent. Sub-section (2) of Section 5 indicates that if the total area of such Bhogra lands in possession of a holder of a village office is ten acres or less, then the entire land is to be settled with him. If the holder of the Village office holds lands in excess of ten acres, then he is liable to be divested of 5 per cent area in excess of ten acres. The total area in the present case is 10-76 acres. Therefore, the Plaintiff is only liable to be evicted by the Government in respect of five per cent of the excess of A0.76 decimals, that is to say, about three and odd decimals which he can lawfully hold until the Collector demands delivery of possession. The total area in the present case is 10-76 acres. Therefore, the Plaintiff is only liable to be evicted by the Government in respect of five per cent of the excess of A0.76 decimals, that is to say, about three and odd decimals which he can lawfully hold until the Collector demands delivery of possession. Section 9 of the Act provides that it shall be the duty of every Village officer to deliver to the State Government possession of all lands to which they have no right to a settlement by or under the provisions of this Act. This reiterates the position already indicated in other parts of the Act that the holder of the Village office has a right to continue in possession of the lands in respect of which he has acquired a right of settlement. With regard to lands of which he is to deliver possession to Government in accordance with Section 9 of the Act, he is to be penalised, if within thirty days from the date of service of notice for delivery of possession of such land, issued by the Collector he defaults to comply with the same. Thus, in my view, this Act 10 of 1963, even though it abolishes the Village offices and vests the lands appertaining thereto, in the State Government, it reserves the right to the holder to continue to possess as before and to have the lands settled with him or to enforce settlement of the same with him with occupancy rights. The order of settlement is bound to be issued after some formal proceedings in accordance with rules framed under the Act. Thus the right to possess the suit-land and to have the same settled with him co-existed with Plaintiff, and he has the right to recover possession from a rank-trespasser. This is not a case comparable with the position of an intermediary whose estate having been abolished, he loses not only his title, but also his proprietary right to possess. learned Counsel for the Respondents has filed a petition under order 41, Rule 27 claiming that the original patta in respect of Khata No. 35, plot No. 76 comprising an area of 10.76 acres in mouza Kutariposi may be taken as additional evidence. learned Counsel for the Respondents has filed a petition under order 41, Rule 27 claiming that the original patta in respect of Khata No. 35, plot No. 76 comprising an area of 10.76 acres in mouza Kutariposi may be taken as additional evidence. He alleges that subsequent to the abolition of Village office, the Plaintiff resorted to proceeding for settlement of the entire Bhogra lands of 10.76 acres including the suit-lands with him, and they have been settled under this Act, 10 of 1963, with him. During the pendency of this second appeal, the Village office was not only abolished, but the entire Bhogra lands including the suit-lands have been settled with the Plaintiff in appropriate proceedings taken under the Act. learned Counsel for the Appellant bases his argument on Act 10/63 contending that the Court may take note of events subsequent to the filing of this second appeal. He cited three decisions, viz., AIR 1965 Assam 551 : AIR 1954 Madhya Bharat 1932, to substantiate his contention that the Court is entitled to take notice of subsequent events and model the relief accordingly. 8. Mr. S. Mohanty, learned Counsel for the Respondent, also takes his stand on this principle and prays for accepting the patta granted to his client during the pendency of this second appeal as additional evidence. I think this is a proper case where that evidence ought to be accepted. They are, therefore, treated as additional evidence. So, it is now clear that the Plaintiff has now united in himself the right to possess which be bad with him, that is, his occupancy tenancy right, by virtue of this settlement. There is, therefore, no legal bar to recover possession of the suit property from the Defendant who is a trespasser. 9. It may be observed that it is open to the Defendant to take recourse to any step that is available to him under the provisions of Act 10 of 1963, to unsettle the settlement of the suit-lands with the Plaintiff. In the result, the appeal must fail and is dismissed with costs. Final Result : Dismissed