JUDGMENT B.D. Gupta, J. - This order will govern both Cr. Revision No. 1402 of 1967 and Cr.Misc. Case No. 4397 of 1968, Cr. Revision No. 1402 of 1967 has been filed against the conviction of the applicant under section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), whereas Cr. Misc. Case No. 4397 of 1968 arises out of an application in the aforesaid revision for permission to add certain grounds in the memo of revision. In the view which I have taken in regard to the merits of Cr. Revision No. 1402 of 1967, learned counsel for the applicant has not pressed Cr. Misc. Case No. 4397 of 1968. 2. Having heard learned counsel for the parties I have come to the conclusion that the conviction of the applicant, which is the subject-matter of Cr. Revision No. 1402 of 1967, must be set aside and the applicant must be acquitted. 3. The prosecution case was that on March 14, 1966, P.N. Agnihotri, a Food Inspector, inspected the sweetmeat shop of the applicant situate in Puranpur town in the district of Pilibhit, that he purchased some sweet Papri made of Besan and Maida from the applicant who was exposing it for sale at the shop and that a sample there of having been sent to the Public Analyst it was found to have been coloured by Acramine, a colouring matter not permitted by the rules framed under the Act. After the necessary sanction the applicant was tried and found guilty by a I Class Magistrate who sentenced the applicant to six months' R.I. and fine in a sum of Rs. 1,000/- in default further R.I. for six months. An appeal to the Sessions Judge having failed, the applicant filed the revision before me. 4. The contention of learned counsel in the main is that the provisions contained in Cl. (7) of Section 10 of the Act have not been complied with and that, apart from the fact that those provisions are mandatory in character, the non-compliance of those provisions in the particular circumstances of the present case has prejudiced the applicant. 4. The contention of learned counsel in the main is that the provisions contained in Cl. (7) of Section 10 of the Act have not been complied with and that, apart from the fact that those provisions are mandatory in character, the non-compliance of those provisions in the particular circumstances of the present case has prejudiced the applicant. It may be stated here that the defence set forward by the applicant was that the particular sample which the Food Inspector had taken was no doubt simple of the Papri which the applicant had prepared but the Food Inspector had taken the sample after the applicant had laid it aside because some coloured water had fallen in the Papri in consequence of sprinkling of colour by some children who were playing Holi. It was asserted that since coloured water had fallen in the Papri the applicant never intended to sell it to customers. He added that the Food Inspector initiated the case against the applicant because he was annoyed which the applicant. 5. There is no controversy that the solitary witness examined on behalf of the prosecution was the Food Inspector P.N. Agnihotri. There is nothing in his statement to indicate that at the time of the alleged purchase of sample of Papri from the applicant he was accompanied by anybody or that he had called any person to be present at that time. Document Ex. Ka. 2 which purports to evidence the sale by the applicant purports to be signed by three witnesses but, in his evidence at the trial, the Food Inspector made no statement whatever about purchase of the sample by him in the presence of any witnesses. Indeed, a scrutiny of his entire statement makes it clear that he was unable to say as to whether any person had witnessed the alleged purchase. It must also be noted that the aforesaid document Ex. Ka. 2 which purports also to bear the signature of the applicant was not at all put to the applicant in his examination u/S. 342 Cr. P.C. and, that also, in the above statement the applicant did not specifically admit that he had sold any Papri to the Food Inspector. The applicant, on the other hand, examined two witnesses in defence each of whom supported the defence set forward by the applicant which has been summarised earlier in this order. P.C. and, that also, in the above statement the applicant did not specifically admit that he had sold any Papri to the Food Inspector. The applicant, on the other hand, examined two witnesses in defence each of whom supported the defence set forward by the applicant which has been summarised earlier in this order. The Food Inspector was also cross-examined in line with the defence case. The calendar for the year 1966 makes out that colour throwing on the occasion of Holi must have started in March that year on the 8th day. The Food Inspector admitted that in Puranpur sprinkling of coloured water in connection with Holi normally continued for 15 or 20 days. He also admitted that the applicant told him that children had thrown colour on the Papri, that he did not remember whether other persons also told him the same and that he did not even remember whether the applicant treated the Papri as useless. In further cross-examination he stated that he did not remember whether at the time of his purchase any of the neighbouring shop keepers were present. Learned counsel for the applicant has urged that, keeping in view the aforesaid material and the non-observance of the provisions contained in Cl. (7) of Section 10 of the Act, it must be held that the finding recorded by the courts below, based on the solitary testimony of the Food Inspector, has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice. 6. There is no controversy that it has already been held by this Court that the provisions contained in Cl (7) of S. 10 of the Act, after its amendment in 1964, are mandatory. There is also no controversy that in the present case there is no material whatever on record to make out that the aforesaid provisions were observed. Whilst conceding non-observance of the provisions contained in Cl. (7) learned counsel for the State referred to the decision of brother Mathur in Criminal Appeal No. 1545 of 1966 (Nagar Swastha Adhikari, Nagar Mahapalika, Agra v. Jawahar Singh) decided on the 15th of March, 1969, 1969 ACC 281 and urged that the action taken by the Food Inspector was nevertheless not invalid ab initio and that all that was required, in consequence of non-observance of the provisions contained in Cl. (7), was that the evidence regarding taking of the sample deserved to be examined carefully. (7), was that the evidence regarding taking of the sample deserved to be examined carefully. There is nothing in the judgements of the courts below to indicate that in examining the material before them they kept in view the circumstance that the provisions contained in Cl. (7) of S. 10 of the Act had not been complied with and that, therefore, particular caution and prudence had to be exercised in assessing the evidence. It is this circumstance which led me to examine the evidence myself and, keeping in view the features referred to earlier in this order, I have arrived at the conclusion that the finding recorded by the courts below is improper and the conviction of the applicant cannot be sustained. 7. The intention of the legislature in amending the provisions contained in Cl. (7) of S. 10 of the Act in 1964 is manifest. The punishment provided in the law for an offence like the one giving rise to this revision is drastic inasmuch as for the first conviction a minimum sentence of six months' R.I. and fine in a sum of Rs. 1,000/- has been laid down. It appears that the legislature having considered the severity of the punishment provided by the law, amended the provisions contained in Cl. (7) with a view to providing safeguard to a person accused of an offence like the one alleged in the present case. I am in full agreement with the view expressed by Somasundaram, J. in the case of In re Raju Konai, A.I.R. 1959 Mad. 118. The learned Judge observed as follows:- "This provision has been enacted as a safeguard to the accused because a severe punishment is sought to be inflicted for a second offence. The more severe the punishment the greater must be the care shown in observing the procedure laid down in the statute. The Parliament after taking into consideration all the circumstances, has indicated that salutary provision, it is not intended to be honoured by its breach. Such disregard of the mandatory provisions produces an irritating effect on court." It must be noted that the aforesaid quotation summarises the view taken by Somasundaram, J. whilst interpreting the provisions contained in Cl. (7) before its amendment in 1964. Such disregard of the mandatory provisions produces an irritating effect on court." It must be noted that the aforesaid quotation summarises the view taken by Somasundaram, J. whilst interpreting the provisions contained in Cl. (7) before its amendment in 1964. The provision requiring presence of two persons was qualified by the expression "as far as possible" before the amendment in 1964, which as it stands after amendment in 1964, lays down that the Food Inspector shall call one or more persons to be present at the time when he takes action and takes his or their signatures. The observation of Somasundaram, J. quoted above, should, therefore, now be applicable with much greater force. It is extremely difficult for a judicial mind to sustain conviction for possession of an article on the basis merely of evidence given by the officer who carried out the raid in the course of which he claimed to have recovered the article from the possession of a particular person. The provision contained in Cl. (7) of S. 10 of the Act incorporates legislative recognition thereof. No reason has been suggested, much less offered, for non-compliance with those provisions in the present case. After examining the material on record I am satisfied that it is not possible to uphold the conviction of the applicant. 8. Accordingly I allow this revision, set aside the conviction of the applicant u/S. 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the sentence awarded to him and the applicant is acquitted of the charge on which he was tried. The applicant is on bail. He need not surrender. His bail bonds are discharged. The fine if realised shall be refunded to the applicant. The application giving rise to Cr. Misc. Case No. 4397 of 1968 is dismissed.