Judgment :- 1. The common petitioner in these writ petitions is an advocate of this Court; and he is sought to be assessed to profession tax by three panchayats within the limits of which he owns lands. He questions the validity of the notices issued by the Panchayats. In the first case his contention is that he is only collecting rent from the tenants of the lands within the Thekkumkara Panchayat and that he is not cultivating the lands through his servants or agents. Though the panchayat has filed a counter affidavit stating that the Panchayat is not aware whether all the lands of the petitioner within its limits are in the possession of tenants, we have to proceed on the basis that the petitioner is just collecting rent from his tenants to whom he has leased out the lands. As a taxing authority, the panchayat should have ascertained the facts necessary which would have entitled it to assess the petitioner and its pleading ignorance whether all the lands of the petitioner are in the possession of tenants or not cannot justify its attempt to tax the petitioner. Moreover, the assessment order itself, Ex. P-4, states that the assessment is in relation to the agricultural income derived by way of pattom (rent), etc. of the lands of the petitioner. Therefore, the question for us to consider in the first case is whether receiving rent by the petitioner from his tenants is a business, calling, avocation, vocation or occupation which would come within the relevant provision of the Kerala Panchayats Act. 2. In the second case two pachayats have sought to assess the petitioner, the first respondent, the Ongallur Panchayat, and the second respondent, the Desam-angalam Panchayat. However, the second respondent has since filed a counter affidavit stating that, since the petitioner is not cultivating lands within the limits of the panchayat through his servants or agents and is only receiving rent from his tenants, the panchayat has passed a resolution not to tax him, as such receiving of rent is not a calling, business, vocation, avocation or occupation. The first respondent contends that some of the lands belonging to the petitioner within that panchayat the petitioner cultivates through his agent, while he receives rent from the tenants of the other lands. The first respondent contends that some of the lands belonging to the petitioner within that panchayat the petitioner cultivates through his agent, while he receives rent from the tenants of the other lands. Thus, in the second case we have to decide whether atleast the cultivation of lands by the petitioner through his agent is not a calling, business, vocation, avocation or occupation which will come within the relevant provision of the Panchayats Act. 3. Mr. K. V. Suryanarayana Ayyar, the counsel of the petitioner in the first case, has brought to our notice some decisions, and the counsel of the panchayat in that case has also invited our attention to some decisions. The first case cited by Mr. Suryanarayana Ayyar is Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal, Calcutta v. Benoy Kunar Shas Roy (ARI.1957 SC. 768). The Supreme Court considered in that case the meaning of the expression "agriculture" and "agricultural purpose" in considering a provision of the Indian Income-tax Act of 1922. Bhagwati J., who spoke for the Court, considered these expressions in some detail, referring to several decisions and also to the meaning of these expressions given in some dictionaries, and said that the word "agriculture" had two meanings, one, a basic or primary meaning, and the other, a wider meaning. The learned judge pointed out that the word "agriculture" was derived from agar (field) and cultra (cultivation) and meant cultivation of the field. In that restricted sense the term meant tilling of the land, sowing of the seeds, planting and similar operations on the land. And the learned judge proceeded that there were other operations as well, for instance, weeding, digging the soil around the growth, removal of undesirable under-growth, preventing depredation from outside, tending, pruning, cutting, harvesting and rendering the produce fit for the market; and that in the wider sense these subsequent operations would also be agricultural operations. But His Lordship pointed out that these subsequent operations, divorced from the primary operations of cultivating the field in the sense of tilling the land, sowing the seeds, planting and similar operations, would not be agriculture; in other words, the primary operations by themselves would be agriculture, and the subsequent operations would also be agriculture if taken along with the primary operations and not divorced from them. 3. 3. At this stage, we shall refer to the Division Bench ruling of this Court in Velu v. Executive Officer, Erumayur Panchayat (1967 KLT. 350.) Therein this Court was, considering the validity of an assessment under the Kerala Panchayats Act; and the Division Bench held that the pursuit of agriculture was a calling. In this connection, it may be noted that there is a decision of the Madras High Court in Sankaranarayana Pillai v. Executive Officer, Panchayat Board, Ayikudi (AIR. 1966 Madras 262), where it was held that the pursuit of agriculture would not be the exercise of a profession or art or calling or the transaction of a business or the holding of any appointment, public or private, coming under S.121 of the Madras Panchayats Act of 1959. The Division Bench of our Court disagreed with this view of the Madras High Court. 4. Now we shall refer to the relevant provision in the Kerala Panchayats Act under which profession tax is levied. S.69 (1) (ii) (a) of the Act enacts that profession tax may be levied on every personal who "exercises a profession, art or calling or transacts business or holds any appointment, public or private." We may straightway observe that the counsel of the Panchayat has no case that the. collection of rent or even cultivation of lands is the exercise of a profession or the holding of an appointment. His contention is only that the collection of rent and the cultivation of lands will be a calling or a business. This leads us to the consideration of the meaning of the expressions "calling" and "business" and probably of the meaning of expressions like "vocation" "avocation" or "occupation". 5. We may at the outset refer to a decision of a Full Bench of the Punjab High Court cited by the counsel of the Panchayat. The decision is Waliati Ram Nathu Ram v. Municipal Committee, Rupar (AIR. 1960 Punjab 669), The Punjab High Court was considering in that case a similar provision in the Punjab Municipal Act, namely, the expression "practising any profession or art or carrying on any trade or calling." The Court observed that this expression should be given the widest meaning. Next we refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Narain Swadeshi Weaving Mills v. The Commissioner of Excess Profit Tax (1955: I-SCR. 952). Next we refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Narain Swadeshi Weaving Mills v. The Commissioner of Excess Profit Tax (1955: I-SCR. 952). That was a case where the Supreme Court was considering the Excess Profits Tax Act and the term "business" used in S.2 (5) of that Act. Das J, who delivered the judgment of the Court, considered this word in some detail and observed that no general principle could be laid down which would be applicable to all cases, and that each case must be decided on its own circumstances "according to ordinary common sense principles.". The learned judge observed in another part of the judgment that the question whether a particular source of income was business or not "must be decided according to our ordinary notions as to what a business is". Two or three other decisions cited before us may also be noted. One of them is C. Rajagopalachari v. Corporation of Madras (1964 SC. 1172). Rajagopalachari who was a lawyer, a politician, the Chief Minister of Madras and the Governor - General of India, was allowed a pension on his retirement and the Madras Corporation sought to impose profession tax on it. The Supreme Court had to consider in that case a provision in the City Municipality Act of Madras similar to the provision before us; and the Court accepted the contention of Rajagopalachari that for getting the pension he was not doing any business or pursuing any vocation, or calling and that the pension he was receiving was only for past services rendered by him. The Supreme Court made one observation, which will be relevant a little later in this judgment, to the effect that the tax on the receipt of pension or on the income from investments was in truth and substance a tax on income and such income was not income derived from any profession, calling or business. Another Supreme Court decision brought to our notice is Krishna Menon v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1959 KLJ.178). The assessee, who was teaching Vedanta, was taxed on the income received by him for giving instructions in Vedanta and the levy was opposed by him. The Supreme Court held that teaching was a vocation if not a profession, and that the teaching of Vedanta should not be anything but a vocation. Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld the tax. The assessee, who was teaching Vedanta, was taxed on the income received by him for giving instructions in Vedanta and the levy was opposed by him. The Supreme Court held that teaching was a vocation if not a profession, and that the teaching of Vedanta should not be anything but a vocation. Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld the tax. Lastly, we refer to a decision of the Madras High Court where again C. Rajagopalachari was the petitioner C. Rajagopalachari v. Commissioner of Income-tax Madras (1963: 50 ITR.196). In that case the income derived from Rajagopalachari's contribution of articles to magazines and periodicals was sought to be taxed. The Madras High Court observed that a vocation was only a way of living or sphere of activity for which one had special fitness and it was not necessary that such activity should be one indulged in for earning a livelihood before it could be called a vocation, nor could it be said that a person could not have more than one vocation. The Madras High Court also held that a vocation did not even involve any organised or systematic activity like business. We would also in conclusion refer to the Law Lexicon of British India by P. Ramanadha Aiyar. The learned author has said, after considering relevant observations in some English decisions, that "business" has no definite technical meaning, but is to be read with reference to the object and intent of the Act in which it occurs and that'business" has a more extensive meaning than "trade". 6. Now we shall consider the question before us in the light of the aforesaid authorities. We do not propose to distinguish between "business', "calling', "occupation," "vocation" or "avocation": we do not think it is necessary in these cases. We are also mindful of the contention of the counsel of the Panchayat that these terms should be given the widest meaning: at the same time, these terms should be understood "according to common sense principles." Giving the widest meaning to these expressions, we find if difficult to hold that these expressions in their common sense meaning, would bring within their ambit or scope the receiving of rent by a landlord from, tenants to whom he has leased out his lands. The contention of the panchayat emerging from its counter affidavit is that the petitioner is "transacting the business of a landlord"; putting it differently, being a landlord is a business! The counsel has argued that, if a person pursues a course of investing and collecting income from the investments or pursues a course of investing in land and collecting rent from the tenants of such lands, the pursuit will be a business or calling. We do not propose to decide the question whether the pursuit of investing in land too will be a business or a calling. For the purpose of argument, we accept this contention: still the receipt of income from the investments or the receipt of rent from the lands in which the investment is made will not, by itself, be a business or calling or vocation or avocation or occupation. It may be that the investment and the collection of income therefrom, or the investment in land and the collection of rent from the lands thereof, both together may constitute a business. (We reiterate that we are not deciding this.) Still, the subsequent operation or act of receiving income from the investments or of receiving rent from the tenants of the lands will not by itself constitute a business. In this connection, we refer back to the observation of the Supreme Court in Rajagopalachari's case which we have already referred to. 7. Thus. in the first case our conclusion is that receiving rent from the tenants of the petitioner is not an act which comes within S.69 (1) (H) (a) of the Kerala Panchayats Act. 8. The second case, as already indicated, is slightly different. In that case, the petitioner is cultivating some lands through his agent and deriving income therefrom. To that activity the dedsion of our Court in Velu's case will apply: that is pursuit of agriculture, and that is a calling. But we make it clear that the activity of collecting rent from other lands in the possession of tenants of the petitioner will not come within S.69 (1) (ii) (a) of the Panchayats Act. In other words, regarding the measure of the tax to be imposed on the petitioner, the income derived from the property in his direct cultivation we mean, in his cultivation through his agent alone can be taken into consideration. Mr. In other words, regarding the measure of the tax to be imposed on the petitioner, the income derived from the property in his direct cultivation we mean, in his cultivation through his agent alone can be taken into consideration. Mr. P. R. Nambiar, the counsel of the petitioner in the second case, tells us that, since the petitioner filed the writ petition on the receipt of the notice, he did not file a return and the time for submitting return is now over. The counsel prays that the petitioner might be given time to submit a return. The counsel of the Panchayat has no objection to this; and we also do not think there will be any difficulty regarding this. 9. In the result, we allow OP. No. 1516 of 1966 with costs of the petitioner and quash Exx. P-4 and P-5. And we also allow O. P. No. 4101 of 1966 in part as indicated above; and in this case we direct the parties to bear their respective costs. Allowed.