JUDGMENT : G.K. Misra, C.J. - The Plaintiffs are admittedly Bhag tenants in respect of 4.40 acres under the landlord opposite party No. 1. On 12-6-1962, opposite party No. 1 filed an application u/s 9(1) of the Orissa Tenants Relief Act, 1955, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for eviction of the Plaintiffs. The only ground for eviction of the Plaintiffs was that they were to pay rent on or before) 2.4.1962, and that inspite of repeated demands they were not paying it although the two months period from the due date was going to expire on 12.6.1962. The Plaintiffs resisted the application for eviction alleging that the opposite party No. 1 refused to accept rent at the statutory rate, as he was going in the previous years, and that the cause of action for the application had not yet arisen. The O.T R. Collector, by his order dated 2.7.1963 granted the prayer for eviction of the Plaintiffs holding that they failed to prove that rent was ever offered to the landlord which he did not accept. Against the said order the Plaintiffs preferred an appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Puri who allowed the appeal and dismissed the application for eviction on the ground that it was premature because it should have been filed on 13-6-1902 while in fact it was filed one day earlier on 12-6-1962. But he found that the tenants failed to pay rent as prescribed in Section 9(1)(b) of the Act. In revision, the Additional District Magistrate, Puri, allowed the application for eviction as no steps bad been taken by the Plaintiffs to pay the bhag dues by 13.6.1962. He held that the petition could not be termed premature as the Plaintiffs are habitual defaulters and no payment of rent had been made by them before issue of notice in the application for eviction. Against the revisional order this writ application has been filed by the tenants under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 2. Mr. N.K. Misra, on behalf of the Plaintiffs urges that the cause of action for eviction arcse on 13.6.1962 and the application having been filed on 12.6.1962, a day earlier before any cause of action arcse, should have been dismissed. Mr. 2. Mr. N.K. Misra, on behalf of the Plaintiffs urges that the cause of action for eviction arcse on 13.6.1962 and the application having been filed on 12.6.1962, a day earlier before any cause of action arcse, should have been dismissed. Mr. A.B. Misra, on the other hand, contends that the cause of action arcse on 12.6.1962 and that even if the cause of action be held to have arisen on 13.6.1962, the application for eviction was rightly allowed as the cause of action arcse a day later during the pendency of the main application. 3. On the aforesaid arguments, the following points arise, for determination: (i) Did the cause of action arise on 12-6-1962 or on 13-6-1962? (ii) Assuming that the cause of action arcse on 13.6.1962, is the application for eviction to be dismissed, as being premature? The aforesaid questions require a careful examination of Section 9(1)(b) and Section 9(2) of the Act. These may be ex-tracted: 9(1) Any dispute between the tenant and the landlord as regards-- (a)** (b) failure of the tenant to deliver to the landlord the rent accrued due within two months from the date on which it becomes payable. *** (c) (d) (e)***** shall be decided by the Collector on the application of either of the parties; Provided that such application shall be filed before the Collector in the prescribed manner within sixty days from the date on which the dispute arises or from the date of the passing of this Act, whichever is later. (2) On receipt of an application under Sub-section (1) the Collector may, after making such enquiries if he may deem necessary, order the tenant by a notice served in the prescribed manner and specifying the grounds on which the order is made, to cease to cultivate the land; Provided that where the tenant has any permanent and heritable rights of cultivation in any land, the steps to be taken for eviction of such tenant shall be in accordance with the law or custom or usage having the force of law applicable to such tenancy. 4. An analysis of the aforesaid provisions would indicate that if there is a dispute between the tenant and the landlord wherein the landlord alleges that the tenant failed to deliver the rent already accrued due within two months from the date it becomes payable, then, the Collector shall decide the matter. 4. An analysis of the aforesaid provisions would indicate that if there is a dispute between the tenant and the landlord wherein the landlord alleges that the tenant failed to deliver the rent already accrued due within two months from the date it becomes payable, then, the Collector shall decide the matter. The provision prescribes that the application shall be filed by the landlord or the tenant as the case may be within 60 days from the date on which the dispute arises. The second part of the proviso is not relevant here. Once such a dispute arises, the Collector is to make an enquiry. 1 f he is satisfied that there was default on the party of the tenant and that the application filed by the landlord is not barred by limitation, then the Collector will serve a notice on the tenant to cease to cultivate the land. In other words the landlord's application for eviction is to be allowed. 5. In this case there is no dispute that the Plaintiffs did not pay the rent even by 13.6.1962 when, according to them the dispute and the cause of action arcse. If the application for eviction had been filed on that date there would be no defence against the landlord's case and eviction must have been allowed. It is the admitted case that the rent accrued due on 12-4-1962, by agreement between the landlord and the tenants. Thus 12.4-1962 was the date on which the rent become payable. The dispute would arise only if the Plaintiffs did not pay the rent within two months from 12-4-1962. 6. The controversy arises here as to the meaning of the word "month". "Month" has not been defined in the Act. Its meaning is therefore to be taken from the Orissa General Clauses Act,' 1937. Section 2(26) of that Act defines "month". 'month' shall mean a month reckoned according to the British calendar. There is no difficulty in applying this definition in a case where the month prescribed in a statute begins with the first day of the calendar month. In such a case, 1st February to 1st March would be a month though the month consists of only 28 or 29 days. Similarly, 1st March to 1st April would be a month even though the month consists of 31 days. In such a case, 1st February to 1st March would be a month though the month consists of only 28 or 29 days. Similarly, 1st March to 1st April would be a month even though the month consists of 31 days. The difficulty however arises when the month is to be reckoned as in the present case from a day falling within a British calendar month. In this case, the date payable falls on 12-4-1962. If the definition given in the Orissa General Clauses Act is made applicable, then the period of two months would Expire on 12.6.1962. Section 9 of the Orissa General Clauses Act deal with commencement and termination of time. It says that in any Orissa Act it shall be sufficient for the purpose of excluding the first in a suits of days or any other period of time, to use the word "from" and for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word "to". It is now well settled that Section 9 of the General Clauses Act cannot be construed to mean that it applies only where both the words "from" and "to" occur in a statute and not otherwise. On a plain reading of the section, it is obvious that the word "and" is used only disjunctively to indicate two things, namely, if the first day is to be excluded it is sufficient to use the word "from" and if the last day is to be included, the word to be used is "to". Section 9(1)(b) of the Act uses the Expression "from the date on which it becomes payable". By application of Section 9 of the Orissa General Clauses Act there fore 12th April 1962 would be excluded, while calculating the period of two months from the due date. The tenants would therefore be taken to have failed to deliver rent only if they did not pay it on 2-6-1662; in other words the tenants had time to pay rent till the end of 12-6-1962. If he did not pay rent on that date, the dispute will rise on 13-6-1962 and not on 12-6-1962. Under the proviso to Section 9(1) an application for eviction shall be filed within 60 days from the date on which the dispute arises. If he did not pay rent on that date, the dispute will rise on 13-6-1962 and not on 12-6-1962. Under the proviso to Section 9(1) an application for eviction shall be filed within 60 days from the date on which the dispute arises. It can, therefore, be filed on any date within 60 days from 13-6-1962 that is till 13-8-1902. The Plaintiff are therefore correct in their contention that the cause of action arcse for the first time on 13-6-1962 and the application for eviction was premature when it was filed a day earlier, on 12-6-1962 when the dispute did not arise. 7. The next question is whether the Application for eviction is liable to be dismissed merely on the ground that it was filed one day earlier even though admittedly rent was not paid even on 13.6-1962 when the dispute arcse. It is the admitted case that the opposite party No. I had to realise rent long after by instituting a proceeding for recovering the same. 8. Legal position is now well settled that ordinarily right of parties must be determined as at the date of action and not on the basis of rights arising after the institution of the suit. Thus if the Plaintiff has no cause of action at all to institute a suit, it is liable to be dismissed and the Plaintiff would not be permitted to take advantage of a cause of action arising subsequent to the suit. Similarly if the Plaintiff has a cause of action on the date of the suit relief will not ordinarily be refused to him by reason of subsequent events. The Court may, however, depart from this general rule in moulding relief on the basis of altered circumstances. It has been held in many cases that relief can be granted even if the cause of action arises subsequently, and this is done with a view to shorten litigation, to preserve the rights of parties and to subserve the ends of justice. This principle, however, is again subject to the further exception that the facts are not in dispute, that a fresh enquiry into other facts does not become necessary and that the Defendant is not put to a disadvantage by allowing relief on the basis of such subsequent cause of action. 9. In support of the aforesaid principle a few important decisions may be noticed. 9. In support of the aforesaid principle a few important decisions may be noticed. In Chinta Havavan v. Radha Charan Poddar AIR 1917 Cal. 822, the suit had been brought on the allegation that there was an Ijra lease of land in favour of Defendant No. 41 upto the Bengali year 1316, but the lease was surrendered by Defendant No. 41 after service of notice before the institution of the suit. During the pendency of the suit the lease admittedly expired. It was concurrently found that the Plaintiff's case of surrender by Defendant No. 41 was not acceptable. It was contended that the suit should not be decreed-on the basis of termination of the lease. The contention was negatived. Their Lordships decreed the suit on the following observation: The term of the Ijra expired in 1316 i.e., before the final decree of the Court of first instance. It is no doubt expired after the institution of the suit, but in exceptional cases Courts have taken cognizance events since the institution of a suit or appeal for the adoption of such course tends to shorten litigation and best subserves the ends of justice. In Subbaraya Chetty v. Nachiar Ammal AIR 1918 Mad 143, the finding was that the Defendant bad received money. The District Judge dismissed the suit holding that it was premature because of the terms of the unregistered mortgage bond. Their Lordships decreed the Plaintiffs suit holding that the money became payable immediately after the suit and the Plaintiff should not be compelled to institute another suit for money. They were of opinion that the Courts have power to grant a decree where the cause of action arises subsequent to the suit. In Gajadhar Lodha Vs. Khas Mahatadih Colliery Co. and Others the Plaintiff's title was inchoate at the time of the filing of the suit in the absence of, a registered deed. The Defendants had taken all possible pleas that they could take against the title of the Plaintiff. The sale deed was registered in favour of the Plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. The Court took notice of a subsequent events, namely registration of the sale deed by which the Plaintiff perfected his imperfect title. The suit was decreed on the basis of this subsequent event. In Amritlal N. Shah Vs. The sale deed was registered in favour of the Plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. The Court took notice of a subsequent events, namely registration of the sale deed by which the Plaintiff perfected his imperfect title. The suit was decreed on the basis of this subsequent event. In Amritlal N. Shah Vs. Alla Annapurnamma the suit was instituted for recovery of arrears of rent and for possession of the disputed property. During the pendency of the suit the lease expired. The Plaintiff applied for amendment of the plaint for recovery of possession on the fresh ground of expiry of the lease. Their Lordships accepted the amendment and decreed the suit. In this decision a thorough review of all the relevant authorities has been made and the contrary view taken in (Mylavarapu) Rangayya Naidu Vs. Basana Simon and Others was held to be no longer good law. Reliance was placed on an observation of Justice Gray in Mills v. Greene (1895) 159 U.S. 651, to the effect that the right to take notice of subsequent events is not only a power, but may also sometimes be the duty of the Court to do so. The latest ruling on the point is to be found in an unreported decision of the Supreme Court in The State of Madhya Pradesh v. D.N. Dutta C.A. 1310 of 1966. Their Lordships have observed thus: The civil Court would ordinarily take into consideration event subsequent to the institution of the suit and adjust the rights and obligations of the parties in the light of those developments. Courts exist to do justice between the parties and procedural difficulties will not ordinarily be permitted to obstruct the course of justice unless the party claiming relief has acted mala fide, or by his blundering has done some injustice to the other side which cannot be compensated for by costs or otherwise. 10. On the aforesaid analysis it would be clear that the authorities are almost unanimous that according to the varying facts and circumstances of each cause the Courts may mould the relief even on the basis of subsequent cause of action arising during the pendency of a suit provided that no new facts are required to be enquired into and no prejudice is caused to the defence. In the present case the facts are telling. In the present case the facts are telling. The Plaintiffs failed to establish that they ever offered the rent accused due and that the Landlord refused to accept the same. On the otherhand the admitted case is that the rent was not paid even by 13-6-1962 when the dispute arcse and that the landlord had to realise the flame through Court subsequently. The relief of eviction is to be granted to the landlord without any further investigation of fresh facts and on the admitted case of the parties. No laches was committed by the landlord. On the other hand, due to ignorance of law on the part of his Advocate the application for eviction was filed a day earlier; the landlord seems to have been a little over-zealous about his right. Thus, by granting the relief of eviction no surprise or injustice is caused to the Plaintiffs. They have to thank themselves for their recalcitrant attitude in not paying the rent due in time and even during the period of grace. 11. Mr. N.K. Misra, finding difficulty in getting over the aforesaid decisions, advanced a contention that though the Courts have got the power to mould relief on the basis of subsequent events Tribunals have no such power. There is no substance in this contention. The particular type of civil rights triable under the Act has been excluded from the jurisdiction of the civil Court and expressly made triable by the Tribunals created under the Act. The principle of moulding relief on the basis of subsequent events is based on the fundamental principle of doing justice and has full application to cases of eviction under the Act. Mr. N.K. Misra placed reliance on Guru Das Shutt v. Nanda Kishore Bal ILR 26 Cal. 199, where the following passage occurs: It was argued that u/s 66 of the Tenancy Act the Plaintiff was entitled to eject the Defendant inasmuch as the rent of the previous years had not been paid. We agree with the Subordinate. Judge that as the suit was brought before the expiry of the year 1302 in respect of arrears for that year, the Plaintiff is not entitled to eject the Defendants from his holding under the provisions of Section 66. The aforesaid observation does not indicate whether their Lordships took into consideration the principle discussed above and is too cryptic. Judge that as the suit was brought before the expiry of the year 1302 in respect of arrears for that year, the Plaintiff is not entitled to eject the Defendants from his holding under the provisions of Section 66. The aforesaid observation does not indicate whether their Lordships took into consideration the principle discussed above and is too cryptic. If it purports to lay down a broad proposition that on the basis of subsequent events eviction should, in no circumstances, be granted, we are unable with respect to follow the same. 12. We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that litigation would be shortened, rights would be preserved, and ends of justice would be subserved if we do not interfere with the revisional order of the Additional District Magistrate allowing the application for eviction. There is no error of law apparent on the fact of the record which calls for interference by a writ of certiorari even though the judgment of the revisional Court should have been more analytical. In the result, the writ application fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. R.N. Misra, J. 13. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed