JUDGMENT Jagmohan Lal, J. - This first appeal arises out of a suit (No. of 1954) filed in the court of First Civil Judge, Kheri, for recovery of Rs. 85,000/-. The suit was originally filed by the Deputy Commissioner Kheri as Manager Court of Wards representing the Mahewa Estate and Rani Rajeshwari Devi's estate, district Kheri, against Kr. Kailash Bramh defendant No. 1, Thakur Pancham Singh defendant No. 2 who is the appellant before its, and Kr. Nihal Singh son, of Pancham Singh, defendant No. 3 who is respondent No. 3 in this appeal. The allegations in the plaint were that the property of late Thakur Jai India Bahadur Singh and his seniormost Rani Raj Rajeshwari Devi had been taken under the management of the Court of Wards during Thakur Jai Indra Bahadur Singh's life-time under the provisions of U. P. Court of Wards Act. Thakur Jai Indra Bahadur Singh died in 1949 leaving a daughter named as Ravija Devi alias Bitta Saheba. When this girl was of marriageable age, the senior Rani Raj Rajeshwari Devi was on the look out to find out a suitable match for her. She negotiated her match with defendant No. 3 Kr. Nihal Singh son of defendant-appellant Thakur Pancham Singh through her relation Kr. Kailash Bramh defendant No. 1, on whom she placed reliance. It was represented to her that this boy was a Colonel in military and that his father was also a man of high status whose estate had a profit of 4 or 5 lacs annually and that the match was suitable in all respects. After the match had been settled, the Tilak ceremony was performed in which Rs. 50,000/- in cash and other articles and jewellery worth Rs. 35,000/- including a motor car were given to defendants Nos. 2 and 3. Subsequently, the Rani and the President Court of Wards came to know that this match was not as suitable as it was represented to be. The boy was only a Subedar in the Army and not a Colonel and his father had married a widow which was not looked upon with favour in this community and that the income of the father was hardly Rs. 60,000- per annum and he was also indebted to the extent of several lacs. So, the Rani and the President Court of Wards decided not to marry the girl with this boy. 60,000- per annum and he was also indebted to the extent of several lacs. So, the Rani and the President Court of Wards decided not to marry the girl with this boy. They demanded back the money and the articles which had been sent to defendants Nos. 2 and 3 on the occasion of Tilak. When they refused to return the same, this suit was filed for recovery of Rs. 85,0001 2. It appears that during the pendency of the suit the estate of Rani was released by the Court of Wards and thereupon an application was made in July, 1954 by the D.G.C. appearing on behalf of the Deputy Commissioner intimating this fact to the court and requesting to issue a notice to the Rani to take such further steps in the case as she thought necessary. This application was allowed and it was further ordered that the name of the Rani be written in place of the Deputy Commissioner Kheri as plaintiff. 3. The suit was contested by all the three defendants. Defendant No. 1 denied that this match was settled through him and alleged that he had simply gone in the Tilak along with other trusted servants and advisers of the Rani. He denied that he had any collusion with the other defendants or that he had made any misrepresentation to the Rani in connection with this match. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 also denied that there was any misrepresentation by them and contended that this match was suitable in all respects, but for reasons best known to the Rani, she decided to break the engagement. It was also alleged by these defendants that defendant No. 1 had nothing to do with the settlement of this match and that he had been impleaded in the suit simply to give territorial jurisdiction to the court at Kheri. These defendants admitted the receipt of the cash and the articles but disputed their value: They further alleged that they had spent more than Rs. 12,000/- on this ceremony. It was then pleaded that this cash and the articles had been given in a Sankalp as an irrevocable gift and they were not refundable under any circumstances. These defendants admitted the receipt of the cash and the articles but disputed their value: They further alleged that they had spent more than Rs. 12,000/- on this ceremony. It was then pleaded that this cash and the articles had been given in a Sankalp as an irrevocable gift and they were not refundable under any circumstances. It was also pleaded that there was a custom in their community that the articles given on the occasion of Tilak are not to be returned even if the marriage may not be performed for one reason or the other. 4. It appears that the estate of Thakur Jai Indra Bahadur Singh know n as Mahewa estate was also decided to be released from the Court of Wards but since there were disputes about the succession to this estate, the Deputy Com- missioner Kheri as Manager Court of Wards filed an inter pleader suit in the court of Civil Judge, Kheri, who during the pendency of the present case appointed a receiver of this estate. Originally the Deputy Commissioner himself was appointed as receiver by the Civil Judge. In view of an objection taken on behalf of the defendants, after the Rani was substituted as plaintiff in place of the Deputy Commissioner, that the suit had not been filed by the person in whom the Mahewa estate vested, the Rani moved another application in April, 1957 with the allegation that the receiver of the estate who at that time was the Deputy Commissioner Kheri should also have been added as a plaintiff along with the Rani in place of the Deputy Commissioner as Manager Court of Wards who had originally filed the suit This application being allowed, the receiver was also added as a plaintiff to the suit. Thereafter the defendants pleaded that the claim was barred by limitation so far as this plaintiff representing Mahewa estate was concerned. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed the following issues : 1. Whether defendant No. 1 made a representation to the plaintiffs and committed a fraud as alleged in para. 4 (d), (e) and (f) of the plaint? 2. What was the value of the Car and the articles given at the time of Tilak Ceremony ? 3. To what relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled ? 4. Whether defendant No. 1 made a representation to the plaintiffs and committed a fraud as alleged in para. 4 (d), (e) and (f) of the plaint? 2. What was the value of the Car and the articles given at the time of Tilak Ceremony ? 3. To what relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled ? 4. Did defendant No 2 confirm to Yudhendra Bahadur Singh and Kesho Chand alias Bachchan what was said to plaintiff No. I Rani Raj Rajeshwari Devi by defendant No. 1 and thus by misrepresentation and fraud led the plaintiff to believe about the suitability of the match ? 5. Did the defendants collude together to take the amounts and articles in suit from the Rani ? 6. Whether there is any custom amongst the Rajputs of Gwalior and Oudh as alleged in Para. 9 (b) (iv) of the written statement 843-A dated 19th October. 1957? 7. Is the claim time-barred? 8. Were the articles and the money returnable to the plaintiffs or either of them, even if breach of promise was on their part? 9 Whether the defendants 2 and 3 also spent some money on the Tilak ceremony. If so, how much ? 5. The learned Civil judge found that no misrepresentation or fraud had been committed by defendant No. 1 and that he was also not in collusion with defendants Nos. 2 and 3, and as such, the plaintiffs had no cause of action against him. On this finding, the suit was dismissed against defendant No. I and he was awarded special costs under Section 35-A. It was also held that defendant No 2 also did not make any misrepresentation. The plea of limitation was decided against the defendants. It was found that there was no such custom among the parties as alleged by the defendants that the gifts given on the occasion of Tilak ceremony are not returnable even if the marriage is not performed. Under Issue No. 8 it was found that even if the breach of promise to carry was occasioned on the part of the plaintiffs, the articles and the money given to defendants Nos. 2 and 3 on the occasion of Tilak were returnable. Under Issue No 9 it was found that the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 had also spent Rs. 2 and 3 on the occasion of Tilak were returnable. Under Issue No 9 it was found that the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 had also spent Rs. 12,000/- of this ceremony which they were entitled to deduct from the money and the articles received by them. The value of the car and other articles was assessed by the learned Civil Judge. As a result of these findings he decreed the plaintiffs' suit for Rs. 62025/- giving an option to defendants Nos. 2 and 3 to return the various articles in specie within six months, if they so desired and in that case the value of the articles so returned would be deducted from this amount 6. Feeling aggrieved by this decree, defendant No. 3 alone filed this appeal for his own benefit as well as for the benefit of his son who was impleaded as respondent No. 3. Respondent No. I was Rani Raj Rajeshwari Devi and respondent No. 2 was Sitaram Singh, receiver of Mahewa estate. The Rani died during the pendency of the appeal and in her place her legal representatives who were Raj Kumari Ravija Devi, the girl whose marriage was settled, and Kr. Yudhwendra Bahadur Singh, adopted son of Raja Jai Indra Bahadur Singh, were substituted. 7. We heard the learned counsel for the parties. The learned counsel that the appellant pressed the following points in this appeal : 1. The suit was not filed by the appropriate plaintiff because the Deputy Commissioner Kheri who originally filed this suit was not representing even at that time the Mahewa estate from which came the money out of which the cash and the presents were given at the time of Tilak ceremony. 2. The subsequent impleading of the Mahewa estate through the Deputy Commissioner or the receiver by making an application in 1957 was of no consequence because at the time of this impleadment the claim was barred by limitation and no notice of this application was given to the receiver. 3. The Civil judge at Kheri had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit a-.,d try the case. 4. The gifts made on the occasion of Tilak were made under a Sankalp, and as such, they were in the nature of irrevocable gifts which were not returnable under any circumstances. 5. 3. The Civil judge at Kheri had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit a-.,d try the case. 4. The gifts made on the occasion of Tilak were made under a Sankalp, and as such, they were in the nature of irrevocable gifts which were not returnable under any circumstances. 5. Even if the provisions of Contract Act were applicable to this transaction, these being gifts made in consideration of the proposed marriage were not returnable as the consideration had not failed and the breach had been committed on behalf of the plaintiffs. 6. A joint decree passed in favour of the Rani and the receiver, was unwarranted. 7. The presents on the Tilak ceremony being made to defendant No. 3. defendant No. 2 was not liable and a joint decree against both these defendants was unwarranted. 8. The price of some of the articles had not been correctly assessed by the trial court. 8. We shall now deal with these points seriatim. Points Nos. 1 and 2 The objections raised by the learned counsel for the appellant under these points are based on two assumptions. In the first place, it is assumed that the money and the articles given on the occasion of the Tilak ceremony came from the funds of Mahewa estate belonging to the heirs of Raja Jai Indra Bahadur Singh and no part of it came from the funds of the Rani's estate, both of which were under the management of Court of Wards at the time of this Tilak ceremony. This assumption is not correct as we shall see while dealing with point No. 6. The other assumption is that the original suit was filed by the Deputy Commissioner only in his capacity as representing the Rani's estate and not Mahewa estate also. This assumption is also not warranted from the facts on record. From the allegations made in paras. 1 and 2 of the plaint as well as from the description of the plaintiff as given originally in this plaint i.e. "Deputy Commissioner as Manager Court of Wards (Mahewa Estate) Rani Raj Rajeshwari Devi's estate, District Kheri-Plaintiff" which description was also substan tially repeated by the defendants in their separate written statements it is evident that the Deputy Commissioner had filed the suit on behalf of both the estates. In the registered address of the plaintiff filed along with the plaint, vide paper No. Kha-4, the plaintiffs was described as "Saheb Deputy Commissioner Bahadur Kheri Manager Court of Wards Ilaqa Mahewa Zila Kheri Lakhimpur". There is nothing on record to warrant the assumption that the original plaint was filed only on behalf of the Rani's estate. Learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that in the extra stamp sheets which were subsequently filed in connection with this plaint only Raj Rajeshwari Devi's Estate was mentioned as thee plaintiff. If a suit is filed on behalf of two plaintiffs, there is nothing wrong if the deficiency in court is subsequently made good on behalf of one of the plaintiffs only. In any case, this circumstance cannot be conclusive to show that the plaint had been filed only on behalf of the Rani's estate when we have specific allegations in the plaint that it was being filed on behalf of both the estates. 9. It appears that during the pendency of this case, the estate of the Rani was released from the Court of Wards as a result of a decision of this Court on her writ petition reported in Rani Raj Rajeshwari Devi v. The State of U. P., A.I.R. 1954 Allahabad 608. Thereupon an application was made by the D.G.C., Kheri, on 19-7-1954, vide paper No. 15, alleging that since the estate of the Rani had been released by the Court of Wards and the plaintiff was no more manager of this estate, a notice should be issued to the Rani that she should put in appearance in court and tare further necessary action in the prosecution of the case. There was no prayer in this application that the name of the Rani should be substituted in place of the plaintiff who was till the the Deputy Commissioner as representing both the estates. On this application, a notice was issued to the Rani but she did not make any objection, and thereupon the Civil judge passed an order dated 30-3-1954 that the name of the Rani be written in place of Deputy Commissioner as plaintiff. On this application, a notice was issued to the Rani but she did not make any objection, and thereupon the Civil judge passed an order dated 30-3-1954 that the name of the Rani be written in place of Deputy Commissioner as plaintiff. It appears that while passing this order the learned Civil judge did not take into consideration that the other estate i.e. Mahewa estate which too was represented by the Deputy Commissioner was still under the management of the Court of wards as there were some disputes between the persons claiming to be the successors of Raja Jai Indra Bahadur Singh for which the Deputy Commissioner had filed an inter pleader suit in the court of Civil Judge. 10. It was on 18th April, 1957 that this mistake was detected by the Rani who then made an application, vide paper No. 56 or in which she prayed that the Deputy Commissioner, Kheri should also have remained as plaintiff in this case though his description should be as receiver in view of the order passed by the Civil judge in that inter- pleader case and not as Manager, Court of Wards. This application as allowed by the learned Civil judge after hearing the defendants who had opposed it. Under this order, the name of Deputy Commissioner as receiver of Mahewa estate was added in the array of plaintiffs. Subsequently, in place of Deputy Commissioner, Sri Sitaram Singh was appointed as the receiver, and on further application made by the Rani, he was impleaded as a plaintiff in place of the Deputy Commissioner. Since this amendment was of a formal nature in view of the order passed in that inter pleader suit appointing Sri Sitaram Singh as receiver in place of the Deputy Commissioner, it was not necessary to give a notice to him. In any case, if this substitution was made without notice to Sri Sitaram Singh, it did not affect the validity of the order passed. There is nothing on record to show that Sri Sita Ram Singh ever opposed this order. Since the Deputy Commissioner was originally representing Mahewa, estate also and through these subsequent orders only his successors were substituted in his place. there is no question of limitation. We therefore, see no substance in any of these two points raised by the learned counsel for the appellant. Point No. 3 11. Since the Deputy Commissioner was originally representing Mahewa, estate also and through these subsequent orders only his successors were substituted in his place. there is no question of limitation. We therefore, see no substance in any of these two points raised by the learned counsel for the appellant. Point No. 3 11. No plea of jurisdiction was raised by any of the defendants in the trial court. All that was contended was that defendant No. 1 liable in any case rind that his name was added in the plaint probably with a view to give jurisdiction to the court at Kheri, which otherwise would not have jurisdiction to enter tam the suit. This shows that the defendants conceded that the court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit as it was framed. They did not plead that even in spite of the impleadment of defendant No. 1 this suit was not cognizable by the court at Kheri unless the court had granted permission under Section 20 (h) .11 the Code of Civil Procedure. On the other hand, they submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and went for trial on merits. They shall, therefore be deemed to have acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the court under Section 20(b) In this view of the matter, there was no question of want of jurisdiction in the trial court. 12. It was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the trial court while exonerating defendant No. I from the liability also found that his name had probably been added in the plaint with a view to give jurisdiction to the Court at Kheri. In our opinion, this observation by the learned Civil Judge does not in any way help the appellant so far as the question of jurisdiction is concerned. The learned counsel for the respondents has further pointed out that this plea of jurisdiction was not taken by the defendants specifically in the lower court and no issue was framed on this point. Not only that, in the grounds of appeal also, this plea was not taken originally and it was added only after 9 years by making an amendment application. This plea is now barred wider Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In support of this contention he also cited a number of rulings. Not only that, in the grounds of appeal also, this plea was not taken originally and it was added only after 9 years by making an amendment application. This plea is now barred wider Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In support of this contention he also cited a number of rulings. We need refer only to Vijaya Ramraj v. Vijaya Ananda, A.I.R. 1952 Allahabad 564, Hiralal v. Sri Kali Nath, A.I.R. 1955 Allhabad 569, Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 340, Hiralal v. Kali Maths, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 199 and B. Petroleum Co. v. P. J. Pappue, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 634. It had been clearly held in all these cases that a plea of territorial jurisdiction cannot be taken up by a defendant in appeal unless such a plea had been taken in the trial court and he had suffered some material injustice on account of the suit being tried in the wrong court. In the present case, none of these two conditions has been fulfilled. Hence, this plea of jurisdiction is not sustainable. Points Nos. 4 and 5 13. The nature of a betrothal among the Hindus where the marriages are usually arranged by the parents was fully discussed by this Court in Rajendra Bahadur v. Roshan Singh, A.I.R. 1956 Allahabad 592. After considering the various rulings on the subject and examining the provisions contained on this matter in the Mitakshara. translated by Sri W. H. Macnaghten and Mr. H. T. Colebrooke it was held that "In a Hindu family a betrothal is in the nature of a contract to which the Contract Act is applicable. The gifts made by the parties to the contract on the occasion of the various ceremonies preceding the marriage are not absolute or irrevocable gifts even if they are accompanied by a Sankaip. Where, there, fore, the contract becomes void on account of impossibility of execution i.e. death of the bride, the parties to the contract will be entitled to the return of the ;lifts made in consideration for the proposed marriage and also to expenses legitimately incurred in connection with the ceremonies preceding marriage". The learned counsel for the appellant tried to distinguish this ruling on the ground that in that case on account of the death of the bride, the consideration A. 1. The learned counsel for the appellant tried to distinguish this ruling on the ground that in that case on account of the death of the bride, the consideration A. 1. R. 1952 Allahabad 561 A. I. R. 1955 Allahabad 569 had failed and the contract had become impossible of performance, while in the present case, there was no such impossibility in the performance of the contract as the groom was prepared to marry the girl, but the breach was committed by the mother of the girl. In our opinion, this fact by itself does not make any difference. The learned Civil judge has found that there were valid reasons for the mother to break this engagement. We may reproduce his findings on this point in his own words:- "......In this case it is established that Th. Pancham Singh defendant No. 2 had married a widow. He admitted that amongst Rajputs widow marriage is rot looked upon with favour. He also admitted that only those persons, who are of modern views marry a widow. It is nowhere alleged in the pleadings of the defendants or in the statements of the witnesses of the defendants that the plaintiffs had knowledge of this fact, namely, that defendant No. 2 had married a widow. When plaintiff No. 1 who belongs to a conservative family and who herself is a conservative lady could very well be justified in refusing to marry her daughter in a family where the father of the proposed bride-groom had himself married a widow. It is also admitted in the present case that when the contract of marriage took place the proposed bride-groom defendant No. 3 was employed as a Subedar in the Army drawing a salary of Rs. 175/- per month. There is no doubt that defendant. No. 2 is a respectable Jagirdar of Gwalior with an estate yielding an annual income of about Rs. 50,000/- and he also belongs to a very old and reputed family. (proved from Exhibit B-I) but it is quite natural for plaintiff No. 1, the mother of the bride, who was going to spend Rs. 2 lacs in the marriage and who was the wife of a premier Taluqdar of Oudh to have thought it proper not to marry her daughter to a boy who was drawing a salary of Rs. 175/- per month. 2 lacs in the marriage and who was the wife of a premier Taluqdar of Oudh to have thought it proper not to marry her daughter to a boy who was drawing a salary of Rs. 175/- per month. It is immaterial whether she knew this from before or not because she in the interest of her daughter, who though not a minor was not herself negotiating her marriage, could on an after thought decide that it was not proper for her to marry her daughter to such a boy. To my mind the above two factors were sufficient and good grounds for the plaintiff No. 1 to have refused to per- form the marriage. In this case the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 cannot even claim any special damage (besides the money actually spent). "because the contracting party was the mother of the bride and not the bride herself. Thus I am of the opinion that in this case there is no doubt that the contract was broken by the plaintiffs but on the facts I hold that there were good grounds for the plaintiffs to have broken the contract, although defendants No. 2 and 3 were not at all at fault." 14. We agree with the learned Civil judge that these were valid grounds for the plaintiffs to have second thought in the matter and to break the engagement. But this would not entitle the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 to retain all the presents received by them on the occasion of the Tilak ceremony even though they were given in a Sankaip. It was held in Dharindhar v. Kanhji Sahay, A.I.R. 1949 Patna 250 which was later on followed in Gopi Krishna v. Janak Prasad, A.I.R. 1954 Patna 519, that these gifts are not absolute and free gifts but they are subject to overriding conditions that should the marriage not take place whether due to the refusal of the plaintiff or other wise, the gift was to be returned unless the defendant alleged and proved that there was a condition that in any case the gift will not be returnable. No such condition was proved in this case also. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act which is applicable to Hindus also. No such condition was proved in this case also. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act which is applicable to Hindus also. He contended that even if it is considered to be a conditional gift, the only implied condition that can be imported in it is that if the breach of the terms is made on the side of the groom the gifts would be returnable otherwise not. We are unable to accept that this condition alone can be implied in such a gifts. In our opinion, the implied condition in such a gift is the performance of the marriage and if, for one reason or the other, the marriage could not be performed, the gifts become returnable subject of course to the adjustment of the equities between the parties. We therefore find both these points raised on behalf of the appellant to be without any force. Point No. 6 15. No such plea was raised by the defendants in the trial court and no specific issue was framed on this point. So, it is not open to the appellant to raise this plea for the first time in appeal. Even otherwise, this plea is devoid of any merit. The defendants did not adduce any evidence to show that the articles and the cash that were sent on the occasion of the Tilak came from the funds of Mahewa estate and not from the Rani's estate. On the other hand, from Ex. 1 printed at page 130 of the paper-book which is an extract from the accounts of the Punjab National Bank relating to Rani's estate it is evident that the draft for Rs. 45,000/- which was sent on the occasion of this Tilak ceremony was obtained by debiting this amount along with the bank commission in the accounts of Rani's estate. On behalf of the appellant it was pointed out that in Ext. B-2 which is a letter addressed by the President, Court of Wards, to the appellant it was stated that the Court of Wards had sanctioned from the funds of Mahewa estate Rs. 1 lac to be presented in cash at the time of Tilak ceremony. besides Rs. 13,000/- for a car and Rs. 12,000- for other expenses. B-2 which is a letter addressed by the President, Court of Wards, to the appellant it was stated that the Court of Wards had sanctioned from the funds of Mahewa estate Rs. 1 lac to be presented in cash at the time of Tilak ceremony. besides Rs. 13,000/- for a car and Rs. 12,000- for other expenses. It may be that the amount had originally been sanctioned from the funds of Mahewa estate but that estate having no liquid money at that time, the amount was actually with- drawn from the accounts of the Rani's estate which was also under Court of Wards. In any case, as we have found above, both these estates were represented by the Deputy Commissioner when he had filed the suit, and if the decree has been passed in favour of both of them, no exception can be taken to it. It will be for the owners of both these estates to adjust among themselves as to how much amount would be payable to one or the other. Point No. 7 16. This point was also not taken in the trial court and so it cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time in the appeal. On merits also, it is not sustainable, because we find that the defendant-appellant had admitted in his statement on oath the receipt of the various articles sent on the occasion of Tilak Ceremony. There is nothing on record to show that the father and the son lived separately. On the other hand, the presumption is in favour of jointness. Under the circumstances, the decree has rightly been passed against both defendants now. 2 and 3. Point No. 8 17. The price of the various articles was assessed by the learned Civil judge after taking into consideration the evidence produced by the parties. The learned counsel for the appellant questions only the price assessed for the sword and the Calgi. It may be stated that the trial court had given an option to the defendant to return these articles or other articles if they thought that the price assessed was excessive and in that case the price so assessed would have been deducted from the amount decreed, but they did not avail of that option. It may be stated that the trial court had given an option to the defendant to return these articles or other articles if they thought that the price assessed was excessive and in that case the price so assessed would have been deducted from the amount decreed, but they did not avail of that option. It was however contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the defendants may be given further time so that they may return these articles. Learned counsel for the plaintiff was also not opposed to this offer provided the same articles were recovered which had been offered on the occasion of the Tilak ceremony. No other point was pressed before us. 18. In view of the above findings we dismissed the appeal with costs to the contesting respondents. We, however, allow further time of two months to the defendants to return the sword and Calgi if they so like, and in that case, the price of the articles so returned will be deducted from the amount decreed.