JUDGMENT T.C. Raghavan, J. The questions to be considered in these references arise under the Super Profits, Tax Act of 1963. The questions referred are: "(1) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in not including in the computation of capital of the company the sum of Rs. 7,14,512 shown as provision for taxation under the head Current liabilities and Provisions' as at the commencement of the year in the balance-sheet as on 31st March 1963, in terms of Rule 1 of the second Schedule to the Super Profits Tax Act, 1963. (2) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in including in the computation of capital of the company the sum of Rs. 2,00,000 shown under the head 'Gratuity Reserve' as at the commencement of the year in the balance-sheet as on 31st March 1963, in terms of Rule 1 of the second Schedule to the Super Profits Tax Act, 1963." The first question has been referred at the instance of the assessee company in the second of these references and the second question has been referred at the instances of the Revenue in the first reference. Section 4 of the Super Profits Tax Act is the charging section; and under Schedule 2 to the Act the capital of a company for the purpose of Minerals excluding it from super profits tax has to be ascertained. For ascertaining the capital, which under the rules in the second Schedule, includes reserves, the nature of the amounts involved in these questions whether they are reserves or not has to be considered. We do not think that it is necessary to go into further details regarding the provisions of the Act in these references. Mr. G. Viswanatha Iyer, the counsel of the assessee-company, brought to our notice a few decisions arising under the Business Profits Tax Act of 1947, wherein there were similar provisions. The first decision is Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City v. The Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., 24 I.T.R. 499 of the Supreme Court. Mr. G. Viswanatha Iyer, the counsel of the assessee-company, brought to our notice a few decisions arising under the Business Profits Tax Act of 1947, wherein there were similar provisions. The first decision is Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City v. The Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., 24 I.T.R. 499 of the Supreme Court. Ghulam Hassan, J., speaking for the Court, considered the meaning of the word, "reserve" and said that, since the term was not defined in the Act or in any other Act like the Companies Act or the Income-tax Act, the term must have its meaning in common parlance. The learned Judge also considered the dictionary meaning of the term in the Oxford Dictionary, Webster's New International Dictionary, etc. and concluded: "A reserve in the sense in which it is used in rule 2 can only mean profit earned by a company and not distributed as dividend to the share-holders but kept back by the directors for any purpose to which it may be put in future." The learned Judge observed that this was the plain natural meaning of the term "reserve". In that case the Supreme Court was considering whether a particular amount was earmarked or allocated for a future purpose, in other words, kept back for a future purpose. The learned Judge held that the particular amount involved in that case was not so earmarked and it therefore remained part of the unappropriated profits. The next decision is again a decision of the Supreme Court, First National City Bank v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay, 42 I.T.R. 17. That was also, a case under the Business Profits Tax Act; and the Supreme Court was dealing, with a company incorporated in the United States of America. The amount which was shown in the balance-sheet of the company as "Undivided Profits" was the subject for consideration; and the Supreme Court, recognising the practice in the United States, held that such undivided profits were really earmarked or allocated amounts for a future purpose. In the second case the Supreme Court referred to their earlier decision in Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company's case and followed it. In the second case the Supreme Court referred to their earlier decision in Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company's case and followed it. The only observation of the Supreme Court that has to be noted in this case is: "It was held that the true nature and character of a sum disputed as reserve was to be determined with reference to the substance of the matter." This observation was made when the Supreme Court was considering its own earlier decision in Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company's case. The third decision is again a decision of the Supreme Court; and that is Commissioner of Income-tax (Central), Calcutta v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., 59 I.T.R. 685. That case was also under the Business Profits Tax Act; and in that case the Supreme Court was again considering a foreign company registered in the United States of America. In that case too the Supreme Court followed its earlier decisions; and accepting the practice in the United States, the disputed amount in that case was also held to be a reserve. In addition to the fact that the Supreme Court followed its decision in the Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company's case, the Supreme Court observed: "'Earned Surplus' (the nature of which was being considered by the Supreme Court) has, it is true, not been called 'reserve', but if it is truly a reserve it must be taken into account in the computation of capital." From these decisions of the Supreme Court what emerges is that, if a particular amount is held back, allocated or earmarked for a future purpose, it is reserve; and that it is the true nature and substance of the allocation or earmarking that has to be taken into account and not the mere nomenclature. Mr. Viswanatha Iyer draws our attention to another decision the decision of the Madras High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax and Business Profits Tax, Madras v. Vasantha Mills Limited, 32 I.T.R. 237. Rajagopalan and Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.J. were considering a case under the Business Profits Tax Act; and the disputed amount was an amount reserved for payment of taxes, similar to the amount involved in the first question before us. Rajagopalan and Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.J. were considering a case under the Business Profits Tax Act; and the disputed amount was an amount reserved for payment of taxes, similar to the amount involved in the first question before us. Rajagopalan, J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench, considering, inter alia, the decision of the Supreme Court in Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company's case, held that the amount was earmarked, allocated or held back for the future purpose of payment of taxes, so that the amount was a reserve under the Business Profits Tax Act for the purpose of calculating the capital as contemplated by the rules in the relevant schedule to that Act. We may however point put that in that case the Court was of opinion that the Revenue should not be allowed to raise that question, but, however, since the question was also argued at some length before the Court, the learned Judges decided that question as well. That decision, Mr. Viswanatha Iyer claims, is directly in his favour since the amount claimed as reserve in the first question before us is an amount earmarked for payment of taxes as in the Madras case. Incidentally, Mr. Viswanatha Iyer hast brought to our notice two more decisions, one of the Calcutta High Court in Indian Steel and Wire Productions Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal, 33 I.T.R. 579 and another of our own High Court in Aluminium Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Kerala, 68 I.T.R. 125. In the Calcutta case the assessee claimed that an amount paid as advance tax under section 18-A of the Indian Income-tax Act of 1922 was reserve; and the Calcutta High Court rejected the contention saying that, on the payment of the amount to the Income-tax authorities, the disposing power of the company over the amount was completely and irretrievably lost and it was not possible thereafter to say that the said money was still laying as part of the company's reserve. The decision of our Court is relied upon by the counsel only for the purpose of showing that the decisions given under the Business Profits Tax Act can be applied to cases arising under the Super Profits Tax Act. The decision of our Court is relied upon by the counsel only for the purpose of showing that the decisions given under the Business Profits Tax Act can be applied to cases arising under the Super Profits Tax Act. This Court, in the last decision cited, has followed the decisions of the Supreme Court in finding out whether a particular amount was really reserve or not, though the decision may not be of any direct help to say whether the Travancore Minerals amounts involved in the references before us are reserves. If we go by the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in unequivocal terms in the three decisions hereinbefore referred to, it is clear that the amount of Rs. 7,14,512, the amount mentioned in the first question, is a reserve. The balance sheet of the company for the previous year ending 31st March 1962 is in Annexure A1, wherein this amount is shown under the head "Current Liabilities and Provisions" and the sub-head "Provisions for Taxation". The relevant year with which we are concerned in these references is 1962-63, from 1st April 1962 to 31st March 1963. Now we shall consider the contention of the Revenue. Mr. P. K. Krishnankutty Menon, the counsel of the Revenue, contends that the decisions of the Supreme Court and the decision of the Madras High Court relied upon by the counsel of the assessee-company apply only to cases arising before the Companies Act of 1956 came into force: in other words, these decisions were given considering the relevant provisions of the Companies Act of 1913, and after the coming into force of the Companies Act of 1956, these decisions cannot apply. This seems to be the reasoning of the Tribunal as well, wherein the Judicial Member has given a fairly long discussion on this question. The argument is that under Schedule VI of the Companies Act of 1956 the form of the balance-sheet is given in Part I, wherein there are separate heads providing for "Reserve and Surplus" and for "Current Liabilities and Provisions". Part II of the said Schedule provides further for the preparation of balance-sheets by companies, and Part III deals with the interpretation of some terms wherein the terms "provision" and reserve also come in. Part II of the said Schedule provides further for the preparation of balance-sheets by companies, and Part III deals with the interpretation of some terms wherein the terms "provision" and reserve also come in. Paragraph 7 (1) on part III provides that for purpose of Parts I and II of Schedule VI, unless the context otherwise provides, the expression "provision" shall, subject to sub-clause (2), inter alia, mean any amount retained by way of providing for any known liability of which the amount cannot be determined with substantial accuracy. This paragraph also provided that the expression "reserve" shall not, subject as aforesaid, include any amount retained by way of providing for any known liability. Similarly, the expression "capital reserve" is also interpreted in this paragraph: but we are not concerned with that expression in these references. On the basis of these interpretations, the counsel of the Revenue argues that if provision is made for any known liability, even if its amount cannot be determined with substantial accuracy, the provision will only be a "Provision" under this Schedule and will not be a "Reserve". According to him, what are reserves are only amounts reserved as "Reserves" in the balance-sheet. Mr. Krishnankutty Menon has invited our attention to the historical background of the Companies Act of 1956 and has also brought to our notice some accountancy practices prevailing in England. We do not think we need consider these matters in any detail in these references. The term "reserve" is not defined in the Super Profits Tax Act or in the Companies Act of 1956. The interpretation relied upon by the counsel of the Revenue occurs only in Schedule VI dealing with the rules for the preparation of balance-sheets. Even here, care is taken to mention that the interpretations are for the purposes of Parts I and II of Schedule VI. If the legislature wanted to have a different Travancore meaning, it could have easily given a definition term "reserve" in the Super Profits Tax Act. We also reiterate that the term "reserve" is not defied even in the Companies Act: the interpretation occurs only in Schedule VI providing the rules for the preparation of balance-sheets. If the legislature wanted to have a different Travancore meaning, it could have easily given a definition term "reserve" in the Super Profits Tax Act. We also reiterate that the term "reserve" is not defied even in the Companies Act: the interpretation occurs only in Schedule VI providing the rules for the preparation of balance-sheets. If the contention of the Revenue is accepted, the result will be that the decisions of the Supreme Court which interpreted the term "reserve" in considering the Business Profits Tax Act will not apply to similar provisions in the Super Profits Tax Act. We do not think that the legislature has given any indication that the term should be understood in any way other than in the common sense or common parlance meaning. We pointed out to the counsel of the Revenue clause (vii) of paragraph 3 of Part II of Schedule VI, wherein it is mentioned that the "amounts reserved for" inter alia, repayment of loans, and asked the counsel whether, if a particular loan was to be repaid in the course of the year on a particular date and if provision was made for that in the balance-sheet, that provision would be a "reserve" or only a mere "provision" which might not have the characteristic of capital. The counsel answered that such a provision would not be a reserve. Then we pointed out that that would also be an "amount reserved for", in the language of clause (vii), for which the counsel of the Revenue had no answer. This shows that the word "reserve" must be understood as it is understood in common parlance; and the interpretations given in Part III of Schedule VI are only for the purposes mentioned in that part. In other words, bearing in mind the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the decisions cited, what is a "Provision" in the balance-sheet may also be a "Reserve", if it is in fact and in substance a reserve, namely, an amount held back, earmarked or allocated for a future purpose. From this discussion it follows that the amount mentioned in the first question (Rs. 7,14,512), though it is only a provision for payment of tax and as such a provision for discharging current liabilities coming under the head "Current Liabilities and Provisions", is really a reserve. Now about the amount of Rs. From this discussion it follows that the amount mentioned in the first question (Rs. 7,14,512), though it is only a provision for payment of tax and as such a provision for discharging current liabilities coming under the head "Current Liabilities and Provisions", is really a reserve. Now about the amount of Rs. 2,00,000 mentioned in the second question in the relevant balance-sheet (Annexure A-1). Therein a sum of Rs. 5,00,000 is earmarked as "Gratuity Reserve". In the balance-sheet for the next year (Annexure A-2) the same amount of Rs. 5,00,000 is carried over as ''Gratuity Reserve". Then a sum of Rs. 3,00,000, out of the said Rs. 5,00,000, is taken to the "Profit and Loss Account" and the balance of Rs. 2,00,000 is transferred to "Provision for Gratuity". The contention of the Revenue is that this whole amount of Rs. 5,00,000 should not have been treated as reserve and only Rs. 3,00,000 which was transferred to the "Profit and Loss Account" in the next year should have been treated as reserve: in other words, the sum of Rs. 2,00,000 should not have been treated as reserve. The crucial date for fixing the capital was 1st April 1962; and the relevant balance-sheet for this purpose is the balance-sheet for the year 1961-62 ending 31st March 1962. Undisputedly, the amount of Rs. 5,00,000 was earmarked or allocated or kept back in that balance-sheet for a future purpose payment of gratuity. Therefore, what happened subsequently in the next year is not material for finding out whether the directors of the company ear- marked a particular amount for a future purpose. Thus, the answer to the second question also should be that this amount of Rs. 2,00,000 was a reserve. We may only add well-known proposition of Rowlatt, J. in Case Brandy Syndicate v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, (1921) 1 K.B. 64. "In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used." and the observation of Subba Rao, J. in Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. Aiax Products Ltd., 55 I.T.R. 741. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used." and the observation of Subba Rao, J. in Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. Aiax Products Ltd., 55 I.T.R. 741. "To put it in other words, the subject is not to be taxed unless the charging provision clearly imposes the obligation." Considering the language used, without any definition of the term "reserve", it is only proper to interpret that term as it is understood in common parlance. That was what the Supreme Court did too. We do not find any reason for holding that in the Super Profits Tax Act the expression should mean something different. If we interpret it differently, we are afraid, it will be straining the language of the Act in favour of the Revenue. For the reasons stated hereinbefore, we answer the first question in the negative in favour of the assessee; and to the second question our answer is in the affirmative that also in favour of the assessee. Since there is no direct decision on the question, we do not think this is a case for directing the Revenue to pay the costs of the assessee-company. Therefore, we pass no order regarding costs. A copy of this judgment will be sent to the Tribunal.