JUDGMENT : B.K. Patra, J. - This is an appeal by the unsuccessful Defendant No. I against the reversing judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge, Berhampur decreeing the Plaintiff's suit. The Plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration of their title to the suit lands situated in village Nuabandhopalli comprised in the Bodokhemidi zamindari in the district of Ganjam, and for permanent injunction restraining the Defendants from interfering with their possession of the same. The Plaintiff are Kondho residents of the village. Their case is that the Zamindar of Bodokhemidi allowed the ancestors of the Plaintiffs to reclaim the suit lands and enjoy the usufruct thereof in lieu of bethi service to him and that Borne time later, the Zamindar did not like to extract bethi service from them and allowed the ancestors of the Plaintiffs to enjoy the lands with permanent occupancy right therein. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs ancestors, and after them, the Plaintiffs have been in possession of these lands on payment of rajbhag to the Zamindar or to the mustajars, appointed by him. Defendant No. 1 as mustajar farmer of rent appointed by the Zamindar collected Rajbhag from the Plaintiffs from the year 1932 onwards. Thereafter, Defendant No. 1 in collusion with Defendants 2 and 3 wanted to take forcible possession of the suit lands in about July, 1951. The Plaintiffs, therefore, were obliged to file the suit. 2. The suit was contested only by Defendant No. 1, who is the sole Appellant before this Court. He denied the Plaintiffs' case that they are the occupancy tenants of the suit lands or that they ever paid rent to Zamindar directly for the same. His case is that his father Dasarathi Patnaik and three others got Banjar patta in respect of the suit lands from the Zamindar in 1903. In course of time, Dasarathi Patnaik acquired the interests of the co-pattadars and was in exclusive possession of the suit lands till his death in 1916. Since then, the Defendant has been the occupancy tenant in respect of the suit lands. The Zamindar granted a fresh zeroity patta in his favour in 1933 and his name was also recorded as an occupancy tenant in the Record of Rights prepared in 1942. According to him, the Plaintiffs along with others cultivated the suit lands as under-tenants under him for about five years from 1928. The Zamindar granted a fresh zeroity patta in his favour in 1933 and his name was also recorded as an occupancy tenant in the Record of Rights prepared in 1942. According to him, the Plaintiffs along with others cultivated the suit lands as under-tenants under him for about five years from 1928. In the year, 1940, the Plaintiffs wanted to trespass on the suit lands for which a proceeding u/s 107, Code of Criminal Procedure was instituted against them and they had been warned. In the circumstances, he prayed for dismissal of the suit. 3. The learned Munsif, who tried the suit, dismissed in on the ground that the Plaintiffs failed to prove their title to and possession over the disputed lands. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge, Berhampur reversed the judgment of the trial Court and declaring the Plaintiffs were the occupancy ryots in respect of the suit lands, passed an order restraining the Defendants permanently from interfering with the possession of the Plaintiffs. It is against this decision that the appeal has been filed by the first Defendant. This appeal came up in the first instance for hearing before G.C. Das, J. who allowed the appeal on the preliminary ground that the appeal which had been filed by the Respondent in the Court of the Subordinate Judge had abated as a whole for non-inclusion of some of the legal representatives of one of the deceased Appellants therein. The Respondents (Appellants in the first appellate Court) appealed against that order of this Court in the Supreme Court and their Lordships held for reasons stated in their judgment, that the appeal in the first appellate Court did not abate. The decision of this Court was therefore set aside and the case was sent back to this Court for decision on merits after bringing the heirs left out earlier into record. This having been done, the appeal is Bet down for hearing. 4. The judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge is assailed on the ground that he has at several places committed errors of record and has misconstrued important documents on which parties have relied in support of their respective claims of title. It is argued, that he has also committed errors on questions of law relevant for deciding the controversy between the parties. To support these contentions, Mr. It is argued, that he has also committed errors on questions of law relevant for deciding the controversy between the parties. To support these contentions, Mr. N.V. Ramdas, learned Advocate for the Appellants has placed before us the several documents on which the parties have relied and, as we find that his contentions are well-founded, it is necessary for us to refer to these contentions at some length. 5. Section 6 of the Madras Estates Land Act (Act I of 1908)(hereinafter referred to as the Act) which relates to the acquisition occupancy right in respect of ryoti lands in an estate runs as follows: 6. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, every ryot now in possession or who shall hereafter be admitted by a landholder to possession of ryoti land situated in the estate of such landholder shall have a permanent right of occupancy in his holding. Explanation (1): - For the purpose of this sub-section, the expression 'every ryot in possession' shall include every person who, having held lands as a ryot, continues in possession of such land at the commencement of this Act. xx xx xx xx The expressions "ryot" and "ryoti land" are defined in Section 3(15) and 3(16) of the Act respectively as follows: "Ryot" means a person who holds for the purpose of agriculture ryoti land in an estate on condition of paying to the landholder the rent which is legally due upon it. Explanation: - A person who has occupied ryoti land for a continuous period of twelve years shall be deemed to be a ryot for all the purposes of this Act. "Ryoti land" means cultivable land in an estate other than private land but does not include xx xx xx xx 6. The Plaintiffs having come to Court for a declaration that they are the occupancy ryots in respect of the disputed lands, the burden is on them to establish either (1) that they as ryots were in possession of the disputed lands by the time the Act came into force on the 1st of July, 1908 or (2) that subsequent to 1st July, 1908, they were admitted by the landholder to possession of the disputed lands. It may be stated here that there is no dispute between the parties that these are ryoti rands. It may be stated here that there is no dispute between the parties that these are ryoti rands. The words "admitted to possession as a ryot" occurring in Section 6(1) of the Act have been construed in several decisions of the Madras High Court, some of which have been summarised in a Full Bench decision of that High Court in Sri Navaneethaswaraswami Devasthanam Vs. P.Swaminatha Pillai to mean that it must be a conscious and deliberate act and not something which was not intended, and that a person admitted to possession did not ordinarily mean a person in possession. The learned subordinate Judge does not appear to have kept these principles in view either in assessing the evidence in this case or in arriving at the conclusion on the most vital question in controversy, namely, whether the Plaintiffs have acquired occupancy right in the disputed lands. The specific case of the Plaintiffs is that the Zamindar of Bodokhemedi authorised the fore-fathers of the Plaintiffs to reclaim the disputed lands and enjoy the income in lieu of rendering Bethi service to him and that some time later the Zamindar wanted that they need not render Bethi service and enjoy the lands on payment of rajbhag. The Plaintiffs have not filed a single scrap of paper in support of this contention and the learned Subordinate Judge in paragraph 8 of his judgment takes note of the fact that there is no contemporaneous document to evidence the grant of the suit lands to the ancestors of the Plaintiffs in lieu of Bethi service to the Zamindar and its subsequent resumption by the Zamindar and the assessment of rent thereon. The Plaintiffs have not let in any evidence to prove that their ancestors were in possession of the disputed lands as ryots when the Act came into force. It, therefore, follows that the Plaintiffs can succeed only on proving that subsequent to the 1st of July, 1908 they were admitted by the landholder to possession of the disputed lands. The only document on which they relied to support their claim on this score is Ext. 1, dated 15-10-1932 which, according to the learned Subordinate Judge, is the trump card of the Plaintiffs and furnishes the key to the solution of the controversy in the suit. Ext. The only document on which they relied to support their claim on this score is Ext. 1, dated 15-10-1932 which, according to the learned Subordinate Judge, is the trump card of the Plaintiffs and furnishes the key to the solution of the controversy in the suit. Ext. 1 which purports to be an order of the Raja of Bodokhemedi is not the original but a copy of the order said to have been in the hand writing of Defendant No. 1. P.w. 3 deposed that Defendant No. 1 wrote Ext. 1 in his presence but Defendant No. I himself has denied it to be in his handwriting. The learned Munsif rejected it as having not been proved, but the learned Subordinate Judge has held otherwise. Assuming that Ext. 1 is a true copy of the original, we find, that there is nothing in that document to support the case of the Plaintiffs. This order is addressed to certain persons including the ancestors of some of the Plaintiffs. The essence of the order translated into English would read as follows: A Khausu Nagada Gutta Patta in respect of Badabada, Jamabada, Salpabada etc. had been given to Krushna Chandra Pattanayak, the Karan of Karapada. If you give ragi (Mandia) to him at the Panchakote rate, the Karan says that there would be loss and he would not be able to pay cist. In the practice prevailing in the estate, there is nothing like Tinikote and Panchakote. The practice is for equal division of the produce between the Raja and the Praja. Therefore, you must pay half of the produce of paddy, ragi etc. After the crops ger ripe, you should not harvest the same without prior intimation to the Karan. If this order is disobeyed, you would be punished. It is not clear and no steps were also taken at the time of trial to explain what exactly Tinikote and Panchakote mean, but from the context it appears that they reiate to the division of produce in certain proportions which are lower than the division of the produce half and half between the estate and the ryot. It may be stated here that out of the suit schedule lands, plot Nos. 1/1, 1/2, 1/3, 1/4, and 1/5 are known as Bodobad a lands situated at Bodobada chhak and plot Nos. It may be stated here that out of the suit schedule lands, plot Nos. 1/1, 1/2, 1/3, 1/4, and 1/5 are known as Bodobad a lands situated at Bodobada chhak and plot Nos. 24/1, 24/2, & 24/3 are situated in the Jamabada chhak and are known as Jamabada lands. Assuming that Ext. I is genuine, the utmost that can be said about it is that it shows that the persons to whom it Was addressed were in possession of the lands in Bodobada, Jamabadam, Salpabada etc. chhaks and that in respect of the lands situated in those chhaks Defendant No. 1 was appointed as a farmer of rent for the year 1932. There is absolutely no reference in Ext. 1 to the disputed lands and no evidence has been let in on Plaintiffs' side to show that besides the disputed lands, they did not possess any other lands in Bodobada, Jamabada and Salpabada chhaks. Ext. 1 is therefore not inconsistent with the claim of Defendant No. 1 that since long before 1932, he has been in possession of the disputed lands. The position becomes further clear if a reference is made to Ext. C series which are Muchilikas executed in the years 1925, 1927 and 1928 In favour of Defendant No. 1 by certain Kondhos of mouza Nuabandhapalli including some of the ancestors of the present Plaintiffs in respect of the disputed lands. One of the Muchilikas, Ext. C/2 is a registered Muchilika. The genuineness of these Muchilikas has not been disputed. But the learned Subordinate Judge has brushed them aside with the observation that these documents do not cover the entire extent of the suit lands which again is inconsistent with the observation that these documents do not cover the entire extent of the suit lands which again is inconsistent with his further observation that there is no evidence to connect these land with the suit lands. These lands are described in Ext. C series by their boundaries as the lands were not surveyed at that time, there was no other method of describing them except describing them by their popular names in the locality, their area and their boundaries. The lands were surveyed much later. To connect the disputed lands with the suit survey numbers, we have to refer to the Muchilikas Exts. The lands were surveyed much later. To connect the disputed lands with the suit survey numbers, we have to refer to the Muchilikas Exts. E. and E/1 of the years 1936 and 1937 respectively executed by some of the Kondhos of Nuabandhapalli including the ancestors of some of the Plaintiffs in favour of Defendant No. 1, in respect of the lands which are described not only by their boundaries but also by their survey numbers. The survey numbers mentioned are the suit survey numbers and the boundaries thereof mentioned in Exts. and E/1 tally with the boundaries mentioned in the Muchilikas Ext. C. series. The learned Subordinate Judge does not at all appear to have taken Ext. E series into consideration, although the trial Court has relied on the same. Had the learned Subordinate Judge considered the effect of the recitals in Ext. C series, he would not have faced to notice that the lands dealt with in Ext. C series are the same as those dealt with in Ext. E series and that they relate to the lands in dispute in the suit. Thus it is, that the areas of lands mentioned in Ext. C series do not tally with the areas of the disputed lands, but once it is remembered that Ext. C series had been executed at a time when the lands had not been surveyed and their areas determined, discrepancy in area loses all significance. It follows from the discussion above that Defendant No. 1 was in possession of the disputed lands at least during the years 1925 to 1928 and that his possession is not direct, but through tenants admitted to the lands by him from year to year. Ext. E series also establish the possession of Defendant No. 1 over the disputed lands during the years 1936 and 1937. In the fact of such evidence, it is somewhat surprising that the appellate Court on the basis of Ext. 1 could come to the conclusion that the Plaintiffs were in possession of the disputed lands in their own rights in the year 1932. In the fact of such evidence, it is somewhat surprising that the appellate Court on the basis of Ext. 1 could come to the conclusion that the Plaintiffs were in possession of the disputed lands in their own rights in the year 1932. As we have stated above, even if it is assumed for a moment that in 1932 the Plaintiffs were in possession of the disputed lands that would not be enough to show that they are occupancy ryots in respect of the same in the absence of any evidence that they were admitted into such possession by the land bolder. It is not alleged anywhere in the plaint that subsequent to the 1st of July, 1908, the landholder had ever admitted the Plaintiffs into possession of the disputed lands and much less there is evidence to support the same. These findings are sufficient to dismiss the Plaintiff's suit. 7. Apart from the documents Ext. C series and Ext. E series referred to above, which go to show that Defendant No. 1 was in possession of the disputed lands in his own right during the years 1925 and 1928 and again during the years 1936 and 1937, there is Ext. D, a zeroyati patta dated 22-4-1933 granted by the Zamindar to Defendant No. 1 in respect of the disputed lands. The appellate Court refused to attach any importance to this document on the ground that as by then the Plaintiffs were already holding the disputed lands as ryots, the Zamindar had no right to execute a zeroyati patta in favour of Defendant No. 1 in respect of the very same lands. In view of our finding that the Plaintiffs had not acquired any right in respect of the suit lands by 1933, this finding of the learned Subordinate Judge is clearly unacceptable. It is the case of Defendant No. 1 that under Ext. B, dated 18-1-1903, his father and the latter's co-shares obtained a Baniar patta in respect of the disputed Bodobanda lands, that they reclaimed the same and also reclaimed the adjoining lands situated in Jamabada, that they were in possession of these reclaimed lands when the Act came into force and that they acquire occupancy right therein. Ext. B was executed only for a period of three years and while authorising the lessees to reclaim the lands, they were asked to vacate possession thereof after three years. Ext. B was executed only for a period of three years and while authorising the lessees to reclaim the lands, they were asked to vacate possession thereof after three years. Relying on this condition in Ext. B it was pointed out by the learned Judge that Defendant No. 1's father and his co-sharers would not have remained in possession of the lands after 1906. There is not much evidence in the suit to show t he possession of the father of Defendant, No. 1 over the disputed lands in the year 1908. Assuming, therefore, that Defendant No. 1's father did not acquire any occupancy right in the suit lands on the coming into force of the Act in 1908 and in the absence of any evidence to show that before 1933 any other person had acquired occupancy right therein, nothing prevented the landholder from admitting Defendant No. 1 into possession of the suit lands by granting him the Patta (Ext. D) in the year 1933. In our opinion, therefore, under Ext. D deft No. 1 had acquired occupancy right over the suit lands in the year 1933. Defendant No. 1 had leased out these lands in the year 1936 and 1937 to the ancestors of some of the Plaintiffs. Defendant No. 1 has been shown as the occupancy ryot in respect of the disputed lands in the Record of rights (Ext. F) published in the year 1942. It is relevant to refer in this connection to the fact that some of the Plaintiffs had filed objections before the Settlement officer (vide Ext. L.) objecting to the lands being recorded in Defendant No. 1's name. Their objections were duly considered and rejected. The objection that the Plaintiffs had advanced before the Settlement officer was not that they had occupancy rights in the lands, but that they were cultivating the Emit lands for about 8 years before the objections were filed and were paying half share of the produce to Defendant No. 1. It appears to have been admitted by them before the Settlement officer that they had never paid rent direct to the Zamindar. The Muchilikas (Ext. A series) relating to the years 1943, 1944 and 1945 of which Ext. A/2 is a registered one show that Defendant No. 1 had leased out these lands to certain other persons during three years. Ext. The Muchilikas (Ext. A series) relating to the years 1943, 1944 and 1945 of which Ext. A/2 is a registered one show that Defendant No. 1 had leased out these lands to certain other persons during three years. Ext. H/1 of the year 1948 shows that the Zamindar had filed a suit against Defendant No. 1 for realising rent due on the disputed lands for Faslis 1355, 1356 and 1357. 8. We are fully conscious of the limitations of the High Court in hearing a second appeal and that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of fact however gross the error may be. But if a finding of fact has been recorded by the first appellate Court without any evidence, that finding of fact can be successfully challenged in second appeal. That apart, if the High Court thinks that the evidence accepted by the lower appellate Court would not have been reasonably accepted, the High Court would be justified in interfering with the decision of the lower appellate Court. V. Ramchandra Ayyar and Anr. v. Ramalingam Chettiar and Anr. 1962 S.C.D. 982. If the lower appellate Court arrives at certain conclusions ignoring important evidence on record, such conclusion is not binding in second appeal. We find that the judgment under appeal suffers from all these defects. The learned Subordinate Judge has not kept Section 6 of the Act in view, when be decided the question whether the Plaintiffs had acquired occupancy right in the disputed lands. There is absolutely no evidence on record either to show that the Plaintiffs were in possession of these lands on the 1st, July, 1908 or that subsequent thereto the landholder admitted them to the possession of the lands. He has completely misconstrued Ext. 1 which he considered to be the document under which the Plaintiffs are alleged to have got title to the lands. As pointed out earlier in this judgment, he has ignored important evidence on record like Ext. E series. The evidence on record far from establishing the Plaintiff's cases goes to establish that Defendant No. 1 has acquired occupancy right in the disputed lands. 9. We would accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned Subordinate Judge and dismiss the Plaintiff's suit with costs throughout. S. Acharya, J. 10. I agree. Final Result : Allowed