JUDGMENT V.P. Gopalan Nambiyar, J. 1. The Sabarimalai Sastha Temple is a temple of great sanctity and repute throughout this State, under the administration and management of the second respondent, the Travancore Devaswom Board. Applications were invited for the appointment of a Mel Santhi in the temple for the year 1145 M.E. (1969-70). Ext. P-1 is a copy of the notification appearing in one of the vernacular papers circulating in this State, which sets out the qualifications and the terms and conditions for the appointment. It is enough to call attention to two conditions stipulated, viz. (1) that candidates called for interview should deposit Rs. 500 (five hundred) in the office of the Devaswom Board, which amount would be forfeited irrespective of the result of the interview; and (2) that the candidate appointed should contribute in advance a sum of not less than Rs. 15,000 (fifteen thousand) towards the Sabarimalai Amenities Fund. It is claimed that these conditions are not warranted by the statutory provisions governing the appointment, and violate, besides, the petitioner's fundamental rights under Articles 14 Board and 16 of the Constitution. The petitioner prays for issue of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to forbear from giving effect to the terms and conditions in Ext. P-1 in making the appointment of a "Mel Santhi", and restraining them from taking any further steps in the matter. He also prays to quash Ext. P-1 notification. 2. Paragraph 5 of the petition proceeds on the basis that the appointment in question is statutory, and that its terms and conditions are governed by rules framed under section 35 (2) of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act (Act 15 of 1950). These allegations have not been expressly denied in the counter affidavit of the first respondent. P-1 notification. 2. Paragraph 5 of the petition proceeds on the basis that the appointment in question is statutory, and that its terms and conditions are governed by rules framed under section 35 (2) of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act (Act 15 of 1950). These allegations have not been expressly denied in the counter affidavit of the first respondent. At the hearing, counsel appearing for the respondents attempted to make out by reference to rule 21 of Chapter 1, Part II, of the Travancore Devaswom Manual, Volume I, read with rule 21 of the "Rules regarding the Recruitment, Service and Conduct of Devaswom Servants" framed under section 35 (2) of the Act and published in the Gazette dated 5th August 1952, that Shantikkars are contingency staff borne on the establishment, and that appointments, to the post of Shantikkars will be according to "pathivu", keeping in view the usages and customs obtaining in the particular institution, That Shantikkars are borne on the contingency staff may well be assumed, and seems clear enough from the provisions referred to. But the statutory rules dated 5th August 1952 published at page 197 of the Travancore Manual, Volume II, comprehends within its scope even appointments to servants borne on the contingency staff envisaged under rule 2 (3) (d) thereof. It seems to admit of little doubt that Board appointment of "Mel Santhi" is statutory and that Ext. P-1 is a statutory notification. 3. Although the stand was taken in the counter-affidavit that the insistence on cash security and advance contribution to the Amenities Fund were conditions which have been insisted upon without demur or protest for the past two or three years, counsel for the respondents" very fairly and properly" did not seek to justify these conditions on the basis of any custom or usage peculiar to the institution. 4. The question therefore arises whether the impugned terms of Ext. P-1 notification contravene the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. No separate arguments were really addressed on Article 14, Article 16 being only a particular application of Article 14. 4. The question therefore arises whether the impugned terms of Ext. P-1 notification contravene the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. No separate arguments were really addressed on Article 14, Article 16 being only a particular application of Article 14. Article 16 (1) of the Constitution reads: "There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State." The argument was that the insistence on security and on contribution to the Amenities Fund, of fairly substantial amounts, operates as an unconscionable check on persons otherwise well qualified to perform the duties of "Mel Santhi", and has the effect of weeding them out from the purview of selection and appointment by unfair means. The rejoinder made on behalf of the respondents is that the Travancore Devaswom Board is not a "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, nor is employment under it an employment under the "State", so as to attract Article 16. On the merits of the impugned provisions themselves, the argument ran that they are reasonable and proper provisions, in the best interests of the efficiency of selection and of service. 5. Article 12 of the Constitution furnishes the definition of the term "State" for the purpose of Part III, in the following terms: " "In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires "the State" includes the Government and the Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India." Judicial opinion was at one time in conflict as to the exact connotation of the term "or other authorities" occurring in the above article. In the University of Madras v. Santha Bai, A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 67 the view taken was that the expression "other authorities" must be understood ejusdem generis with the words "Government and legislature" preceding them, so as to render it necessary that the "other authority" contemplated by the article must exercise governmental or quasi-governmental functions. The view received support from certain other decisions which, it is unnecessary to notice. It was disapproved in Rajastan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal, A.I.R. 1967 S.C.1867. The view received support from certain other decisions which, it is unnecessary to notice. It was disapproved in Rajastan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal, A.I.R. 1967 S.C.1867. Bhargava, J. speaking for the majority, observed: "The meaning of the word "authority" given in Webster's Third New International Dictionary, which can be applicable is "a public administrative agency or corporation having quasi-governmental powers and authorised to administer a revenue-producing public enterprise". This dictionary meaning of the word "authority" is clearly wide enough to include all bodies created by a statute on which powers are conferred to carry out governmental or quasi-governmental functions. The expression "other authorities" is wide enough to include Commissioner within it every authority created by a statute and functioning within the territory of India, or under the control of the Government of India; and we do not see any reason to narrow down this meaning in the context in which the words "other authorities" are used in Art. 12 of the Constitution." Reference was made to the previous decisions of the Supreme Court in Smt. Ujjambai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1621 and to Ramamoorthi Reddiar v. Chief Commissioner, Pondicherry, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1464 and it was observed: "These decisions of the court support the view that the expression other "authorities" in Article 12 include constitutional or statutory authorities on whom powers are conferred by law. There are provisions in the Electricity Supply Act which clearly show that the power conferred on the Board include power to give directions disobedience of which is punishable as a criminal offence. The Board was clearly an authority to which the provisions of Part III of the Constitution were applicable." Shah, J. who delivered a separate concurring judgment rested his decision on a narrower ground. The learned Judge noticed the power of the Board to promote and co-ordinate development, generation, supply and distribution of electricity, to make, alter, amend and carry out schemes for the purpose, to make rules and regulations and to issue directions, etc. and included: "The power to make rules and regulations and to administer the Act is in substance the sovereign power of the State delegated to the board. and included: "The power to make rules and regulations and to administer the Act is in substance the sovereign power of the State delegated to the board. The board is in my judgment 'other authority" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution." Whether the majority judgment has been couched in far too wide a language so as to comprehend every constitutional or statutory authority has been a matter of some comment from academic writers. [See for instance the comment by Sri H. M. Seervai in his "Constitutional Law of India (1968) Supplement to pages 152, 153]. It is quite unnecessary" and perhaps beyond me" to consider this question, as, on the provisions of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act it is clear that the Travancore Devaswom Board" like the Electricity Board in the Supreme Court case" has power to administer the Devaswoms, to take action affecting it employees, issue directions, disobedience to which has been made penal, and to enforce obedience from its officers and servants. (Vide sections 15, 16, 17, 25, 28, 35, 36, 37, etc., of the Act.) These provisions, in my opinion, are sufficient to hold that Travancore Devaswom Board is among the "other authorities" in Article 12, for the purpose of Part III of the Constitution. 6. There is indeed the direct authority of the decision of a Full Bench of the Travancore- Cochin High Court in P. M. Brahmadathan Namboothiri v. Cochin Devaswom Board, A.I.R. 1956 T.C. 19 that the Cochin Devaswom Board is an "other authority" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. The decision was rendered with respect to the provisions relating to Cochin Devaswom Board under the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act of 1950, which are in pari materia with those relating to the Travancore Devaswom Board. Counsel for the respondents maintained that the decision has shaken by the Supreme Court's pronouncement in the Rajasthan Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal, A.I R. 1967 S.C. 1867 and that the said pronouncement, properly understood, is authority for the view that any "other authority" under Article 12 must possess" as the definition from Webster's International Dictionary quoted by the Supreme Court would show," quasi-governmental powers. He cited Pramodrai v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, A.I.R. 1969 Bombay 337 in support of his contention. He cited Pramodrai v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, A.I.R. 1969 Bombay 337 in support of his contention. After the disapproval by the Supreme Court of the Madras decision in Shanta Bai's case it is difficult to posit the discharge of governmental or quasi-governmental powers as necessary to constitute "other authority" under Article 12. As for the Bombay case it is enough to notice that it was there held that the Life Insurance Corporation was not concerned with making decisions or implementing laws, and was not a "State". 7. Counsel for the respondents contended that it was only the melkoima right, which His Highness the Maharaja of Travancore had over the temples as the Ruler of the State, that was transferred to the Devaswom Board and not any sovereign power, and cited the Travancore Proclamation of 1097 and the Press Communique issued about it, to support his position. Counsel for the petitioner maintained that the Devaswom Department and the Devaswom Board were constituted as Departments of Government and were discharging governmental or quasi-governmental functions. The relevant provisions of the Proclamation, the Act and the Rules were referred to. In the view that I have taken, it is unnecessary to pronounce on this aspect of the question. It is equally unnecessary to consider whether the Board would be a "local authority" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, read with the definition of that term in the General Clauses Act, 1897, made applicable to the interpretation of the Constitution by Article 367. 8. In Banarsi Das v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 520 the Supreme Court recognised that the State has the right to lay down qualifications for recruitment to its service, and such conditions of appointment as would be conducive to the maintenance of discipline amongst its servants. It is also fairly well accepted that the administrative authority may lay down qualifications not only of mental excellence but also of physical fitness, sense of discipline, moral integrity and loyalty to the State, and that in the case of, what may be called "skilled" appointments, it may prescribe technical qualifications and standards [vide Sukhnandan Thakur v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1957 Patna 617, and George v. State of Kerala, 1963 K.L.J. 1155]. In Sukhnandan's case the question was whether the preference directed to be given to " political sufferers" and " displaced persons" in regard to appointment of Supply Inspectors offended the provisions of Article 16 (1) of the Constitution. Ramaswamy, J. on a difference of opinion between Das, C. J. and Ahmed, J. held that the preference or qualification had no material bearing or relation to the efficiency or proper performance of the duties of a Supply Inspector. The learned Judge observed: "It is manifest that equality of opportunity mentioned in Article 16 (1) is not a mathematical equality. It is equally manifest that Article 16 (1) does not preclude the administrative authority from making a selection from numerous candidates before making appointments; but the selective test employed must be reasonable and not arbitrary. The selective test must be based upon some reasonable principle. Otherwise, the principle of equality of opportunity would be infringed. In my opinion no selective test can be reasonable unless Board there is some proximate connection between the selective test and the efficient performance of the duties and obligations of the particular office. I must make it clear that the administrative authority has a wide range of discretion in making the appointment." In George's case the question was whether the disqualification imposed on George, the petitioner, an applicant for the post of a Munsiff, on the ground that his character and antecedents were not satisfactory could be said to contravene Article 16 (1). The learned Chief Justice who delivered the judgment of the Bench accepted the principle that the State was entitled to lay down qualifications for an office which have reasonable relation to the efficient performance of its duties, and observed: "In order to decide the petition in favour of the petitioner, therefore, we must be able to say that the conclusion of the State that the petitioner's character and antecedents are not suitable for the appointment is based on considerations which are irrelevant and which should not have been taken into account. Suppose for example, the view of the State was that only candidates above a particular height or below a particular weight can be considered as the possessors of a satisfactory character and a test on that basis was formulated and applied, it will be easy for a court to strike down that test and upset its application. Suppose for example, the view of the State was that only candidates above a particular height or below a particular weight can be considered as the possessors of a satisfactory character and a test on that basis was formulated and applied, it will be easy for a court to strike down that test and upset its application. But in cases where the tests are not so patently absurd or irrelevant, the position will naturally be different. The duty and the responsibility in these matters are primarily that of the State; its discretion by its very nature will have to be large and untrammelled; and a Court cannot possibly substitute its own yardstick for that of the Government of the day Ideas rule mankind; and here we are in the realms of ideologies and their reactions on the make-up and loyalties of a man. The yardstick to be applied will not be mechanical but elastic; various factors" the extent of the dedication, the needs and temptations of the post concerned, the circumstances obtaining at the time of the appointment, all these and more must enter into the calculation and influence the conclusion. In such a region a court should not and will not, as already indicated, substitute its own opinion for those of the executive with which rests the primary duty of appointment and the entire responsibility therefor." It is useful to compare the decision in Balagopalan v. State of Kerala, 1963 K.L.J. 1168 where the insistence on character and antecedents for a "non-sensitive" post, such as that of a lower division clerk, was thought to be not relevant or germane. (See again the decisions in 1964 K.L.J. 162 and 1171.) 9. The classic example, given in decisions, of a consideration not being relevant to the action taken, is that of the teacher dismissed from Office on account of her red hair. [See Short v. Poole Corporation, 1926 Ch. 66.] The learned Chief Justice of Kerala in George's case has furnished another illustration of considerations of height or weight being considered as the acid test of a satisfactory character. The conditions as to cash security of Rs. 500 at the time of interview, and the advance contribution of Rs. 15,000 to the Amenities Fund, in the instant case, reach, I am afraid, perilously near to those illustrations. 10. The conditions as to cash security of Rs. 500 at the time of interview, and the advance contribution of Rs. 15,000 to the Amenities Fund, in the instant case, reach, I am afraid, perilously near to those illustrations. 10. The petitioner has averred, and it is not disputed, that he is fully qualified to, perform the duties of a "Mel Santhi" in accordance with the traditional Vedic and religious practices, I am unable to see what bearing the financial ability or stability of an applicant has on the efficient performance of the duties of "Mel Santhi" of the Sabarimalai Temple" an office Board which requires abstemiousness and dedication. Rules 31 and 34 of the Travancore Devaswom Manual, Vol.I are intended to accentuate this aspect. The justification attempted for the provision for contribution is that the "Mel Santhi" though prohibited by rule 34 supra, from receiving vazhivadus from worshippers, actually gets a large amount of perquisites, offered as "dakshina" or otherwise by the millions of worshippers who congregate at the seasonal gatherings, and that a share of the same was being taken for the Amenities Fund. That this was a sort of illicit gain for the "Mel Santhi", was the argument of counsel for the respondent, though not stated in that form in the counter-affidavit. If so, the remedy of stipulating for a share in the spoils, I am afraid, is worse than the disease; and I need not pause to consider whether the earnings of the "Mel Santhi" can be justfied by the "pathivu and customs of the temple" under rule 31 of the Travancore Devaswom Manual, Vol.I, or otherwise. As for the insistence on the deposit of Rs. 500 at the time of interview, it was explained that it was intended to act as a check on a plethora of applications which might otherwise pour in, and to serve as a sort of application money. As application money, this seems extortionate and also redundant, as Re. 1 on that account has already been stipulated in Ext. P-1; and as non-refundable security, it seems to have no place in the face of rule 37 of the above Manual which provides for furnishing of security by the "Mel Santhi". Neither of the impugned provisions are proper or relevant considerations, having a reasonable nexus to the office of "Mel Santhi" or to the efficient performance of its duties. 11. P-1; and as non-refundable security, it seems to have no place in the face of rule 37 of the above Manual which provides for furnishing of security by the "Mel Santhi". Neither of the impugned provisions are proper or relevant considerations, having a reasonable nexus to the office of "Mel Santhi" or to the efficient performance of its duties. 11. I must notice" only to reject" the argument of counsel for the respondents that the appointment is contractual and the petitioner's remedy does not lie in proceedings under Article 226. 12. I allow this petition and quash Ext. P-1 notification and direct the respondents by a writ of mandamus not to proceed further in the matter of making appointment to the office of "Mel Santhi" of the Sabarimalai Temple in pursuance of Ext. P-1 notification. The petitioner will have his costs from the respondent.