JUDGMENT Jagdish Sahai, J. - This is a defendant's second appeal and is directed against the decree of the learned Civil Judge, Faizabad dated 6-5-1961 by which he reversed the decree passed by the learned Munsif at Akbarpur, Faizabad. 2. The plaintiff-respondent brought the suit giving rise to this appeal in the Court of the learned Munsif Akbarpur on the plea that there was a contract of tenancy between him and the erstwhile Zamindar. The plaintiff-respondent prayed that he be declared as the tenant of the plots in dispute. He also claimed injunction against the defendant-appellant restraining him from interfering with his (plaintiff's) possession. In the alternative he prayed that if he is not found to be in possession, it may be restored to him after the ejectment of the defendant. The suit was tried by the learned Additional Munsif, Akbarpur who dismissed it on 12-5-1960. 3. The plaintiff appealed to the District Judge, Faizabad and the appeal was heard by the learned Additional Civil Judge of that place. The learned Additional Civil Judge recorded a categorical finding that the case of contract of tenancy had not been proved, but he allowed the appeal and decreed the suit of the plaintiff on the' finding that inasmuch as he was in possession of the plots in dispute for a period of more than 20 years, he had acquired the rights of hereditary tenant under Section 180 (2) of the U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939. Mr. J. B. Srivastava, learned counsel for the defendant-appellant has submitted that the decree passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge is bad for the following two reasons :- (1) That the case of having acquired hereditary rights by virtue of adverse possession under Section 180 (2) of the U. P. Tenancy Act not having been pleaded, the learned Additional Civil Judge could not spell out a new case for the plaintiff and extraneous to the pleadings of the parties. (2) That the name of the defendant-appellant having been entered in the Khasra of 1356 F. and 1359 F., the defendant-appellant to the exclusion of the plaintiff-respondent was entitled to be declared Sirdar. No other submission has been made before me. I proceed to consider the submissions in seriatim. 1. I find merits in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that no Court could cull out a new case for a party. No other submission has been made before me. I proceed to consider the submissions in seriatim. 1. I find merits in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that no Court could cull out a new case for a party. Order VI, Rule 2, C. P. C. provides that : "every pleadings shall contain ........... a statement in a concise form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence as the case may be .......". 4. Rule 4 of Order VI, C. P. C. provides that :- "In all cases in which the party pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default or undue influence, and in all other cases in which particulars may be necessary beyond such as are exemplified in the forms aforesaid, particulars (with dates and items if necessary) shall be stated in the pleadings". 5. Whether or not a person has acquired the status of a hereditary tenant under Section 180 (2) of the U. P. Tenancy Act would depend upon the determination of several questions of facts. The first question of fact would be whether the person so claiming had taken or retained possession of an agricultural plot. The second question would be whether he had done so with the consent of the person entitled to admit him to occupy such plot. The third question would be whether the possession is in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force. This would no doubt be a question of law. Sub-sec. (2) of Section 180 of the U. P. Tenancy Act' provides that if no suit is brought under Section 180 of the U. P. Tenancy Act, or if a decree obtained under that section is not executed, the person in possession shall become a hereditary tenant of such plot-The plaintiff, therefore, was under an obligation to specifically plead that he took or retained possession of the plots in dispute without the consent of the person entitled to admit him to occupy such plot otherwise than is accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force. He had also to specifically plead that he had acquired the status of hereditary tenant by virtue of sub-sec. (2) of Section 180 of the Act. This he admittedly did not do. He had also to specifically plead that he had acquired the status of hereditary tenant by virtue of sub-sec. (2) of Section 180 of the Act. This he admittedly did not do. 1 am, therefore, of opinion that the learned Additional Civil Judge was in error in culling out a new case for the plaintiff on the basis of the provisions of sub-sec. (2) of Section 180 of the U. P. Tenancy Act. I find support of my view from the case of Siddik Mahomed Shah v. Mt. Saran, A.I.R. 1930 PC 57 where their Lordships held that :- "Where a claim has been never made in the defence presented no amount of evidence can be looked into upon a plea which was never put forward". 6. The case of the plaintiff, as disclosed in the plaint, was that he was a tenant and consequently the Sirdar of the land in dispute by virtue of a contract of tenancy between him and the Zamindar. He did not even alternatively plead having acquired the status of hereditary tenant by virtue of sub-sec. (2) of Section 180 of the Act.. I, therefore, find the first submission of the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant well-founded. 7. In view of this finding it is not necessary to go into the second question raised by the learned counsel i.e. that the defendant-appellant became a Sirdar because of the Khasra entries of 1356 F. and 1359 F. I would only state that the learned Additional Civil Judge has not decided in favour of the plaintiff-respondent on the basis of the entries of 1356 F. and 1359 F., but only on the basis of the provisions of Section 180 (2) of the U. P. Tenancy Act. 8. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The decree passed by the learned Civil Judge is reversed and the one passed by the learned Munsif Akbarpur is restored. The parties are, however, directed to bear their own costs of this appeal