Judgment :- 1. The Subordinate Judge of Palghat by the order challenged in this revision found jurisdiction in that court to entertain the suit. This finding was entered on issue 5 in the suit which was framed on the contention of defendants 1 and 2 that no part of the cause of action arose within that territorial jurisdiction of that court. The suit was on a promissory note executed by the defendants at Kasargode in the Cannanore District where the defendants are said to be permanently residing. The plaintiff obtained an endorsement of the promissory note from the third defendant, and is suing as the holder of the promissory note. The endorsement is said to have been made in favour of the plaintiff at Kavilpad amsom which is within the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judg's Court of Palghat. The question that was raised was whether the endorsement or assignment of a promissory note would give jurisdiction to the court within whose jurisdiction such endorsement or assignment was made. That was decided in favour of the plaintiff and in the revision the order passed by the learned judge is challenged. 2. Two contentions have been raised before me by learned counsel for the petitioner Sri. C.K. Viswanatha Iyer. The first of these is that when there is an endorsement of a negotiable instrument cause of action for suit on the negotiable instrument does not arise at the place of endorsement. The other question that is argued before me is that even if the cause of action would so arise it is necessary for the plaintiff to show not only that the promissory note has been endorsed or assigned but that it was for consideration and in the present case no evidence has been adduced by the plaintiff to show that the endorsement is supported by consideration. 3. The learned counsel rests his contention that cause of action would not arise wholly or partly at the place where a promissory note is endorsed on the reasoning that if such was the case it will be open to the holder of a promissory note to file a suit anywhere by taking endorsement within the jurisdiction of any court. 3. The learned counsel rests his contention that cause of action would not arise wholly or partly at the place where a promissory note is endorsed on the reasoning that if such was the case it will be open to the holder of a promissory note to file a suit anywhere by taking endorsement within the jurisdiction of any court. This, according to counsel, would be a quite unreasonable position and therefore when, in S.20 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is provided that every suit shall be instituted in a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action wholly or in part arises it will have to be taken that the endorsement of a promissory note will not give rise to cause of action partly or wholly. 4. In Read v. Brown (22 Q. B. Division 128) Lord Easher, M. R. quoting the definition of the term'cause of action' in an earlier case in Cooke v. Gill (Law Rep. 8 C. P, 107, at p. 116) defined'cause of action' as follows: "Every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. It does not comprise every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, but every fact which is necessary to be proved." Lopes, L. J. agreeing with Lord Esher, M. R. said that "it includes every fact which it would be necessary to prove, if traversed, in order to enable a plaintiff to sustain his action." This definition of cause of action' in Read v. Brown has been relied on by Indian courts to understand the scope of S.20 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Though the Rangoon and Rajasthan High Courts have taken a different view as to the scope of S.20 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, all other courts have taken the uniform view that the place where a negotiable instrument is endorsed is one where a part of the cause of action arises within the meaning of that section In Manepalli Mangamma v. Manepalli Sathiraju (31 M.L. J. 816) the Madras High Court noticed the strong current of authority in India accepting the definition of 'cause of action' in Read v. Brown and felt no doubt that they must also follow the definition. Applying this definition, the Madras High Court held that the assignment in plaintiff's favour of a promissory note was an essential part of the cause of action since, without proof of such assignment, if that fact was traversed, the plaintiff could not have succeeded in getting a decree. One of the earliest cases where a contrary view is seen expressed is that in Jupiter General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Abdul Aziz (A. I. R 1924 Rangoon 2). The Division Bench of the Rangoon High Court in that case noticed the definition of the term 'cause of action' in the English case Read v. Brown where the Master of the Rolls cited with approval the definition in Cooke v. Gill. But in applying that definition to S.20 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure the Division Bench of the Rangoon High Court found some difficulty. In Read v. Brown the assignee of a debt due for the price of goods sold and delivered outside London sued in London for the debt claiming jurisdiction in the London Court by reason of the fact that the assignment was in London. It was in this connection that it was held in that case that cause of action arose where the assignment took place. The Rangoon High Court found that to apply this in India would be that if A, a merchant in Rangoon, owed B, another merchant in Rangoon, a debt contracted in Rangoon and payable in Rangoon and if B assigned that debt to C in Karachi, C could sue A in Karachi. It seems that this result appeared to the learned judges to be contrary to the intention of the framers of the Code and the judges were of the view that it could not possibly have been contemplated by them. The answer to this can be best given quoting the words of Ameer Ali, J. in Harnathrai Binjraj v. Churamoni Shah (A. I. R.1934 Cal. 175). The answer to this can be best given quoting the words of Ameer Ali, J. in Harnathrai Binjraj v. Churamoni Shah (A. I. R.1934 Cal. 175). It was said by the learned judge in that case that: "I do see difficulties in the present system under which an assignor can create jurisdiction in any place where the Civil Procedure Code applies but I do not think it would be right for me to attempt to change it." The case before the Calcutta High Court was also one where the scope of S.20(c) arose for consideration, and the view adopted by the Madras High Court in 31 MLJ. 816 was adopted by the Calcutta High Court also. The definition of 'case of action' in Read v. Brown was again noticed and adopted by the Madras High Court in the decision in In re, D. Lakshminarayana Chettiar and another (AIR. 1954 Mad. 594). The Nagpur High Court also took the same view in Gopal Ghuriamal v. T.G.S. Narayanan (AIR. 1953 Nag. 192). The case before the Calcutta High Court in Alliance Assurance Co, Ltd. v. Union of India (AIR. 1959 Cal. 563) was one of an assignment of a railway receipt and the suit was instituted in the place where the assignment took place. There again it was held that the assignment was part of the cause of action within the meaning of S.20 (c). It may be noticed that'in all these decisions the view taken by the English courts as to the definition of the term'cause of action' seems to have been accepted. The Supreme Court had occasion to notice this definition in Read v. Brown in its decision reported in The State of Madras v. C. P. Agencies (AIR. 1960 S. C. 1309). In Para.3 at page 1310, Das C. J. speaking for the Court, said: "It refers entirely to the grounds set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour." The case before the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in Radhakrishnamurthy v. Chandrasekhara Rao (AIR. 1966 And. Pra. 334) was one similar to the present case. 1966 And. Pra. 334) was one similar to the present case. In that case a promissory note was transferred in favour of the plaintiff at Vijayawada and the plaintiff brought a suit in Subordinate Judge's Court of Vijayawada though the note was executed and the parties were resident outside the jurisdiction of that court. It was held in that case: 'I have no doubt that the endorsement of the suit promissory note and the assignment of it does give rise to a part of the cause of action at Vijayawada where admittedly the endorsement and the assignment have taken place. The endorsement and the assignment would therefore provide in part a cause of action. The expression "cause of action" has been compendiously defined to mean every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove if traversed in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. It may not comprise every piece of evidence which may be necessary to prove the facts involved in a case, but every fact which is necessary to be proved in order to give relief to the plaintiff would undoubtedly provide a cause of action on that basis: (See Read v. Brown (1888 22 Q. B. D. 128). In this case in order to succeed in the suit apart from the execution and consideration of the promissory note the plaintiff would be required to prove that the promissory note has been bona fide transferred in his favour. The fact of transfer being an essential part of the case would certainly be a part of the cause of action. The plaintiff will not be entitled to a decree unless he proves that the assignment has taken place in his favour. The place where such assignment takes place therefore assumes importance. That being the part of the cause of action the plaintiff can institute the suit at a place where an endorsement and an assignment has taken place. Thus a bona fide voluntary assignment of a negotiable document affords a valid cause of action to the assignee to sue not only his assignor but also the original debtor in the Court within whose jurisdiction the assignment takes place. I do not think there can be any doubt that the assignment is a part of the cause of action in such cases. I am fortified in my conclusion by the following decisions. I do not think there can be any doubt that the assignment is a part of the cause of action in such cases. I am fortified in my conclusion by the following decisions. In Alliance Assurance Co Ltd v. Union of India, AIR. 1959 Cal 563 P. B. Mukharji, J., held: "In a suit against the Union of India for short delivery by the assignee of the right, title and interest of the consignor in the goods despatched by railway where, by the assignment, the railway receipt or the claims thereunder are transferred to the assignee, the assignment is a part of the cause of action and the Court, within whose jurisdiction the assignment took place, is competent to entertain and try the suit." "It is pertinent to note that his Lordship decided that the railway receipts are documents of title and can be negotiated and transferred. In that view of the matter the doctrine of negotiability can be invoked to grant jurisdiction to the court and refuse to limit the application of this doctrine only to cases under the Law Merchant or to cases of assignment of negotiable instruments." My attention has been drawn to the decision in Mistrimal v. Moda (ILR.1951 (1) Rajasthan 662). According to the learned "counsel for the petitioner the view taken by the Rajasthan High Court in that decision is contrary to the view taken by the Madras, Calcutta, Nagpur and Andhra Pradesh High Courts to which I have already referred. I do not find anything in that decision to warrant such a view. The Rajasthan High Court considered the decisions, in Harnathrai Binjrai v. Churamani Shah (AIR. 1934 Cal. 175), Dilbagh Rai v. Walu Ram AIR. 1933 Lah. 940 and Seth Wadhumal v. Mallur Noor Ahmad AIR. 1933 Sind. 179 all of which were in support of the view that cause of action would arise even at the place where an assignment of a negotiable instrument is made. 1934 Cal. 175), Dilbagh Rai v. Walu Ram AIR. 1933 Lah. 940 and Seth Wadhumal v. Mallur Noor Ahmad AIR. 1933 Sind. 179 all of which were in support of the view that cause of action would arise even at the place where an assignment of a negotiable instrument is made. After referring to these cases Bapna J. who spoke for the Division Bench said that: "The authorities are, however, distinguishable " and concluded the discussion as follows: "Since the present is not a suit for recovery of money on the basis of an assignment of any promissory note or a money debt, it is not necessary to express any opinion on the question of law which has been dealt with in the above cases and it may only be stated that they are not applicable on the facts of the present case." Subsequent to this a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Abdul Gafoor V. Sensmal (AIR. 1955 Rajasthan 53) took a view in line with the decisions of the other High Courts, and held that the place of assignment of a negotiable instrument or a debt would be a place where cause of action arises within the meaning of S 20 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Bapna J. who spoke for the Bench in ILR.1951 (1) Rajasthan 662 had occasion to consider the same question in the later case reported in Remashwar Lal, Ram Karan v. Gulab Chand PuranmaI (AIR. 1960 Rajasthan 243). There the learned judge was sitting single and he noticed the Division Bench decision of the Rajasthan High Court in AIR. 1955 Raj. 53 but he did not accept the view taken by the Division Bench. In Para.7 the learned judge said: "The Third ground that the assignment of a part of the debt made a part of the cause of action to arise at Balotra is also, in my opinion, untenable. My attention has been invited to a Division Bench authority to the contrary in Abdul Gafoor v. Sensmal, AIR. 1955 Raj S3. After a careful consideration of that judgment and with great respect to the learned judges who decided the above case, T still stick to the opinion expressed by me in Mistrimal v. Moda, 1951 Raj LW. 433, which is also a Division Bench case. 1955 Raj S3. After a careful consideration of that judgment and with great respect to the learned judges who decided the above case, T still stick to the opinion expressed by me in Mistrimal v. Moda, 1951 Raj LW. 433, which is also a Division Bench case. I confess that if an assignment were to be treated as forming part of a cause of action for the purpose of giving jurisdiction, the defendant could be compelled to defend the suit at the choice of the plaintiffs is and this would cut at the basic principle underlying S.20 CPC " I have to observe that what the learned judge said with reference to the earlier decision to which His Lordship was a party is certainly not correct. The learned judge seemed to think that in Mistrimal v. Moda opinion had been expressed in favour of the view he expressed in the case before him. Certainly that is not so as could be seen from the relevant passage in that decision which has been noticed by me earlier. Therefore, with great respect to that learned judge it does not appear that there was any justification for the learned judge to depart from the view taken by a Division, Bench of that court, a view which was consistent with the line of the authorities on this question, of the various High Courts in India. Though a reference has been made before me to the decision in Union of India v. Adam Hajee Peer Mohammad Essack (AIR 1954 TC. 362) I do not see any principle in that decision which would be of application to this case, since that was a case for damages arising out of short delivery of the goods by the railway, and the question whether the assignment of the railway receipt would be a cause of action was not really decided by that court. 5. As a result of the review of the decisions I would sum up the position as follows. A suit may be instituted in a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action wholly or in part arises. Such cause of action arises in the case of a suit on a promissory note or any other negotiable instrument, also at the place where the promissory note or such other instrument is endorsed in favour of the plaintiff. Such cause of action arises in the case of a suit on a promissory note or any other negotiable instrument, also at the place where the promissory note or such other instrument is endorsed in favour of the plaintiff. This is because cause of action includes every fact which it would be necessary to prove, if traversed, in order to enable the plaintiff to sustain his action. A plaintiff suing as an endorsee of a promissory note or any other negotiable instrument cannot succeed in, a suit without proving the fact of endorsement. An averment and proof, in the event of its being traversed, of the fact of endorsement is necessary to support the case of a plaintiff in a suit on such promissory note or other negotiable instrument. There is no justification to give a limited construction to the words 'cause of action' in S.20 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The fact that such a construction will enable the holder of a promissory note by taking endorsement at any place to choose the forum where the suit can be instituted does not in any way affect the question of construction of S.20 (c) of the Code. That such a result would follow is not a matter which should have any bearing on the construction of the section. If so, a suit instituted on a promissory note or other negotiable instrument, by assignment or endorsement of such negotiable instrument, could be instituted at the place where the said instrument has been endorsed in favour of the plaintiff. The cause of action partly arises in that jurisdiction also. Hence, in the present case the promissory note, having been endorsed within the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge's Court of Palghat, that court has got jurisdiction and therefore the order of the court below does not call for any interference. 6. The next question that is urged is that in a suit by an endorsee of a promissory note it is for the plaintiff to prove consideration and unless consideration is proved the endorsement must be taken to be without consideration and if so according to counsel the endorsee cannot sue within the jurisdiction where the endorsement took place. 6. The next question that is urged is that in a suit by an endorsee of a promissory note it is for the plaintiff to prove consideration and unless consideration is proved the endorsement must be taken to be without consideration and if so according to counsel the endorsee cannot sue within the jurisdiction where the endorsement took place. The learned counsel places reliance upon the decision in Messrs Kashmiri Mal Om Prakash v. Messrs Durga Parshad Gulzari Lal (ILR 1962 (2) Punjab 447) in support of the proposition contended for by him, I find nothing in that decision to support his stand. In that case there was a contention that the court within whose jurisdiction the assignment took place had no jurisdiction as the cause of action did not arise within its limits. The decision cited in support of this contention was not considered by the court since it found that in that case the assignment was a bogus transaction and had been entered into simply to give jurisdiction to the court which tried the suit. It is seen from the judgment is that case that the question whether the assignment was bogus was actually tried by the lower court and the finding was that it was not supported by any consideration and the High Court also concurred with this finding on an appreciation of evidence. When, as a matter of fact, it found that the assignment was without consideration and sham it was only natural that the question whether the court within whose jurisdiction such assignment took place was competent to entertain the suit had necessarily to be found against the plaintiff. I do not find any authority in that decision to support the case that it is for the plaintiff who is an endorsee of a promissory note to prove consideration for the promissory note, if traversed, so as to sustain the suit within the jurisdiction. To hold so would be contrary to the provisions of S.118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Until the contrary is proved every negotiable instrument shall be presumed to have been made or endorsed for consideration. If that is the rule I fail to see how the plaintiff in a suit, in order to sustain his case of jurisdiction, is called upon to prove consideration. I therefore negative this contention raised on behalf of the revision petitioner. 7. If that is the rule I fail to see how the plaintiff in a suit, in order to sustain his case of jurisdiction, is called upon to prove consideration. I therefore negative this contention raised on behalf of the revision petitioner. 7. In the result, it follows that the revision petition has to be dismissed. It is dismissed with costs. Dismissed.