JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - These writ petitions raise common questions, and can be disposed of by a single judgment. The petitioners allege that more than 10 years ago, they took possession of the land in dispute and started cultivating it. They have spent a huge amount in making the land culturable. On or about 28th May, 1966, the State Government issued a notification under Section 4 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, declaring that it was intended to constitute the land in dispute as a reserved forest. The notification under Section 6 if the Forest Act was issued on 10th August, 1966. The petitioners filed objections. They were dismissed by the Settlement Officer on the finding that the evidence led by the petitioners to prove that they were in possession for the period alleged was not sufficient to establish their claim. It appears that the petitioners had led no elementary evidence, but had only themselves appeared in the witness box to prove their claim. 2. The petitioners went up in appeal before the District judge, but failed. The District judge held that the land belonged to the Government and vested in the forest Department. It would be deemed to have been held for a public purpose. No question of hereditary tenancy rights accruing to the petitioners in the land would, therefore, arise. Aggrieved, the petitioners have come to this Court. 3. The learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that they were in possession for more than two years while the U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939, was in force, and that they became hereditary tenants under sub-sec. (2) of Section 180 of that Act. The respondents allege that on 28th June, 1905, the State issued a notification, declaring the land in dispute to be forest land, under Section 28 of the Indian Forest Act, 1878. By that notification, the provisions of Chapter IV of that Act were made applicable to this land. This land was, therefore, held by the Forest Department of the State Government since then. Section 30 of the Tenancy Act declares that notwithstanding anything in Section 29, hereditary rights not accrue in the classes of lands mentioned in it. Sub-sec. (3) of Section 30 mentions the land acquired or held for a public purpose, etc. Clause (e) thereof mentions the land within the boundaries of any Government forest. Section 30 of the Tenancy Act declares that notwithstanding anything in Section 29, hereditary rights not accrue in the classes of lands mentioned in it. Sub-sec. (3) of Section 30 mentions the land acquired or held for a public purpose, etc. Clause (e) thereof mentions the land within the boundaries of any Government forest. Section 29' defines the classes of persons who would become hereditary tenants on the commencement of the Act. The question is whether Section 180 (2) U. P. Tenancy Act 1939, could apply to the classes of lands mentioned in Section 30, and hence hereditary rights could accrue in such classes of land also. 4. Section 180 (1) contemplates a suit for ejectment of persons occupying land without title. Sub-Sec. (2) thereof provides the consequence for not bringing a suit, or executing a decree obtained in such a suit, within the prescribed period of limitation. In Rasul Ahmad v. Beni Prasad, 1965 A.L.J. 70 it was held that Sec. 180 (1) applies to suits for ejectment of trespassers from all kinds of land as defined by the definition clause in Section 3, and that a suit under Section 180 can also be brought for ejectment of persons from lands mentioned in Section 30. But, the learned Judge did not express any opinion whether Section 180 (2) would apply to lands included in Section 30. He held that even though for certain classes of and, the consequence mentioned in Section 180 (2) may not ensue, yet a suit can Le instituted under Section 180(l) in respect thereof. He referred to the decision of V. Bhargava, J., in Ram Swarup v. Lalji, C.R. No. 1020 of 1950. decided on 17.08.1955, in which it was held that hereditary tenancy rights cannot accrue in respect of a grove land, though a suit under Section 180 of the Act was maintainable for ejectment of a trespasser from such land. 5. In my opinion, Section 30 is a declaratory provision, which prevents the accrual of hereditary tenancy rights in certain classes of lands mentioned in it. The non-obstante clause, no doubt, refers only to Section 29. But, that is by way of an abundant caution, presumably because of Section 30 occurring, as is did, immediately after Section 29. Section 29 conferred tenancy rights on certain classes of persons. The amplitude of Section 29 was, cut down by Section 30. The non-obstante clause, no doubt, refers only to Section 29. But, that is by way of an abundant caution, presumably because of Section 30 occurring, as is did, immediately after Section 29. Section 29 conferred tenancy rights on certain classes of persons. The amplitude of Section 29 was, cut down by Section 30. In my opinion, this would not curtail the general applicability of the declaratory provision in the Section, namely, the non-accrual of hereditary tenancy rights in certain classes of land, in so far as other provisions of the Tenancy Act, including Section 180 (2) , are concerned. Under Section 180 (2) , hereditary tenancy rights accrue in certain given conditions. Those are the non-institution of suit or the non-execution of a decree for ejectment within the prescribed period of limitation. There is nothing in the language of Section 180 (2) to indicate that it is applicable to all kinds of land. If that was the intention, the Legislature would have put a similar excluding clause in Section 180 (2) . Then, that Section would have stated "that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 30," hereditary tenancy rights would accrue. But, there is no such clause. In my opinion, Section 180 (2) is also subject to Section 30. Hereditary tenancy rights cannot accrue in classes of land mentioned in Section 30. As seen above, sub-Sec. (3) of Section 30 mentions the land held or acquired for a public purpose. Clause (e) thereof mentions the land within the boundaries of a Government forest. The land in question was a forest land. No hereditary tenancy rights could accrue in it. The petitioner's claim was rightly rejected. 6. The petitions have no merit, and are accordingly dismissed.