JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution arises out of a suit for ejectment. 2. Mohammad Yasin (respondent No. 4) on 26th February, 1966, instituted a suit for the petitioner's ejectment under Section 209, U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act read with Section 64, U. P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. He claimed that he was the hereditary tenant of the land in dispute and, on the date of vesting (namely on 1st July, 1961), became its sirdar. He had sub-let the land to one Nattha Singh for five years commencing from 30th May, 1956. The sub-lease came to an end on 30th May, 1961. Thereafter, Nattha Singh surrendered the land to the plaintiff. In 1965, the present petitioner, Amar Nath trespassed over the land. Hence, the suit. The petitioner contested the suit. He claimed that he was really the sub-tenant, and that on 27th November, 1958, he had purchased the proprietary rights from the zamindari and had become bhumidhar of the land in dispute, because he was at least since 1958 in exclusive possession of the land. In the alternative, it was also pleaded that he had been in adverse possession and had matured sirdari rights and that the suits was barred by limitation. 3. The trial court dismissed the suit. It found that Nattha Singh had died on 22nd September, 1959. It also found that the plaintiff had treated the defendant as a sub-tenant even from before the death of Nattha Singh and that since 1365 Fasli, (i.e. 1958) the defendant was in exclusive possession. In the alternative, it was found that if the defendant was not treated to be a sub-tenant, he matured title as a Hereditary tenant under Section 180,U. P: Tenancy Act 1939, also as a sirdar by remaining in possession for more than three years prior to the institution of the suit. The plea that the defendant had by purchase had become the Bhumidhar was also accepted. 4. Against this decree dated 31st August, 1967, the plaintiff-respondent went up in appeal. The Additional Commissioner, without discussing the evidence, in one sentence, recorded a finding that the defendant had not proved the sub-letting to him. He found that the defendant was in possession on 1-7-1961, the date of vesting, as a trespasser. 4. Against this decree dated 31st August, 1967, the plaintiff-respondent went up in appeal. The Additional Commissioner, without discussing the evidence, in one sentence, recorded a finding that the defendant had not proved the sub-letting to him. He found that the defendant was in possession on 1-7-1961, the date of vesting, as a trespasser. The plaintiff came to know of the death of Nattha Singh only about five and a quarter years prior to the institution of the suit. Till the date of vesting, the plaintiff considered Nattha Singh to be the sub-tenant. The period of limitation was held to be six years, and the suit was held within time, presumably on the view that the limitation would commence to run from the date of the knowledge of the death of Nattha Singh by the plaintiff. On these findings, the appeal was allowed and the suit was decreed. 5. Aggrieved, the defendant filed a second appeal before the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue has dismissed the appeal on 25-10-1968. After narrating the facts and arguments of Counsel for both the sides, the Board (C. M. Nigaui, J. M.) gave its findings as follows : "I have considered these contentions. I am inclined to agree with the line of arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent. The counsel for the appellant, I am afraid, has not able to rebut the contention of the other side on limitation and the lower appellate court has given a correct finding which is based on a proper appreciation of evidence and cannot be characterised as perverse. The defendant Amar Nath was trespasser liable to ejectment from the land in dispute." I regret to say that the Additional Commissioner Meerut, did not come to grips with the problems arising in the case. The trial court had upheld all the three defences to the suit. It had held that the plaintiff had treated the defendant as his sub-tenant, and, so, the defendant became a sirdar on the date. of vesting. It also held that if it be held that the defendant was not the sub-tenant, then, since he was in exclusive possession since 1358 F., he became a hereditary tenant after two years under Section 180 of the U. P. Tenancy Act, and as such, became a sirdar on the date of vesting, namely, on 1-7-1961. of vesting. It also held that if it be held that the defendant was not the sub-tenant, then, since he was in exclusive possession since 1358 F., he became a hereditary tenant after two years under Section 180 of the U. P. Tenancy Act, and as such, became a sirdar on the date of vesting, namely, on 1-7-1961. In the third place, it held that the plaintiff having purchased the proprietary rights from the zamindar in 1958, and being in possession since then, became a bhumidhar on the date of vesting. The Additional Commissioner did not at all deal with the question whether the plaintiff had become the bhumidhar. The finding that the defendant was in exclusive possession since 1365 F. or that he matured title as a Hereditary tenant have also not been touched upon. The Commissioner simply held that the defendant was in possession as a trespasser on the date of vesting. Though the Commissioner observed that if Nattha Singh was actually alive and was in possession on the date of vesting, he would have become a sirdar of the land but he did not give a finding whether Nattha Singh was in possession till the date of his death. The trial court had found that Amar Nath was in possession from before his death namely, since 1365 F. (1958). On the question of sub-letting, the Commissioner did not discuss the evidence at all. He contented himself by merely observing that the defendant has not proved the sub-letting. Further, the commissioner held that the period of limitation will be six years, without considering the relevant provisions of the law in that regard. 6. The judgment of the Board of Revenue is still more unsatisfactory. The Judicial Member just stated that he was inclined to agree with the line of arguments advanced by the Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent. The argument of the counsel for the respondent, as stated in the judgment of the Board, was that the finding about the defendant not proving the sub-tenancy was right. On possession, the argument was : "... The Judicial Member just stated that he was inclined to agree with the line of arguments advanced by the Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent. The argument of the counsel for the respondent, as stated in the judgment of the Board, was that the finding about the defendant not proving the sub-tenancy was right. On possession, the argument was : "... the lower appellate court rightly said that after the determination of ease and death of Nattha Singh, the appellant who came in possession on 1-6-1961 is liable to ejectment as a trespasser and the limitation would be six years on the date of enforcement of Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, i.e. on 1-7-1961. It will expire on 30-6-1968 and so the suit is within limitation .........." I have gone through the judgment of the Additional Commissioner carefully. He has nowhere held that the defendant came in possession on 1-6-1961, that is, after the lapse of the lease. The Commissioner had not accepted the plaintiff's case that Nattha Singh had surrendered the land to him on 1-6-1961, and that the plaintiff was in possession since then till the defendant trespassed in 1373 F. He only found that on the date of vesting, the defendant was in possession as a trespasser. Though there is no actual finding one way or the other, but a reading of his judgment may show that the Commissioner was inclined to the view that Nattha Singh was in possession till he was alive and that since his death, Amar Nath defendant had been in possession. On that view, the defendant would be in possession since September, 1959. The Judicial Member was not correct when he said that he was inclined to agree with the argument that the tower appellate court had held that the defendant had come in possession on 1-6-1961. Further, the opinion of the Board that the lower appellate court has given a correct finding which is based on proper appreciation of evidence and cannot be characterised as perverse, cannot be justified except on the hypothesis that the judicial Member did not care to peruse the judgment of the Additional Commissioner. The trial court had discussed the evidence on the question of sub-letting. The trial court had discussed the evidence on the question of sub-letting. It had mentioned that the plaintiff himself had on 18th January, 1959 executed a receipt for rent in favour of the defendant, Amar Nath, which showed that the plaintiff had treated the defendant as his sub-tenant. The Commissioner did not discuss the evidence on this aspect. He did not say a word why the finding was wrong. He simply said that the defendant had not proved sub-letting. I fail to see how this finding could be said to be one based on a proper appreciation of the evidence. Then, on the question of limitation, neither the Commissioner nor the Board has referred to or considered the relevant provisions of law. 7. Even if the Board's opinion that the lower appellate court's finding that there was no sub-letting was not perverse, be accepted, yet the suit could not have been decreed. The trial court had found that the defendant was in exclusive possession since 1365 F., that is to say, since 1958. The lower appellate court did not upset this finding. It contented itself by merely holding that the defendant was in possession as trespasser. In either event, the suit would be barred by limitation. 8. The Additional Commissioner had emphasised that the plaintiff came to know of the death of Nattha Singh about five and a quarter years prior to the institution of the suit. In my opinion, this was irrelevant. The relevant provisions do not provide for the commencement of the period of limitation for a suit for ejectment from the elate of knowledge. The learned Counsel for the respondents argued that the question of knowledge would be relevant because a suit under Section 209 of the Zamindari abolition Act is maintainable if the defendant was in possession without the consent of the plaintiff. It was urged that the defendant's possession till Nattha Singh's death would be with the consent of the plaintiff, and, hence, his possession till the death of Nattha Singh could not be adverse to the plaintiff. This argument runs counter to the plaintiff's pleadings. The plaintiff came to court with the specific case that Nattha Singh surrendered the holding on the expiry of the lease, and since then the plaintiff was in possession. This argument runs counter to the plaintiff's pleadings. The plaintiff came to court with the specific case that Nattha Singh surrendered the holding on the expiry of the lease, and since then the plaintiff was in possession. The defendant trespassed in 1373 F. The plaintiff thus did not even admit that the defendant was in possession from before the death of Nattha Singh. There was, therefore, no question of it being assumed that the plaintiff's case was that Amar Nath was in possession during that period with his consent. If the trial court's finding that the defendant was in exclusive possession since 1365 F. be treated as still operative, the suit; which was filed in February, 1966, will be barred by time even if the period of limitation is six years. Similar would be the result, if it is held that the defendant was in exclusive possession since after the death of Nattha Singh on 22nd September, 1959: 9. In my opinion, the suit would be barred by time even on the footing that the defendant was in possession as a trespasser since 1-6-1961. The defendant was recorded in the column of sub-tenant on the date of vesting. On the finding, he was not a sub-tenant. He will, therefore, be treated as an occupant on the date preceding the date of vesting, and hence, he would become an adhivasi and then a sirdar. 10. But, assuming that the defendant did not become an adhivasi or sirdar, but was in possession on the date of vesting as a trespasser, the question would be what will be the period of Limitation for a suit for his ejectment. Appendix I to the Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules provide the period of limitation for various kinds of suits. At serial No. 31, it deals with a suit under Section 209 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition Act, 1950. Relevant extracts from the entry at serial No. 31 are quoted below : Description of suit, application and other proceedings Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run- (i) If the person was in possession of the land on the date of vesting and the period of limitation for his ejectment specified in the U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939, had not expired. Three years From date of vesting (ii) In case of occupant referred to in Section 144. Three years From date of vesting (ii) In case of occupant referred to in Section 144. Ditto From the date of declaration under Section 144 (iii) In case where land whose possession is taken or retained unlawfully, forms a part of the holding of a bhumidhar, sirdar or asami. Six years From the first of July following the date of occupation. (iv) In any other case. Twelve years From the first of July following the date of occupation. 11. Even, on the finding that the defendant was in possession since 1-6-1961, that is, from before the (late of vesting, the case would be covered by the first clause, and the period of limitation would be three years from the date of vesting. The suit would be barred by time from 1-7-1964. But, it was urged that the third clause would apply to this case. That applies to land which forms a part of the holding of a bhumidhar, sirdar or asami. A person could become a bhumidhar, sirdar or asami, only with effect from the date of vesting, because the Act confers that status with effect from that date. This clause contemplates a case where a bhumidhar, sirdar or asami is dispossessed unlawfully or where a person, who was in possession from before, retains the possession unlawfully after the plaintiff had become a bhumidhar, sirdar, or asami. In other words, this clause would apply when either possession is taken unlawfully after the date of vesting, or, if it was actually taken before that date, its retention became unlawful after that date. If the third clause is held to apply to cases where possession was taken unlawfully before the date of vesting and it was still unlawful on or after that date, then the first clause would become redundant. The two clauses should be interpreted harmoniously, so that both of them may have the play of their amplitude. The first clause specifically deals with a trespasser in possession from before the date of vesting. When it specifies a person, who was in possession on the date of vesting and the period of whose ejectment under the U. P. Tenancy Act had not expired, it clearly points to a situation where the possession of a person was unlawful even before the date of vesting, so as to make him liable to ejectment under the Tenancy Act. Hence, the third clause cannot be interpreted to cover such a case also. The third clause would not apply to a person who was in possession on the date of vesting unlawfully and confines as such, on the finding that the defendant was in possession on the date of vesting as a trespasser, the case would be governed by the first clause and the period of limitation will be three years from the commencement of the date of vesting. The suit, which was filed on 26th February, 1966, was clearly barred by time, and was rightly dismissed by the trial court. 12. In the result, the petition succeeds, and is allowed. The decrees of the lower appellate court and the Board of Revenue are set aside, and the decree of the trial court is restored with costs throughout.