Judgment :- 1. The revision petitioner is the proprietress of Ananda Picture Palace, Kottiyam. She was prosecuted by the Executive Officer of the Mayyanadu Panchayat under S.7,8 and 10 (1) of the Kerala Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1958 (shortly stated the Act) read with R.21 of the Kerala Cinemas (Regulation) Rules (shortly stated the Rules) and the provisions of 4 (a) and (b) of the Condition of Licence, at she did not exhibit documentary films in the theatre during the period between 19th May 1967 and 8th June 1968. S.7 of the Act provides that: "The Government may, from time to time, issue directions to any licensee or to licensees generally, requiring the licensee or licensees to exhibit such film or class of films having a scientific or educative value, such films dealing with news and current events, such documentary films, indigenous films or such other films having special value to the public where any such directions having been issued, those directions shall be deemed to be additional conditions, and restrictions subject to which the licence has been granted." The proviso to the section would state that: "no direction issued under this section shall require the licensee to exhibit any such film or films exceeding two thousand feet at, or for more than one-fifth of the entire time taken for, any one show." S. 8 deals with the power of the licensing authority to issue directions. The section reads: "The licensing authority may, from time to time, issue directions to any licensee or to licensees generally requiring the licensee or licensees to exhibit in each show such slides of public interest as may be supplied by that authority: Provided that no direction issued under this section shall require the licensee to exhibit more than three such slides at, or for more than four minutes in, any one show." S.10 (1) deals with penalties for contravention of the provisions of the Act or of the Rules or of the conditions and restrictions upon or subject to which any licence has been granted. Condition 4 (a) of the Conditions of Licence states that: "The licensee shall exhibit at each performance one or more approved films of such length and for such length of time, as the State Government or the Central Government may, by general or special order, direct subject to the proviso to S.7 of the Act." And 4 (b) provides that: "The licensee shall comply with such directions as the State Government may, by general or special order give as to the manner in which approved films shall be exhibited in the course of any performance." The fact cannot be denied that from 19th May 1967 no documentary films were exhibited in the theatre. The accused could not do so since she was not supplied with documentary films From 19th May 1967 as she failed to remit the dues for getting the documentary films. From Ex. P-5 notice issued to the accused by the Executive Officer of the Panchayat on 19th January 1968 it is seen that the supply of documentary films to the accused was stopped from 19th May 1967, and the arrears of dues payable by her at the time was Rs. 538-20. Ex. P-1 which is another notice issued to her from the Panchayat shows that she was called upon to close down the theatre, and that notice is dated 22nd December 1967; but from Ex. P-5 it is seen that she was asked to close down the theatre from 25th January 1968 only. Ex. P-7 is a proceeding, dated 1st March 1968 passed by the Executive Officer of the Panchayat. P-5 it is seen that she was asked to close down the theatre from 25th January 1968 only. Ex. P-7 is a proceeding, dated 1st March 1968 passed by the Executive Officer of the Panchayat. In para 8 of the proceeding it is stated: "That under these circumstances it is proposed to revoke the licence issued to Smt. K. Bhanumathi, Anandamand iram, Thazhuthala, Kottiyam for conducting cinema exhibition in the Ananda Picture Palace, Kottiyam as per the provisions of the Kerala Cinemas (Regulation) Act and the Rules framed thereunder for the breach of conditions No. 4 (a) exercising the powers vested with the undersigned as per 12th condition of the licence and other provisions of the above Act and Rules." Twelfth condition in the Conditions of Licence is to the effect that: "The licence shall be subject to revocation or suspension for the breach of any of these conditions or of the special conditions specified on the reverse." Thus the licence was cancelled as provided in condition 12 of the Conditions of Licence under which the licence was issued, and the cancellation of the licence was followed by the prosecution under S.7, 8 and 10(1) of the Act and R.21 and condition 4 (a) and (b) of the licence. The accused denied the charge and stated that it is incorrect to say that the documentary films were not exhibited. The contention was also raised that the complaint is unsustainable and that the Executive Officer of the Panchayat is incompetent to file the complaint. These contentions were repelled and the accused was convicted under S.10 (1) of the Act and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 500 by the Sub Magistrate, Quilon which was confirmed in appeal by the District Magistrate, Quilon. 2. The first point argued is about the competency of the Executive Officer of the Panchayat to launch this prosecution. The complaint is seen to have been preferred on behalf of the Mayyanad Panchayat. But in the Act there is no provision authorising the Executive Officer of the Panchayat to initiate action for any contravention of the provisions of the Act or Rules. The learned appellate Magistrate observes that under S.119 of the Panchayats Act the executive officer is authorised to initiate the prosecution. This is wrong. But in the Act there is no provision authorising the Executive Officer of the Panchayat to initiate action for any contravention of the provisions of the Act or Rules. The learned appellate Magistrate observes that under S.119 of the Panchayats Act the executive officer is authorised to initiate the prosecution. This is wrong. Under S.119 of the Panchayats Act, prosecution can be started by the police, executive authority or a person expressly authorised in that behalf by the Panchayat. But that applies only to offences against the Panchayats Act and the provision cannot be extended to the present complaint which is one launched against the Cinemas Regulation Act. S.10 of the Act, as already pointed out, provides for penalties for contravention of the provisions of the Act or of the rules or of the conditions under which the licence is granted. Without some one initiating the action, the penal provisions of S.10 cannot be enforced. Craies on Statute Law, 5th edition, page 105 observes: "If a statute is passed for the purpose of enabling something to be done, but omits to mention in terms, some detail which is of great importance (if not actually essential) to the proper and effectual performance of the work which the statute has in contemplation, the courts are at liberty to infer that the statute by implication empowers that detail to be carried out." The power of the Executive Authority, therefore, to start prosecution for the enforcement of the provisions of the Act and the Rules has to be inferred. Where the Legislature has conferred any power, it must be deemed to have also granted any other power, without which that power cannot be effectively exercised. This principle is enunciated in Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 31, para 642 (1938 Edn.) as follows: "A duty imposed or a power granted by parliament carries with it the power necessary for its performance or execution. Similarly, an authority given by statute to do certain work authorises the doing not only of all things absolutely necessary for its execution, but of all things reasonably necessary." Maxwell in his book on Interpretation of Statutes (Edn. Similarly, an authority given by statute to do certain work authorises the doing not only of all things absolutely necessary for its execution, but of all things reasonably necessary." Maxwell in his book on Interpretation of Statutes (Edn. 9) has observed (p. 360): "Where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution." As an illustration, the learned author has stated: "An Act which authorises the making of by-laws, impliedly authorises the annexation of a reasonable pecuniary penalty for their infringement, recoverable (in the absence of other provision) by action or distress." At page 361 the learned author has observed: " In the same way, when powers, privileges or property are granted by statute, everything indispensable to their exercise or enjoyment is impliedly granted " It is the duty of the executive officer of the Panchayat to see that none of the provisions of the Act and the Rules is violated and unless he is given the power to enforce the provisions of the Act and the Rules, the penal provision in S.10 will be rendered otiose or superfluous. The Magistrate is competent to take cognisance of an offence under the Act, under S.190 (1) (a) Cr. P. C. upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence. A Division Beach of this court in a similar instance has held so [Vide Ananda Rao v. Labour Officer, Mattancherry 1957 KLT. 273]. That was a prosecution under S.45 (1) read with S.41 (3) of the T. C. Shops and Establishments Act, 1125. P. C. upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence. A Division Beach of this court in a similar instance has held so [Vide Ananda Rao v. Labour Officer, Mattancherry 1957 KLT. 273]. That was a prosecution under S.45 (1) read with S.41 (3) of the T. C. Shops and Establishments Act, 1125. S.45 (1) of that Act provides that any employer who contravenes any of the provisions of the sections enumerated in that sub-section "shall be punishable, for a first offence with fine which may extend to twenty-five rupees and for a second and subsequent offence with fine which may extend to two hundred and fifty rupees." S.41 is one of the sections mentioned in S.45 (1) which runs: "No employer shall dispense with the service of a person employed continuously for a period of not less than six months, except for a reasonable causa and without giving such person atleast one month's notice " It is clear from the wording of sub-section (3) of S.41 that non-compliance of a decision of the appellate authority has not been made penal and the conviction therefore for a contravention of the provisions of that sub-section cannot be sustained. The Sessions Judge to whom the appeal from that conviction was filed came to the conclusion that the Second Class Magistrate could take cognisance of the offence, only under S.190(1) (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. There Their Lordships held that: "The complaint filed before the second class Magistrate ran be considered as a complaint of facts constituting the offence under S.190 (1) (a)." It was also pointed out in that decision that "as a general rule, any person having knowledge of the commission of an offence, may set the law in motion by a complaint, even though he is not personally interested or affected by the offence." The complaint is, therefore, quite in order, and that want of provision in the Act authorising a particular person to launch the prosecution is not of any serious consequence. 3. But the prosecution, in my view; must fail on another ground, viz„ that the accused has not intentionally contravened any of the provisions of the Act or Rules or the conditions of the licence. We have seen from Ext. 3. But the prosecution, in my view; must fail on another ground, viz„ that the accused has not intentionally contravened any of the provisions of the Act or Rules or the conditions of the licence. We have seen from Ext. P-5 that the supply of documentary films to the accused was stopped from 19th May 1967; but inspite of that, the cinema show was continued in the theatre till 8th June 1968. This shows that no action was taken against her under any of the provisions of the Act or the Rules. The supply of documentary films was stopped since she did not make necessary remittance for getting the documentary films. She was liable, of course, to action, if any, for her failure to make the remittance and obtain the documentary films. But, for that no action lies under the Act; in other words, for failure to obtain the documentary films in time no action can be taken under S.10 of the Act. Her licence is probably liable to be cancelled; but no criminal prosecution can be instituted. For over one year, cinema-shows were going on in the theatre, and the executive officer of the Panchayat used to attend the shows also as is conceded by P. W.1 in his evidence. If this inaction, on the part of the Panchayat was construed to be an act of condonation of the offence, the accused cannot be blamed for that. A criminal prosecution can lie, only if the guilty intention is also proved on the part of the accused. It is true that in a statutory offence like this, the element of mens rea will be presumed and need not be proved by the prosecution. But if the accused succeeds in showing the negative, he could escape punishment. Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) in Nathulal v. State of M. P. (AIR. 1966 SC. 43) observed: "Mens rea is an essential ingredient of a criminal offence. A statute may exclude the element of mens rea; it is, however, a sound rule of construction which is adopted in England and also accepted in India, to construe a provision which creates an offence in conformity with the common law rather than against it, except where the statute expressly or by necessary implication excludes mens rea. A statute may exclude the element of mens rea; it is, however, a sound rule of construction which is adopted in England and also accepted in India, to construe a provision which creates an offence in conformity with the common law rather than against it, except where the statute expressly or by necessary implication excludes mens rea. Of the question whether the element of guilty mind is excluded from the ingredients of an offence the mere fact that the object of the statute is to promote welfare activities or to eradicate a grave social evil, is not by itself decisive. Only where it is absolutely clear that the implementation of the object of the statute would otherwise be defeated that mensrsa may, by necessary implication, be excluded from a statute. The nature of the mensrea that would be implied in a statute creating an offence depends on the object of the Act and the provisions thereof." That was a case under the Madhya Pradesh Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order, 1958. The accused had made an application for a licence under the Order. He did not get any intimation to the effect that the application was rejected. Under a bonafide impression that the licence in regard to which he had made the application, was issued to him though not actually sent to him, he purchased the foodgrains from time to time and submitted returns to the Licensing Authority. The fact that the licensing authority did not communicate to him the rejection of his application confirmed his belief that the application was granted. It was in that belief that he stored the foodgrains. "It was, therefore, a storage of foodgrains within the prescribed limits under a bonafide belief that he could legally do so. He could not, therefore, be said to have intentionally contravened the provisions of S.7 of the Act or those of the order made under S.3 of the Act." The learned judge observed: "An offence under S.7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 10 of 1955, for breach of S.3 of the Madhya Pradesh Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order, 1958, necessarily involves a guilty mind as an ingredient of the offence. Considering the scope of the Act it would be legitimate to hold that an offence under S.7 of the Act is committed by a person if he intentionally contravenes any order made under S.3 of the Act. Considering the scope of the Act it would be legitimate to hold that an offence under S.7 of the Act is committed by a person if he intentionally contravenes any order made under S.3 of the Act. The object of the Act will be best served and innocent persons will also be protected from harassment if S.7 is so construed." It, therefore, follows that the prosecution has to establish that the contravention was intentional; but in the present case it is difficult to impute the guilty knowledge to the accused, because even if she wanted to exhibit the film it was not possible for her to do so, since the supply of the documentary films was withheld. The guilty knowledge can be presumed only when it is proved by the prosecution that at the time the documentary films were in stock with her; but she wilfully refused to exhibit them. It might be said that she was negligent in not getting the documentary films by performing her part of the obligation, viz., by remitting the necessary amount with the department. But that will not justify a criminal prosecution. 4. On this reasoning, I would quash the conviction and sentence and acquit the accused. Fine, if realised, will be refunded. The revision petition is allowed.