JUDGMENT S.D. Khare, J. - This is an application under Section 561-A Cr. P. C. for quashing the order passed by the Judicial Officer, Gorakhpur, on 13th April, 1968. By that order Shri J. R. Sharma, Judicial Officer, City, Gorakhpur, in exercise of his powers under Section 159, Cr. P. C., directed that investigation of the case by the police be not taken up, or in case it had been commenced the police was directed not to proceed further with the investigation. The Judicial Officer further ordered that the preliminary enquiry be held by the court itself. 2. It appears that a first information report was lodged by Shri Vijay Shankar Nigam in respect of certain occurrence which is alleged to have taken place at about 7 p.m. on 10th April, 1968 in front of his house. The report related to certain injuries having been caused to Bipin Kumar Tiwari (applicant) . Shri S. N. Sharma (Opposite Party No. 1) , who was posted as Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) at Gorakhpur at that time, was named in the first information report as the main accused person. The allegation against him was that it was at his instigation that certain goondas had attacked Bipin Kumar Tewari (applicant) and stabbed him with a knife and also caused injuries to Vijay Shankar Nigam. 3. The impugned order was passed by the Judicial Officer, City, Gorakhpur, on an application moved by Shri S. N. Sharma, Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) , Gorakhpur, (Opposite Party No. 1) . The averments made by him in that application were that the report lodged against him was at the connivance and instance of the local police and, therefore, it was desirable that a preliminary enquiry be held under Section 159, Cr. P. C. by the Judicial Officer, himself. After giving notice to the opposite party and after hearing both the parties the Judicial Officer, City, passed the impugned order. 4. On 2nd May, 1968, when this application was admitted by this Court an interim order was passed that the operation of the order passed by the Magistrate on 13th April, 1968, be suspended and the police be permitted to proceed with the investigation. 4. On 2nd May, 1968, when this application was admitted by this Court an interim order was passed that the operation of the order passed by the Magistrate on 13th April, 1968, be suspended and the police be permitted to proceed with the investigation. Subsequently both the parties were heard and on 22nd May, 1968, the interim order passed by this Court was vacated but it was directed that no action will be taken on the basis of the result of any magisterial enquiry until further orders passed by this Court. 5. The Deputy Government Advocate on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh had supported the applicant. The information furnished by him is that both the police investigation and magisterial enquiry are over and orders of this Court are awaited to proceed further in accordance with law. 6. The main ground on which the order of the Judicial Magistrate, City, Gorakhpur, passed on 13th April, 1968, is being challenged is that it is wholly without jurisdiction. Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with the subject of information to the police and their powers to investigate and it is in that Chapter that Section 159, Cr. P. C. finds its place. The scheme of Chapter XIV has, therefore, to be carefully examined to find out what powers the Magistrate can exercise under Section 159, Cr. P. C. and whether or not the impugned order could have been passed under the provisions of that section. 7. Section 154 provides how the information in a cognizable case shall be made to the police. Section 155 lays down that only the substance of information in non-cognizable cases shall be recorded and no police officer shall investigate a non-cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate. Section 156 of the Code authorises an officer in charge of a police station to investigate into a cognizable offence. Section 157 lays down the duties of the officer in charge of a police station. Sub-sec. Section 156 of the Code authorises an officer in charge of a police station to investigate into a cognizable offence. Section 157 lays down the duties of the officer in charge of a police station. Sub-sec. (1) of Section 157 provides that if a cognizable offence is suspected from information received or from other sources a report of the same shall be sent to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such offences upon a police report and the officer in charge of the police station shall proceed in person or shall depute a subordinate police officer to proceed to the spot to take up investigation in the case. According to Proviso (a) to sub-sec. (1) of Section 157 of the Code if the case is not of a serious nature the officer in charge of the police station need not proceed in person or depute a subordinate officer to make an investigation on the spot. Proviso (b) to sub-sec. (1) of Section 157 lays down that if it appears to the officer in charge of the police station that there is no sufficient ground for entering on an investigation he shall not investigate the case. Sub-sec. (2) of Section 157 requires in cases covered by the said two Provisos the officer in charge of the police station to state in the said report his reasons for not fully complying with the requirements of sub-sec. (1) and in cases mentioned in Proviso (b) he shall forthwith notify to the first informant the fact that he would not investigate the case or cause it to be investigated. Section 159 of the Code provides : "Such Magistrate, on receiving such report, may direct an investigation or, if he thinks fit, at once proceed, or depute any Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed, to hold a preliminary enquiry into or otherwise to dispose of the case in manner provided in this Code." 8. There can be no doubt that the words "such report" used in Section 159 refer to the reports-mentioned in Section 157 of the Code. It has, therefore, to be considered whether the provisions of Section 159 of the Code are attracted or not in a case where the police officer has already taken up investigation under sub-sec. (1) of Section 157 of the Code and has not declined to investigate. 9. It has, therefore, to be considered whether the provisions of Section 159 of the Code are attracted or not in a case where the police officer has already taken up investigation under sub-sec. (1) of Section 157 of the Code and has not declined to investigate. 9. It will be noticed that under Section 159 the Sub-Divisional Magistrate may adopt one of the following courses :- (1) He may either direct an investigation by the police, or (2) he may, if he thinks-, fit, himself proceed to hold a preliminary enquiry or depute a subordinate Magistrate to proceed to hold an enquiry. 10. No direction for investigation by the police can be given by a Magistrate under Section 159 in a case where the police has already taken up investigation of its own accord. The second course is merely an alternative procedure to that laid down in the first part of the section. It is, therefore, obvious that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate cannot take recourse to the alternative procedure contained in the second part where the investigation has already been taken up by the police. 11. There is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code which might empower the Magistrate to suspend the police investigation and to hold a preliminary enquiry either himself or cause it to be held by his subordinate. There is no doubt a mention of a preliminary enquiry in Section 159, Cr. P. C., but as mentioned in the preceding paragraph it can be made use of only after a report under Section 157 of the Code has been received by the Magistrate. The words "Such Magistrate on receiving such report" make that condition abundantly clear. The powers of the Magistrate under that section are further circumscribed by the use of the words "to hold preliminary enquiry into, or otherwise to dispose of, the case in manner provided in this Code." There is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure for holding such preliminary enquiries except under Section 202 of the Code. That is, however, possible only after. (1) the police report has been received, and (2) a protest petition has been lodged by the complainant. 12. Such protest petition can be treated as a complaint and an enquiry can be held under Section 202, Cr. P. C. 13. That is, however, possible only after. (1) the police report has been received, and (2) a protest petition has been lodged by the complainant. 12. Such protest petition can be treated as a complaint and an enquiry can be held under Section 202, Cr. P. C. 13. When a report of a cognizable offence is made a duty is cast on the police officer in charge of the police station to investigate that case and in certain cases of a serious nature immediate report has to be sent to the Magistrate. There is, however, nothing in the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure to indicate that the Magistrate is empowered to intervene in the investigation until the investigation is completed and the investigating officer arrives at some conclusion in accordance with Section 169 or 170, Cr. P. C. After arriving at his conclusion under either of those two sections the investigating officer has to submit a report to the Magistrate empowered to take cognisance of the offence under Section 173. If his conclusion is covered by Section 170, Cr. P. C. the report submitted by the investigating officer will necessarily show that a cognizable offence has been committed, and such a report will satisfy the requirements of Section 190 (1) (b), Cr. P. C. On that report, therefore, the Magistrate concerned can take cognizance and proceed with the trial of the case. On the other hand if the report is based on conclusions envisaged in Section 159, Gr. P. C. the report will contain facts found by the police officer and would normally indicate that no such offence was committed of which he could recommend a trial by the Magistrate. Even on the receipt of such a report the Magistrate is competent to take cognizance under Section 190 (1) (b) if he is of the opinion that the facts stated in the report of the police constituted an offence. On the other hand if those facts did not constitute an offence no cognizance of the case can be taken by the Magistrate though he can order further investigation. 14. This scheme of investigation provided in the Criminal Procedure Code came up for consideration in several cases. 15. One of the points that came up for consideration in the case Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, A.I.R. 1945 PC 18 was whether the High Court had power under Section 561-A, Cr. 14. This scheme of investigation provided in the Criminal Procedure Code came up for consideration in several cases. 15. One of the points that came up for consideration in the case Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, A.I.R. 1945 PC 18 was whether the High Court had power under Section 561-A, Cr. P. C. to quash investigation and all proceedings taken in pursuance of the first information report, and it was observed by their Lordships that- "The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary and not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under Section 491, Criminal Procedure Code, to give directions in the nature of habeas courpus. In such a case as the present, however, the court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it and not until then. It has sometimes been thought that Section 561-A has given increased powers to the court which it did not possess before that section was enacted. But this is not so. The section gives no nevi powers, it only provides that those which the court already inherently possess shall be preserved and is inserted, as their Lord ships think, lest it should be considered that the only powers possessed by the court are those expressly conferred by Criminal Procedure Code, and that no inherent power had survived the passing of that Act." 16. The above observations made by their Lordships of the Privy Council were quoted with approval in the case of State of West Bengal v. S.N. Basak A.I.R. 1963 SC 447. That was an appeal against the judgment and order of the High Court of Calcutta quashing the investigation started against the respondent in regard to offences punishable under Section 420, I. P. C. and Section 120-B read with Section 420, I. P. C. The appeal was allowed and the order of the High Court quashing the investigation was set aside. It was further directed that the investigation shall proceed in accordance with law. It was further directed that the investigation shall proceed in accordance with law. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as follows :- "At the time the respondent filed the petition in the High Court only a written report was made to the police by the Sub-Inspector of Police Enforcement Branch and on the basis of that report a first information report was recorded by the officer in charge of the police station and investigation had started. There was no case pending at the time excepting that the respondent had appeared before the court, had surrendered and had been admitted to bail. The powers of investigation into cognizable offences are contained in Chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 154 which is in that Chapter deals with information in cognizable offences and Section 156 with investigation into such offences and under these sections the police has the " statutory right to investigate into the circumstances of any alleged cognizable offence without authority from a Magistrate and this statutory power of the police to investigate cannot be interfered with by the exercise of power under Section 439 or under the inherent power of the court under Section 561-A, Cr. P. C." 17. The case of Pancham Singh v. The State, A.I.R. 1967 Pat. 416 is a direct authority for the proposition that the Magistrate has no power to suspend police investigation already taken up under Section 157 (1) and to direct magisterial enquiry. To the same effect is the case of the Crown v. Mohammad Sadiq Niaz, A.I.R. 1949 Lah. 204. In both these cases reliance was placed on the case of Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad. 18. Shri P. C. Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 had placed reliance on the case of Kashi Nath alias Kashi Ram Misra v. Achuta Nand Das, 1962 Orissa Judicial Decisions, Vol. 4, page 355. In that case it was observed that the District Magistrate had undoubted jurisdiction under Section 159, Cr. P. C. to stop investigation and direct an enquiry to be made by a fairly senior officer above the rank of a Sub-Divisional Officer. The facts of the case were, however, very much different from the facts of the present case. In that case it was observed that the District Magistrate had undoubted jurisdiction under Section 159, Cr. P. C. to stop investigation and direct an enquiry to be made by a fairly senior officer above the rank of a Sub-Divisional Officer. The facts of the case were, however, very much different from the facts of the present case. Since the boundary dispute giving rise to various alleged criminal offences was between two prominent residents of the locality and one of the parties to the dispute was then the Sub-Divisional Magistrate himself the Superintendent of Police, after the case had been registered on the basis of a first information report and investigation had been taken up himself ordered that the investigation be suspended and the matter be reported to the District Magistrate for his help in the matter. After that report had been received by the District Magistrate he ordered a preliminary enquiry by another senior Magistrate under him. The result of the enquiry was that no criminal offence was made out and it was a case 'of boundary dispute between the parties for which they must approach the appropriate civil court. One of the parties to the dispute lodged protest petitions and the Magistrate took the view that the magisterial enquiry was incompetent. He, therefore, issued processes against the opposite party. When the matter came up before the High Court in revision the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate issuing processes against the petitioners was quashed. It was in the peculiar circumstances of the case that it was observed by the Orissa High Court that the District Magistrate had jurisdiction to stop investigation and direct an enquiry by a Magistrate, and action could be taken on the result of that enquiry. Neither the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code were scrutinised nor the case law on the subject examined, perhaps because of the peculiar facts of the case. For the reasons given earlier in this judgment we respectfully disagree with the observations made in this case that the District Magistrate had undoubted jurisdiction under Section 159, Cr. P. C. to-stop investigation and direct a preliminary enquiry. 19. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the opposite parties that the words used in Section 169, Cr. For the reasons given earlier in this judgment we respectfully disagree with the observations made in this case that the District Magistrate had undoubted jurisdiction under Section 159, Cr. P. C. to-stop investigation and direct a preliminary enquiry. 19. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the opposite parties that the words used in Section 169, Cr. P. C. are "direct an enquiry", and the dictionary meanings of the word "direct" are wide enough to empower the Magistrate to guide the investigation or even to suspend the investigation. In the Oxford English Dictionary the word "direct" means "to straighten, set right, direct, guide, to put or keep straight, to rule, to write directly or specially to a person or to address anyone or to put or keep straight or in right order; or to cause to move or point straight to or to-wards a place; to turn to an aim, purpose etc., to regulate the course of, to guide, conduct, lead; to guide with advice, to advise; to give authoritative instructions to, to ordain, order or appoint to do a thing; to calculate the are of direction." 20. In our opinion there is no force in this contention. In the context in which the word "direct" has been used in Section 159. Cr. P. C. all that it can mean is to require the' police to investigate. It cannot, however, be interpreted to mean that the Magistrate has the power to stop police enquiry vide Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad and State of West Bengal v. S. N. Basak. Nor can it mean that the police can be forced to submit a particular kind of report. It was held in the case of Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Misra, A.I.R. 1968 SC 117 that the investigation under the Criminal Procedure Code takes in several aspects and stages ending ultimately with the formation of an opinion by the police as to whether on the material covered and collected a case is made out to place the accused before the Magistrate for trial, and the submission of either a charge sheet or a final report is dependent on the nature of the opinion so formed. The formation of the said opinion by the police is the final step in the investigation and that final step is to be taken only by the police and by no other authority and that there is no power expressly or impliedly conferred by the Code on a Magistrate to call upon the police to submit a charge sheet when they have sent a report under Section 169 of the Code, that there is no case made out for sending up the accused for trial. 21. In the end it has been contended by the learned counsel for the opposite parties that according to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code a Magistrate has also been empowered to effect arrest, make a search or a local inspection or even to record the statements of witnesses (vide Section 164, Cr. P. C.) and, therefore, the mere fact that a police investigation has been started is no bar to a preliminary enquiry by a Magistrate under Section 159, Cr. P. C. This argument has only to be mentioned in order be rejected. A Magistrate can no doubt record statements under Section 164, Cr. P. C. as provided in the Code. However the purpose of recording such statements is limited. It cannot be said that a Magistrate who records statements of an accused person or a witness under Section 164, Cr. P. C. is holding any preliminary enquiry. 22. We respectfully agree with the view taken in the cases of The Crown v. Mohammad Sadiq Niaz and Pancham Singh v. The State as they are quite in conformity with the law laid down by the Supreme Court. 23. In the result the order passed by Shri J. R. Sharma, Judicial Officer City, Gorakhpur, on 13th April, 1968, is quashed. The police of Gorakhpur will be at liberty to conclude the investigation and submit its report to the Magistrate after which the case can proceed in accordance with law.