JUDGMENT : A. P. SEN, J. 1. This appeal, filed by the plaintiff, is directed against a decree of the 1st Additional District Judge, Raipur, dated 10th March 1967, whereby his suit for ejectment and for mesne profits has been dismissed. 2. The material facts leading to this appeal are these. The plaintiff, Babu Harisingh Darbar, is the owner of a cinema theatre known as the “Darbar Talkies”, at Raipur. The theatre with all its cinematograph equipments and other fittings and fixtures were let out by him to one Ratanlal Rathi, the defendant herein, by an unregistered lease deed dated 24th March 1956. The lease in the first instance was apparently for a period of three years commencing from 1st January 1956, with an option to the lessee for a renewal of the lease for a further period of three years. The parties are, however, now agreed that the Indenture of Lease being unregistered was legally inoperative and that the tenancy created by implication of law, was a lease from month to month under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The defendant must, therefore, be regarded as a monthly tenant under the plaintiff in respect of the premises in suit. On the 10th April 1962, the plaintiff commenced the present suit for ejectment and mesne profits on the allegation that the tenancy was determined by a notice to quit and that he bona fide required the accommodation for starting therein his own business of exhibiting cinematograph films. The defendant resisted the claim, inter alia, on the ground that the plaintiff did not bona fide require the accommodation for that purpose. The Court of first instance has found, upon evidence, that the alleged need was not a “bona fide requirement”, within the meaning of section 12 (1) (f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, but that it was just a pretence to get the accommodation vacated with the ulterior object of earning an enhanced rent. 3. After hearing of this appeal had concluded and the appeal was closed for judgment, we felt some difficulty as regards the applicability of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, to the premises in suit. 3. After hearing of this appeal had concluded and the appeal was closed for judgment, we felt some difficulty as regards the applicability of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, to the premises in suit. We, accordingly, had the appeal fixed for re-hearing and have had the benefit of hearing the learned counsel on the question, namely; whether the Cinema theatre is an “accommodation” within the meaning of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The learned counsel for the appellant has now contended that the lease was outside the purview of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, as it was not in respect of any building or part of building, but was in reality a composite lease of a running Cinema business. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent has urged that the plaintiff having taken up the position that he requires the premises in question under section 12 (1) (f), for starting his own business of exhibiting films, must be taken to have admitted that the premises fall within the definition of the term ‘accommodation’, as defined in section 2 (a) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, and that being so, it was not open to him to turn round now at this stage and contend that the suit premises were outside the Act, by the principle of estoppel. Alternatively, he urged that the lease was of the Cinema theatre, which was a “building”, and not of the equipments and other fixtures installed therein, and, therefore, an “accommodation” within the meaning of the Act. 4. We fail to appreciate how the plaintiff can be prevented from claiming relief in his own right as a lessor, on an alternative basis. In the circumstances of this nature, the question of estoppel can, it seems, hardly arises; for it is difficult to imagine that a person is estopped from averring that what in truth appears or can upon correct construction be gathered from the record. That a party is not estopped from alleging that which is consistent with a record seems to be truism. That a party is not estopped from alleging that which is consistent with a record seems to be truism. The principle upon which the rule of estoppels rests is that it would be most inequitable and unjust if a person, who has by a representation made or by conduct amounting to a representation induced another to act as he would not have otherwise done, is allowed to deny or repudiate the effect of a former representation to the detriment of the other. So, in Sales Tax Officer v. Kanhaiyalal ( AIR 1959 SC 135 ), their Lordships observed: “Estoppel arises only when the plaintiff by his acts or conduct makes a representation to the defendant of a certain state of facts which is acted upon by the defendant to his detriment; it is only then that the plaintiff is estopped from setting up a different state of facts.” In regard to the application of the doctrine of estoppel to inconsistent positions, Bigelow states in his Treatise, as follows: “It may accordingly be laid down as a broad proposition that one who, without mistake induced by the opposite party, has taken a particular position deliberately in the course of a litigation must act consistently with it; one cannot play fast and loose.” 5. The facts of the case before us are, however, clearly different and the doctrine of approbate and reprobate has no application for the simple reason that the defendant has not acted to his detriment on account of any representation made to him. It is well established that, upon a given set of facts, a plaintiff may rely upon several different rights in the alternative even though they may be inconsistent. Similarly, a defendant may raise as many distinct and separate and, therefore, inconsistent defences as he may think proper. In this case, what factually leased out is not in controversy. Therefore, there being no alteration of position to the detriment of any party as a consequence, of representation as to a state of facts, no question of estoppel can arise merely because one or, as in this case, both parties were labouring under a mistake of law in regard to the true nature of the transaction. Therefore, there being no alteration of position to the detriment of any party as a consequence, of representation as to a state of facts, no question of estoppel can arise merely because one or, as in this case, both parties were labouring under a mistake of law in regard to the true nature of the transaction. In support of the contention that the plaintiff cannot now be allowed to claim relief on the basis that the subject-matter of the lease was not an accommodation within the meaning of the Act, reliance was placed upon Amritlal N. Shah v. Alla Annapurnamma ( AIR 1959 AP 9 ). In our opinion, that case is only an instance of the application of the doctrine of estoppel to the peculiar facts appearing therein. There, a suit for eviction under section 7 of the Madras Act (Act No. 15) was rejected on the tenant’s plea that the premises did not fall within the definition of ‘building’ and he was not, therefore, a tenant within the Act, and their Lordships, there-fore, held that it was not open to him to turn round and contend in a subsequent civil suit for eviction that lease related to a ‘building’ within the Act and that the civil Court had no jurisdiction. The reason for the view taken by their Lordships is that a defendant who obtains judgment on an allegation that a particular obstacle exists, cannot, in a subsequent suit, based upon such allegation deny its truth. It is needless to refer to the several authorities on the subject, because the principle that a party litigant cannot be permitted to assume inconsistent positions in Court to the detriment of his opponent, is well settled [See Sarkar’s Evidence, 11th Edition, pp. 1088-89]. As we have already indicated, in the facts of this case, no question of estoppel by reason of assumption of inconsistent positions arises. 6. The questions for consideration in this appeal are briefly, the following:— (i) Whether the requirements of section 12 (1) (f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, are fulfilled, and if not, then alternatively, (ii) Whether the lease-hold premises are outside the purview of the Act, not being an “accommodation”, within the meaning of that term as defined in section 2 (a) thereof. 7. 7. As to the first, even if the Cinema theatre in question is an ‘accommodation’ brought within the purview of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, we are of the view that the requirements of section 12 (1) (f), are fulfilled. For a proper appreciation of this question, it is necessary to set out the terms of the section, which read : “12 (1) (f): That the accommodation let for non-residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned.” The language of this section is somewhat different from that of section 4 (1) (h) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955. In the repealed Act, the words used were : “4 (1) (h): In the case of non-residential accommodation, that the landlord genuinely requires the accommodation for continuing or starting his own business or that of any person of his family bona fide residing or to reside with him and that he or the aforesaid person of his family is not in occupation or any other accommodation in the city or town for that purpose and if he was in occupation, has for sufficient reasons vacated it after the Act has been extended to that city or town;” It is noteworthy that the Legislature has now employed the words “is required bona fide”, in section 12 (1) (f) of the 1961 Act instead of the words, “genuinely requires”, previously appearing, but the use of a different phraseology is merely a change in form and is not one of substance. The two expresssions are interchangeable and the requirements under the two enactments are virtually the same. 8. The meaning that has to be given to the expression, “genuinely requires”, occurring in section 4 (1) (h) of the repealed Act, is now well settled. The two expresssions are interchangeable and the requirements under the two enactments are virtually the same. 8. The meaning that has to be given to the expression, “genuinely requires”, occurring in section 4 (1) (h) of the repealed Act, is now well settled. In Damodar Haridas Sharma v. Nand Ram Deviram ( 1960 MPLJ 925 , at p. 944 (FB)), one of us (Pandey J.) speaking for the Full Bench, stated : “The Legislature appears to have borrowed the word ‘genuinely’ from the judgment in Motilal’s case (AIR 1955 NUCMB 2096=1954 MBLJ 274) and should, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, be regarded as having used it in the sense in which it was interpreted in that case. It is clear from that case itself that the word ‘genuinely’ was construed as equivalent to the word, ‘bona fide’ and distinguished from the word ‘reasonably’, the following observations are significant: “It is wrong to say that ‘genuinely requires’ is the same as ‘reasonably requires’. There is a distinction between the two phrases. The former phrase refers to a state of mind; the latter to an objective standard—‘genuine requirement’ would vary according to the idiosyncraay of the individual and the time and circumstances in which he lives and thinks. ‘Reasonable requirement’ belongs to the ‘knowledge of the law’ and means reasonable not in mind the person requiring the accommodation but reasonable according to the actual facts.” In this background, the word ‘genuinely’, which speaks of a state of mind, means honestly or in good faith.” So, in the context, the word, “genuinely” means, ‘honestly’, or ‘in good faith’, i.e., it speaks of a state of mind. Similarly, the word “requires” is something more than the word “desires”, involving a felt need and not a mere whim or fancy. In other words, it had to be ascertained objectively whether the land-lord requires the premises “honestly” or “in good faith”, in the sense that he really wants to occupy it, for continuing or starting his business. (per Pandey J., at p. 946). In other words, it had to be ascertained objectively whether the land-lord requires the premises “honestly” or “in good faith”, in the sense that he really wants to occupy it, for continuing or starting his business. (per Pandey J., at p. 946). The interpretation placed by this Court in Damadardas v. Nandram ( 1960 MPLJ 925 , at p. 944 (F B)) on the expression ‘genuinely requires’, appearing in section 4 (l) (h) of the repealed Act, has been accepted to be correct by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in T. B. Sarvate v. Nemichand (1966 MPLJ 26 (SC)), wherein Shah J., speaking for the Court, has stated : “We agree with the High Court of Madhya Pradesh that the word ‘genuinely’ used in section 4 (h) which “speaks of the state of mind”, means honestly or in good faith.” 9. In Netaram v. Jiwanlal ( AIR 1963 SC 499 ), Hidayatullah J., while interpreting section 13 (b) of the Patiala and East Punjab States Union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (8 of 2006 BK) stated that such intention must be ‘honestly’ held, in relation to the surrounding circumstances. The oft-quoted passage, which precedes this conclusion, reads: “The Controller has to be satisfied about the genuineness of the claim. To reach this conclusion, obviously the Controller must be satisfied about the reality of the claim made by the landlord, and this can only be established by looking at all the surrounding circumstances, such as the condition of the building, its situation, the possibility of its being put to a more profitable use after construction, the means of the landlord and so on. It is not enough that the landlord comes forward, and says that he entertains a particular intention, however strongly, said to be entertained by him. The clause speaks not of the bona fides of the landlord, but says, on the other hand, that the claim of the landlord that he requires the building for reconstruction and re-erection must be bona fide, that is to say, honest in the circumstances.” Section 15 of the Ordinance which uses the word ‘bona fide’ is in terms alike to section 12 (1) (f), with which we are concerned. Reading that section as a whole, Hidayatullah J., has indicated that the Controller must be satisfied about the reality of the claim made by the landlord, and this can only be established by looking into all the surrounding circumstances, including the means of the landlord. Otherwise, as his Lordship states, the very purpose of the Rent Restriction Act would be defeated, if the landlord were to come forward and get the tenant turned out on a bare plea that he requires the accommodation for certain purposes. The clause speaks not of the bona fides of the landlord, but it says that the claim of the landlord that he requires for certain purposes should be bona fide, that is to say, honest in the circumstances. The investigation is not confined only to the existence of an intention in the mind of the landlord, but that intention must be “honestly held” in relation to the surrounding circumstances. Shortly stated, the “genuineness of the claim” is the real criterion and not the mere ipse dixit of the landlord. 10. Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, we have to see whether the requirements of section 12 (1) (f) are satisfied. On a consideration of the surrounding circumstances, the Court below has arrived at a finding which is totally unrelated to the legal connotation of the expression “requires bona fide”. It has held that the plaintiff has failed to establish that he bona fide requires the premises in suit, primarily, on the following premises : (i) The alleged desire of the plaintiff to start a business of exhibiting films for augmenting his income because he was at the moment, not carrying on any other business of his own and was unable to meet his expenses, was merely his whim or fancy; particularly when, his monthly income admittedly was Rs. 1,750 which, with a family comprising of only 4 members, was more than sufficient for his requirements. (ii) Conversely, if his income were not sufficient even to meet his expenses, the plaintiff would then not have the ‘necessary funds’ to start a new Cinema business because he could not, in that event, raise the requisite capital for making any advances to the Film Distributors for the supply of films. (ii) Conversely, if his income were not sufficient even to meet his expenses, the plaintiff would then not have the ‘necessary funds’ to start a new Cinema business because he could not, in that event, raise the requisite capital for making any advances to the Film Distributors for the supply of films. (iii) The plaintiff could not possibly at the age of 81, have the intention to start any new business when one would normally like to lead a retired life on account of one’s age and infirmity. This was evident from recitals of the trust deed executed by him. (iv) The negotiations started by the plaintiff, through the intervention of Shankerlal (D. W. 1) and Baburao Chimote (D. W. 2) in June, 1961, and the talks at the residence of Shri W.N. Mokasdar, Advocate, Raipur, signifying his willingness to compromise the claim if the rent was increased to Rs. 3,500 per month, ex facie showed that the plaintiff simply wanted rent at an enhanced rate and did not really need the theatre for starting a business. 11. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, has strenuously urged that this finding was on a question of fact proceeding on the credibility of witnesses, and there should, therefore, be no interference merely because this Court may, upon a reapprisal of the evidence, feel inclined to arrive at a contrary conclusion. In support of this contention, he places reliance on the dictum of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Sarju Prasad Ramdeo Sahu v. Jwaleshwuri Pratap Narain Singh and another ( AIR 1951 SC 120 ). We are afraid that this contention cannot be accepted. The question, whether the plaintiff’s requirements of the suit premises are bona fide or not, is one which has to be objectively determined, in the light of all the surrounding circumstances When the ultimate inference of fact drawn by the learned Judge is not preeminently reasonable or is unrelated to the meaning of the expression “requires bona fide” appearing under section 12 (1) (f), and does proceed on extraneous considerations, this Court undoubtedly has the right as well as the duty to interfere with such a finding. It is well settled that where a question is not of credibility based on any demeanour of the witnesses as observed in the Court below, but one of inference from the proved primary facts, a Court of Appeal is in as good a position as the trial judge, and is free to reverse his findings, if it thinks that the inference made by him was not justified, or, that there were some special features about the evidence of a particular witness which had escaped his notice, or, that there was a sufficient balance of improbabilities as to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lies. [See, Radha Prasad v. Gajadhar Singh ( AIR 1960 SC 115 )]. 12. Now, while adjudging the bona fides of the claim in this suit, we have to look to all the surrounding circumstances, including “the means of the land-lord”. If nothing more was known, we could have considered it rather unsafe to rely on his mere ipse dixit that he requires the premises for starting his own business. We cannot, however, disregard the admitted circumstances appearing in the case, viz. (i) the plaintiff has necessary wherewithal to start a business of this kind, i. e., owns a fully equipped Cinema theatre of his own, and (ii) also has previous experience in this line of business. The Court below has wrongly inferred want of bona fides on his part, mainly from 2 circumstances (i) his old age; and (ii) want of necessary funds. In our view, the first is not a relevant consideration in the circumstances of this particular case. It is true that the plaintiff may be old and infirm, but that hardly was a ground for negativing his claim, because a buniness of this kind involves no manual work. An Exhibitor of films can as well carry on his business by employing the necessary staff. As regards the alleged “want of means”, we find that there is not an iota of evidence on the record as regards his financial incapacity, though a plea was taken in that behalf. Suffice is to say that the plaintiff owns a fully equipped Cinema theatre which is in a running condition, and it is for him to find a financier, and make the necessary arrangements with the Distributors for the supply of films. That it is so, can hardly be disputed. Suffice is to say that the plaintiff owns a fully equipped Cinema theatre which is in a running condition, and it is for him to find a financier, and make the necessary arrangements with the Distributors for the supply of films. That it is so, can hardly be disputed. The result might have been different, if the defendant had substantiated his plea as regards the alleged financial incapacity of the plaintiff, or, his indebtedness. We are also inclined to think that talks of compromise through the intervention of others, or their mutual effort at a settlement, do not stand in the way of the plaintiff. Perhaps, the parties to these negotiations felt that the lease being of a definite duration and its renewed term having expired, a new lease would be subject to new terms and conditions. It must be borne in mind that at the time when the theatre initially was let out, all places of entertainment were excluded from the purview of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955, by section 2 (d) of that Act. It is a strange coincidence that the term of six years expired by efflux of time on 31st December, 1961, while the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, came into force with effect from 30th December 1961, i. e., just a day before. It is a matter of common knowledge that there is a phenomenal rise in rents of cinema theatres and nothing turns on the efforts of the mutual friends to persuade the plaintiff to give up his claim for eviction. For all the foregoing reasons, we would, accordingly, reverse the finding reached by the Court below and, hold that the plaintiff has established his bona fide requirement for the suit premises, for starting his own Cinema business. The plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to recover possession of it from the defendant, in accordance with the provisions of section 12 (1) (f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. 13. The only other question then is, whether the lease of the Cinema theatre was outside the purview of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The answer to that depends on whether the lease-hold premises constitute an “accommodation”, within the ambit of section 2 (a) of the Act. 13. The only other question then is, whether the lease of the Cinema theatre was outside the purview of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The answer to that depends on whether the lease-hold premises constitute an “accommodation”, within the ambit of section 2 (a) of the Act. That expression, unless the context otherwise requires, has been defined thus : “2 (a) ‘accommodation’ means any building or part of a building, whether residential or non-residential and includes, (i) any land which is not being used for agricultural purposes; (ii) garden, grounds, garages and out-houses, if any, appurtenant to such building or part of the building; (iii) any fittings affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof; (iv) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or part of a building;” 14. It is now well settled that a composite lease of land and building together with fixtures, fitting etc. cannot be split, because so to split up such a lease would be to destroy it altogether. One of us (Pandey J.) had occasion to deal with a lease of a running Dal hlill, in Sardarmal Lalwani v. Uttamchand ((C. R. No. 428/62, D/- 8-2-1963)), and the question was whether it was an “accommodation”, within the meaning of section 3 (a) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955, which is a provision in pari materia with section 2 (a) of the present Act with which we are concerned. It was held in that case that as defined, although any building or part of building is an accommodation and it includes fittings, fixtures affixed for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof, the lease of a running business was outside the purview of the Act, because a Dal Mill could hardly be regarded as a fitting or amenity for the more beneficial enjoyment of the building in which it was housed, being not a fixture attached to the freehold premises but machinery which continued to remain a chattel. That view has been affirmed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Uttamchand v. S. M. Lalwani ( AIR 1965 SC 716 ). That view has been affirmed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Uttamchand v. S. M. Lalwani ( AIR 1965 SC 716 ). Their Lordships have stated that the Court must determine the character of the lease and the question in each case would be, what is the dominant part of the demise and what is the purpose for which the building was constructed and let out; and, having regard to the dominant purpose of the lease in that case, “the fitting or the machinery could not”, in their Lordships’ words “be regarded to be fittings which had been affixed for the more beneficial enjoyment of the building” but held the “fixtures were the primary object which that lease intended to cover” and the building in which they were located came in incidentally. 15. On these principles, we have to ascertain the nature of the present lease. There is really no controversy between the parties as regards the subject-matter of the demise. It is alleged in para. 3 of the plaint that the plaintiff had delivered possession of a Cinema theatre together with the articles mentioned in Schedule A annexed to the plaint, and that the defendant had been in possession thereof from which he has been carrying on his trade of exhibiting cinema films. The schedule to the plaint gives a detailed description of the Cinema theatre with all its equipments, fittings and fixtures etc., i.e., of a running cinema theatre. The plaintiff, Harisingh Darbar (D. W. 1), states : There is no evidence in rebuttal of this. The defendant had, in his written statement, craved leave to refer to the original Indenture of Lease dated 24th March 1956 for purposes of “ascertaining its true meaning and effect”, while denying the Schedule attached to the plaint. He had also relied upon a written Deed of Agreement dated 29th December 1955, between the parties in pursuance whereof the formal Indenture of Lease was drawn. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, urged that neither of these documents can be looked into for ascertaining what the dominant purpose was, for which the lease was granted, because the ultimate Indenture of Lease being unregistered was inadmissible and legally inoperative to create a valid lease. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, urged that neither of these documents can be looked into for ascertaining what the dominant purpose was, for which the lease was granted, because the ultimate Indenture of Lease being unregistered was inadmissible and legally inoperative to create a valid lease. We are clearly of the view that even though the Indenture of Lease, being unregistered may be inadmissible, the earlier Agreement is not such because it did not create a present demise. That document is Exh. D. 1, which was proved at the instance of the defendant, by Harisingh (P. W. 1). The lease-hold premises are therein described as : “All the premises known as “Darbar Talkies” situated in Ramsagarpara, Raipur and of all buildings and open space comprised within the compound of the said Darbar Talkies together with all machinery, apparatus, cinema projector etc. with which the said buildings are at present equipped as also the entire furnishings of the said building including the furniture and screen etc. with “all easements and appurtenances whatever belonging or in any way appurtenant thereto exclusively belongs to the lessor etc., etc . . . . . . .” When we look at the other clauses of the Agreement, it becomes manifest that the intention of the parties was to let out a fully equipped Cinema Theatre which could be used only for running a Cinema business of exhibiting films. There is, therefore, no merit in the contention that the lease was merely of the super-structure of a Cinema Theatre with a few projectors and other fixtures and equipments thrown in. Equally unacceptable is the contention that the lease could not be regarded as one of a running Cinema theatre because the plaintiff had evidently closed down his business before leasing out the theatre. When a fully equipped Cinema theatre is let out to an exhibitor for showing films on a commercial basis, the lease is of a running Cinema theatre, intended to be used as such, irrespective of the fact whether it is actually being so used or not. 16. We are satisfied that the fittings, fixtures and other equipments installed in the Cinema theatre can in no sense be regarded and meant for the more beneficial enjoyment of the building in which the theatre is housed. 16. We are satisfied that the fittings, fixtures and other equipments installed in the Cinema theatre can in no sense be regarded and meant for the more beneficial enjoyment of the building in which the theatre is housed. There is no difference in principle between a lease of this nature and that of a running Dal Mill with which their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Uttam Chand v. S. M. Lalwani ( AIR 1965 SC 716 ) were concerned. Therefore, in their Lordships’ words, the fittings and fixtures and other equipments fitted in the Cinema theatre were the primary object which the lease was intended to cover and the building in which they were located merely came in incidentally. The parties had, therefore, clearly intended to let out a Cinema theatre along with all its equipments, and such a composite lease is not an “accommodation” within the meaning of section 2 (a) of the 1961 Act, and, therefore, the lease was outside the purview of the Act. A large number of decisions of various High Courts were cited by the learned counsel for the respondent for the purpose of showing that the matter is not free from doubt and there is a sharp conflict of judicial opinion in India. [See, Kali Prosad v. Jagadish Pada ( AIR 1953 Cal. 149 ); J. H. Irani and others v. T. S. Pl. P. Chidambaran Chettiar ( AIR 1953 Mad. 650 ); Konijeti Venkayya and another v. Thammana Peda Venkata Subbarao and another ( AIR 1957 AP 619 ) ; Amritlal N. Shah v. Alla Annapurnamma ( AIR 1959 AP 9 ) ; N. Vajrapuri Naidu v. The New Theatres Carnatic Talkies Ltd. ( AIR 1960 Mad. 108 )]. No useful purpose would, however, be served in referring to these authorities, as the law on the subject is now firmly settled by the decision of their Lord-ships of the Supreme Court in Uttamchand v. S. M. Lalwani ( AIR 1965 SC 716 ). 17. No other points were pressed before us in the appeal. At the very outset, the learned counsel for the appellant confined his submissions to the claim for ejectment. We would, therefore, refrain from expressing any opinion as regards the quantum of damages which would be ordinarily payable, upon determination of a lease of the Cinema theatre in question. 18. 17. No other points were pressed before us in the appeal. At the very outset, the learned counsel for the appellant confined his submissions to the claim for ejectment. We would, therefore, refrain from expressing any opinion as regards the quantum of damages which would be ordinarily payable, upon determination of a lease of the Cinema theatre in question. 18. The result is that the appeal partly succeeds and is allowed with costs. The judgment and decree of the Court below is modified to the extent that the dismissal of suit for ejectment is set aside and, instead, it is ordered and decreed that the plaintiff shall be entitled to recover possession of the suit premises, comprised of the Cinema theatre, i. e., of what is known as “Darbar Talkies” with all fittings, fixtures and other equipments, as detailed in Schedule ‘A’ annexed to the plaint. The rest of the decree regarding damages is, however, confirmed. The plaintiff shall be entitled to his proportionate costs of this appeal as well as of the Court below. Hearing fee as per schedule, or certificate, whichever be less.