Judgment :- 1. These appeals are by the accused in S. C. 74 of 1968 on the file of the Sessions Judge of Trivandrum against the conviction and sentence passed on them under S.120-B, 489-A and 489-D of the I. P. C. Accused Nos. 1, 5 and 6 have been sentenced to Rigorous Imprisonment for five years under S.489-A and accused Nos. 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8 sentenced to Rigorous Imprisonment for three years each under the same section. Accused 1, 5 and 6 have been further sentenced to Rigorous Imprisonment for five years under S.489-D and accused 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8 to a further term of Rigorous Imprisonment for three years each under above the above section. Accused 1, 5 and 6 have been further sentenced to Rigorous Imprisonment for five years under S.120-B and the other accused to Rigorous Imprisonment for three years. Sentences are to run concurrently. Criminal Appeal No. 99 is by the 1st accused, 106 by the 7th accused, 116 by the 3rd accused, 123 by the 4th accused, 137 by accused 2,5 and 6, and 144 by accused No. 8. 2. The prosecution case is that accused 1, 5, 6 and 8 entered into a conspiracy in June 1967 to commit the offence of counterfeiting two rupee currency-notes and to traffic in the same. In furtherance of the conspiracy the 5th accused purchased 4 kilograms of type metal (antimony) from the shop of Pw6 for making blocks for counterfeiting. With the type metal the 5th accused got 4 plates cast by Pw 3 and 4 days thereafter accused Nos. 5 and 6 together went to Pw3 and got 3 more similar plates made by him. The plates were intended for engraving the blocks of two rupee currency-notes and the 6th accused started engraving the plates for counterfeiting. The tools for engraving were made by one Subramonian Asari at the behest of accused 5 and 6. The 6th accused continued the work of engraving for about a month supervised by accused 1, 5 and 8. While the engraving work was in progress, accused Nos. 1, 5 and 6 started looking for a second-hand treadle press and finally fixed upon the one owned by Pw4 at Ambasamudram. That was purchased through a broker, Pw 10. The press was then transported from Ambasamudram to 'Lakshmi Vilas' the residence of the 1st accused. While the engraving work was in progress, accused Nos. 1, 5 and 6 started looking for a second-hand treadle press and finally fixed upon the one owned by Pw4 at Ambasamudram. That was purchased through a broker, Pw 10. The press was then transported from Ambasamudram to 'Lakshmi Vilas' the residence of the 1st accused. There, the press was re-assembled by accused 1, 5, 5 and 8 and it was made fit for printing the notes. Accused 5 and 6 then purchased printing ink of different colours, the ink reducer and sunlit bond paper from the Travancore Paper Mart, Trivandrum, and one tin of light rose printing ink from Vidyadiraja Paper Depot, Trivandrum. All these were then taken to the residence of the 1st accused and there incomplete two rupee currency notes called by the witnesses as "proof notes" were printed by accused 1, 5, 6 and 8 somewhere in August 1967 or beginning of September, 1967. Accused 2, 3, 4 and 7 and one other accused absconding and another Velayudhan Achari since deceased, joined the conspiracy in December, 1967 or January 1968 and by the joint effort of all these accused the process of printing two rupee currency-notes went on at'Lakshmi Vilas' the residence of 1st accused till the beginning of March 1968. The crime was detected by the Deputy Superintendent of C. I. D. Crime Branch who gave the F. I. Statement, Ext. P66 before the Neyyattinkara Police. The F. I. R. Ext. P67 was prepared by the Station Officer. The Deputy Superintendent of Police assisted by pws 41 and 42, the Sub Inspector of Police Neyyattinkara and Assistant Commissioner of Police, Trivandrum respectively, conducted the investigation and filed the charge. 3. In the course of the investigation some recoveries were made. The Dy. S. P. Pw43 went to the residence of the 1st accused on 22 31968 and recovered 31 small parts of the printing press as also a letter, under Ext. 13 search list. A photo of the 1st accused was also seized from there. 1st accused's house was found locked and had to be broken open with the help of a blacksmith. One Bhaskaran Nair brother-in-law of the 1st accused was present at the scene. Another important recovery is the recovery of the blocks. The blocks were kept in an Amul tin which was recovered from the compound of Pw 32 under Ext. P18 mahazar. One Bhaskaran Nair brother-in-law of the 1st accused was present at the scene. Another important recovery is the recovery of the blocks. The blocks were kept in an Amul tin which was recovered from the compound of Pw 32 under Ext. P18 mahazar. The recovery is stated to have been made on the basis of the information supplied by the 1st accused. The information elicited from the 1st accused was that he had kept one Amul tin in one of the rooms of the house of Pw32. No Amul tin could be found in any of the rooms in the house, but the tin was recovered from the compound, under the bed of a tree. Another recovery is that of the gunny bag in which the ink, chisel etc., were concealed. The case of the prosecution is that the gunny bag was taken by accused 3 and 4 to Pw35, the brother-in-law of the 3rd accused. Pw35 is a head-load cooly working in Trivandrum but has got his house at Neyyattinkara. According to him about one year back on a Monday while he was in his house the 3rd accused went and took him to the road where the 4th accused was waiting with the gunny bag on his shoulder. The 3rd accused wanted Pw35 to keep the gunny bag in his house and when the witness asked what it contained, the 3rd accused told him that it was paint. Pw35 accordingly took the bag to his house and kept it there. The wife of Pw35 got suspicious about the contents of the bag and fearing that it contained stolen property, wanted her husband to remove it from there. Pw35 went to the 3rd accused and requested him to to take the bag. The 4th accused was also present at the time, in the house of the 3rd accused. They asked Pw35 to throw away the bag wherever he pleased and accordingly, Pw35 threw the gunny bag in a pond in Panavilakath Purayidom. On the information supplied by Pw35 the bag with its contents was recovered from the pond by somebody diving in the water. The bag contained 7 tins of ink. Ext. P15 is the mahazar prepared in connection with this recovery. The prosecution claims that this recovery was made on the information supplied by the 4th accused. 4. On the information supplied by Pw35 the bag with its contents was recovered from the pond by somebody diving in the water. The bag contained 7 tins of ink. Ext. P15 is the mahazar prepared in connection with this recovery. The prosecution claims that this recovery was made on the information supplied by the 4th accused. 4. The prosecution would rely on the evidence of the expert also. Pw40 is the expert examined in the case. He is stated to be the expert in detection of forged currency and banknotes, working in the Studio Department, India Currency Press, Nasic Road. The blocks were sent to him by the Sub Magistrate for examination"; Ext. P50 is the report submitted by him. He has stated in his report that blocks are hand-engraved, meant for printing back and front tint and back body and front body of two rupee currency note. According to the expert, the small metal block is meant for printing back tint resette of two rupee currency notes. Another block which was also in the tin, was meant for impressing water-mark of Asoka Pillar on the two rupee currency note. The numbering machine is a hand numbering machine found in a damaged condition; still it could be used for numbering forged notes. In the blocks the signature of P. C. Bhatacharya who was once the Governor of the Reserve Bank, was also seen engraved. The prosecution has also relied on the confessional statements of some of the accused. These are the main items of evidence in the case. The accused have denied the charge in toto. 5. The first point argued was in respect of the criminal conspiracy. There is absolutely no evidence in the case to connect any of the accused with criminal conspiracy. Learned Judge has not discussed this question with reference to the witnesses cited for the purpose. In Para.11 of the judgment however, a passing reference has been made about the conspiracy and even there no reference is made to the witnesses cited for the purpose. Learned Judge has not discussed this question with reference to the witnesses cited for the purpose. In Para.11 of the judgment however, a passing reference has been made about the conspiracy and even there no reference is made to the witnesses cited for the purpose. The learned judge has made some general observations about criminal conspiracy, for instance: "In appreciating the evidence in a case relating to conspiracy it has to be borne in mind that it is not possible to give evidence of the date of the formation of the conspiracy and about the particular object of each person who was member of the conspiracy." To substantiate this general feature of criminal conspiracy the learned judge has cited some authorities also. But the question as such has been left out without any discussion whatever, much less any finding touching on it. Learned State Counsel invited my attention to the evidence of pws 2 and 13 in this connection. Pw2 is one Daniel who deposed that he had occasion to see accused 3 and 6 going to the house of the 9th accused. But he is not sure for what purpose accused 5 and 6 used to go to the house of the 8th accused. The witness has also made it clear that the 8th accused is a physician, practising also black magic. In connection with his profession all sorts of people used to visit him. On this evidence it is difficult to find criminal conspiracy against the accused. Pw 13's evidence is of no help at all, because he speaks of people going to the 1st accused's house. The charge which the accused are called upon to answer is that they conspired in the house of the 8th accused. But Pw13's evidence is that he had seen some of the accused going to the 1st accused's house. Like Pw2, this witness also does not know for what purpose the accused used to meet in the 1st accused's house. He has also stated that not only the accused but he has seen so many others also going to the 1st accused's house. From this no criminal conspiracy can be inferred. Of course, direct evidence cannot possibly be expected to prove criminal conspiracy. But the materials now before court are of no consequence at all to prove conspiracy. He has also stated that not only the accused but he has seen so many others also going to the 1st accused's house. From this no criminal conspiracy can be inferred. Of course, direct evidence cannot possibly be expected to prove criminal conspiracy. But the materials now before court are of no consequence at all to prove conspiracy. I should in the circumstances, think that the charge of criminal conspiracy has not been proved against the accused. 6. Another item of evidence on which the prosecution relies, is the recoveries made in the case. The recoveries were made mostly by the Deputy Superintendent of Police Pw13. The first item coming under this head are certain spare parts of a printing press recovered from the 1st accused's house under Ext. P13 search list on 22-3-1968. The house was locked and had to be broken open with the help of a blacksmith. The first accused was running a cinema and this fact has been stated by Pw13 who was for some time an employee under the 1st accused. 31 items of parts of printing press were recovered from the house. All those items are articles used by him for printing, connected with the cinema. A perusal of the articles will show that none of them is intended to be used for counterfeiting two rupee currency notes. It is therefore, difficult to connect the accused with the crime of counterfeiting through this recovery. The next recovery is the recovery of the blocks. The blocks were kept in one Amul tin which was buried in the compound of Pw32. The mahazar prepared in respect of this recovery is Ext. P18, Pw32 is the 1st accused's wife's sister. In Ext. P18 it is stated that the recovery, was made on the information supplied by the 1st accused. But what exactly was the statement given by the 1st accused which led to the recovery is not stated in Ext.P18. It is mandatory that the statements given under S.27 of the Evidence Act should be recorded in the first person, that is to say, as far as possible in the actual words of the accused. They should not be paraphrased. The Judge should admit those parts which he considers admissible, but leave some record for the consideration of the appellate court of any other words which the prosecution claimed should be received in evidence. They should not be paraphrased. The Judge should admit those parts which he considers admissible, but leave some record for the consideration of the appellate court of any other words which the prosecution claimed should be received in evidence. In the present case we are left in the lurch as to what exactly were the words uttered by the accused which led to the recovery. That apart, as a matter of fact, it was the statement of Pw32 that actually led to the recovery. The statement alleged to have been made by the 1st accused was that the articlest were kept by him in one of the rooms in Pw32's house. The house was accordingly searched but the articles were not found. Then Pw32 came forward with the statement that the articles in question had been unearthed by her from the room and buried it in the compound and she herself led the police to that spot in the compound and unearthed it from there. Even this story has not been substantiated in the case. In the witness-box Pw32 stated that the said Amul tin was never unearthed by her from the room and buried in the compound. She denied all knowledge about it. In this set up, it is ununderstandable how the recovery could be treated as a recovery made in pursuance of the information supplied by the 1st accused. The learned judge would observe in respect of the enquiry: "No doubt the Amul tin was not in that room, but it was recovered from a place in the compound. It was recovered from a place near a free From the ruling reported in 1968 Criminal Law journal 1362 at 1370 it could be seen that the recovery need not be from the place stated by the accused, but that it is enough if the information supplied by the accused leads to the recovery." I do not think that the ruling of this court reported in Narayana Pillai v. State of Kerala (1968 Crl. L. J. 1362) will apply to the facts of the present case. In the present case, the article was buried by the witness in her compound believing the prosecution case in its entirety and it was unearthed from there and handed over to the police by the witness herself. The statement of the accused was that he had kept it in the room. In the present case, the article was buried by the witness in her compound believing the prosecution case in its entirety and it was unearthed from there and handed over to the police by the witness herself. The statement of the accused was that he had kept it in the room. Pw32 stated that it was found to be buried in the courtyard and from there it was unearthed by her; but no indications of any burial in the room or the unearthing of it, were seen by the police in the room. The recovery therefore, was virtually a recovery made on the statement of the witness and not of the accused. Learned Judge relying on the decision rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in Narayana Pillai v. State of Kerala (1968 Crl. L. J. 1362) has held that the recovery in the present case is the one made under S.27 of the Evidence Act. In that case the facts are: "Accused who had admitted having killed the deceased told the police that he threw away the knife with which he inflicted stab wounds, near a certain tank. When police went near the tank, while they were searching for the knife they got information from a girl there, that she had found a knife which she gave to another person. Upon her information the police went to this person and recovered the knife from him who admitted that what the girl said was true." On these facts the learned judges held: "In this case, the fact discovered was the knife and if it was discovered consequent on any information received from the accused, so much of the information which distinctly related to its discovery was admissible in evidence. Whether it was discovered consequent on the said information was mainly a question of fact. Here it was the information which the accused gave to the police to the effect that he had thrown away the knife by the side of the tank, which caused them to search the premises of the tank. It was during the course of that search that the police got the further information that the knife had been picked up from that place by the girl, and handed over to another. It was during the course of that search that the police got the further information that the knife had been picked up from that place by the girl, and handed over to another. Thus the information received from the accused led to the discovery of the knife." In support of the above view, the learned judges followed In re Ramamurthy (AIR. 1941 Madras 290) and Kapur Singh v. Emperor (AIR. 1919 Lahore 184). Since these two decisions, it is worthwhile to remember that the law on the subject has been further clarified and the matter has now been placed beyond the range of controversy by the decisions of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court. According to the learned judges of the Division Bench in Narayana Pillai v. State of Kerala (1968 Crl. L. J. 1362) "the fact discovered was the knife and it was discovered consequent on the information received from the accused." This view is diametrically opposed to the view taken by the Privy Council in Kottaya v. Emperor (1947 P.C. 67). In that case the argument was put forward on behalf of the Crown that the fact discovered or produced and any information which relates distinctly to that fact can be proved. Sir John Beaumont speaking for the Board repelling the above contention observed: "It is fallacious to treat the 'fact discovered" within the section as-equivalent to the object produced. The fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given, must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history of the object produced, is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that'I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house" does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant." Thus in the opinion of the Privy Council the 'fact discovered' in S.27 of the Evidence Act means the place from where the incriminating article is produced or discovered. On the conditions necessary to bring S.27 into operation, the Privy Council would further observe: "discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence in the custody of a Police officer must be deposed to, and thereupon so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved. The section seems to be based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given some guarantee is afforded thereby that the information was true, and accordingly can be safely allowed to be given in evidence; but clearly the extent of the information admissible must depend on the exact nature of the fact discovered to which such information is required to relate. Normally the section is brought into operation when a person in police custody produces from some place of concealment some object, such as a dead body, a weapon or ornaments, said to be connected with the crime of which the informant is accused. Mr. Magaw, for the Crown has argued that in such a case the 'fact discovered' is the physical object produced, and that any information which relates distinctly to that object can be proved. Upon this view, information given'by a person that the body produced is that of a person murdered by him, that the weapon produced is the one used by him in the commission of a murder, or that the ornaments produced were stolen in a dacoity would all be 'admissible. If this be the effect of S.27, little substance would remain in the ban imposed by the two preceding sections on confessions made to the police, or by persons in police custody. That ban was presumably inspired by the fear of the Legislature that a person under police influence might be induced to confess by the exercise of undue pressure. But if all that is required to lift the ban be the inclusion in the confession of information relating to an object subsequently produced, it seems reasonable to suppose that the persuasive powers of the police will prove equal to the occasion and that in practice the ban will lose its effect." 7. But if all that is required to lift the ban be the inclusion in the confession of information relating to an object subsequently produced, it seems reasonable to suppose that the persuasive powers of the police will prove equal to the occasion and that in practice the ban will lose its effect." 7. Their Lordships of the Privy Council have also referred to the contrary view taken by some of the High Courts in India and have expressed their disapproval of it in the following terms: "A contrary view has, however, been taken by the Madras High Court, and the question was discussed at length in a Full Bench decision of that Court in Athappa Goundan v. Emperor (ILR. 1937 Mad. 695) where the cases were referred to. The Court whilst admitting that the weight of Indian authority was against them, nevertheless took the view that any information which served to connect the object discovered with the offence charged was admissible under S.27. Their Lordships expressing their inability to accept this reasoning stated: "The difficulty, however great, of proving that a fact discovered on information supplied by the accused is a relevant fact can afford no justification for reading into S.27 something which is not there, and admitting in evidence of a confession barred by S.26". Finally, Their Lordships expressed the view that Athappa Goundan v. Emperor (ILR, 1937 Mad. 695) was wrongly decided. In re Ramamurthy (AIR. 1941 Madras 290) which the Division Bench of this Court followed in Narayana Pillai v. State of Kerala (1968 Crl. Q. 1362) was influenced very much by the decision in Athappa Goundan v. Emperor (ILR. 1937 Mad. 695) and that decision having been over-ruled by the Privy Council, the decision that followed the over-ruled decision can have no legal or ethical grounds to survive. Koshi C. J, has observed in Joseph v. State (1952 KLT. 216): "It is not infrequently that in criminal appeals coming from certain parts of the State, we find such gross disregard of the provisions of S.25 to 27 of the Evidence Act and S.162 of the Criminal Procedure Code. We take the liberty to tell Sessions Judges and Public Prosecutors that the decision of the Privy Council in Kottaya v. Emperor (AIR. 1947 PC. We take the liberty to tell Sessions Judges and Public Prosecutors that the decision of the Privy Council in Kottaya v. Emperor (AIR. 1947 PC. 67) will well repay persual." The learned judge has further pointed out that "after this pronouncement of the Privy Council an expert Committee was appointed in Madras to examine the correctness of the convictions made in that jurisdiction following Athappa Goundan v. Emperor (ILR. 1937 Madras 695) (FB.) and that on the recommendations made by that Commutes the unexpired portion of the sentences passed on several prisoners were remitted by Government and the prisoners concerned released." In re Ramamurthy (AIR. 1941 Madras 290) therefore, can no longer be the correct law on the point. The same fate has befallen Kapur Singh v. Emperor (AIR. 1919 Lahore 184) which is the other decision that the Division Bench has followed. A Full Bench of the same High Court in Sukhan v. Emperor (AIR, 1929 Lahore 344) has struck a different note and observed: "The legislature has prescribed two limitations in order to define the scope of the information provable against the accused: (1) The information must be such as his caused the discovery of the fact, and (2) the information must 'relate distinctly' to the fact discovered. The requirements of both the conditions specified above must be satisfied before an incriminating statement can be received in evidence. Thus, only that portion of the information is provable which was the immediate or proximate cause of the discovery of the fact. Anything, which is not connected with the fact as its cause or is connected with it, not as its immediate or direct cause, but as its remote cause, does not come within the ambit of the section and should be excluded." Elucidating the expression 'fact discovered' the learned judges would further observe: "In other words, the fact must be the consequence, and the information the cause of its discovery. The information and the fact shall be connected with each other as cause and effect. If any portion of the information does not satisfy this test, it should be excluded. (2) The information must 'relate distinctly' to the fact discovered. The word 'relate' means to 'have reference to' or 'to connect'; and the word 'distinctly' means clearly, unmistakably, decidedly or indubitably. If any portion of the information does not satisfy this test, it should be excluded. (2) The information must 'relate distinctly' to the fact discovered. The word 'relate' means to 'have reference to' or 'to connect'; and the word 'distinctly' means clearly, unmistakably, decidedly or indubitably. To put it in a different language, the information must be clearly connected with the fact." The Supreme Court in Prabhoo v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR. 1963 S. C. 1113) has reaffirmed the view of the Privy Council in the following words: "Incriminating statements made to a police officer are hit by S.25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. The statement that the axe is one with which the murder had been committed is not a statement which leads to any discovery within the meaning of S.27 of the Evidence Act. Nor is the alleged statement of the accused that the blood-stained shirt and dhoti belonged to him a statement which leads to any discovery within the meaning of S.27. It is fallacious to treat the 'fact discovered' within S.27 as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact." The same view is seen expressed by the Supreme Court in a recent decision Jaffer Hussain Dostgir v. State of Maharashtra (1969-II-S. C. W. R.650). That was a case where the information supplied by the accused was: "I will show you the person to whom I have given the diamonds exceeding 200 in number." Therefore, a named person was substituted for the place where the article was kept. But that did not in the view of the learned judges alter the position or shake the foundation of the rule as is evident from the following observations of the learned judges: "Under S.25 of the Evidence Act no confession made by an accused to a police officer can be admitted in evidence against him. An exception to this is however provided by S.26 which makes a confessional statement made before a Magistrate admissible in evidence against an accused notwithstanding the fact that he was in the custody of the police when he made the incriminating statement. An exception to this is however provided by S.26 which makes a confessional statement made before a Magistrate admissible in evidence against an accused notwithstanding the fact that he was in the custody of the police when he made the incriminating statement. S.27 is a proviso to S.26 and makes admissible so much of the statement of the accused which leads to the discovery of a fact deposed to by him and connected with the crime, irrespective of the question whether it is confessional or otherwise. The essential ingredient of the section is that the information given by the accused must lead to the discovery of the fact which is the direct outcome of such information. Secondly, only such portion of the information given as is distinctly connected with the said recovery is admissible against the accused. Thirdly, the discovery of the fact must relate to the commission of some offence If an accused charged with theft of articles or receiving stolen articles, within the meaning of S.411 I. P. C. states to the police 'I will show you the articles at the place where I have kept them' and the articles are actually found there, there can be no doubt that the information given by him led to the discovery of a fact i. e., keeping of the articles by the accused at the place mentioned. The discovery of the fact deposed to in such a case is not the discovery of the articles but the discovery of the fact that the articles were kept by the accused at a particular place. In principle there is no difference between the above statement and that made by the appellant in this case which in effect is that'I will show you the person to whom I have given the diamonds exceeding 200 in number. The only difference between the two statements is that a 'named person' is substituted for 'the place' where the article is kept. In neither case are the articles or the diamonds the fact discovered." 8. The net result of the above discussion is that the 'fact discovered' in S.27 embraces the place from which the object is produced and does not relate to the object produced. The object produced might have been discovered long ago. So much of the information given by the accused distinctly connected with the fact discovered, alone can be proved against him. The object produced might have been discovered long ago. So much of the information given by the accused distinctly connected with the fact discovered, alone can be proved against him. In the present case, the articles were recovered from the compound of the witness and it was unearthed and produced by the witness herself. The information supplied by the accused was that he had kept the article in a room in the house and the fact discovered in the circumstances, can have relationship only with that room in the house. But nothing was found there and the statement of the accused must, therefore, end there. There, the chain connecting the accused with recovery is broken. The intervention of the witness thereafter and her production of the article cannot in any way, be connected with the accused or the information alleged to have been supplied by him. Ext. P 18 recovery, therefore, must go. The other recovery relied on by the prosecution is the recovery of a gunny bag in which ink and chisels where kept. The prosecution case in this regard is that the gunny bag was entrusted by the 3rd accused to his brother-in-law pw 35, at a time when the 4th accused was also present. pw 35 is a cooly working mainly in the Railway Station at Trivandrum. He has got his house at Neyyattinkara. One day when he was in his house the 3rd accused went to him and called him out and entrusting the gunny bag to him, requested him to keep it in his custody. He asked him what it contained. Then the 3rd accused told him that it contained some paint. The witness accordingly took it to his house but his wife protested, suspecting that it contained stolen articles. So the next day, he went to the 3rd accused and told him that it was difficult for him to keep it in his house. The 3rd accused then asked him to throw it somewhere. Accordingly, he took it from his house and threw it in a pond in Penavilakathy purayidam belonging to a police constable. pw 35 then contacted the police at the Neyyattinkara T. B. and apprised them of the position. Accordingly, the bag was recovered from the pond by pw 24 diving in the water. Ext. P 28 is the confessional statement given by the 4th accused. pw 35 then contacted the police at the Neyyattinkara T. B. and apprised them of the position. Accordingly, the bag was recovered from the pond by pw 24 diving in the water. Ext. P 28 is the confessional statement given by the 4th accused. Therein the 4th accused has stated that gunny bag was dropped by pw 35 in an unused well. In Ext. P 15 the mahazar prepared in connection with the recovery, it is stated that the recovery was in pursuance of the information supplied by the 4th accused Sreekantan Nair. But the information supplied by him, as seen from Ext. P. 28, is that pw 35 had dropped the bag in a well. In any event, this recovery cannot be treated as one falling under S.27 of the Evidence Act. In the first place, the police had obtained information already from pw 35 about the secretion of the article, and secondly, the recovery, for reasons already stated in connection with Ext. P 18 recovery, cannot be brought under S.27 of the Evidence Act. 9. Next item of evidence relied on by the prosecution to connect the accused with the crime is the confessional statements given by the various accused. All the accused except accused 1 and 3 have confessed before the Magistrate, but the confessions have all been retracted. But according to the learned judge, the confessions having been proved to be voluntary, can be accepted even without corroboration. I cannot agree. The confessions are vitiated firstly by the fact that they were recorded long after the accused were arrested. The 2nd and 4th accused were in police custody for two days, the 5th accused for eight days, and the 6th accused for fourteen days. The Supreme Court has observed in Nathu v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR. 1956 S. C. 56): 'Where the Courts below have, incoming to the conclusion that the confession of the accused was voluntary, failed to note that the C. I. D. Inspector had offered no explanation for keeping the accused in prolonged custody immediately preceding the making of the confession, which matter the prosecution had to explain if the confession was to be accepted as voluntary the Supreme Court would interfere with the finding of the lower Courts in the special appeal." In that case, the accused was arrested on the 20th and the confession was recorded on the 24th. Even then the confession was rejected on the above ground. The prosecution has not explained the delay in recording the confession. The circumstance will go very much against the voluntary nature of the confession. There is also the further fact that the Magistrate before recording the confession did not think it proper to disclose to the deponents his identity as Magistrate. This fact has been conceded by the Magistrate who recorded the confession. "The omission on the part of the magistrate to make known to the accused that he was in the presence of a Magistrate takes away much of the force of the confessional statement. In regard to a matter of such vital importance it was necessary that the Magistrate should have left on record the fact of his having told the accused that he was in the presence of a Magistrate, so that (here may be material on record from which the Court of trial could reach the conclusion as to whether the confessional statement was voluntary. It is not enough if the conscience of the Magistrate is satisfied as to the voluntary character of the statement of the accused, but it is also necessary that the Magistrate should leave such materials on record as would satisfy the Court that sits in judgment in the case that the confessional statement was made voluntarily." (A. I. R.1959 Mysore 250) It is of the utmost importance that the identity of the Magistrate should be disclosed to the accused, because that would dispel fears from the mind of the accused about the police, and the accused is assured of the fact that he is in the free atmosphere of a magistrate's court and this circumstance has an important bearing on the voluntariness of the confession. 10. None of these confessional statements can get corroboration from any of the recoveries in the case because the recoveries, for reasons already stated, have been discarded as not falling under S.27 of the Evidence Act. It would therefore, be improper to rely on the confessional statements for entering the conviction. 11. The main witnesses relied on by the learned judge are pws 1, 12,15 and 16 but on a scrutiny of their evidence it could be seen that they are unreliable. They themselves are participants in the crime. They are thus, accomplices and an accomplice's evidence cannot be accepted without corroboration. 11. The main witnesses relied on by the learned judge are pws 1, 12,15 and 16 but on a scrutiny of their evidence it could be seen that they are unreliable. They themselves are participants in the crime. They are thus, accomplices and an accomplice's evidence cannot be accepted without corroboration. Hidayatullah J, as he then was, would observe in Haroom Haji v. Stale of Maharashtra (A. I. R.1968 Cr. L. J. 1017): "The law as to accomplice evidence is well-settled. The Evidence Act in S.133 provides that an accomplice is a competent witness against an accused person and that a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. The effect of this provision is that the Court trying an accused may legally convict him on the single evidence of an accomplice. To this there is a rider in illustration (b) to S.114 of the Act which provides that the Court may presume that accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars. This cautionary provision incorporates a rule of prudence because an accomplice, who betrays his associates is not a fair witness and it is possible that he may, to please the prosecution, weave false details into those which are true and his whole story appearing true, there may be no means at hand to sever the false from that which is true. It is for this reason that courts, before they act on accomplice evidence, insist on corroboration in material respects as to the offence itself and also implicating in some satisfactory way, however small, each accused named by the accomplice. In this way the commission of the offence is confirmed by same competent evidence other than the single or unconfirmed testimony of the accomplice and the inclusion by the accomplice of an innocent person is defeated. This rule of caution or prudence has become so ingrained in the consideration of accomplice evidence as to have almost the standing of a rule of law." The rule of caution sounded in the above observation has not been conformed to, by the learned Sessions judge in the present case. There is absolutely no evidence of any independent witness, tending to corroborate the statements of the accomplices. That these witnesses are accomplices cannot admit of any doubt. Pwl is a cooly who used to be employed by the 1st accused. There is absolutely no evidence of any independent witness, tending to corroborate the statements of the accomplices. That these witnesses are accomplices cannot admit of any doubt. Pwl is a cooly who used to be employed by the 1st accused. He has admitted in cross-examination that he was under fear of the police. He had borrowed some money from a certain person and supplied it to the 1st accused to help him in the venture. He confesses before court that the statements made by him to the police, were made out of fear for the police. He was manhandled by the police. He stated before the police that he was shown a proof note by the accused before he parted with his money. This shows that he was also a party to the project. He also stated that he buried some of the blocks. All these show that he was moving hand-in-glove with the accused. Besides, he is a dealer in illicit arrack and is one always shadowed by the police. Pw.15 was originally on the array of the accused, but later betrayed by the other accused and went over to the side of the police. (This is seen from Ext. P48 the report submitted by the Dy. S. P. stating that even though he was included as an accused, further investigation showed that he was not in the conspiracy.) Such a person cannot be believed for any purpose and the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case cited above, would fully apply to him. The other witnesses are Pws.12 and 16. Pw 16 is stated to be the bullock-cart man in whose cart the press was transported. His evidence is not of any help since the accessories of the press had not anything to do in the alleged crime. Pw12 was cited to show that he had occasion to see the proof-notes prepared by the accused. He is a dealer in timber. The 1st accused had agreed to sell a jack tree to him and he had received Rs. 180/- by way of advance. Later, when he went to cut the tree, the 1st accused's wife protested. She said that the property belonged to her, and the 1st accused had no right to sell the tree. He then demanded the money back, from the 1st accused. 180/- by way of advance. Later, when he went to cut the tree, the 1st accused's wife protested. She said that the property belonged to her, and the 1st accused had no right to sell the tree. He then demanded the money back, from the 1st accused. Then the 1st accused is stated to have taken him to his house and shown him the proof-notes made from the block. He is stated to have promised the witness to return his money when the work of counterfeiting had materialised. The evidence of Pw 15 is also sought to be made use of for the purpose, that the proof-notes were shown. Pwl5 is a dealer in arrack and the 1st accused had owed him Rs. 133/-towards price of the arrack consumed by him, and when he asked for the money, he was taken by the 1st accused to his house and shown the proof-notes kept there. To this witness also the 1st accused is alleged to have made the statement that after the completion of the work of counterfeiting, he would be able to pay him the money. This story cannot be believed for a moment. According to the learned judge himself, counterfeiting is something done in private. Strict secretary will be maintained by the persons engaged in the work of counterfeiting. To quote the learned judge's own words: "In the nature of things the process of counterfeiting will be very secret and it will difficult if not impossible to secure eye-witnesses regarding the transaction." Having thus accepted the position that counterfeiting is usually done in great secrecy, it is ununderstandable how the learned judge accepted the evidence of these witnesses who claimed to have been taken by the 1st accused to his house and shown the proof-notes. No proof-note has been produced in the case. In the circumstances, this part of the prosecution case has only to be rejected as unbelievable. 12. The sum and substance of the above discussion of the evidence is that criminal conspiracy is not proved by any evidence, and in proof of the offence under S.489A and 489D the two items of evidence relied on namely, the confession of the accused and the recoveries are both of no consequence. 12. The sum and substance of the above discussion of the evidence is that criminal conspiracy is not proved by any evidence, and in proof of the offence under S.489A and 489D the two items of evidence relied on namely, the confession of the accused and the recoveries are both of no consequence. We have seen that the confession is tainted with irregularities of a serious nature in the recording of it, and it has also not been shown that it is voluntary. The recoveries for the reasons discussed, cannot be brought under S.27 of the Evidence Act and as such cannot be accepted as an item of evidence connecting the accused with the crime. All the accused in the circumstances, are entitled to be acquitted. The conviction and sentence are set aside and all the appeals are allowed and the accused are acquitted. They will be set at liberty forthwith. Allowed.