Judgment :- 1. The appeal filed by the judgment-debtor is directed against an order passed in execution of the decree in O. S.45 of 1960 'The suit was based on a promissory note dated 119 1957. In the written statement the defendant had pleaded that he is an agriculturist entitled to the benefit of Act 31 of 1958. The plaintiff and the defendant filed a compromise petition dated 23 111960 on the basis of which the decree of the same date was passed. In Para.1 of the compromise petition the defendant expressly withdrew all his contentions in the written statement. The compromise decree provided for payment of interest at the contract rate namely 12% per annum for the period prior and subsequent to the suit. After the amendment Act 2 of 1961 the judgment-debtor claimed the benefits thereunder. The plea of the judgment-debtor has been overruled by the lower court on the ground of res judicata. The suit itself was instituted after the commencement of Act 31 of 1958 and before the amendment Act of 1961. The compromise decree also was passed before the passing of the amendment Act 2 of 1961. The learned judge has taken the view that since the judgment-debtor specifically withdrew his plea that he was an agriculturist in the compromise petition he is precluded from raising the same question in execution and disallowed relief to him. The plea on behalf of the judgment-debtor was that the compromise decree cannot operate as res judicata. 2. If the words "heard and finally decided" in S.11 of the Civil Procedure Code are strictly and literally interpreted, it follows that there must be an actual hearing by the court of the issue or the suit and a decision thereon by the court. If so no consent decree can operate as res judicata. The Supreme Court in Subba Rao v. Jagannadha Rao AIR. 1967 S.C. 591 in holding that consent decree cannot operate as res judicata under S. H, CPC. observed: "The compromise decree was not a decision by the Court. It was the acceptance by the Court of something to which the parties had agreed. It has been said that a compromise decree merely sets the seal of the court on the agreement of the parties. The court did not decide anything. Nor can it be said that a decision of the court was implicit in it. It was the acceptance by the Court of something to which the parties had agreed. It has been said that a compromise decree merely sets the seal of the court on the agreement of the parties. The court did not decide anything. Nor can it be said that a decision of the court was implicit in it. Only a decision by the court could be res judicata, whether statutory under S.11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or constructive as a matter of public policy on which the entire doctrine rests." Bhagwati, J. pointed out in Sunderabai v. Deraji AIR. 1954 S.C. 82: "The bar of res judicata however, may not in terms be applicable in the present case, as the decree passed in Suit No. 291 of 1937 was a decree in terms of the compromise. The terms of S.11 of the Civil Procedure Code would not be strictly applicable to the same but the underlying principle of estoppel would still apply." In Shankar Sitaram v. Balakrishna Sitaram AIR. 1954 S.C. 352 it was pointed out that a consent decree is as binding upon the parties thereto as a decree passed by court in invitum unless it is shown that the compromise is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation, misunderstanding or mistake and the consent decree has the binding force of res judicata. In re South American and Mexican Company. Ex parte Bank of England, (1895) 1 Ch. 37 Lord Hereschell observed: "...the truth is. a judgment by consent is intended to put a stop to litigation between the parties just as much as is a judgment which results from the decision of the Court after the matter has been fought out to the end. And I think it would be very mischievous if one were not to give a fair and reasonable interpretation to such judgments, and were to allow questions that were really involved in the action to be fought over again in a subsequent action". The same principle has been stated by the Judicial Committee in Kinch v. Walcott 1929 A.C. 482 at 493. It was observed: "First of all their Lordships are clear that in relation to this plea of estoppel it is of no advantage to the appellant that the order in the libel action which is said to raise it was a consent order. It was observed: "First of all their Lordships are clear that in relation to this plea of estoppel it is of no advantage to the appellant that the order in the libel action which is said to raise it was a consent order. For such a purpose an order by consent, not discharged by mutual agreement, and remaining unreduced, is as effective as an order of the Court made otherwise than by consent and not discharged on appeal-" These observations have been quoted with approval by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Raja Sri Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo v. The State of Orissa AIR. 1956 S.C. 346. It therefore follows that the compromise decree creates an estoppel by judgment between the parties. Mulla in the Civil Procedure Code has observed: "A consent decree, however, has to all intents and purposes the same effect as res judicata as a decree passed in invitum. It raises an estoppel as much as a decree passed in invitum." There cannot therefore be any controversy regarding the principle that a consent decree operates as an estoppel by judgment. But to uphold an estoppel on the basis of a consent decree the court must be satisfied that the question raised in the subsequent suit was present in the minds of the parties and was dealt with by the compromise decree either expressly or by implication. It has to be satisfied that the parties intended that the question at issue should be finally decided by the consent decree and whether it finally settled the same. Unless these two questions are answered in favour of the party raising the plea of estoppel the consent decree cannot estop a party thereto from his plea. 3. Judged in the light of the above principles we have to uphold the plea of estoppel raised by the decree holder. The judgment-debtor had claimed the benefits of Act 31 of 1958 based on his status as an agriculturist. This was disputed by the decree holder and the compromise was after withdrawing the plea specifically. The compromise decree has therefore proceeded on the basis that the judgment-debtor is not an agriculturist. This is quite sufficient to hold that it is not open to him to repeat the same plea in execution even after Act 2 of 1961. The decision in Subba Rao v. Jagannadha Rao AIR. The compromise decree has therefore proceeded on the basis that the judgment-debtor is not an agriculturist. This is quite sufficient to hold that it is not open to him to repeat the same plea in execution even after Act 2 of 1961. The decision in Subba Rao v. Jagannadha Rao AIR. 1967 S.C. 591, does not in any way help the judgment-debtor. It has only said that a consent decree cannot operate as res judicata either under S.11 or otherwise. The plea of estoppel arising from a consent decree was overruled on the ground that it was not raised. There is also the further fact that the" compromise decree in the said case was on the assumption that the judgment-debtor was an agriculturist entitled to benefit under the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act (4 of 1938) as it stood before its amendment by Act 23 of 1948. The decision therefore cannot in any way affect the view that we are taking in.this appeal. We therefore hold that the appeal is without substance and dismiss the same. No costs. A. K. A. Dismissed.