JUDGMENT 1. THE petitioners in these eight applications under article 227 of the Constitution, mohanlal Jain and Narayan Prosad Dutta, constituted a partnership firm, which held a license for cultivating Ganja. The petitioners took lease of 50 acres of land at Dilforebagh in the district of Murshidabad from one Durgarani Dutta for the cultivation of Ganja by a registered deed of lease, dated July 24, 1954. The lease was for a period of three years, commencing from the 1st day of Baisakh 1361 B. S. The deed of lease provided that the lessees could, at their option, at the end of one term, have the lease renewed for a further term of three years. 2. THE lessees being under raiyats, their interest in the lands vested in the State on the 1st Baisakh 1363 B. S. after Chapter VI of the West Bengal estates Acquisition Act, 1953, had come into force by virtue of a notification under section 49 of the Act. The lessees did not exercise their option of having the lease renewed under the terms of the deed on the expiry of the period of three years; nor had they, on the vesting of their interest in the state, exercised their choice of retention of lands within permissible limits under sub-section (1) of section 6 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. It appears that, during the revisional settlement operations, the Settlement authorities for reasons, not very clear from the records, split up the holding of 50 acres into 8 separate holdings of smaller areas and recorded them in 8 separate Khatians. The Government started 16 certificate proceedings under the public Demands Recovery Act against the petitioners, eight of them being for arrears of rent and cesses due for the year 1363 B. S. and the remaining 8 for such arrears for the period 1364 to Aswin 1367 B. S. We are not, however, concerned here with the fate of the eight certificates for the year 1363 B. S. The present applications arise out of the other eight certificates, which cover the period from Baisakh 1364 B. S. to Aswin, 1367 B. S. 3. THE certificate debtors filed objections under Section 9 of the Public demands Recovery Act, denying their liability for the demands, made under the certificates. THE certificate debtors filed objections under Section 9 of the Public demands Recovery Act, denying their liability for the demands, made under the certificates. The objections of the certificate debtors having been dismissed by the Certificate Officer, appeals were preferred by them to the collector. But, in that, also they were unsuccessful. 4. BEFORE the Certificate Officer and the Collector, the main contentions of the Certificate Debtors were that they were not liable to pay road cess and education cess as the rent was inclusive of cesses: and that the rent, at the rate of Rs, 50/- per bigha as per the terms of the lease, was payable not for the entire area of the holding but only for such portions of it as were actually under Ganja cultivation. The Certificate officer and the Collector rejected these contentions on the ground that they were not supported by the terms of the relative deed of lease. The Certificate debtors then moved the Divisional Commissioner for revising the orders of the Collector. The Commissioner held that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the Government and the certificate debtors. He came to this conclusion by reason of the facts that the bessees did not apply for renewal of their lease after the expiry of its term at the end of 1363 B. S., that there was nothing from which it could be said that there was any holding over by the lessees, and further, that the Sub-Divisional land Reforms Officer, Lalbag, by has letter, dated December 6, 1958, to the lessees, treated them as trespassers and asked them to show cause why appropriate steps should not be taken against them for their unauthorised cultivation of Government lands. The commissioner was of the. view that the Government could sue the lessees for damages, if they were actually in unauthorised occupation of the lands, but could not take recourse to certificate proceedings, which was permissible only for recovery of arrears of rent. In this view of the matter, he cancelled all the certificates. 5. THE Government, thereupon, moved the Board of Revenue against the above orders of the Commissioner. The Board of Revenue found as a fact that the lessees were still in possession of the lands in question and this, in its view, amounted to holding over. In this view of the matter, he cancelled all the certificates. 5. THE Government, thereupon, moved the Board of Revenue against the above orders of the Commissioner. The Board of Revenue found as a fact that the lessees were still in possession of the lands in question and this, in its view, amounted to holding over. The board further held that, even if there was no holding over, the tenancy would not come to an end by efflux of time as the lessees had, under section 6 (1)of the Estates Acquisition Act, the right to retain their lands after the vesting of their estate in the State. It pointed out that, in view of the provisions of rule 4 of the Rules under the act; an intermediary would be an occupancy raiyat under the State in respect of the retained lands. 6. IN execution of the certificates, some money of the certificate debtors, lying in deposit with the Excise commissioner, was attached. The certificate debtors raised a contention before the Board that attachment of the money was illegal in view of the provisions of section 168a (1) of- the Bengal Tenancy Act. This contention also was negatived by the Board and it set aside the Commissioner's orders and restored the Certificates for the reasons, indicated above. It is against these orders of the board that the present rules were issued. It must, in the first place, be pointed out that mere retention of the lands after the expiry of the lease, without some overt acts to indicate the intention to hold over on the same terms, would not amount to a legal holding over. The petitioners did not pay any rent to the Government and the Sub-Divisional Land Reforms Officer, as his letter, dated December 6, 1968, shows, was not also willing to recognise them as tenants of the Government. So, there was nothing tangible, from which any inference of holding over could be made. 7. PROPERLY speaking, however, there was no scope at all for the application of the principle of holding over in the present case as the old tenancy had been extinguished completely by the vesting of the lessee's interest in the State free from all incumbrances. It is true that, after the vesting of their interest in the State, the petitioners became entitled to retain some lands as tenants under the government. It is true that, after the vesting of their interest in the State, the petitioners became entitled to retain some lands as tenants under the government. But that would be a different tenancy, created by the special provisions of the statute. So no question of application of the principle of holding over arises at all. 8. SUB-SEC. (5)of sec. 6 of the estates Acquisition Act says that an intermediary has to exercise his choice for retention of land under sub-section (1) within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed and that, if no choice is exercised by him during the prescribed period, the Revenue officer shall, after giving him an opportunity of being heard, allow him to retain so much of the lands as do not exceed the limits, specified in clauses (c), (d)and (j)of that sub-section. The lands in question being agricultural lands clause (d)will apply and the limit of retainable lands, prescribed thereunder, is 25 acres only. The petitioners were in possession of 50 acres, which was much in excess of this limit, but they did not exercise their choice by submitting 'b' form, as required by the rules, within the prescribed period, nor did the Revenue officer comply with the provisions of sub-section (5of section 6. The petitioners may, if they so desire, refuse to retain any land at all or to retain upto the maximum limit permissible, when a notice is given to them by the Revenue Officer, as required under sub-section (5of section 6. Even assuming that they would be willing to retain the maximum area permissible under the law, they would, in such cases, be tenants in respect of 25 acres only, and not in respect of the entire 50 acres. So long as the formalities, prescribed under sub-section (5of Section 6 are not complied with, there is no certainty as to which lands would constitute the tenancy. In any case, the Government could not demand rent for the entire 50 acres. The amount claimed under the 8 certificates in question must evidently be partly for rent and partly for damages due to the Government for the unauthorised occupation of the lands above the ceiling. But there cannot be any certificate for such mixed demands of rent and damages. In the circumstances, the Certificates in question must be set aside. 9. The amount claimed under the 8 certificates in question must evidently be partly for rent and partly for damages due to the Government for the unauthorised occupation of the lands above the ceiling. But there cannot be any certificate for such mixed demands of rent and damages. In the circumstances, the Certificates in question must be set aside. 9. AS the Certificates themselves are going to be set aside, it will not be necessary to go into the question whether section 168a (1of the Bengal tenancy Act is a bar to the attachment of the petitioners' money, lying in deposit with the Excise Commissioner. 10. THE result, therefore, is that all the eight rules are made absolute. The orders of the Board of Revenue are set aside and those of the Divisional Commissioner, cancelling the Certificates are restored. In the circumstances of these cases, no order is made as to costs.