JUDGMENT C.D. Parekh, J. - This writ petition has been directed against the orders dated 3-9-1964 and 16-9-1964 passed by respondent No. 1 Shri Sushil Kumar Varma, Munsif Orai, in Cr. Reference No. 12 of 1964 Lakhan Singh v. Jaipal Singh. 2. The facts briefly stated are as below : There was dispute about possession of agricultural plot nos. 195 and 415 between the petitioner and opposite party no. 3 Jaipal Singh. The petitioner is said to have filed a case under section 145 Cr.P.C. in the court of the opposite party no. 2 Shri B.P. Mathur, SDM, Pargana Kalpi, district Jalaun. After completing the formalities of law he passed an order u/ S. 145(1) Cr.P.C. and ordered attachment of the aforesaid plots and the standing crop thereon. This attachment is said to have been effected on March 13, 1964 and the plots were given in the supardgi of one Babu Singh, a local resident. The parties to the proceedings thereafter filed written statements in respect of their respective claim and also their affidavits in support of their claim and the documents which they wanted to file in support of their respective claims. Opposite party no. 2, viz., the SDM, was unable to decide, from the evidence on record, as to which of the parties was in possession over the disputed plots and, therefore, he made a reference to the opposite party no. 1 Munsif under section 146 (1). Cr.P.C. on May 18, 1964. While ma-making the reference to the civil court opposite party no. 2 did not fix any date for the appearance of the parties before opposite party no. 1 as required by the provisions of S. 146 (1) Cr.P.C. It is stated in the writ petition that the opposite party no. 1 also did not issue summons, notice or any information to the petitioner or his counsel of the date fixed for the appearance before him. From the true copy of the order sheet of the court of the Munsif it appears that after the receipt of the reference it was ordered to be registered and the case was put up on July 31, 1964, for final hearing but the Munsif also wrote out a word "inform" which clearly meant information to the parties concerned in the dispute. There is a note appended below the order-sheet which runs thus:- "July 27, 1964 Ko Notice Bhejee Gayee Thee". There is a note appended below the order-sheet which runs thus:- "July 27, 1964 Ko Notice Bhejee Gayee Thee". This order was passed by the Munsif on July 2, 1964 but it does not appear as to when this note was appended on the order sheet. From the next order which is dated September 2, 1964 is appears that none responded to the call of the case and the Munsif was, therefore, of the opinion that the parties have not been informed of the date. Therefore, he on that date ordered that information be given to the counsel for the parties and he fixed September 3, 1964 for the final hearing of the case. From the perusal of the order-sheet it does not appear that the counsel for the petitioner had any information or information was given to the petitioner himself. On September 3, 1964 the case appears to have been finally decided in the absence of the petitioner. The petitioner further appears to have moved a restoration application on being informed that the case had been decided ex parte. This restoration application was put up before the Munsif and it appears to have been decided by his order dated September 16, 1964, The Munsif in his order observed; hat the proper remedy for the applicant (petitioner) is now to move revision application against the decision of the learned magistrate under section 145 Cr.P.C. which remedy is still open to the applicant (petitioner). He observed that the magistrate while referring the case did not fix any date for the appearance of the parties in the civil court and, therefore, the civil court sent information to the parties but it appeared to the Munisif that the applicant was not informed of the date fixed. The Munsif further observed that the applicant did not respond on the date fixed and, therefore, the reference was decided ex parte. The Munsif further observed that the civil court cannot restore the criminal reference because there is no provision under which the civil court can do so. The provisions of the C.P.C. in the opinion of the Munsif have not been made applicable to the criminal reference which are solely governed by S. 146 Cr.P.C. and S. 146 Cr.P.C. does not provide for setting aside of an ex parte order. The provisions of the C.P.C. in the opinion of the Munsif have not been made applicable to the criminal reference which are solely governed by S. 146 Cr.P.C. and S. 146 Cr.P.C. does not provide for setting aside of an ex parte order. He further observed that there is no force in the restoration application, although he felt that the applicant (petitioner) has been put to great hardship. He rejected the restoration application. After passing this order the opposite party no. 1 sent the record of the case to the court of the opposite party no. 2, i.e., the SDM, and the final order may be passed but the petitioner approached this Court u/Art. 226 of the Constitution of India and the proceedings before the SDM have been stayed by an order of this Court. 3. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the ex parte order of respondent no. 1 dated September 3, 1964 in Cr. Reference No. 12 of 1964 is without any information to the petitioner and is illegal and without jurisdiction. In the alternative it has also been submitted that in the special circumstances of the case the ex parte order is in violation of the natural justice and is liable to be quashed. The learned counsel for the petitioner also argued that it is wrong to say that the provisions of the C.Y.C. do not apply to the proceedings when a criminal reference is sent to the civil court for decision. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a ruling reported in Ram Chandra Agarwal and others v. State of UP and others (1966 AWR 674 SC) wherein it has been held that the provisions of CPC would apply generally to a proceeding before a civil court arising out of a reference to it by a Magistrate under section 146 (1) of the Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court observed that the expression 'proceeding' used in S. 24, C.P.C. is not a term of art which has acquired a definite meaning. Looking to the context in which the word has been used in S. 24 (1) (b) of the C.P.C it would appear to be something going on in a court in relation to the adjudication of a dispute other than a suit or an appeal. Looking to the context in which the word has been used in S. 24 (1) (b) of the C.P.C it would appear to be something going on in a court in relation to the adjudication of a dispute other than a suit or an appeal. Bearing in mind that the term "proceeding" indicates something in which business is conducted according to a prescribed mode it would be only right to give it, a comprehensive meaning so as to include within it all matters coming up for judicial adjudication and not to confine it to a civil proceeding alone. A proceeding before a civil court arising out of a reference to it under section 146 (1) Cr.P.C. can be transferred by the District Court under section 24 C.P.C. because it is in any case a proceeding. The Supreme Court further observed that it is not necessary to consider in this case whether the proceeding before the civil court is a civil proceeding as contemplated by S. 141 or not. The Supreme Court was only concerned with a case whether the provisions of S. 24 (1) (b) of the C.P.C. are available with respect to a proceeding arising out of a reference under section 146 (1) CrPC. It has further been observed by the Supreme Court that looking to the context in which the word has been used under section 24 (1) (b) of the C.P.C. it would appear to be something going on in the court in relation to the adjudication of a dispute other than a suit or an appeal. Bearing in mind that the term "proceeding" indicates something in which business is conducted according to a prescribed mode it would be only right to give it as used in the aforesaid provision, a comprehensive meaning so as to include within it all matters coming up for judicial adjudication and not to confine it to a civil, proceeding alone. Examining the facts of this case in view of the observations of the Supreme Court it is apparent from the order sheet and the copy of the order dated Sept. 16, 1964 that the petitioner was not informed of the date either by the Magistrate or by the Munsif and the Munsif very much felt the hardship which the petitioner is to suffer on account of the final order having been passed ex parte. 16, 1964 that the petitioner was not informed of the date either by the Magistrate or by the Munsif and the Munsif very much felt the hardship which the petitioner is to suffer on account of the final order having been passed ex parte. The Munsif, therefore, finding no provision of law dismissed the restoration application with certain observations as stated above. In my opinion in the circumstances of the case the Munsif had ample power u/S,. 151 C.P.C. to correct its own mistake. The mistake was that no information reached the petitioner at any point of time although the Munsif himself had ordered for giving the information. It appears that while passing the final order the Munsif over-looked his own order otherwise this mistake could not have been committed. On Sept. 2, 1964 the Munsif himself has stated in his order that the parties have not been informed of the date and, therefore, he directed the office to inform the counsel for the parties and fixed Sept. 3, 1964 for final hearing. On Sept. 3, 1964 the Munsif did not ascertain whether the counsel had been informed or not. If lie would have taken this care lie would not have passed final order on Sept. 3, 1964 and would have stayed his hands till the information reached the counsel for the petitioner or the petitioner himself. In my opinion under section 151 C.P.C. there are ample powers in a court to correct its own mistakes and that mistake could have been corrected when an application for restoration of the case was filed under section 151 CPC. These proceedings under section 146(1) could well have been treated as civil proceedings. It is correct to say that O. 9 C.P.C. in terms does not apply to the facts of the case as it was not a question of restoration of a suit. But it was a question wherein the court was required to correct its own mistake and that could have very well been (lone by the Munsif under the inherent powers with which he had been vested under S. 151 C.P.C. Section 151 C.P.C. invests the court with an inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the court. For the ends of justice in my opinion it was required of the Munsif to have invoked his inherent powers and could have set aside the ex parte order and the petitioner should have been afforded an opportunity of hearing. 5. It has been argued on behalf of the opposite party in this case that there is an alternative and efficacious remedy open to the petitioner u/sub S. (1-E) of S. 146 Cr.P.C. and the petitioner could have filed a civil suit for declaration of his rights. I do not agree with the contention raised on behalf of the opposite party. Firstly for the reason that no reasonable opportunity was afforded to the petitioner for hearing of the matter against him and secondly the Magistrate referring the order under section 146 did not direct the parties to appear before the civil court on a date to be fixed by him and the Munsif also did not care to see that information of the date fixed reached the petitioner or not. In these circumstances I feel that it is not a material irregularity in conducting the proceedings. In my opinion it is a non compliance of the relevant provisions of law. It may he true that the existence of an alternative statutory remedy may be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs and where such a remedy exists it would be a sound exercise of jurisdiction to refuse interference in a writ petition but in such circumstances it should always be remembered that the rule of exhaustion of a statutory remedy before a writ is granted is a rule of self impaid limitation and not a rule of law. In the case which I have before me the existence of an alternative remedy in my opinion is no bar to the grant of the writ petition, particularly when it has been alleged that the tribunal acted in violation of law and principles of natural justice. 6. In my opinion the writ petition must succeed and the petitioner may be given an opportunity of hearing before the Munsif. I, therefore, quash the order dated Sept. 3, 1964 and Sept. 6. In my opinion the writ petition must succeed and the petitioner may be given an opportunity of hearing before the Munsif. I, therefore, quash the order dated Sept. 3, 1964 and Sept. 16, 1964 passed by the Munsif and direct the SDM, Pargana Kalpi, district Jalaun, to fix a date for the appearance of the parties before the Munsif Oral and Munsif Oral should treat the case on its original number and thereafter decide the reference according to law. The writ petition is allowed. I make no order as to costs.