JUDGMENT : Untwalia & Verma, JJ. This second appeal by the plaintiffs has come before us for hearing and disposal on being referred & to a Division Bench by a learned Single Judge of this Court. It arises out of a suit filed by the appellants against the defendant-respondents for realisation of Rs. 2587.50 paise, being half the cost of prosecuting an appeal in the Supreme Court under the circumstances stated hereinafter. 2. Salamat Ali Khan and Sakhawat Ali Khan were brothers. The former had a son named Nazir Md. Khan and a daughter named Bibi Hamidan. The latter had two sons named Basir Md. Khan and Nazir Md. Khan and a daughter named Bibi Jamila Khatoon. Jamila was married to Nazir, and Hamidan was married to Basir. Hamidan died during the life time of Basir. On her death, defendant no. 2, one of the sons of Nazir and Jamila, being an heir of Basir to the extent of 1/6th share filed a suit against him for realisation of 1/6th amount of the dower debt, said to be due to Hamidan from Basir. According to the case of defendant no. 2, the amount of the whole of the dower debt was Rs. 40,000/-, There was a contest by Basir, who said that the amount of dower debt was only Rs. 500/- and resisted the suit on other grounds also. The suit was dismissed by the trial court, but on appeal to the High Court it was decreed. Basir went up in appeal to the higher Court which eventually came to be pending in the Supreme Court, during the pendency of which Basir died. Basir died leaving without any issue. His heirs were Jamila Khatoon to the extent of half and the sons' of Nasir to the extent of the other half. Jamila did not apply to be substituted as an appellant in the appeal in the Supreme Court in place of Basir. The only applicants were the plaintiffs, the son of Nasir, who were substituted as appellants. Jamila was substituted as respondent no. 4. The appeal eventually succeeded, and the decree of the High Court in favour of defendant no. 2 was set aside. The only applicants were the plaintiffs, the son of Nasir, who were substituted as appellants. Jamila was substituted as respondent no. 4. The appeal eventually succeeded, and the decree of the High Court in favour of defendant no. 2 was set aside. The plaintiffs filed the present suit for realisation of half the amount of cost claimed to have been incurred by them in the Supreme Court appeal on the ground that by the setting aside of the decree for dower debt, Jamila Khatoon, who was the heir of Basir to the extent of half, was also benefited. 3. Jamila Khatoon was defendant no. 1 in the suit and, after her death, she has been substituted by her daughter named Bibi Khairon Nisa, whereas her sons are defendants 2 to 4. The defence of Jamila Khatoon was that she was not benefited by the result of the appeal. She did not like to prosecute the appeal in the Supreme Court. Certain facts were stated on her behalf to show that the plaintiffs really prosecuted the appeal in the Supreme Court for their own benefit and not for the benefit of Jamila Khatoon. 4. Both the courts below have dismissed the suit. The concurrent findings of the courts below seem to be that the plaintiffs prosecuted the appeal in the Supreme Court for their own benefit primarily and that they were never asked to do so by Jamila Khatoon or on her behalf. 5. Mr. Mazhar Hussain, learned counsel for the appellants, submitted, that on a correct application of the principle of law en grafted in Section 70 of the Contract Act, the suit ought to have been decreed. Counsel submitted that it is obvious that the appeal in the Supreme Court was prosecuted by the plaintiffs not only for their own benefit but for and for the benefit of Jamila Khatoon also. Since she has derived benefit from the prosecution of the appeal in the Supreme Court by the plaintiffs and success therein, she is bound to compensate them in respect of the cost incurred by them to the extent of her share, that is, half. 6. In regard to the amount of cost, both the courts below have accepted the case of the plaintiffs. That fact is no longer in dispute before us. 6. In regard to the amount of cost, both the courts below have accepted the case of the plaintiffs. That fact is no longer in dispute before us. The question, however, is as to whether on the facts pleaded or found the plaintiffs are entitiled to be re-imbursed to the extent of half the cost incurred by them in the Supreme Court. 7. In Paragraph 3 of the plaint, the only fact pleaded to found the claim of reimbursement is that after the death of Basir Mohammed Khan, the plaintiffs met all the costs of the appeal which was decided by the Supreme Court on the 25th of May, 1950, in favour of the heirs of Basir Mohammed Khan, and, thereby defendant no. 1 had been benefited and so she was bound in law to pay her quota of the expenses which she was liable to I contribute. The three facts to be pleaded or found either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence to found the claim under Section 70 of the Contract Act must be (1) that a person has done anything for another person, (2) that he has so done not intending to do so gratuitously, and (3) that such other person has enjoyed the benefit thereof. The facts pleaded in the plaint merely show that the plaintiffs did something. It does not show that they did it for Jamila Khatoon also and not only for themselves; nor does it show that while prosecuting the appeal in the Supreme Court they did not intend to do anything for Jamila Khatoon gratuitously. The mere fact of some benefit going to Jamila Khatoon, even assuming that some benefit did go, is not sufficient to decree the plaintiffs' suit on the principle of Section 70 of the Contract Act. 8. At the trial, the plaintiffs attempted to adduce evidence that Jamila Khatoon had asked them to prosecute the appeal and they did so for her benefit. This case naturally has rightly failed in both the courts. 8. At the trial, the plaintiffs attempted to adduce evidence that Jamila Khatoon had asked them to prosecute the appeal and they did so for her benefit. This case naturally has rightly failed in both the courts. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in (1) State of West Bengal V. M/S B.K. Mandal and Sons (A.I.R. 1962 Supreme Court 779), it is not necessary to prove the existence of an express or implied contract for the purpose of founding a claim in accordance with Section 70 of the Contract Act, rather the claim under the said provision of law is based upon different principles other than the existence of an express or implied contract. Nonetheless, no case has taken the view that the mere fact of benefit to some person will entitle the person whose act brought about the benefit to be compensated from the person benefited. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance upon the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in (2) S. Sriram Raja and others V. Secretary of State (A.I.R. 1943 Madras 85) and submitted that even though, according to the findings of the courts below they were not asked by Jamila Khatoon to prosecute the appeal in the Supreme Court, they are bound to compensate them for half the amount of cost incurred by them as the appeal has resulted in benefit to Jamila Khatoon also. The case is clearly distinguishable. It has been pointed out at Page 86, column 1, of the report that the person benefited by the excavation and clearance of the tank had not objected to the work being done for him by the Government. He had merely objected to share the cost. When, however, the work was done, he enjoyed the benefit. In that view of the matter, it was held that the work was done for the benefited man also, although the Government which had done the work was also benefited and had done it also for itself. On the facts of the instant case, either on the pleadings or on the findings recorded by the courts below, it is clear that the plaintiffs did not do the work for Jamila Khatoon. They did it entirely for themselves. On the facts of the instant case, either on the pleadings or on the findings recorded by the courts below, it is clear that the plaintiffs did not do the work for Jamila Khatoon. They did it entirely for themselves. The result might have benefited Jamila Khatoon to some extent, although, as has been stated above, even in that regard, the finding is not in favour of the appellants. 10. In (3) Abdul Wahid Khan V. Shaluka Bibi and others (I.L.R. 21 Calcutta 496), under similar circumstances, Sir R. Couch, while delivering the JUDGMENT : on behalf of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, has stated at Page 504 “In the present appeal the defendant claimed to be allowed a proportion of those costs, on the ground that the plaintiffs had got the benefit of the reversal of the decree of the Judicial Commissioner. This is not a ground for making the plaintiffs liable for any portion of those costs. The proceedings were taken by the defendant for his own benefit, and without any authority express or implied from the plaintiff; and the fact that the result was also a benefit to the plaintiffs does not create any implied contract or give the defendant any equity to be paid a share of the costs by the plaintiffs." This case has rightly been relied upon by the courts below to repel the claim of the plaintiffs. Learned counsel for the appellants endeavoured to distinguish this case on the ground that the principle of Section 70 of the Contract Act has not been expressly discussed in that case. We are unable to accept this contention. The principle was not enunciated only upon the basis of express or implied contract but upon the basis of equity also which is really the principle engrafted in Section 70 of the Contract Act. 11. It has been pointed out by Madhavan Nair, J. in (4) Komanduru Sampath Ayyangar and another V. Sri Govinda Krishna Yachandralavari Bahadur (A.I.R. 1931 Madras 51) that the question whether what has been done by 'a person' has been done for 'another' person within the meaning of Section 70 is a question of fact in each case. 11. It has been pointed out by Madhavan Nair, J. in (4) Komanduru Sampath Ayyangar and another V. Sri Govinda Krishna Yachandralavari Bahadur (A.I.R. 1931 Madras 51) that the question whether what has been done by 'a person' has been done for 'another' person within the meaning of Section 70 is a question of fact in each case. That being so, on the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below and specially in absence of any express pleading to that effect in the plaint instituted by the appellants, it cannot be held that the plaintiffs have succeeded in making out a case for compensation under Section 70 of the Contract Act. 12. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed; but, in the circumstances, we shall make no ORDER :as to cost in this Court. Appeal dismissed