JUDGMENT R.S. Pathak, J. - This is a plaintiff's appeal against an order of the learned Civil Judge, Farrukhabad directing that the remuneration of the Receiver should be met from the profits of the property in suit, and the deficiency, if any from one of the defendants personally. 2. Original suit No. 42 of 1958 was filed by the appellant for a declaration that he was the sole proprietor of the cattle market and for an injunction restraining his brothers from interfering with his possession and management of the market. One of the two brothers was Attat Mand Khan. During the pendency of the suit Attat Mand Khan applied for the appointment of a Receiver, and it appears that on May 17, 1951 an order was made by the trial court appointing one Shafiqur Rahman as Receiver. At a later stage of the litigation, another order was made by the trial court on November 16, 1966 appointing Shri K. B. Hajela as Receiver in place of Shafiqur Rahman. His remuneration was fixed at 4% of the income from the share of Attat Mand Khan in the property. On December 2, 1956 the trial court modified the order and fixed the remuneration of the Receiver at Rs. 401- per day for each day on which he worked and directed the amount to be paid by Attat Mand Khan. Upon an application by Attat Mand Khan for modification of that order, the trial court passed an order on December 7, 1956 directing that the remuneration of the Receiver should be recovered in the first instance from a one-third part of the income of the market, and in case it was found that the one-third part did not suffice to cover the same the deficiency should be made good by Attat Mand Khan personally. Against that order the present appeal has been filed. 3. At the outset, the first question is whether the appeal is maintainable. It is clear from the facts enumerated above that the order under appeal is an order determining the source from which the remuneration of the Receiver has to be paid. It seems to us that the order is one falling under Rule 2 of Order 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is clear from the facts enumerated above that the order under appeal is an order determining the source from which the remuneration of the Receiver has to be paid. It seems to us that the order is one falling under Rule 2 of Order 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under Order 43, Rule 1 (5) of the Code, it is only an order under Rule 1 or Rule 4 of Order 40 which is appealable. No appeal has been provided against an order under Rule 2. 4. It has been urged on behalf of the appellant that in every case where an order directs payment of the remuneration of the Receiver from out of the estate in respect of which the Receiver is appointed it is an order made under Rule 1 of Order 40. We think not, merely because the source of payment of the Receiver's remuneration is the estate itself does not, in our opinion, make the order one under Rule 1 of Order 40. The order is still one under Rule of Order 40. 5. In Thomas Cunlif Tweedie v. Pokea Khatun, AIR 1915 Calcutta 74 a Receiver was appointed by the Calcutta High Court but the Court did not actually appoint a person to that office. When the case was taken up by the trial court, one Mr. Tweedie was appointed Receiver. The trial court, while appointing Mr. Tweedie as receiver added the direction that he would get by way of remuneration 122%0 out of the amount actually collected by him. Against that order, an appeal was filed to the High Court. It was urged that inasmuch as the remuneration was to be paid out from the property in charge of the Receiver, the order was one under Rule I (d) of Order 40 and, therefore, an appeal lay. The contention was repelled by Carnduff, J. who observed : "I cannot yield to the contention that an order finding the amount of remuneration can be taken out of Rule 2, and brought within Rule 1 (d) because it involves "the application and disposal of the rents and profits". Clearly, it is only out of these that such remuneration is ordinarily, if not invariably, provided. That being so, no appeal would lie." Richardson, J. agreed and observed : "The contention that the order in question is an order under Cl. Clearly, it is only out of these that such remuneration is ordinarily, if not invariably, provided. That being so, no appeal would lie." Richardson, J. agreed and observed : "The contention that the order in question is an order under Cl. (d) , Rule 1, Order 40, conferring on the receiver a. power as to the application and disposal of the rents and profits of the properties in his hands and is therefore appealable cannot be entertained. The existence of the separate Rule 2 goes far to negative this contention and it would be absurd to suppose that an appeal lies when remuneration is to be paid from rents and profits and that no appeal lies when it is to be paid from some other source." We have been referred by the appellant to Messrs Budhulal Jagannath v. The Hirdagarh Collieries Ltd., A.I.R. 1942 Nagpur 64. In that case the Nagpur High Court took the view that though the court has the power to make an order fixing the remuneration of the Receiver at any time, nevertheless it must be regarded as part of the order of appointment. The Court observed : "Ordinarily, the remuneration would be fixed at the time of appointment and it is not denied that in such a case the. appeal could be directed against the remuneration fixed and it is obvious that it must be so. A party might have no objection to the appointment of a Receiver or even to the appointment of a particular person as receiver provided a reasonable remuneration was fixed, but it a receiver could only be appointed on a remuneration which, it's in his opinion, was unreasonable, then clearly he would object to the appointment on the ,)round that it was not just and convenient to have a receiver who would prove so costly as to cause a serious loss. If that is the position when the order fixing the remuneration is made along with the order of, appointment, we can see no difference in principle to allowing the party to appeal when the order fixing the remuneration is made at a later stage. We have no doubt that the Court has power to make the order at a latter, stage, especially if the circumstances. We have no doubt that the Court has power to make the order at a latter, stage, especially if the circumstances. are altered but we are of opinion that in every such case the order is really a continuation of the original order of appointment; at any rate it is so closely connected with the original order that it must be regarded as part and parcel of that order. Therefore a person objecting must either take the first order mentioning no remuneration as conclusive in the sense that no remuneration is to be fixed or take the order which fixes a remuneration at a later stage as a continuation of the original order. In either event the matter would, in our opinion, be appealable." With great respect to the learned judges, we are unable to agree. It is not necessary to express any opinion on the question whether an order fixing the remuneration of the receiver at the time when the order appointing the receiver is made is appealable. We are concerned in this case with an order made in respect of the remuneration of a receiver some time after the order of appointment of the receiver was made. We cannot agree with the learned judges that it an order is made fixing the remuneration of a receiver subsequently to the order appointing the receiver, it is not an order under Rule 2 of Order 40 but must be treated as part of the order appointing the receiver under Rule 1. 6. In Rebati Ranjan Chakravarty v. Umaprasanna Mukerjee, AIR 1953 Calcutta 574 the Court made an order appointing a receiver and directed him to furnish security. There was a further direction that he would get Rs. 500/- as fixed remuneration. An sppeal against that order was dismissed as not maintainable. The Calcutta High Court approved of the decision in Thomas Cunliff Tweedie's case and dissented from the view taken in Messrs Budhulal Jagannath's case. It observed: "The original order of appointment is clearly appealable under Order 40, Rule 1. In that appeal the whole of the order is liable to review by the Court i f Appeal. A similar view cannot be taken where the only question before the Court is one under Order 40, Rule 2 fixing the remuneration of the Receiver. It observed: "The original order of appointment is clearly appealable under Order 40, Rule 1. In that appeal the whole of the order is liable to review by the Court i f Appeal. A similar view cannot be taken where the only question before the Court is one under Order 40, Rule 2 fixing the remuneration of the Receiver. Order 42, Rule 1 (a) distinctly limits the appeal to an order made under Order 40, Rule 1 or under Order 40, Rule 4. An order made under Order 40, Rule 2 has not, however, been made appealable." It also considered an earlier decision of the Calcutta High Court in Ali Ismail Boodha v. Momin Bibi, AIR 1952 Calcutta 52 and distinguished it on the ground that the question involved there was whether the order was appealable under clause 15, Letters Patent. The learned judges pointed out that Harries, C. J. was inclined in that case to accept the submission made by one of the learned counsel that if the order-fell under Order 40, Rule 2, no appeal lay from that order, and an order fixing 'the remuneration of the receiver was not 'perse' appealable under Order 43, 'Rule 1 (a). The Patna High Court also took the same view in Girdharan Prasad Missir v. A. Jamid, Pleader, Receiver, A.I.R. 1953 Pat. 264. It rejected the contention that an order directing payment of the remuneration of the receiver from the rents and profits of the estate was an order under Order 40, Rule 1 (d) . The learned Judges said "The order fixing the remuneration of the receiver is in the nature of a special order coming within the scope of Order 40, Rule 2. In view of this special procedural provision, it is difficult to hold that the matter of remuneration is governed either by Order 40, Rule 1 or by Order 40, Rule 4. In this connection, it is not a relevant consideration whether the remuneration of the receiver is to be paid out of the rents and profits of the estate, in his hand or not. In this connection, it is not a relevant consideration whether the remuneration of the receiver is to be paid out of the rents and profits of the estate, in his hand or not. Even if the remuneration is to be paid to the receiver from the rents and profits of the estate, the matter would properly fall within Rule 2 which states that "the Court may by a general or special order fix the amount to be paid as remuneration for the services of the receiver". If this is the correct position, it follows that no appeal lies against the order passed by the Subordinate judge in this case." 7. We are clearly of opinion that the instant order made by the learned Civil judge is not an order falling either under Rule 1 or Rule 4 of Order 40. it is, therefore, not appealable. 8. Towards the end of the hearing, learned counsel for the appellant prayed for leave to convert the present appeal into a revision application under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Even if leave is granted, we are unable to see how that can be of any assistance to the appellant. It has not been shown that the order passed by the learned Civil judge is vitiated by any error of jurisdiction or by any illegality or material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction. 9. The appeal fails and is dismissed. There is, however, no order as to costs.