JUDGMENT Asthana, J. - The applicant applied under Order 33 of the C. P. Code for leave to file a suit in forma-pauperis. An application was filed containing the necessary particulars together with a schedule of the properties belonging to the applicant. The court under Rule 4 of Order 33 examined the applicant and recorded his statement on the back of the application. No ground was found by the court for rejecting the application under Rule 5 of Order 33 and it fixed a date for receiving such further evidence as the applicant wanted to adduce in proof of his pauperism and for recording any evidence adduced in disproof thereof. It appears that 13-1-1968 was fixed for the purpose. On that date an application was filed on behalf of the applicant for adjournment but it was rejected. The court then passed the following order : "The permission to sue in forma pauperis is rejected for want of evidence. Jet court fee be paid by 27-1-1968." It is against the said order of the court below that the applicant has come up ,n revision before this Court. 2. It was contended by the learned counsel for the applicant that the court below had no jurisdiction to reject the application to site in forma pauperis without recording any finding that the applicant was not a pauper. He further contended that the court below acted illegally and with material irregularity in taking the view that there was no evidence on record in support of the applicant's case that he was a pauper. It was submitted that even if -he applicant did not adduce any evidence on the date fixed and there being no evidence to the contrary in disproof thereof there was at least on the record the applicant's statement under Rule 4 of Order 33 and the report of the District Government Counsel supporting the case of the plaintiff that he was a pauper. 3. It would be seen that under Rule 4 an applicant is examined if the court thinks it fit regarding the merits of the claim and the property of the applicant. In the instant case the court thought it fit to examine the applicant. The statement of the applicant regarding his property shows that he was not possessed of sufficient means to pay the court-fees. In the instant case the court thought it fit to examine the applicant. The statement of the applicant regarding his property shows that he was not possessed of sufficient means to pay the court-fees. To my mind, a statement made by an applicant as a result of examination by the court under Rule 4, would be evidence on which the court can proceed even at a subsequent stage. The court is then empowered under Rule 5 to reject the application for any of the reasons mentioned therein. In the instant case the court did not find anything for rejecting the application under Rule 5. Then Rule 6 says where a court sees no reason to reject the application on any of the ground stated in Rule 5 it shall fix a elate for which at least 10 days clear notice shall be given to the opposite-parties and the Government Pleader for recording such evidence as the applicant may produce in proof of his pauperism and for recording any evidence that may be adduced in disproof thereof. When the court axed 13-1-1968 of which notice as given to the opposite-parties and the Government Pleader, it acted under Rule 6. No party is under compulsion to adduce any evidence. There is nothing in Rule 6 laying clown that the opposite-parties will not adduce evidence in disproof of pauperism unless the applicant at first adduced evidence in proof of pauperism. The applicant may not adduce any further evidence and continue to rely on his statement made under Rule 4 which, as observed above, is good evidence on record in support of his pauperism. Merely because the applicant does not adduce any further evidence it would not empower the court just to reject the application, more so when the opposite-parties have not adduced any evidence in disproof of pauerism. Rule 6 contemplates service of the notice on Government Pleader also. I am not concerned in this case to decide the question whether the report submitted by a Government Pleader either favouring the applicant or opposing him is evidence or not. Rule 6 contemplates service of the notice on Government Pleader also. I am not concerned in this case to decide the question whether the report submitted by a Government Pleader either favouring the applicant or opposing him is evidence or not. But I think if in response to a notice under Rule 6 the Government Pleader appears and submits a report favouring the applicant then that would be a circumstance which ought to be taken into consideration by the court as a statement of Government Pleader amounting to a concession on be- half of the State to the effect that it does not consider that the applicant is possessed of sufficient means to pay the court-fee and his case be entertained by the court without payment of court-fees. Primarily it is the State whose interest is to realise the court fees. A party to a suit is not interested as such in the levy and payment of court-fees. Under the scheme of Order 33 notice is given to the opposite-parties with the object of finding out whether the applicant has any case and whether he is possessed of sufficient means as the opposite-parties can assist the court in this regard. On behalf of the State, the Government Pleader, if it is found on enquiry that the applicant is possessed of sufficient means, can also place the 'material on which he relies. The opposite-parties will also place the material of which it relies. There is nothing to prevent the Government Pleader and opposite-parties making a joint representation in this respect before the court. It is also open to the opposite- parties to bring any evidence before the court in disproof of pauperism inspite of the District Government Counsel on behalf of the State not raising any contest. It all depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. I do not read anything in the scheme of Rule 6 that a court would not have asked the opposite-parties to adduce evidence if the said party wished to do so in disproof of pauperism. On the record at that stage the only material before the court in favour of the applicant's pauperism was his own statement and the concession by the State made through the District Government Counsel. On the record at that stage the only material before the court in favour of the applicant's pauperism was his own statement and the concession by the State made through the District Government Counsel. In those circumstances I think it was incumbent on the opposite-parties if they wanted to adduce evidence in disproof of pauperism to do so on the date fixed, as under Rule 6 the date is fixed for the production of evidence by both the parties if they wanted to do so and not only for the applicant. Apart from adducing their own substantive evidence it is open to the opposite-party to call the applicant for cross-examination on his statement made under Rule 4 even though the applicant does not adduce any further evidence on the date fixed under Rule 6. 4. Coming to Rule 7, it is clear that the court will examine the witnesses, it any, produced by other party and then again examine the applicant. If either party does not produce any witnesses it does not mean that the court shall not hear arguments which it is bound to do under clause (2) of Rule 7 of Order 33. I do not find anything on record in the instant case showing that the court afforded an opportunity to the applicant or his counsel or his agent to make arguments. The court thought that if the applicant did not produce any evidence then the application was to be dismissed automatically. There is force in the argument made by the learned counsel for the applicant that the law contemplates a finding to be recorded by the court and then either allow or refuse to allow the applicant to sue as a pauper as envisaged by clause (:1) of Rule 7 of Order 33. It is not clear from the impugned order of the court below as to what it meant by observings "the permission to sue in forma pauperism is rejected for want of evidence." The permission to sue in forma pauperism is to be refused only when the courts find an applicant not to be a pauper. Once the Court has proceeded beyond the stage of Rule 5 it ought not to view the case as if there was no proof on record in favour of the applicant's pauperism. Once the Court has proceeded beyond the stage of Rule 5 it ought not to view the case as if there was no proof on record in favour of the applicant's pauperism. As I have already held above there was material on the record in support of the applicant's pauperism which was not rebutted by the opposite-parties either by adducing such evidence or by calling the applicant for cross-examination, the procedure adopted by the court below, therefore, was not in accordance with the provisions of Order 33. On the date fixed the court ought to have asked either party whether any evidence was to be produced and if none of the parties were prepared to produce any evidence the court ought to have heard arguments and then decided whether the applicant was a pauper or not. I do not find any material on record showing that the court asked either party if they wanted to adduce any evidence or afforded an opportunity to the counsel, of either party to address argument. The impugn- ed order thus is vitiated. 5. Accordingly, I allow this application in revision, set aside the impugned order of the court below and direct that the application under Order 33 shall be restores to its original number, heard and decided in accordance with law and in the light of the observation made above. In the circumstances of the case I make no order for costs.