ORDER M.H. Beg, J. - This writ petition is directed against the decisions of the consolidation authorities in proceedings u/s 9 of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act. Petitioner No. 1 is a man called Mohammad Miyan, who is said to be deaf and dumb and an idiot since his birth. He has been described as "fatirul aql" (insane) in the revenue records. Petitioner No. 2, Smt. Ahmadi Begum, is his sister who is also said to be a disabled person. A copy of the objections filed jointly on behalf of both the Petitioners, u/s 9 of the Act, before the Consolidation Officer, was placed before me. It shows that the case taken up by the Petitioners clearly and specifically was firstly, that Petitioner No. 1 was a disabled person; secondly, that his sister, Petitioner No. 2, was also a disabled person because she had separated long ago from her husband, a man called Ali Ahmad; and thirdly, that Petitioner No. 2 was a disabled person because her husband Ali Ahmad was himself a chronic patient of gout and heart trouble since 9-4-1946 and was unable to cultivate land. In other words, so far as Petitioner No. 2 was concerned, the disability set up was distinctly and unmistakably two-fold. It was a disability alleged on the ground of separation from her husband Ali Ahmad for more than 30 years before the filing of the objection on 28-6-1961 and also on the ground that the husband was physically infirm and unable to cultivate. The Petitioner's case was that the contesting opposite parties, their tenants, had no higher rights than those of Asamis as both the Petitioners were disabled bhumidhars, within the definition of the term "disabled" contained in Section 157 of UP ZA and LR Act. 2. The Consolidation Officer had held that neither of the two Petitioners were disabled. But, it is clear from his judgment that although he had considered whether Petitioner No. 1 was disabled on the only ground set up by the Petitioner No. 1, the question whether Petitioner No. 2 was disabled was considered only on one of the two grounds of disability; whether she was a separated wife. But, it is clear from his judgment that although he had considered whether Petitioner No. 1 was disabled on the only ground set up by the Petitioner No. 1, the question whether Petitioner No. 2 was disabled was considered only on one of the two grounds of disability; whether she was a separated wife. The alternative case of Petitioner No. 2, that she was also disabled as her husband was physically infirm and therefore, disabled within the meaning of Section 157 of the UP ZA and LR Act, was not considered at all by the Consolidation Officer. 3. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation), on appeals to him, held that Mohammad Miyan, Petitioner No. 1, was "certainly a disabled person within the meaning of Section 157 of the UP ZA and LR Act." He, therefore, allowed appeal No. 834 relating to plots Nos. 1498 and 1499 on the ground that Petitioner No. 1 was the exclusive land-holder of these plots entitled to the benefit of the disability set up by him. With regard to the other plots, the Settlement Officer held that they were the plots in which both the Petitioners were co-sharing landholders so that the disability of one was not enough. The disability of Petitioner No. 2 was held not to have been proved. But, the Settlement Officer too had considered the case of a disability of Petitioner No. 2 due to her alleged separation from her husband only and ignored the alternative case. 4. The Dy. Director of Consolidation, in second appeal, merely observed that he had gone through the observations of both the authorities below him and that their findings of fact could not be disturbed as they were based on evidence and supported by good reasons. In other words, the Dy. Director did not consider it necessary to reassess the evidence, upon a second appeal u/s 11(2) of the Act, as it stood before its amendment in 1963, because the authorities below him had recorded certain findings of fact. The Dy. Director seemed to have erroneously thought that findings of fact could not be reopened by him. He certainly had the power to re-assess evidence u/s 11(2) of the Act. 5. When the case was taken to the Joint Director, in revision u/s 48 of the Act, it was contended that the subordinate authorities had not considered the alternative case of Petitioner No. 2. He certainly had the power to re-assess evidence u/s 11(2) of the Act. 5. When the case was taken to the Joint Director, in revision u/s 48 of the Act, it was contended that the subordinate authorities had not considered the alternative case of Petitioner No. 2. The Joint Director repelled the contention by holding that it could not be considered because the forwarding report of the Assistant Consolidation Officer did not mention that the Petitioner, Ahmadi Begum, claimed any disability on the ground that her husband was also disabled. He observed that the Petitioner's counsel had pointed out a ground of appeal that evidence was led on the alternative case, but the Joint Director thought that "this does not mean that Smt. Ahmadi Begum had claimed disability on the ground that her husband had been a disabled person." The Joint Director, therefore, thought that there was no failure to exercise jurisdiction simply because, in the circumstances pointed out by him, the Dy. Director was silent on the issue. 6. Neither the Joint Director nor any other consolidation authority gave the finding that the alternative plea, very clearly and specifically taken in the objection filed before the Consolidation Officer, on which evidence had been led, had been actually abandoned by Petitioner No. 2. Moreover, if, as the consolidation authorities held, Smt. Ahmadi Begum was not separated from her husband Ali Ahmad, who was said to be a vakil doing pairvi in litigation for Smt. Ahmadi Begum and looking after her interests, it is very difficult to conceive any reason why such a plea, to substantiate which the Petitioner had taken the trouble and presumably incurred the expense of producing a former Civil Surgeon, Dr. Gupta, who was said to have treated Ali Ahmad for several years from 1941 onwards, should be just dropped or abandoned by Petitioner No. 2 at any stage. No reason for such an abandonment could even be suggested. It may be mentioned here that, in para. Gupta, who was said to have treated Ali Ahmad for several years from 1941 onwards, should be just dropped or abandoned by Petitioner No. 2 at any stage. No reason for such an abandonment could even be suggested. It may be mentioned here that, in para. 4 of an affidavit filed on 21-7-1969 on behalf of the Petitioners, it was asserted that the alternative plea of Petitioner No. 2 was not only supported by "overwhelming and unrebutted evidence", but was also "raised and argued at every stage including that of the Joint Director." In para 4 of the counter affidavit filed in reply, there is only a general denial followed by the specific assertion that the disability of Petitioner No. 2 as well as of her husband were considered by all the consolidation authorities. If it was considered, it must have been raised and argued. But, the contesting opposite parties have not been able to show any passage in any judgment, except that of the Joint Director, indicating that the alternative plea was considered in any way. Judicial consideration implies at least a mention of the plea considered. It is more probable that it has escaped consideration by oversight. 7. The Joint Director's view seemed to be that unless a ground for a claim is advanced before the Assistant Consolidation Officer and mentioned by him in his report, forwarding the case to the Consolidation Officer as a disputed one, the claim can be ignored. If this was, as it appeared to be, the opinion of the Joint Director, it was clearly erroneous. The Assistant Consolidation Officer's function is that of a pretrial authority. He tries to find out whether there is a dispute and attempts to bring about a compromise and can only report the matter to the Consolidation Officer, the trial court, which takes evidence and adjudicates if no compromise is possible. 8. u/s 10(1)(2) of the Act, the disputants get an opportunity of being heard which should be widely construed to include a fresh opportunity to file objections before evidence is led. Technical rules of pleadings are not strictly applied even in regular civil courts in this country. 8. u/s 10(1)(2) of the Act, the disputants get an opportunity of being heard which should be widely construed to include a fresh opportunity to file objections before evidence is led. Technical rules of pleadings are not strictly applied even in regular civil courts in this country. In any case, when a plea was taken specifically in writing before the Consolidation Officer, on which evidence was also taken without any objection by opposite parties, either findings must be recorded on it by the Consolidation Officer, or, a sufficient reason for not recording findings on it, such as an abandonment of the plea, should be given. The Joint Director should have directed his subordinate authorities to consider the alternative plea and decide it as the failure to consider it at all was a material irregularity. 9. Another question which was argued was that the Consolidation authorities had clearly misunderstood the meaning of the words "separated from her husband" as they are used in Section 157 of the ZA and LR Act. The relevant part of this provision reads as follows: 157. Lease by a disabled person: (1) A bhumidhar or a sirdar or an asami holding the land in lieu of maintenance allowance under (Section II) who is: (a) an unmarried woman, or if married, divorced or separated from her husband or whose husband suffers, from any of the disqualifications mentioned in Clauses (c) or (d), or a widow; (b) a minor whose father suffers from any of the disqualifications mentioned in Clauses (c) or (d) or has died; and (c) a lunatic or an idiot; (d) a person incapable of cultivating by reason of blindness, or other physical infirmity; (e) prosecuting studies in a recognised institution and does not exceed 25 years in age and whose father suffers from any of the disqualifications mentioned in Clauses (c) or (d) or has died; (f) in the Military, Naval, or Air Service of Indian Dominion; or (g) under detention or imprisonment; may let the whole or any part of his holding; Provided that in the case of a holding held jointly by more persons than one, but one or more of them, but not all, are subject to the disabilities mentioned in Clauses (a) to (g), the person or persons may let out his or their share in the holding. 10. 10. Although, in the instant case, we are not concerned with any land held by a bhumidhar in lieu of maintenance, yet, in determining the limits of any one of the "classes mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 157," whose tenants are to be asamis u/s 21(1)(h) of the ZA and LR Act, the section must be read as a whole. If this is done, it is evident that the disability in each case is such that it either actually incapacitates a person from cultivating land or it is presumed to do this. So far as women are concerned, they are presumed to be incapable of physically cultivating the land with their own strength. Hence, an unmarried or a divorced woman is disabled irrespective of her own health or the strength of her body and even a married woman is to be held to be disabled if she is "separated from her husband". This phrase certainly does not mean that she must be either divorced or judicially separated. The word "judicially" cannot be introduced here before the word "separated". Separation can be outside and independently of proceedings of a court. It may be the result of either an agreement to separate or by force of circumstances which deprive the wife of her husband's presence arid disable her from calling upon his strength and physical capacity to carry ok cultivation. The husband may have deserted her or the couple may have reached an amicable settlement to live separately so that the husband and wife cannot function as a single economic unit for purposes of cultivation. 11. The words used in Section 157(1) of the ZA and LR Act are wide enough to cover various kinds of separation between a husband and a wife. But, each such separation, to enable the wife to set it up as a disability, must be genuine and lasting. It is evident that a faked or make-believe arrangement, even if sought to be supported by a written agreement will not do. Again, a temporary separation due to the husband's visit to another place will not do. It should at least be of a kind which necessitates a maintenance allowance by the husband to the wife. It is evident that a faked or make-believe arrangement, even if sought to be supported by a written agreement will not do. Again, a temporary separation due to the husband's visit to another place will not do. It should at least be of a kind which necessitates a maintenance allowance by the husband to the wife. Moreover, Section 21(1)(h) of the ZA and LR Act, which is relied upon on behalf of the Petitioners, requires the disability set up to exist both on the dates of vesting and the letting or of occupation and if the letting or occupation took place prior to 9-4-1946, also on the last mentioned date. This also indicates the lasting character of the disability contemplated. No case of this Court on the nature of wife's separation from her husband which constituted her disability was brought to my notice. But, in two reported decisions of the Board of Revenue UP, Sheo Narain Singh v. Smt. Sukhrani Kuer 1958 AWR (Rev.) 181 and Mt. Ram Ghandi v. Mukhtara and Ors. 1955 AWR (Rev.) 153, which have dealt with this question, the nature of a separated wife's disability was correctly approached from the angle indicated above. 12. The last consolidation authority which examined the facts concerning the disability of Petitioner No. 2 was the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). It has been contended, not without substance, that the Settlement Officer confused separation with strained or unpleasant relations between husband and wife. He observed: "In cases where separation from husband is claimed as disability, there should be positive evidence to show that on account of some personal differences or disputes, either party ceased to have any connection with the other and specially the husband turned his back against his wife." He then went on to observe that some "action" must be proved giving rise to a dispute followed by a separation. The conclusion of the Settlement Officer was that, despite some evidence of alleged payment of a maintenance allowance given by the husband under some agreement, it was not proved that "personal relations between the husband and wife were so much strained that it amounted to separation." He then examined the evidence of the conduct of Ali Ahmad in attending to litigation and doing "pairvi" of cases on behalf of his wife and came to the conclusion that relations of Petitioner No. 2 with her husband were normal so that she could not be said to have separated from Ali Ahmad. 13. Even if the finding of the Settlement Officer that the husband and wife had not separated could be said to be one of fact, which did not call for interference Under Article 226 of the Constitution inspite of the fact that it was coloured by the wrong impression that separation between husband and wife, necessarily involves a dispute or strained relations, yet, the failure of the consolidation authorities to consider the alternative case of the disability of Ali Ahmad compels interference by this Court Under Article 226 of the Constitution. It appears to me that the case of the Petitioners was prejudiced by the failure of the consolidation authorities to consider the plea that Ali Ahmad was also disabled for cultivating land. He could be disabled for that purpose even if he was well enough to supervise cultivation or to do "pairvi" for his wife. I may mention here that this question was recently considered by this Court in Abdul Sayeed Ahmad and Anr. v. The State of UP 1968 AWR 398 at p. 399 where it was held that: The idea underlying the provision is that the person who is physically infirm must be incapable of cultivating and not incapable of supervising. Cultivation and its supervisions are not identical. Different words are used to express the two ideas. Even if cultivation includes supervision, it necessitates more than mere supervision. Cultivation involves use of physical strength and also attention and is, therefore, more comprehensive than supervision of it. If a person is so infirm as to be incapable of using his own strength for cultivating land, he would be entitled to the benefit of the provisions even though he may be physically able to employ the strength of others and to supervise cultivation. If a person is so infirm as to be incapable of using his own strength for cultivating land, he would be entitled to the benefit of the provisions even though he may be physically able to employ the strength of others and to supervise cultivation. Reasons for this view are very fully discussed by the Division Bench with which I concur. I need not, therefore, elaborate the point. 14. The Division Bench case relied upon was Smt. Reoti v. Board of Revenue CMW No. 1706 of 1959 decided on 13-9-1962, where the view taken by a Full Bench of the Board of Revenue in Abdul Shakoor v. Malkhan 1958 AWR (Rev.) 138 was not approved. 15. An. argument put forward by Mr. S.N. Kacker, on behalf of the Petitioners, may also be dealt with. It was that the disability of one of the lessors was enough to entitle that lessor to the benefit of Section 21(1)(h) of the UP ZA and LR Act qua his share because the proviso to Section 157(1) of the said Act is clear that a person may let out his share in the holding. This argument is unacceptable because Section 21(1)(h) makes it quite clear that, if there is more than one landholder who has let out the holding, each one of them must be a person disabled within the meaning of Section 157(1) of the UPZA and LR Act. Section 157(1) is only to be used here in order to examine the nature of the disability. The rest of Section 157 of the Act is not applicable when considering rights arising under the provisions of Section 21(1)(h) of the aforesaid Act. 16. Mr. Kacker's argument was that the contesting opposite parties have claimed sirdari rights on the strength of Section 165 of the UP ZA and LR Act. This contention is also incorrect. It is true that Sections 157 and 165 refer to leases after the UP ZA and LR Act had come into force with the creation of tenures mentioned therein. But, the contesting opposite parties claimed to be sirdars by a combined operation of Section 20 of the UP ZA and LR Act and Section 3 of the UP Land Reforms (Supplementary) Act 31 of 1952. Nor was it the case of the Petitioners that any letting took place by the Petitioners as bhumidhars. But, the contesting opposite parties claimed to be sirdars by a combined operation of Section 20 of the UP ZA and LR Act and Section 3 of the UP Land Reforms (Supplementary) Act 31 of 1952. Nor was it the case of the Petitioners that any letting took place by the Petitioners as bhumidhars. To the time at which and other conditions governing the letting set up in the instant case by the Petitioners, the provisions of Section 21(1)(h) have to be applied. Section 157(1) is to be seen only for determining the nature of disability of the lessor or lessors. On this question, the view taken by the consolidation authorities is quite correct. The disability of one co-sharer in a holding was not enough to entitle him to get the benefit of Section 21(1)(h) of the Act. 17. In the result, I quash the orders of the Joint Director of Consolidation dated 23-2-1963 and that of the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 25-9-1962 and I direct that the case will be reconsidered and necessary findings given on the questions indicated above in accordance with law. The Petitioners are entitled to get their costs from the contesting opposite parties 5 to 16.