JUDGMENT 1. IN this Rule the petitioner prays for quashing an order of reference made by the State of West Bengal of an industrial dispute for adjudication by the second Industrial Tribunal. 2. THE facts as stated in the petition briefly are : Upon a Charter of demands submitted to the petitioner which is a limited company through the respondent No. 4, Oriental Metal majdoor Association, a registered trade union, there was an agreement on 28th march, 1961 between the petitioner and its workmen whereby the industrial dispute so raised relating amongst other things to pay and workers' allowances and other disputes was settled. Subsequently, by another agreement on march 12, 1962 the award of the Third omnibus Engineering Tribunal (referred to as Engineering Tribunal) was accepted concerning grades, scales and dearness allowance of the operatives viz., un-skilled semi-skilled, skilled and high skilled with effect from 1st february, 1962. Thereafter, another dispute was raised on identical items by a separate trade union, Oriental Metal Industries majdoor Union, the respondent No. 3. After exchange of several letters ultimately there was another agreement on June 5, 1963. The disputes so raised were settled between the petitioner and the respondent No. 3 concerning inter alia the dearness allowance payable to the workmen to bring it in line with the award of Engineering tribunal with retrospective effect. There was another agreement between the respondent No. 3 and the petitioner in a conference before the Labour commissioner under which the dearness allowance of the workmen concerned was agreed to be paid at an enhanced rate of Rs. 5/- with effect from April 1964 with certain other conditions. In spite of these facts the respondent No. 3 tried to raise an industrial dispute complaining of non-implementation of 1962 agreements and for fixation of dearness allowance by the Tribunal before the State government which was refused. 3. THEREAFTER the respondent No. 3 gave notice for termination of two agreements dated May 1, 1962 and june 5, 1962 by a letter given to the petitioner on 21st January, 1966. An order of reference much to the petitioner's surprise dated March 1, 1966 was made by the State Government for adjudication by the Second Industrial tribunal of the quantum of dearness allowance of the workmen mentioned in the bipartite agreement from 1st february, 1962 on the basis of the award of the Engineering Tribunal. An order of reference much to the petitioner's surprise dated March 1, 1966 was made by the State Government for adjudication by the Second Industrial tribunal of the quantum of dearness allowance of the workmen mentioned in the bipartite agreement from 1st february, 1962 on the basis of the award of the Engineering Tribunal. That is in short how the petitioner felt aggrieved and obtained the present Rule. 4. UPON these facts quite a large number of grounds were taken but mr. Ghosh, learned Advocate for the petitioner raised only three points. First; was that upon the notice given by the respondent No. 3 terminating agreements dated 12th March, 1962 (wrongly described as May 1, 1962) and June 5, 1963 the order of reference was made by the respondent No. 1 on march 1, 1966 for adjudication of the industrial dispute before the expiration of two months even from the date of the notice and, therefore, invalid. Secondly, there being no termination of the agreement of August 18, 1964 given by the respondent No. 3 the order of reference was incompetent in law. Third point was that the State government having once refused to refer the industrial dispute for adjudication on the identical issue the order of reference on the same matter was entirely bad in law. Before I take up these points for consideration I must take notice of a preliminary objection raised by Mr. Sanyal, learned Advocate for the State challenging the maintainability of the present writ petition in this Court at the present stage of the adjudication proceeding before the Tribunal. It was contended that the question whether the order of reference made by the state Government was competent in law should have been raised before the Tribunal first. Not having done so the petitioner is not entitled to raise these points straightway in this Court by a writ petition. Precisely, Mr. Sanyal's argument was that the questions raised really affected the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and if the petitioner was so aggrieved it was open to the tribunal to decide the question as a preliminary issue. I am unable to accept such a broad contention. For in the facts and circumstances of this case it is not so much a question of jurisdiction of a tribunal as of competency of the State to refer the dispute in issue for adjudication by the Tribunal. I am unable to accept such a broad contention. For in the facts and circumstances of this case it is not so much a question of jurisdiction of a tribunal as of competency of the State to refer the dispute in issue for adjudication by the Tribunal. Even assuming that it is not so, then also the fact that the question raised here could have been decided by the Tribunal as a preliminary issue could by no means preclude the petitioner from agitating the matter in writ jurisdiction of this court for the principles barring remedy owing to existence of effective or adequate and alternative remedy has well-known exceptions too. In cases where, as here, the question is one of exercising power without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or in excess of statutory authority or in breach of statutory obligation or duty or in violation of rules and principles of natural justice by a statutory authority the party aggrieved is entitled to ask for appropriate remedy in writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution even though it might, have adequate and specific or alternative remedy before the tribunal concerned. I, therefore, find no substance in the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Sanyal. 5. NOW, coming to the merit of the first point, it appears that the notice of termination of two agreements dated march 12, 1962 (wrongly described as may 1, 1962) and June 5, 1962 by a letter was given to the petitioner on 21st January, 1966. There is no dispute that there were two agreements as mentioned in notice of termination (Annexure I to the petition) between the Company and workmen. It was also stated that "on expiration of two months from the date of receipt of this notice the said agreements will have no binding effect upon the workmen. But before the impugned order of reference was made on 1st March, 1966 (Annexure I) for adjudication on the quantum of dearness allowance of the workmen mentioned in the bipartite agreement effective from 1st February, 1962 on implementing the award of the Engineering Tribunal. It is, therefore, clear that before the agreements mentioned in the notice of termination ceased to have binding effect upon the parties, the impugned order of reference was made by the State Government. This, in my view, is clearly illegal. It is, therefore, clear that before the agreements mentioned in the notice of termination ceased to have binding effect upon the parties, the impugned order of reference was made by the State Government. This, in my view, is clearly illegal. For subsection (2) of section 19 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (referred to herein as the Act) provides : " (2) Such settlement shall be binding for such period as is agreed upon by the parties, and if no such period is agreed upon, for a period of six months, from the date on which the memorandum of settlement is signed by the parties to the dispute, and shall continue to be binding on the parties after the expiry of the period aforesaid, until the expiry of two months from the date on which a notice in writing of an intention to terminate the settlement is given by one of the parties to the other party or parties to the settlement." 6. FROM the above provision it follows that the appropriate Government is competent to refer any dispute if at all again for adjudication in an Industrial Tribunal only after the impugned settlement between the parties have ceased to exist. Clearly, it could not be disputed that the agreements of 1962 mentioned in the notice were not settlements but the reference was sought to be justified by the respondent no. 3 on the plea that it related only to implementation of 1962 agreements as regards dearness allowance, whereas the so-called 1963-64 agreements deal with dearness allowance payable during the periods subsequent to the period of 1962 agreements. Thus the said two later agreements also could not be a bar to the impugned reference. It was also argued that the 1963-64 agreements were not settlement within the meaning of Section 2 (B) of the Act and could not be binding on the respondent No. 3 who was not a party. On behalf of the respondent no. 1 it was stated in its affidavit-in-opposition inter alia that no effective purpose was served by the several bipartite agreements between the petitioner and the recognised Union and the respondent No. 3. The disputing Union was not satisfied with the said agreements and on its prayer the appropriate authority after carefully considering the report of the Labour commissioner, West Bengal decided to refer the question of dearness allowance for adjudication. The disputing Union was not satisfied with the said agreements and on its prayer the appropriate authority after carefully considering the report of the Labour commissioner, West Bengal decided to refer the question of dearness allowance for adjudication. i think these pleas taken by the respondents on the validity of impugned reference are not at all relevant. It is clear from the notice of termination that both the agreements of 1962 and 1963 were binding on the respondent No. 3 at the date of reference. Whether or not the settlement in question was implemented by the Company or in making the reference. The State Government considered the report of the Labour commissioner are matters to be considered only when it is to be found that the impugned agreements or settlements ceased to have effect in law, or validly terminated in accordance with the above provision of sub-section (2) of section 19 of the Act. In this case, it seems to me quite clear that the order of reference was made for adjudication of the industrial dispute on a matter covered by the impugned settlement even though at the relevant time it continues to have binding effect between the parties. If the settlement were not implemented there are enough provisions in the Industrial Dispute act for enforcing the terms of the settlement. That fact by itself cannot form the subject matter of a separate industrial dispute or call for a reference by the State Government for adjudication by the Tribunal. Any way this again is not the issue in the present proceeding. That being the position, there can be little doubt that the validity of a reference must be judged at its inception when the order of reference was made and not by any subsequent event which might have the effect of converting such an invalid reference into a valid one. That being the position, there can be little doubt that the validity of a reference must be judged at its inception when the order of reference was made and not by any subsequent event which might have the effect of converting such an invalid reference into a valid one. If any authority is needed I may refer to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1963 SC 318 , Bombay Union of journalists v. "the Hindu", Bombay, where shah J. while considering the question as to whether an individual dispute could be converted into an industrial dispute by subsequent actions or events inter alia observed (at page 324, paragraph 16 of the report) : "if the dispute was in its inception an individual dispute and continued to be such till the date of the reference by the Government of Bombay, it could not be converted into an industrial dispute by support subsequent to the reference even of workmen interested in the dispute. We have already held that subsequent withdrawal of support will not take away the jurisdiction of an industrial tribunal. On the same reasoning subsequent support will not convert what was an individual dispute at the time of reference into an industrial dispute. The resolution of the Indian Federation of Working Journalists, assuming that it has any value, would not be sufficient to convert what was an individual dispute into an industrial dispute. " It is true that in the above case the question was whether an individual dispute could be converted into an industrial dispute by actions or events subsequent to the date of such reference but the principle indicated is the same. It, therefore, follows that the impugned reference which was incompetent at the date when it was made by the State Government because of the settlements still being binding between the parties could not be rendered valid even if subsequent to the date of reference the impugned settlement might cease to have any binding effect on the basis of the notice of termination according to the provision of subsection (2) of Section 19 of the Act. That being so, the impugned order of reference, in my view, suffers from serious infirmities and must be struck down as invalid. 7. That being so, the impugned order of reference, in my view, suffers from serious infirmities and must be struck down as invalid. 7. IN the above view of the matter it is unnecessary to examine the correctness of the other contentions made in support of the second and third points raised by Mr. Ghosh and I am not expressing any opinion on them. 8. THE result is, the petition succeeds. The impugned order of reference is quashed. The Rule is made absolute but there will be no order as to costs. I make it, however, clear that nothing in my judgment will prevent the respondents to proceed afresh and take such steps as they are entitled to take according to law. Let a writ in the nature of mandamus issue accordingly.