Judgment :- Kailasam, J, By which he dismissed the appellant's petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution to quash an order of the Accountant-General, Madras, dated 27 September 1968. By that order the appellant was told that, in view of the strike by certain the Government servants in the Department of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, he had come to the conclusion that the de facto recognition of the appellant-association should be withdrawn with immediate effect. The order also stated that the facilities given to the association and its office-bearers should stand automatically withdrawn and that the secretary of the association should make over immediately to the care-taker of the Accountant-General's office vacant possession of the room in the office premises which had been in the occupation of the association. Kailasam, J., was of the view that the recognition of the association being no longer rested on any statutory rules, its withdrawal could not be interfered with. He was also of the view that since rule 4B of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955, was held to be violative of Art. 19(1)(c) of the Constitution in Ghosh (O. K.) and another v. Joseph (E. X.) and vice versa it automatically followed that the Central Civil Services (Recognition of Service Associations) Rules, 1959, should be regarded as invalid. On the contention that the withdrawal of recognition was without notice to the appellant, the learned Judge considered that it could not be stated that, as a rule of law, even in cases where the appellant had no right in law, notice should be given. 2. We are unable to share the view of Kailasam, J., in so far as it related to the validity of the Central Civil Services (Recognition of Service Associations) Rules, 1959. In our view these rules are not invalidated by reason of Ghosh (O. K.) and another v. Joseph (E. X.) and vice versa and the assumption of the respondents, to the contrary, is not well-founded. In our view these rules are not invalidated by reason of Ghosh (O. K.) and another v. Joseph (E. X.) and vice versa and the assumption of the respondents, to the contrary, is not well-founded. That case only held that the exercise of the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(c) could not validly be conditioned on recognition subject to certain conditions of an association Rule 4B of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955, prohibited a Government servant from attending or continuing to be a member of any service association of Government servants which had not, within a specified period, obtained the recognition of the Government under the rules prescribed in that behalf, or the recognition in respect of such association had been refused or withdrawal by the Government under those rules. The Central Civil Services (Recognition of Service Association) Rules, 1959, were framed by the President, after consultation with the Comptroller and Auditor-General, in exercise of the powers under Arts. 148(5) and 309 of the Constitution read with rule 4B of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955. Rule 7 relates to withdrawal of recognition and, it says that recognition can be withdrawn in respect of a service association if it had failed to comply with the conditions set out in rules 4, 5 and 6. The respondents do not say, we may notice in passing, that the withdrawal, in this case, is covered by rule 7, for it was not on the ground that the appellant had failed to comply with the conditions set out in rules 4, 5 and 6. If the Recognition Rules of 1959 are still in force, there can be no doubt, therefore, that the withdrawal of recognition of the appellant association cannot be supported. But the respondents assume they were invalid and, because of that, the Accountant General, by his communication, dated 1 April 1967, stated that the recognition of the appellant should be regarded as purely on de facto basis and that it was subject to the conditions embodied in the Recognition Rules, 1959. 3. Ghosh (O. K.) and another v. Joseph (E. X.) and vice versa entirely left untouched the validity of the Central Civil Services (Recognition of Service Association) Rules, 1959. 3. Ghosh (O. K.) and another v. Joseph (E. X.) and vice versa entirely left untouched the validity of the Central Civil Services (Recognition of Service Association) Rules, 1959. Since rule 4B of the Conduct Rules violated the Government servants' fundamental right under Art. 19(1) (c), the Supreme Court considered that it was not easy to see any rational direct or proximate connexion between the observance of the conditions for continued recognition of the association and public order and that, it was possible, therefore, that recognition might be refused or withdrawn on grounds which were wholly unconnected with public order. On that view, it was held that the right to form associations guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(c) was made subject to the rigorous restriction that the association in question must secure and continue to enjoy recognition from Government and that the restriction thus imposed would make the guarantee ineffective or even illusory. It may be seen at once that the Court, in that case, was looking at the matter from the standpoint of the fundamental right of the Government servant to form associations. That right could not be made dependent on whether recognition was given to an association by the Government, or it was given, it continued to operate or it was withdrawn. But that has nothing to do with the validity of the Central Civil Services (Recognition of Service Associations) Rules, 1959. No association has a fundamental right to recognition by the Government. Indeed, that was not the question that came up for consideration or decisions in Ghosh (O. K.) and another v. Joseph (E. X.) and vice versa It is one thing to say that a Government servant's right under Art. 19(1)(c) cannot be made to depend on whether an association was recognized one or not, and, it is quite another that if and when an association is formed, it is entitled to recognition or not. The last aspect is not governed by Art. 19(1) at all. The Recognition Rules were, therefore, not affected by Ghosh (O. K.) and another v. Joseph (E. X.) and vice versa Their validity is also not affected by the fact that rule 4B of the Conduct Rules has been struck down. In fact, the power to make the Recognition Rules was not derived from rule 4B though it was cited in the preamble to the notification of the Recognition Rules. In fact, the power to make the Recognition Rules was not derived from rule 4B though it was cited in the preamble to the notification of the Recognition Rules. Merely because a wrong rule was cited as the source of power, it does not follow that it would, by itself, invalidate the rules if they can be justified with reference to the power under the proper source. 4. It follows that the view of the department that the appellant had only de facto recognition cannot be maintained. The recognition accorded to it under the Recognition Rules continued to operate, and since it is not the case that the withdrawal of the recognition was under rule 7 of the Recognition Rules, the order of the Accountant General dated 27 September, 1968 cannot be sustained as valid. 5. The appeal is allowed and the impugned order is quashed. There will be order as to costs here and in the writ petition.