Judgement G. K. MISRA, C. J. :- Plots Nos. 217 and 218, having an area of 50 and 90 decimals respectively are situated in holding No. 1147 in Khata No. 56 in Mouza Balisahi within the municipal limits of Puri town. A residential house located thereon is the subject-matter of this litigation. Opposite party No. 1 filed Title Suit No. 150 of 1960 in the Court of the Munsif, Puri, for eviction of the petitioner on the allegation that he was the owner of the disputed house and that the petitioner (defendant in the suit) had been inducted as a tenant therein and was also liable to pay arrears of the rent to the tune of Rs. 152/- and damages for use and occupation. The petitioner took the defence that he had purchased one-fourth interest of the co-sharer in the disputed plots and the room in question on 7-11-58. He also denied the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant and asserted that he was not liable to pay rent. The case was ultimately tried by the Additional Munsif, Puri. Issues 3 to 5 were the main issues in the suit. They were : Issue No. 3 : Is the defendant a tenant under the plaintiff in respect of the suit house as alleged? Issue No. 4 : Is the plaintiff entitled to arrears of rent and damages as claimed? Issue No. 5 : Is the plaintiff to recover possession of the suit land from the defendant? In the judgment passed on October 12, 1961 (Annexure A) the learned Munsif held that the plaintiff failed to establish his title and possession within twelve years of the suit and also failed to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant between himself and the petitioner. He accordingly dismissed the suit for eviction as well as for recovery of arrears of rent. An appeal carried by opposite party No. 1 (Plaintiff) was dismissed by the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), Puri (see Annexure B), on 26-8-63. Opposite party No. 1 thereafter filed an application under Section 7 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1958, for eviction of the petitioner on the ground that he had fallen into arrears of rent. The House Rent Controller, by his order dated 26-12-64 (Annexure C) dismissed the application holding that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant. Opposite party No. 1 thereafter filed an application under Section 7 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1958, for eviction of the petitioner on the ground that he had fallen into arrears of rent. The House Rent Controller, by his order dated 26-12-64 (Annexure C) dismissed the application holding that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant. In appeal, the Additional District Magistrate (Executive) Puri, remanded the case to the House Rent Controller holding that there was clear documentary evidence to show that opposite party No. 1 was the owner of the disputed room and that the petitioner was a tenant under him and that there was relationship of landlord and tenant (Annexure D). Against this order the writ application has been filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 2. Mr. Patnaik on behalf of the petitioner contends that the judgment of the civil court that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and opposite party No. 1 operates as res judicata and the impugned order is contrary to law. 3. Before examining the question whether the application before the House Rent Controller is barred by the general principles of res judicata it would be appropriate to clarify the grounds. There is no dispute that an application for eviction of a tenant by the landlord is entertainable only by the House Rent Controller, and the civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide such a question. On the other hand, the claim for recovery of arrears of rent in respect of the very house lies within the jurisdiction of the civil Court and the House Rent Controller cannot decree the same. In the civil suit, eviction was claimed by the opposite party No. 1 on the basis of title. He claimed arrears of rent on the footing that there was relationship of landlord and tenant. In order to determine the issue whether the petitioner was in arrears of rent it was necessary for the Civil Court to decide whether there was relationship of landlord and tenant between opposite party No. 1 and the petitioner. He claimed arrears of rent on the footing that there was relationship of landlord and tenant. In order to determine the issue whether the petitioner was in arrears of rent it was necessary for the Civil Court to decide whether there was relationship of landlord and tenant between opposite party No. 1 and the petitioner. If the determination of both these questions were within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, there cannot be any dispute that the decision that the petitioner was not liable to pay arrears of rent because there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties would constitute res judicata under Section 11, Civil Procedure Code, in respect of any subsequent suit for eviction of the petitioner on the same ground. 4. Difficulty however arises in this case on account of the fact that an application for eviction does not lie within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court while a claim for recovery of arrears of rent lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Court. An application before the House Rent Controller is not a suit and accordingly Section 11 Civil Procedure Code, in terms does not apply. It is only on the general principles of res judicata that an application for eviction filed before the House Rent Controller will be barred, if at all. 5. The question came up directly in AIR 1965 SC 1153 (Gulabchand v. State of Gujarat). Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) in his dissenting judgment held that in such a case there would be no res judicata. The majority of the learned Judges, however, took the contrary view. Raghubar Dayal, J. speaking for the majority laid down that the provisions of Section 11, Civil Procedure Code, are not exhaustive with respect to an earlier decision operating as res judicata between the same parties on the same matter in controversy, in a subsequent regular suit and on the general principles of res judicata any previous decision on a matter in controversy, decided after full contest or after affording fair opportunity to the parties to prove their case by a court competent to decide it will operate as res judicata in a subsequent regular suit. Their Lordships further held that it is not necessary that the Court deciding the matter formerly be competent to decide the subsequent suit or that the former proceeding and the subsequent suit have the same subject-matter, and that the nature of the former proceeding is immaterial. In that case, on the matters in controversy a writ application had already been decided. On the same matter between the same parties a subsequent suit was filed for the same relief. Their Lordships held that the subsequent suit was barred by res judicata. 6. The identical principles apply to the present case. A number of decisions have been referred to in the majority judgment wherein a title once decided between the parties in a land acquisition proceeding constituted res judicata in a subsequent suit. 7. In this case, as already stated, in the civil suit it was necessary to decide whether there was relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, with a view to allow or dismiss the claim for recovery of arrears of rent. Evidence was given, trial was contested and the matter was finally heard and decided. That being the position the finding in the civil suit that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant constitutes res judicata in the eviction proceeding before the House Rent Controller. If the application for eviction is barred by the general principle of res judicata, it would be wholly superfluous to go into evidence as to whether there was any such relationship. There is thus an error of law apparent on the face of the impugned order and it is accordingly liable to be quashed. 8. In the result, the writ application is allowed. A writ of certiorari be issued quashing the impugned order. The application for eviction is liable to be dismissed. In the circumstances parties to bear their own costs. 9. RAY. J. :- I agree.