JUDGMENT G.C. Mathur, J. - This case has been referred to a larger Bench by Shukla, J. as he has doubted the correctness of the decision of S. D. Singh J. in Raja Ram v. Mata Prasad, 1968 AWR 247 The case arises in the following circumstances. 2. An application under section 145 CrPC was made by Munnu Singh opposite party on December 16, 1966. The SDM ordered the Station Officer to make a report. The report waw made on December 31, 1966 and on February 6, 1967 the SDM passed the preliminary order. The stated therein that from the police report he was satisfied that there existed an apprehension of a breach of the peace. After the order was served on the parties both the parties filed their written-statements on April 28, 1967. In the statement filed by the applicants, who were opposite parties before the SDM they raised a plea that there was no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace. The applicant filed five affidavits and these affidavits also stated that there was no apprehension of a breach of the peace. The SDM passed ed the final order on April 26, 1968 holding that Munnu Singh was in possession and directed the property to be released in his favour. Against the final order the applicants filed a revision. One of the points raised at the hearing of the revision was that the SDM should have recorded a finding whether there was an apprehension of the breach of the peace or not, when that question was raised before him by the applicant. The ADM (J) who heard the revision agreed with this contention and made a reference to this Court recommending that the revision be allowed, inter alia, on the ground that it was obligatory on the SDM to give a finding on the existence of the apprehension of the breach of the peace. He relied on the decision in Raja Ram's case. The reference came up for hearing before Shukla, J. Who finding himself unable to agree with S.D. Singh, J. has made a reference to a larger Bench. 3. Sub-S. (1) of S. 145 of the CrPC provides that when a Magistrate is satisfied from a police report or other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land etc. 3. Sub-S. (1) of S. 145 of the CrPC provides that when a Magistrate is satisfied from a police report or other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land etc. he shall make a preliminary order stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, requiring the parties to attend his court, to file their written statements, documents and affidavits. Sub-S. (4) enjoins upon the Magistrate to decide the question whether any and which of the parties was in possession of the property at the date of the preliminary order. Sub-S. (5) gives the right to a party to show that no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists or has existed and if he succeeds in doing so the Magistrate is required by this sub-section to cancel the preliminary order. The preliminary order is, subject to an order u/sub-S. (5), final. The question which arises for consideration in this case is whether if, after the making of the preliminary order, a party or any other person raises the question that no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace, exists or has existed and produces evidence to support his contention, the Magistrate is bound to decide the question and to record his decision and the reasons therefor. The same question arose in Raja Ram's case and S. D. Singh, J. observed : "......After the opposite parties are served they are entitled to urge before the SDM that there is no apprehension of breach of the peace; and if and when such an allegation is made, it is incumbent upon the SDM to make an enquiry in respect of that allegation. Provision for this enquiry is made sub. S. (5) of S. 145 CrPC, which provides that nothing in this section shall preclude any party from showing that no such apprehension of breach of the peace exists or has existed. In such a case the SDM is required to cancel his earlier order and all the further proceedings are to be stayed. The SDM mentions in his judgment that the second party, namely, the opposite parties in this case who are applicants in the revision, denied that there was any apprehension of breach of the peace to Mata Prasad and Shitla Prasad. The SDM mentions in his judgment that the second party, namely, the opposite parties in this case who are applicants in the revision, denied that there was any apprehension of breach of the peace to Mata Prasad and Shitla Prasad. If this was the allegation made by them, the SDM should have considered the evidence on that point and recorded a positive finding that there was or there was not apprehension of breach of the peace. No such finding was recorded by the SDM and the entire proceedings in the case are consequently vitiated by that illegality. The exparte finding recorded by the Magistrate in the first paragraph of his judgment was not enough to give him jurisdiction to proceed further in the matter after the opposite parties had made their appearance before him and had alleged as a fact that there was no apprehension of breach of the peace. Enquiry about possession over the disputed land or in any case a finding concerning the the same was required to he undertaken or recorded only if in an enquiry u/sub-S. (5) of S. 145 CrPC the Magistrate came to the conclusion that there was apprehension of breach of the peace." Shukla, J. in doubting the correct. ness of this decision seems to be of the view that : (1) The only question to which the Magistrate has to address himself after making a preliminary order and when the parties have appeared is whether any and which of the parties is in possession ; (2) The Magistrate is not required to go on reiterating at every stage of the proceeding that the apprehension of the breach of peace continues: (3) It is not obligatory on the Magistrate even where a party expressly controverts the existence of the dispute and apprehension in his written-statement and affidavits filed by him to record a specific finding on that point and (4) If there is no contrary finding given by the Magistrate at any subsequent stage it should be presumed that the dispute and the apprehension continues. There is nothing in S. 145 CrPC or in any authority cited before us which supports the view taken by Shukla, J. We have examined the cases referred to by him but, in our opinion, they do not deal directly with the question before us. 4. To us the position seems to be perfectly simple. There is nothing in S. 145 CrPC or in any authority cited before us which supports the view taken by Shukla, J. We have examined the cases referred to by him but, in our opinion, they do not deal directly with the question before us. 4. To us the position seems to be perfectly simple. Proceedings under section 145 CrPC may be initiated either by a party or upon a police report. If the Magistrate is satisfied., either upon the police report or upon other information that there existed a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace concerning any land etc. he may make a preliminary order in writing stating the ground of his being so satisfied. The order is then served upon the parties requiring them to appear and to put in their written-statement, documents, affidavits and oral evidence. The Magistrate may, if he considers the case one of emergency attach the property. If after the parties have appeared, the existence of such a dispute is not challenged, the preliminary order becomes final and the Magistrate is then to decide whether any and which of the parties is in possession. But if any of the parties or any other person challenges the existence of such a dispute and adduces evidence to support is contention the Magistrate must first decide this question. The raising of this question really 'amounts to the raising of a jurisdictional question. Sub. S. (5) provides that the Magistrate 'shall cancel" the preliminary order if it is shown to him that no such dispute exists or had existed. How can this be shown to the Magistrate unless he examines the material placed before him and arrives at a conclusion one way or the other? This necessarily means that sub-S. (5) casts a duty upon the Magistrate to decide the question raised before him. If he comes to a decision that such a dispute exists the preliminary order will become final and ne will go on to decide the question of possession. But if he arrives at the conclusion that no such dispute exists he shall cancel the preliminary order and stay further proceedings. Whatever his decision the Magistrate must record it in writing together with his reasons there for whether as a part of the final order or as a separate order. But if he arrives at the conclusion that no such dispute exists he shall cancel the preliminary order and stay further proceedings. Whatever his decision the Magistrate must record it in writing together with his reasons there for whether as a part of the final order or as a separate order. Neither on principle nor on authority can the view be justified that the Magistrate need not record his decision in writing on the challenge to the existence of the dispute and that the continued existence of the dispute should be presumed from the fact that the Magistrate has gone on to decide the question of possession. 5. When the Magistrate makes a preliminary order exparte on the basis of the police report or other information sub S. (1) requires him to state the ground of his satisfaction that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists. Surely, when he is required by sub-S. (5) to decide the question as to the existence of the dispute in the presence of the parties and on the basis of the evidence produced by them before him, he must give his decision in writing and state the reasons therefor. Such an order or decision cannot be left to be inferred or presumed from the subsequent conduct of the Magistrate. The order or decision is subject to revision by the higher courts and they are entitled to know the reasons for passing or not passing an order under sub S. (5). 6. In Ganga Singh v. Raj Bahadur Singh (A.I.R. 1958 Allahabad 803) the Magistrate dropped the proceedings under section 145 CrPC after passing an order in writing that there was no apprehension of a breach of the peace. Reference for quashing the order was rejected by a Division Bench of this Court. The observations of the learned Judges are to the effect that the preliminary order u/sub. S. (1) is a tentative order on the basis of the information then available to the Magistrate and that he is empowered by Sub. S. (5) to revise that order when fuller information and evidence is placed before him. 7. In Abdul Rauf v. Mohd. Shafi, (A.I.R. 1956 Allahabad 337) the Magistrate made the preliminary order and directed the filing of the written-statements. S. (5) to revise that order when fuller information and evidence is placed before him. 7. In Abdul Rauf v. Mohd. Shafi, (A.I.R. 1956 Allahabad 337) the Magistrate made the preliminary order and directed the filing of the written-statements. In a subsequent order the Magistrate came to the conclusion that there was no apprehension of the breach of the peace and found that the opposite party was in possession at the time of the preliminary order and directed the restoration of possession to him. Apparently neither the opposite party nor any other person moved the Magistrate to cancel the preliminary order u(sub. S. (5) and he by himself revived that order. V.D. Bhargavl, J. observed that there was no provision in S. 145 CrPC for a reconsideration of the question whether a dispute is or is not likely to cause a breach of the peace. These observations were not made with respect to the provisions of sub-S. (5) to which no reference is made in the judgment. 8. Shukla, J., has also relied on an observation of Sinha, J. (though he attributes it to Chakravarti, J.) in Khudiram Mandal v. Jitendra Nath, (A.I.R. 1952 Calcutta p. 713) (paragraph 62). The contention raised in that case was that since both the sides had asserted in their written-statements that there was no apprehension of a breach of the peace the Magistrate ought to have cancelled the preliminary order u/sub S. (5). Before making the observations relied on by Shukla, J., Sinha J. said: "One has only to read with written statements as a whole to be disabused of the, impression that the parties really intended to say that no apprehension of a breach of the peace existed." It is in the context of this finding that the parties did not really contend that there was no apprehension of a breach of the peace that Sinha, J. observed that it was not necessary for the Magistrate "that he should at every stage go on recording his satisfaction as to the existence or otherwise of such an apprehension." His further observation that if the Magistrate chooses to go on it must be presumed that he is not satisfied that the apprehension has ceased was also made in the same context. 9. These are the cases on which Shukla, J. has founded the propositions in his referring order which have been set out above. 9. These are the cases on which Shukla, J. has founded the propositions in his referring order which have been set out above. In our opinion none of these cases supports these propositions. We think that the view taken by S.D. Singh, J. in Raja Rain's case was correct and that the true legal position is as has been stated above by us. 10. In the instant case it appears, both from the order of the ADM (J) and of Shukla, J., that the applicants (who were the opposite parties before the SDM) had specifically said in their written-statement that there was no apprehension of a breach of the peace and this assertion was supported by categorical statements made in five affidavits filed in their behalf. The jurisdiction of the Magistrate to continue the proceedings was thus challenged. It was incumbent upon the magistrate to first decide this question before proceeding to decide the question of possession. The magistrate acted illegally in going into the question of possession without first deciding whether the dispute exists or not. We accordingly accept the reference made by ADM (J), set aside the final order passed by the magistrate and remand the case back to him for deciding it afresh in accordance with law.