Judgment :- 1. This revision is by the complainant in C. C. 288 of 1967 on the file of the First Class Magistrate, Crangaanora. The only question arising in this revision is whether the sentence awarded by the learned Magistrate is adequate in the circumstances of the case. The complaint was under S.143, 342 and 506 IPC. The allegation was that the accused five in number, formed themselves into an unlawful assembly along with certain others with the common object of wrongfully confining the complainant and intimidating him so that he might be forced to pay Rs. 5/- to each of the accused who had assembled in front of his factory (The Hindustan Umbrella Factory, Cranganore). In furtherance of the common object the accused on 22 41967 wrongfully confined the complainant in his office room in the factory between 5.30 and 10.15 PM. He was then threatened with death in case he did not comply with their demand. He was released from his confinement at 10.15 PM. pursuant to an order of protection issued from this court on CMP. 3685 of 1967 presented in OP. 1185 of 1967 on 22-4-1967. When the petitioner was under wrongful confinement the allegation is that he was not even allowed to take a cup of coffee which was brought for him. He was also prevented from using his telephone to contact the police. But somehow, a message was conveyed to the Sub Inspector of Police by the complainant's brother and the S I. came, But he had no sufficient number of constables with him. So, he contacted the Deputy Superintendent of Police and the Circle Inspector, for reinforcement. They accordingly came and released him. Crime No. 81 of 1967 was taken by the police against the accused for the above said atrocities committed by them, but later that was referred. Thereupon the petitioner filed the present complaint and it was registered as CC. No. 228 of 1967. The learned Magistrate at the conclusion of the trial found that the offences charged against were in fact, committed by the accused and accordingly they have been convicted and sentenced to fine. The first accused has been sentenced under S.143 IPC. to a fine of Rs. 20/-, under S.342 to a fine of Rs. 30 and under S.506 (ii) to a fine of Rs. 50/-. The 2nd accused has been sentenced to a fine of Rs. The first accused has been sentenced under S.143 IPC. to a fine of Rs. 20/-, under S.342 to a fine of Rs. 30 and under S.506 (ii) to a fine of Rs. 50/-. The 2nd accused has been sentenced to a fine of Rs. 20/-under S.143, a fine of Rs. 30 under S.342 and a fine of Rs. 50/-under S.506. Accused 3 to 5 also have similarly been sentenced to Rs. 20, 30 and 50 on each count. There is no direction in the judgment that the sentences shall run concurrently. It must therefore, be taken that the sentences on the various counts are to run consecutively. The conviction and sentence have been confirmed in appeal by the Sessions Judge of Trichur. The complainant's grievance is that the sentence awarded is unduly lenient and bears no proportion whatever to the magnitude of the offence proved against them. 2. Before going into the question as to the advisability or otherwise of enhancing the sentence in the present case, the preliminary objection taken by the respondents against the maintainability of the petition has to be considered. The learned counsel would point out that a petition of this nature preferred by a private party cannot be entertained since the question is one with which the Crown alone is concerned. Of course, the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction can tackle the question and pass appropriate orders. But according to the learned counsel, a petition by a private party for enhancement of the sentence would smack of retribution which is out of tune with modern trends in the realm of penology. It is no doubt the responsibility of the Crown and not of the individual to ask the court for enhancement of the sentence. But the right of individual to apprise the High Court of a particular position calling for the High Court's interference is always there and cannot be stifled. A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Bisheshar v Rex (AIR. 1949 Allahabad 213) has observed: "A complainant can invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court to bring to its notice that the case is one in which a higher punishment should have been awarded. So far as the question of right of audience is concerned nobody has a right to be heard in a revision. 1949 Allahabad 213) has observed: "A complainant can invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court to bring to its notice that the case is one in which a higher punishment should have been awarded. So far as the question of right of audience is concerned nobody has a right to be heard in a revision. It is purely discretionary with the High Court whether it will hear any party in a revision or not. But in the ordinary course the High Court does bear counsel appearing in revisions and in that respect a complainant can be in no worse position." This view was been endorsed by the Supreme Court in Bissu Mahgoo v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR. 1954 SC. 714) in the following words: "Whether the State filed a revision or the complainant moved the High Court in revision, it is competent to the High Court to go into the question of sentence and it is well within its power to enhance the sentence." I am, therefore, of the view that a private party is quite competent to ask for an enhancement of the sentence through the medium of a petition before the High Court. 3. The position is however, well settled that the question of sentence is clearly in the discretion of the trial Judge. In Alamgir and another v. State of Bihar (19591 S.C.R. 464) the Supreme Court laid down the law on this subject in the following words: "It is unnecessary to emphasise that the question of sentence is clearly in the discretion of the trial judge. It h for th3 trial judge to take into account all the relevant circumstances and decide what sentence would meet the ends of justice in a given case. It h for th3 trial judge to take into account all the relevant circumstances and decide what sentence would meet the ends of justice in a given case. The High Court undoubtedly has jurisdiction to enhance such sentence under S.439 of the Code of the Criminal Procedure, but this jurisdiction can be properly exercised only if the High Court is satisfied that the sentence imposed by the trial judge is unduly lenient or, that, in passing the order of sentence, the trial judge had manifestly failed to consider the relevant facts ...It would not be right for the appellate court to interfere with the order of sentence passed by the trial court merely on the ground that if it had tried the case it would have imposed a slightly higher or heavier sentence." "Dealing with the question of sentence for an offence under S.304 I.P.C. Beaumont C. J., speaking for the court, observed in Emperor v. Khanmahomed Shermahomed (38 BLR.1111) that in estimating the sentence to be passed on the accused in a case of causing death by negligence the court has to consider whether the negligent act which has occasioned the death shows callousness on his part as regards the risk to which he was exposing other persons. The severity of the sentence must depend to a great extent on the degree of callousness which is present in the conduct of the accused". (19681 S C. W. R.1) 4. "The power of the High Court to enhance a sentence is contained in sub-S. (1) of S.439 of the Code, which clothes the High Court with the powers of a court of appeal under the Code as also the power to enhance the sentence. There is no doubt that the question of sentence is a matter of discretion which has to be exercised in a judicial way, that is why the sentence imposed by the trial court should not be lightly interfered with and should not be enhanced unless the appellate court comes to the conclusion, on a consideration of the entire circumstances disclosed in the evidence, that the sentence imposed in inadequate". (AIR. 1956 SC. 127) As observed by Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Nasir Khan v. Emperor (AIR. 1941 Allahabad 309), "The High Court should generally be very loathe to enhance sentence on the application of. (AIR. 1956 SC. 127) As observed by Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Nasir Khan v. Emperor (AIR. 1941 Allahabad 309), "The High Court should generally be very loathe to enhance sentence on the application of. a private complainant but even on such application the High Court can in a proper case enhance the sentence if the interests of justice so require." In the present case the learned Magistrate has of course, not awarded a sentence of imprisonment. But he has awarded a sentence of fine in such a way that the sentence under each count runs consecutively. I think in the circumstances of the case, the punishment awarded is adequate. No act of violence or high handedness in any other manner was alleged, much less proved in the. case. All that the accused are stated to have done is that they surrounded the office room of the complainant in such a way that it was difficult for him to escape from the room. In that state, he was forced to remain for less than five hours. In the meanwhile a person who had brought coffee for the complainant, was not allowed to go in. This is the solitary act of highhandedness attributed to the accused. The accused were the labourers of the factory and the whole thing was a sequel to labour dispute. I do not think in the above circumstances that the accused deserves a deterrent sentence, In my opinion, it is not possible to say that the sentence awarded is disproportionate with the seriousness of the offence with which the accused were charged. The ends of justice are very well met by the punishment awarded by the learned Magistrate. The revision Petition in the circumstances is dismissed.