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1969 DIGILAW 297 (ALL)

Rajendra Prasad Kanhalya Lal Gupta v. Behari Lal

1969-09-30

T.P.MUKERJEE, V.G.OAK

body1969
JUDGMENT V.G. Oak, C.J. - This civil revision is directed against an order of the Civil Judge, mathura impounding a certain document. The impugned order was passed under the following circumstances. 2. Behari Lal filed a suit against Rajendra Prasad, Kanhaiya Lal Gupta and another. Rajendra Prasad defendant filed a document before the trial court. The document was marked as paper no. 37-B on the file of the trial court. The Inspector of Stamps reported that there was deficiency in stamp duty. The defendant moved an application before the trial court for permission to withdraw the document. That permission was not granted by the trial court. The document was impounded. The court ordered the defendant to pay a sum of Rs. 5,005.50 P. within one month towards deficit duty and penalty. It was further directed that in default, the document would be forwarded to the Collector, Mathura for necessary action. Rajendra Prasad has filed this revision against the order of the Civil Judge, Mathura, dated, 4-12-1965. 3. The first contention of Mr. A. N. Bhargava appearing for the applicant is that the document in question was merely a copy of the original document. The copy as such as not liable to any stamp duty. 4. We have examined the document which was on the record of the trial court as paper no. 37-B. The applicant's contention must be rejected for a 'variety of reasons. The defendant filed this document before the trial court with an index of papers. In this index the defendant described the document in question as original agreement. 5. Mr. Bhargava relies on paragraph 23 of the document. Paragraph 23 of the document reads thus:- "The original of this agreement on a stamp paper of Rs. 1:50 P....... shall remain with the owners and a copy there of on a stamp paper of Rs. 1.50 ......... shall remain with the licensees." In this document certain persons of Bombay were described as the first party; and Rajendra prasad Kanhaiya Lal Gupta and others were described as the second party. The document was described as a memorandum of licence. The document in question itself bears stamp duty of Rs. 1.50 P. The same stamp duty appears to have been paid on that document. which is said to be the original document. Parties including Rajendra Prasad himself have signed the document in question. The document was described as a memorandum of licence. The document in question itself bears stamp duty of Rs. 1.50 P. The same stamp duty appears to have been paid on that document. which is said to be the original document. Parties including Rajendra Prasad himself have signed the document in question. On examining the document as a whole, we are satisfied that the document in question is itself an agreement in original. It seems that the agreement was drawn up in duplicate. One copy remained with the first party; while the second copy remained with the second party (licensees) . This document cannot be dismissed as a mere copy of an original document. The document in question was liable to appropriate stamp duty. 6. The next contention of Mr. A. N. Bhargava is that this document was never produced before the Court. It is true that the document was filed in court at one stage. But the document never became a part of the evidence. The defendant was anxious to withdraw the document from the record. It was, therefore, urged that the document was never produced before the Court. 7. Section 33 of the Stamp Act provides for impounding of instruments. Sub-Sec. (1) of Section 33 of the Stamp Act States:- "Every person having by law or consents of parties authority to receive evidence ........ before whom any instrument chargeable in his opinion with duty is produced ........ shall if it appears to him that such instrument is not duly stamped, impound the same." 8. In the present case the document came before the Civil Judge, who is authorised by law to receive evidence. He was f the opinion that the instrument has not been duly stamped. So, prima facie he was competent to impound the document. 9. In Ujjal Singh Sunder Singh v. Ahmad Yar Khan, A.I.R. 1936 Lahore 985 it was held that mere filing of document without attempt to tender it in evidence or prove it, does not attract Section 33 of the Stamp Act. In that case the plaintiff filed transliteration of certain documents with the plaint. The court itself directed the plaintiff to produce the original book in which those writings were contained, tore off the relevant pages of the book, and impounded the documents. It will be seen that the facts of that case were peculiar. In that case the plaintiff filed transliteration of certain documents with the plaint. The court itself directed the plaintiff to produce the original book in which those writings were contained, tore off the relevant pages of the book, and impounded the documents. It will be seen that the facts of that case were peculiar. The plaintiff did not voluntarily bring the original document before the court. He was compelled to produce the original document before the court. 10. In `Harjimal and sons v. M/s H.S. Palta Sons, A.I.R. 1947 Lahore 319' it was held that mere production of a document does not amount to a tendering of that document in evidence. That case was decided with reference to Section 29 of the Stamp Act. There was no discussion as regards liability under Section 33 of the Stamp Act. 11. In 'Munshi Ram v. Harnam Singh, A.I.R. 1934 Lahore 637 (1)' a suit was compromised at the first hearing. The original entry in a bahi was not put in evidence. It was held that the document cannot be held to have been acted upon, and the provision of Section 33 and 35 of the Stamp Act have no application. In the present case the document in question was actually tendered by the defendant as evidence in the case. 12. In 'Chunni Lal Burman v. Board of Revenue, U.P., A.I.R. 1951 Alld. 851' it was held that when a document is presented to the Collector under Section 31 of the Stamp Act, no action is permissible under Section 33 of the Act. The Same view was taken by a Full Bench of this Court in 'Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan v. The Deputy Commissioner, A.I.R. 1956 Alld. 453. 13. In those cases the question arose whether a presentation under Section 31 of the Stamp Act attracted proceedings under Section 33 of the Act. No such question arises in the present case. We are not dealing with a situation where a document was presented to the Collector for adjudication of the proper stamp duty under Section 31 of the Act. 14. In 'Balram Das Agarwal v. Kedar Nath, A.I.R. 1958 Alld. 659, a document was voluntarily tendered by a party as part of his evidence. It was not withdrawn when the Inspector of Stamps raised a question regarding the sufficiency of stamp duty. 14. In 'Balram Das Agarwal v. Kedar Nath, A.I.R. 1958 Alld. 659, a document was voluntarily tendered by a party as part of his evidence. It was not withdrawn when the Inspector of Stamps raised a question regarding the sufficiency of stamp duty. It was held that those facts were enough to constitute production within the meaning of the section. It was not further necessary that the document should be proved. 15. In the present case, the document in question was filed by the defendant before the trial court as a part of his evidence. The plaintiff was invited to admit or deny the document. The plaintiff made an endorsement on the back of the document to the effect that he was not admitting the document. The result was that the document remained unproved. But it is clear from these proceedings that the defendant tendered the document as evidence on his behalf. The document was 'produced' within the meaning of Section 33 of the Stamp Act. The learned Civil Judge was, therefore, competent to impound the domument. 16. The learned Civil Judge decided that a sum of Rs. 5,005.50 P. was payable towards deficit duty and penalty. We express no opinion as regards the correct stamp duty and penalty payable on the document. If the defendant is not satisfied with the view taken by the learned Civil Judge, he may agitate this question when the matter goes before the Collector, Mathura for necessary action. We are merely examining the question whether the Civil Judge had jurisdiction to take action of this kind. As explained above, the learned Civil Judge had jurisdiction in the matter. There was no error of procedure. There is, therefore, no room for interference under Section 115, C. P. C. 17. The revision is dismissed with costs.